

**THE
HOUSE OF SELEUCUS**

358-251 BC

Edwin Robert Bevan

1. HELENISM IN THE EAST
2. THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
- 3.- PERDICCAS
- 4.- EVENTS IN THE EAST, 321-316
- 5.- SELEUCUS CONQUERS THE EAST
- 6.- FROM IPSUS TO THE DEATH OF SELEUCUS
7. THE PROBLEMS OF ASIA MINOR
- 8.- ANTIOCHUS I (SOTER)
- 9.- ANTIOCHUS II THEOS
- 10.-SELEUCUS II (KALLINIKOS) AND SELEUCUS III (SOTER).
- 11.- SYRIA
12. BABYLONIA
13. IRAN
14. INDIA
- 15.- THE FIRST YEARS OF ANTIOCHUS III (223-216)
- 16.- ACHAEUS
- 17.- THE RECONQUEST OF THE EAST
- 18.- THE CONQUEST OF PALESTINE
- 19.- THE ADVANCE IN THE WEST
- 20.-THE WAR IN GREECE
- 21.-THE WAR IN ASIA
- 22.-THE INTERVAL OF PEACE
- 23.-ANTIOCHUS IV AND THE CONQUEST OF EGYPT
- 24.-ANTIOCHUS THE GOD MANIFEST
- 25.-ANTIOCHUS AND THE JEWS

**26.-ANTIOCHUS V EUPATOR AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
LYSIAS**

27.-DEMETRIUS THE SAVIOUR

28.-ALEXANDER I AND THE PTOLEMAIC ASCENDANCY

29.-THE CRETAN TYRANNY

30.-ANTIOCHUS SIDETES

31.-THE LAST CONVULSIONS

32. GOVERNMENT, COURT AND ARMY

PREFACE

THERE is much to discourage an attempt to write a history of the Seleucid dynasty. It will be only too apparent how often the narrative must halt for deficiency of materials, how the picture must be disfigured by blanks just where they are most vexatious. I hope, however, that if the reading of this book makes these disabilities felt, the question prompted at the conclusion will be, not “Why has such an attempt been made?” but “How comes it that such a subject has been neglected so long”. If the book itself fails to make clear how closely the subject touches us, as students of the world, as Christians and as Englishmen, it would be absurd to think that a preface could do so. It is indeed surprising, defective though the materials are, that the Seleucid dynasty has not been made as a whole the subject of a special study since the Jesuit Frolich wrote his *Annales compendiarii regum et rerum Syria* in the middle of the eighteenth century (1744). In recent times it has only been treated in works dealing with the “Hellenistic” epoch generally, or in catalogues of the Seleucid coinage, such as Mr. Percy Gardner’s *Coins of the Seleucid Kings of Syria in the British Museum* (1878) and M. Ernest Babelon’s *Rois de Syrie, d’Arménie et de Commagène (Catalogue des monnaies grecques de la Bibliothèque Nationale)*, Paris, 1890. Of works dealing with the history of the Greek world between the death of Alexander and the establishment of the Roman Empire an English reader has but few at his disposal. When one has named the latter part of Thirlwall’s *History of Greece*, some of Professor Mahaffy’s books, *The Story of Alexander’s Empire*, *Greek Life and Thought*, and the translation of the last volume of A. Holm’s *Greek History*, one has, I think, named all that are of account. But Bishop Thirlwall’s *History*, however excellent for its day, was written more than fifty years ago, and the works of Mr. Mahaffy and A. Holm, full as they are of suggestion and of the breath of life, are obliged by their plans to be sketchy. In German we have the standard work of J. G. Droysen, the *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, brought up to date in the French translation of M. A. Bouch-Leclercq (1883-85). This treats the history of the Seleucids to the accession of Antiochus III. We have also in progress B. Niese’s *Geschichte der griechischen und makedoniscshen Staaten*, the second volume of which (1899) carries the history to the end of the reign of Antiochus III, and J. Raerst’s *Geschichte ddes hellenistischen Zeitalters*, of which vol. 1. appeared last year (1901); this, however, only covers the life of Alexander. Besides these regular histories, there are numerous articles and monographs on particular parts of Seleucid history, references to some of which will be found in the footnotes of this book at the appropriate places. One may only name here, as the most important, the articles in Pauly’s *Real-Encyclopaedia der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, re-edited by G. Wissowa (in progress since 1894). One’s obligations to Droysen and Niese are, of course, so constant and extensive, that they must in the majority of cases be taken for granted; it is where one’s own conclusions do not altogether tally on some point that they are in many cases referred to a circumstance which may give the work of a younger writer an appearance of presumption, which is far from the truth. M. Haussoullier’s

book on the history of Miletus under Seleucid rule, which has come out within the last few days, I have not yet been able to read.

I must acknowledge the friendly help given me by Mr. D. G. Hogarth, who was good enough to struggle with some of my MS. when it was in a desperately amorphous stage, and by Mr. G. F. Hill of the British Museum, by whose advice I have been guided in choosing the coins for the plates; I owe to Mr. Hill also my knowledge of the superb bust which has furnished the frontispieces. I have had the advantage of discussing some numismatic questions with Mr. G. Macdonald of Glasgow, who will shortly publish important work on the Seleucid coinage (in vol. III of the *Catalogue of Greek Coins in the Hunterian Collection*). My brother, Professor Ashley Bevan, has given me the benefit of his special knowledge in an attempt to write the Semitic and Persian names on an approximately uniform system.

It is tiresome that at this date it is still necessary to explain one's transcription of Greek. On the principle of not giving forms which no one could pronounce in ordinary conversation without pedantry Seleukos, etc. I have in proper names followed the usage, consecrated by the English literary tradition, of writing the Latin form. In the case of words not proper names I have transliterated the Greek. Surnames of kings and gods are in a sort of intermediate category, and here I have been inconsistent. But it is inevitable that where two distinct systems are in use joins should appear.

E.R. B. November 1902.

CHAPTER I

HELLENISM IN THE EAST

It is a common phrase we hear—"the unchangeable East." And yet nothing strikes the thoughtful traveller in the East more than the contrast between the present and a much greater past whose traces meet him at every turn. He seems to walk through an enormous cemetery. Everywhere there are graves—graves in the lonely hills, where there are no more living, graves not of persons only, but of cities; or again, there are cities not buried, whose relics protrude forlornly above ground like deserted bones. Beside the squalid towns, the nomads' huts, the neglected fields of today are the vestiges of imperial splendour, of palaces and temples, theatres and colonnades, the feet of innumerable people. So utterly gone and extinct is that old world, so alien is the sordid present, that the traveller might almost ask himself whether that is not a world out of all connection with this, whether that other race is not severed from the men he sees by some effacing deluge. And yet there is this very peculiarity in the sensations that a European traveller must experience at the sight of these things, that he becomes aware of a closer kinship between himself and some of these fragments of antiquity than exists between himself and the living people of the land. The ruins in question do not show him the character of some strange and enigmatic mind, like those of Egypt or Mexico, but the familiar classical forms, to which his eye has grown used in his own country, associated in his thought with the civilization from which his own is sprung. What do these things here, among people to whom the spirit that reared and shaped them is utterly unknown? The European traveller might divine in the history which lies behind them something of peculiar interest to himself. It is a part of that history which this book sets out to illuminate—the work accomplished by the dynasty of Seleucus in its stormy transit of the world's stage two thousand years ago.

It is not so much the character of the kings which gives the house of Seleucus its peculiar interest. It is the circumstances in which it was placed. The kings were (to all intents and purposes) Greek kings; the sphere of their empire was in Asia. They were called to preside over the process by which Hellenism penetrated an alien world, coming into contact with other traditions, modifying them and being modified. Upon them that process depended. Hellenism, it is true, contained in itself an expansive force, but the expansion could hardly have gone far unless the political power had been in congenial hands. As a matter of fact, it languished in countries which passed under barbarian rule. It was thus that the Seleucid dynasty in maintaining itself was safeguarding the progress of Hellenism. The interest with which we follow its struggles for aggrandizement and finally for existence does not arise from any peculiar nobility in the motives which actuate them or any exceptional features in their course, but from our knowing what much larger issues are involved. At the break-up of the dynasty we see peoples of non-Hellenic culture, Persians, Armenians, Arabs, Jews, pressing in everywhere to reclaim what Alexander and Seleucus had won. They are only checked

by Hellenism finding a new defender in Rome. The house of Seleucus, however feeble and disorganized in its latter days, stood at any rate in the breach till Rome was ready to enter on the heritage of Alexander.

But what does one mean by Hellenism?

That characteristic which the Greeks themselves chiefly pointed to as distinguishing them from "barbarians" was *freedom*. The barbarians, they said, or at any rate the Asiatics, were by nature slaves. It was a proud declaration. It was based upon a real fact. But it was not absolutely true. Freedom had existed before the Greeks, just as civilization had existed before them. But these two had existed only in separation. *The achievement of the Greeks is that they brought freedom, and civilization into union.*

ELEUTHERIA

WHAT was the special gift of Greece to the world? The answer of the Greeks themselves is unexpected, yet it is as clear as a trumpet: *Eleutheria, Freedom*. The breath of *Eleutheria* fills the sail of Aeschylus' great verse, it blows through the pages of Herodotus, awakens fierce regrets in Demosthenes and generous memories in Plutarch. "Art, philosophy, science," the Greeks say, "yes, we have given all these; but our best gift, from which all the others were derived, was *Eleutheria*."

Now what did they mean by that?

They meant *the Reign of Law*.

Aeschylus says of them in *The Persians* :

ATOSSA. Who is their shepherd over them and lord of their host?

CHORUS. Of no man are they called the slaves or subjects.

Now hear Herodotus amplifying and explaining Aeschylus. "For though they are free, yet are they not free in all things. For they have a lord over them, even Law, whom they fear far more than thy people fear thee. At least they do what that lord biddeth them, and what he biddeth is still the same, to wit that they flee not before the face of any multitude in battle, but keep their order and either conquer or die". It is Demaratos that speaks of the Spartans to King Xerxes.

Eleutheria the Reign of Law or *Nomos*. The word *Nomos* begins with the meaning "custom" or "convention", and ends by signifying that which embodies as far as possible the universal and eternal principles of justice. To write the history of it is to write the history of Greek civilization. The best we can do is to listen to the Greeks

themselves explaining what they were fighting for in fighting for *Eleutheria*. They will not put us off with abstractions.

No one who has read *The Persians* forgets the live and leaping voice that suddenly cries out before the meeting of the ships at Salamis: "Onward, Sons of the Hellenes! Free your country, free your children, your wives, your fathers' tombs and seats of your fathers' gods! All hangs now on your fighting!". This, then, when it came to action, is what the Greeks meant by the Reign of Law. It will not seem so puzzling if you put it in this way: that what they fought for was the right to govern themselves. Here as elsewhere we may observe how the struggle of Greek and Barbarian fills with palpitating life such words as Freedom, which to dull men have been apt to seem abstract and to sheltered people faded. For the Barbarians had not truly laws at all. How are laws possible where "all are slaves save one", and he responsible to nobody? So the fight for Freedom becomes a fight for Law, that no man may become another's master, but all be subject equally to the Law, "whose service is perfect freedom".

That conception was wrought out in the stress of conflict with the Barbarians, culminating in the Persian danger. On that point it is well to prepare our minds by an admission. The quarrel was never a simple one of right and wrong. Persia at least was in some respects in advance of the Greece she fought at Salamis; and not only in material splendour. That is now clear to every historian; it never was otherwise to the Greeks themselves. Possessing or possessed by the kind of imagination which compels a man to understand his enemy, they saw much to admire in the Persians their hardihood, their chivalry, their munificence, their talent for government. The Greeks heard with enthusiasm (which was part at least literary) the scheme of education for young nobles "to ride a horse, to shoot with the bow, and to speak the truth!". In fact the two peoples, although they never realized it, were neither in race nor in speech very remote from one another. But it was the destiny of the Persians to succeed to an empire essentially Asiatic and so to become the leaders and champions of a culture alien to Greece and to us. In such a cause their very virtues made them the more dangerous. Here was no possible compromise. Persia and Greece stood for something more than two political systems; the European mind, the European way of thinking and feeling about things, the soul of Europe was at stake. There is no help for it; in such a quarrel we must take sides.

Let us look first at the Persian side. The phrase I quoted about all men in Persia being slaves save one is not a piece of Greek rhetoric; it was the official language of the empire. The greatest officer of state next to the King was still his "slave" and was so addressed by him. The King was lord and absolute. An inscription at Persepolis reads "I am Xerxes the Great King, the King of Kings, the King of many-tongued countries, the King of this great universe, the Son of Darius the King, the Achaemenid. Xerxes the Great King saith: By grace of Ahuramazda I have made this portal whereon are depicted all the countries".

The Greek orator Aeschines says, "He writes himself Lord of men from the rising to the setting sun". The letter of Darius to Gadatas it exists today is addressed by "Darius the son of Hystaspes, King of Kings". That, as we know, was a favourite title.

The law of the land was summed up in the sentence: “The King may do what he pleases”. Greece saved us from that.

No man might enter the sacred presence without leave. Whoever was admitted must prostrate himself to the ground. The emperor sat on a sculptured throne holding in his hand a sceptre tipped with an apple of gold. He was clad in gorgeous trousers and gorgeous Median robe. On his head was the peaked kitaris girt with the crown, beneath which the formally curled hair flowed down to mingle with the great beard. He had chains of gold upon him and golden bracelets, a golden zone engirdled him, from his ears hung rings of gold. Behind the throne stood an attendant with a fan against the flies and held his mouth lest his breath should touch the royal person. Before the throne stood the courtiers, their hands concealed, their eyelids stained with *kohl*, their lips never smiling, their painted faces never moving. Greece saved us from all that.

The King had many wives and a great harem of concubines one for each day of the year. You remember the Book of Esther. Ahasuerus is the Greek Xerxes. There is in Herodotus a story of that court which, however unauthentic it may be in details, has a clear evidential value. On his return from Greece Xerxes rested at Sardis, the ancient capital of Lydia. There he fell in love with the wife of his brother Masistes. Unwilling to take her by force, he resorted to policy. He betrothed his son Darius to Artaynte, the daughter of Masistes, and took her with him to Susa (the Shushan of Esther), hoping to draw her mother to his great palace there, “where were white, green and blue hangings, fastened with cords of fine linen and purple to silver rings and pillars of marble”. In Susa, however, the King experienced a new sensation and fell in love with Artaynte who returned his affection. Now Amestris the Queen had woven with her own hands a wonderful garment for her lord, who inconsiderately put it on to pay his next visit to Artaynte. Of course Artaynte asked for it, of course in the end she got it, and of course she made a point of wearing it. When Amestris heard of this, she blamed, says Herodotus, not the girl but her mother. With patient dissimulation she did nothing until the Feast of the Birthday of the King, when he cannot refuse a request. Then for her present she asked the wife of Masistes. The King, who understood her purpose, tried to save the victim; but too late. Amestris had in the meanwhile sent the King’s soldiers for the woman; and when she had her in her power *she cut away her breasts and threw them to the dogs, cut off her nose and ears and lips and tongue, and sent her home.*

It may be thought that the Persian monarchy cannot fairly be judged by the conduct of a Xerxes. The reply to this would seem to be that it was Xerxes the Greeks had to fight. But let us choose another case, Artaxerxes II, whose life the gentle Plutarch selected to write because of the mildness and democratic quality which distinguished him from others of his line. Yet the Life of Artaxerxes would be startling in a chronicle of the Italian Renaissance. The story which I will quote from it was probably derived from the Persian History of Ktesias, who was a Greek physician at the court of Artaxerxes. This Ktesias, as Plutarch himself tells us, was a highly uncritical person, but after all, as Plutarch goes on to say, he was not likely to be wrong about things that were happening before his eyes. Here then is the story, a little abridged.

She, that is, Parysatis, the queen-mother, perceived that he, Artaxerxes, the King, had a violent passion for Atossa, one of his daughters. When Parysatis came to suspect this, she made more of the child than ever, and to Artaxerxes she praised her beauty and her royal and splendid ways. At last she persuaded him to marry the maid and make her his true wife, disregarding the opinions and laws (Nomoi) of the Greeks; she said that he himself had been appointed by the god (Ahuramazda) a law unto the Persians and judge of honour and dishonour. Atossa her father so loved in wedlock that, when leprosy had overspread her body, he felt no whit of loathing thereat, but praying for her sake to Hera (Anaitis?) he did obeisance to that goddess only, touching the ground with his hands; while his satraps and friends sent at his command such gifts to the goddess that the whole space between the temple and the palace, which was sixteen stades (nearly two miles) was filled with gold and with silver and with purple and with horses.

Artaxerxes afterwards took into his harem another of his daughters. The religion of Zarathustra sanctioned that. It also sanctioned marriage with a mother. According to Persian notions both Xerxes and Artaxerxes behaved with perfect correctness. The royal blood was too near the divine to mingle with baser currents. There is no particular reason for believing that Xerxes was an exceptionally vicious person, while Artaxerxes seemed comparatively virtuous. It was the system that was all wrong. What are you to expect of a prince, knowing none other law than his own will, and surrounded from his infancy by venomous intriguing women and eunuchs? Babylon alone used to send five hundred boys yearly to serve as eunuchs. I think we may now leave the Persians.

Hear again Phocylides: "A little well-ordered city on a rock is better than frenzied Nineveh". The old poet means a city of the Greek type, and by "well-ordered" he means governed by a law which guarantees the liberties of all in restricting the privileges of each. This, the secret of true freedom, was what the Barbarian never understood. Sperthias and Boulis, two rich and noble Spartans, offered to yield themselves up to the just anger of Xerxes, whose envoys had been flung to their death in a deep water-tank. On the road to Susa they were entertained by the Persian grandee Hydarnes, who said to them: "Men of Sparta, wherefore will ye not be friendly towards the King? Beholding me and my condition, ye see that the King knoweth how to honour good men. In like manner ye also, if ye should give yourselves to the King (for he deemeth that ye are good men), each of you twain would be ruler of Greek lands given you by the King". They answered: "Hydarnes, thine advice as touching us is of one side only, whereof thou hast experience, while the other thou hast not tried. Thou understandest what it is to be a slave, but freedom thou hast not tasted, whether it be sweet or no. For if thou shouldst make trial of it, thou wouldest counsel us to fight for it with axes as well as spears!"

So when Alexander King of Macedon came to Athens with a proposal from Xerxes that in return for an alliance with them he would grant the Athenians new territories to dwell in free, and would rebuild the temples he had burned; and when the Spartan envoys had pleaded with them to do no such thing as the King proposed, the Athenians made reply. We know as well as thou that the might of the Persian is many times greater than ours, so that thou needest not to charge us with forgetting that. Yet shall we fight for freedom as we may. To make terms with the Barbarian seek not thou

to persuade us, nor shall we be persuaded. And now tell Mardonios that Athens says : “So long as the sun keeps the path where now he goeth, never shall we make compact with Xerxes; but shall go forth to do battle with him, putting our trust in the gods that fight for us and in the mighty dead, whose dwelling-places and holy things he hath contemned and burned with fire”.

This was their answer to Alexander; but to the Spartans they said:

“The prayer of Sparta that we make not agreement with the Barbarian was altogether pardonable. Yet, knowing the temper of Athens, surely ye dishonour us by your fears, seeing that there is not so much gold in all the world, nor any land greatly exceeding in beauty and goodness, for which we would consent to join the Mede for the enslaving of Hellas. Nay even if we should wish it, there be many things preventing us : first and most, the images and shrines of the gods burned and cast upon an heap, whom we must needs avenge to the utmost rather than be consenting with the doer of those things; and, in the second place, there is our Greek blood and speech, the bond of common temples and sacrifices and like ways of life, if Athens betrayed these things, it would not be well”.

When I was writing about Greek simplicity I should have remembered this passage. But our present theme is the meaning of Eleutheria. “Our first duty”, say the Athenians, “is to avenge our gods and heroes, whose temples have been desecrated”. Such language must ring strangely in our ears until we have reflected a good deal about the character of ancient religion. To the Greeks of Xerxes’ day religion meant, in a roughly comprehensive phrase, the consecration of the citizen to the service of the State. When the Athenians speak of the gods and heroes, whose temples have been burned, they are thinking of the gods and heroes of Athens, which had been sacked by the armies of Mardonios; and they are thinking chiefly of Athena and Erechtheus.

Now who was Athena? You may read in books that she was “the patron-goddess of Athens”. But she was more than that; she was Athens. You may read that she “represented the fortune of Athens”; but indeed she was the fortune of Athens. You may further read that she “embodied the Athenian ideal”; which is true enough, but how small a portion of the truth! It was not so much what Athens might become, as what Athens was, that moulded and impassioned the image of the goddess. It was the city of today and yesterday that filled the hearts of those Athenians with such a sense of loss and such a need to avenge their Lady of the Acropolis. For that which had been the focus of the old city-life, the dear familiar temple of their goddess, was a heap of stones and ashes mixed with the carrion of the old men who had remained to die there.

As for Erechtheus, he was the great Athenian hero. The true nature of a “hero” is an immensely controversial matter; but what we are concerned with here is the practical question, what the ancients thought. They, rightly or wrongly, normally thought of their “heroes” as famous ancestors. It was as their chief ancestor that the Athenians regarded and worshipped Erechtheus. Cecrops was earlier, but for some reason not so worshipful; Theseus was more famous, but later, and even something of an alien, since he appears to come originally from Troezen. Thus it was chiefly about Erechtheus as “the father of his

people”, rather than about maiden Athena, that all that sentiment, so intense in ancient communities, of the common blood and its sacred obligations entwined itself. This old king of primeval Athens claimed his share of the piety due to the dead of every household, an emotion of so powerful a quality among the unsophisticated peoples that some have sought in it the roots of all religion. It is an emotion hard to describe and harder still to appreciate. Erechtheus was the Son of Earth, that is, really, of Attic Earth; and on the painted vases you see him, a little naked child, being received by Athena from the hands of Earth, a female form half hidden in the ground, who is raising him into the light of day. The effect of all this was to remind the Athenians that they themselves were *autochthones*, born of the soil, and Attic Earth was their mother also. Not only her spiritual children, you understand, nor only fed of her bounty, but very bone of her bone and flesh of her flesh. *Ge Kourotrophos* they called her, “Earth the Nurturer of our Children”. Unite all these feelings, rooted and made strong by time : love of the City (Athena), love of the native and mother Earth (G), love of the unforgotten and unforgetting dead (Erechtheus) unite all these feelings and you will know why the defence of so great sanctities and the avenging of insult against them seemed to Athenians the first and greatest part of Liberty.

So Themistocles felt when after Salamis he said : “It is not we who have wrought this deed, but the gods and heroes, who hated that one man should become lord both of Europe and of Asia; unholy and sinful, who held things sacred and things profane in like account, burning temples and casting down the images of the gods; who also scourged the sea and cast fetters upon it”.

And it is this feeling which gives so singular a beauty and charm to the story of Dikaios.

Dikaios the son of Theokydes, an Athenian then in exile and held in reputation among the Persians, said that at this time, when Attica was being wasted by the footmen of Xerxes and was empty of its inhabitants, it befell that he was with Demaratos in the Thriasian Plain, when they espied a pillar of dust, such as thirty thousand men might raise, moving from Eleusis. And as they marvelled what men might be the cause of the dust, presently they heard the sound of voices, and it seemed to him that it was the ritual-chant to Iacchus. Demaratos was ignorant of the rites that are performed at Eleusis, and questioned him what sound was that. But he said, “Demaratos, of a certainty some great harm will befall the host of the King. For this is manifest, there being no man left in Attica, that these are immortal Voices proceeding from Eleusis to take vengeance for the Athenians and their allies. And if this wrathful thing descend on Peloponnese, the King himself and his land army will be in jeopardy; but if it turn towards the ships at Salamis, the King will be in danger of losing his fleet. This is that festival which the Athenians hold yearly in honour of the Mother and the Maid, and every Athenian, or other Greek that desires it, receives initiation; and the sound thou hearest is the chanting of the initiates”.

Demaratos answered, “Hold thy peace, and tell no man else this tale. For if these thy words be reported to the King, thou wilt lose thine head, and I shall not be able to save thee, I nor any other man. But keep quiet and God will deal with this host”. Thus

did he counsel him. And the dust and the cry became a cloud, and the cloud arose and moved towards Salamis to the encampment of the Greeks. So they knew that the navy of Xerxes was doomed.

Athena, the Mother-Maid Demeter-Persephone with the mystic child Iacchus, Boreas “the son-in-law of Erechtheus”, whose breath dispersed the enemy ships under Pelion and Kaphareus of such sort are “the gods who fight for us” and claim the love and service of Athens in return. It is well to remember attentively this religious element in ancient patriotism, so large an element that one may say with scarcely any exaggeration at all that for the ancients patriotism was a religion. Therefore is Eleutheria, the patriot’s ideal, a religion too. Such instincts and beliefs are interwoven in one sacred indissoluble bond uniting the Gods and men, the very hills and rivers of Greece against the foreign master. Call this if you will a mystical and confused emotion; but do not deny its beauty or underestimate its tremendous force.

But here (lest in discussing a sentiment which may be thought confused we ourselves fall into confusion) let us emphasize a distinction, which has indeed been already indicated. Greek patriotism was as wide as Greece; but on the other hand its intensity was in inverse ratio to its extension. Greek patriotism was primarily a local thing, and it needed the pressure of a manifest national danger to lift it to a wider outlook. That was true in the main and of the average man, although every generation produced certain superior spirits, statesmen or philosophers, whose thought was not particularist. It was this home-savour which gave to ancient patriotism its special salt and pungency. When the Athenians in the speech I quoted say that their first duty is to avenge their gods, they are thinking more of Athens than of Greece. They are thinking of all we mean by “home”, save that home for them was bounded by the ring-wall of the city, not by the four walls of a house.

The wider patriotism of the nation the Greeks openly or in their hearts ranked in the second place. Look again at the speech of the Athenians. First came Athens and her gods and heroes their fathers’ gods; next *To Hellenikon*, that whereby they are not merely Athenians but Hellenes community of race and speech, the common interest in the national gods and their festivals, such as Zeus of Olympia with the Olympian Games, the Delphian Apollo with the Pythian Games. Of course this Hellenic or Panhellenic interest was always there, and in a sense the future lay with it; but never in the times when Greece was at its greatest did it supplant the old intense local loyalties. The movement of Greek civilization is from the narrower to the larger conception of patriotism, but the latter ideal is grounded in the former. Greek love of country was fed from local fires, and even Greek cosmopolitanism left one a citizen, albeit a citizen of the world. So it was with Eleutheria, which enlarged itself in the same sense and with an equal pace.

This development can be studied best in Athens, which was “the Hellas of Hellas”. One finds in Attic literature a passionate Hellenism combined with a passionate conviction that Hellenism finds its best representative in Athens. The old local patriotism survives, but is nourished more and more with new ambitions. New claims, new ideals are advanced. One claim appears very early, if we may believe Herodotus

that the Athenians used it in debate with the men of Tegea before the Battle of Plataea. The Athenians recalled how they had given shelter to the Children of Heracles when all the other Greek cities would not, for fear of Eurystheus; and how again they had rescued the slain of the Seven from the Theban king and buried them in his despite. On those two famous occasions the Athenians had shown the virtue which they held to be most characteristic of Hellenism and especially native to themselves, the virtue which they called "philanthropy" or the love of man. What Heine said of himself, the Athenians might have said: they were brave soldiers in the liberation-war of humanity.

There is a play of Euripides, called *The Suppliant Women*, which deals with the episode of the unburied dead at Thebes. The fragmentary Argument says: *The scene is Eleusis. Chorus of Argive women, mothers of the champions who have fallen at Thebes. The drama is a glorification of Athens.* The eloquent Adrastus, king of Argos, pleads the cause of the suppliant women who have come to Athens to beg the aid of its young king Theseus in procuring the burial of their dead. Theseus is at first disposed to reject their prayer, for reasons of State; he must consider the safety of his own people; when his mother Aithra breaks out indignantly. "Surely it will be said that with unvalorous hands, when thou mightest have won a crown of glory for thy city, thou didst decline the peril and match thyself, ignoble labour, with a savage swine; and when it was thy part to look to helm and spear, putting forth thy might therein, wast proven a coward. To think that son of mine ah, do not so! Seest thou how Athens, whom mocking lips have named unwise, flashes back upon her scorners a glance of answering scorn? Danger is her element. It is the unadventurous cities doing cautious things in the dark, whose vision is thereby also darkened". And the result is that Theseus and his men set out against the great power of Thebes, defeat it and recover the bodies, which with due observance of the appropriate rites they inter in Attic earth.

"To make the world safe for democracy" is something; but Athens never found it safe, perhaps did not believe it could be safe. Ready to take risks, facing danger with a lifting of the heart ... their whole life a round of toils and dangers ... born neither themselves to rest nor to let other people. In such phrases are the Athenians described by their enemies.

A friend has said: "I must publish an opinion which will be displeasing to most; yet (since I think it to be true) I will not withhold it. If the Athenians in fear of the coming peril had left their land, or not leaving it but staying behind had yielded themselves to Xerxes, none would have tried to meet the King at sea". And so all would have been lost. "But as the matter fell out, it would be the simple truth to say that the Athenians were the saviours of Greece. The balance of success was certain to turn to the side they espoused, and by choosing the cause of Hellas and the preservation of her freedom it was the Athenians and no other that roused the whole Greek world save those who played the traitor and under God thrust back the King". And some generations later, Demosthenes, in what might be called the funeral oration of Eleutheria, sums up the claim of Athens in words whose undying splendour is all pride and glory transfiguring the pain of failure and defeat.

“Let no man, I beseech you, imagine that there is anything of paradox or exaggeration in what I say, but sympathetically consider it. If the event had been clear to all men beforehand ... even then Athens could only have done what she did, if her fame and her future and the opinion of ages to come meant anything to her. For the moment indeed it looks as if she had failed; as man must always fail when God so wills it. But had She, who claimed to be the leader of Greece, yielded her claim to Philip and betrayed the common cause, her honour would not be clear ... Yes, men of Athens, ye did right be very sure of that when ye adventured yourselves for the safety and freedom of all; yes, by your fathers who fought at Marathon and Plataea and Salamis and Artemision, and many more lying in their tombs of public honour they had deserved so well, being all alike deemed worthy of this equal tribute by the State, and not only (O Aeschines) the successful, the victorious ...”

Demosthenes was right in thinking that Eleutheria was most at home in Athens. Now Athens, as all men know, was a “democracy”; that is, the general body of the citizens (excluding the slaves and “resident aliens”) personally made and interpreted their laws. Such a constitution was characterized by two elements which between them practically exhausted its meaning; namely, *autonomy* or freedom to govern oneself by one's own laws, and *isonomy* or equality of all citizens before the law. Thus Eleutheria, denned as the Reign of Law, may be regarded as synonymous with Democracy. “The basis of the democratical constitution is Eleutheria”, says Aristotle. This is common ground with all Greek writers, whether they write to praise or to condemn. Thus Plato humorously, but not quite good-humouredly, complains that in Athens the very horses and donkeys knocked you out of their way, so exhilarated were they by the atmosphere of Eleutheria. But at the worst he only means that you may have too much of a good thing. Eleutheria translated as unlimited democracy you may object to; Eleutheria as an ideal or a watchword never fails to win the homage of Greek men. Very early begins that sentimental republicanism which is the inspiration of Plutarch, and through Plutarch has had so vast an influence on the practical affairs of mankind. It appears in the famous drinking-catch beginning “I will bear the sword in the myrtle-branch like Harmodios and Aristogeiton”. It appears in Herodotus. Otanes the Persian (talking Greek political philosophy), after recounting all the evils of a tyrant's reign, is made to say : “But what I am about to tell are his greatest crimes : he breaks ancestral customs, and forces women, and puts men to death without trial”. But the rule of the people in the first place has the fairest name in the world, “isonomy”, and in the second place it does none of those things a despot doeth. In his own person Herodotus writes. “It is clear not merely in one but in every instance how excellent a thing is *equality*”. When the Athenians were under their tyrants they fought no better than their neighbours, but after they had got rid of their masters they were easily superior. Now this proves that when they were held down they fought without spirit, because they were toiling for a master, but when they had been liberated every man was stimulated to his utmost efforts in his own behalf. The same morning confidence in democracy shines in the reply of the constitutional king, Theseus, too to the herald in Euripides' play asking for the “tyrant” of Athens. “You have made a false step in the beginning of your speech, stranger, in seeking a tyrant here. Athens is not ruled by one man, but is free. The people govern by

turns in yearly succession, not favouring the rich but giving him equal measure with the poor”.

The naiveté of this provokes a smile, but it should provoke some reflection too. Why does the rhetoric of liberty move us so little? Partly, I think, because the meaning of the word has changed, and partly because of this new “liberty” we have a super-abundance. No longer does Liberty mean in the first place the Reign of Law, but something like its opposite. Let us recover the Greek attitude, and we recapture, or at least understand, the Greek emotion concerning Eleutheria. Jason says to Medea in Euripides’ play, “Thou dwellest in a Greek instead, of a Barbarian land, and hast come to know Justice and the use of Law without favour to the strong”. The most “romantic” hero in Greek legend recommending the conventions!

This, however, is admirably and characteristically Greek. The typical heroes of ancient story are alike in their championship of law and order. I suppose the two most popular and representative were Heracles and Theseus. Each goes up and down Greece and Barbary destroying *hybristai*, local robber-kings, strong savages, devouring monsters, ill customs and every manner of “lawlessness” and “injustice”. In their place each introduces Greek manners and government, Law and Justice. It was this which so attracted Greek sympathy to them and so excited the Greek imagination. For the Greeks were surrounded by dangers like those which Heracles or Theseus encountered. If they had not to contend with supernatural hydras and triple-bodied giants and half-human animals, they had endless pioneering work to do which made such imaginings real enough to them; and men who had fought with the wild Thracian tribes could vividly sympathize with Heracles in his battle with the Thracian “king”, Diomedes, who fed his fire-breathing horses with the flesh of strangers. Nor was this preference of the Greeks for heroes of such a type merely instinctive; it was reasoned and conscious. The “mission” of Heracles, for example, is largely the theme of Euripides’ play which we usually call *Hercules Furens*. A contemporary of Euripides, the sophist Hippias of Elis, was the author of a too famous apologue, *The Choice of Heracles*, representing the youthful hero making the correct choice between Laborious Virtue and Luxurious Vice.

Another Euripidean play, *The Suppliant Women*, as we have seen, reveals Theseus in the character of a conventional, almost painfully constitutional, sovereign talking the language of Lord John Russell. As for us, our sympathies are ready to flow out to the picturesque defeated monsters, the free Centaurs galloping on Pelion, the cannibal Minotaur lurking in his Labyrinth. But then our bridals are not liable to be disturbed by raids of wild horsemen from the mountains, nor are our children carried off to be dealt with at the pleasure of a foreign monarch. People who meet with such experiences get surprisingly tired of them. There is a figure known to mythologists as a Culture Hero. He it is who is believed to have introduced law and order and useful arts into the rude community in which he arose. Such heroes were specially regarded, and the reverence felt for them measures the need of them. Thus in ancient Greece we read of Prometheus and Palamedes, the Finns had their Wainomoinen, the Indians of North America their Hiawatha. Think again of historical figures like Charlemagne and Alfred, like Solon and Numa Pompilius, even Alexander the Great. A peculiar romance clings about their names. Why? Only because to people fighting what must often have seemed

a losing battle against chaos and night the institution and defence of law and order seemed the most romantic thing a man could do. And so it was.

Such a view was natural for them. Whether it shall seem natural to us depends on the fortunes of our civilization. On that subject we may leave the prophets to rave, and content ourselves with the observation that there are parts of Europe today in which many a man must feel himself in the position of Roland fighting the Saracens or Aetius against the Huns. As for ourselves, how-ever confident we may feel, we shall be foolish to be over-confident; for we are fighting a battle that has no end. The Barbarian we shall have always with us, on our frontiers or in our own breasts. There is also the danger that the prize of victory may, like Angelica, escape the strivers' hands. Already perhaps the vision which inspires us is changing. I am not concerned to attack the character of that change but to interpret the Greek conception of civilization, merely as a contribution to the problem. To the Greeks, then, civilization is the slow result of a certain immemorial way of living. You cannot get it up from books, or acquire it by imitation; you must absorb it and let it form your spirit, you must live in it and live through it; and it will be hard for you to do this, unless you have been born into it and received it as a birth-right, as a mould in which you are cast as your fathers were. "Oh, but we must be more progressive than that". Well, we are not; on the contrary the Greeks were very much the most progressive people that ever existed intellectually progressive, I mean of course; for are we not talking about civilization?

The Greek conception, therefore, seems to work. I think it works, and worked, because the tradition, so cherished as it is, is not regarded as stationary. It is no more stationary to the Greeks than a tree, and a tree whose growth they stimulated in every way. It seems a fairly common error, into which Mr. Belloc and Mr. Chesterton sometimes fall, for modern champions of tradition to over-emphasize its stability. There has always been the type of "vinous, loudly singing, unsanitary men", which Mr. Wells has called the ideal of these two writers; he is the foundational type of European civilization. But it almost looks as if Mr. Belloc and Mr. Chesterton were entirely satisfied with him. They want him to stay on his small holding, and eat quantities of ham and cheese, and drink quarts of ale, and hate rich men and politicians, and be perfectly parochial and illiterate. But Hellenism means, simply an effort to work on this sound and solid stuff; it is not content to leave him as he is; it strives to develop him, but to develop him within the tradition; to transform him from an Aristophanic demesman into an Athenian citizen. But Mr. Belloc and Mr. Chesterton are Greek in this, that they have constantly the sense of fighting an endless and doubtful battle against strong enemies that would destroy whatever is most necessary to the soul of civilized men. *Well I know in my heart and soul that sacred Ilium must fall, and Priam, and the folk of Priam with the good ashen spear . . . yet before I die will I do a deed for after ages to hear of!*

Triptolemus starting on his mission of educating the whole of Greece in the art of agriculture. Side A from an Attic red-figure krater with ear-handles, ca. 460 BC. (LOUVRE)



We, like the Greeks, are apt to speak in our loose way of the Asiatic or the “Oriental,” reflecting on his servility, his patience, his reserve. But in so doing we lose sight of that other element in the East which presents in many ways the exact opposite of these characteristics. Before men had formed those larger groups which are essential to civilization they lived in smaller groups or tribes, and after the larger groups had been formed the tribal system in mountain and desert went on as before. We can still see in the East today many peoples who have not emerged from this stage.

The men of these primitive tribes are free. And the reason is plain. In proportion to the smallness of the group the individual has greater influence. Where the whole community can meet for discussion, the general sense is articulate and compulsive. The chronic wars between clan and clan make all the men fighters from their youth up. On the other hand civilization is promoted by every widening of intercourse, everything which fuses the isolated tribal groups, which resolves them in a larger body. The loss of freedom was the price which had to be paid for civilization.

It was in the great alluvial plains, where there are few natural barriers and a kind soil made life easy, along the Nile and the Euphrates, that men first coalesced in larger combinations, exchanging their old turbulent freedom for a life of peace and labour under the laws of a common master. The Egyptians and Babylonians had already

reached the stage of civilization and despotism at the first dawn of history. But in the case of others a record of the transition remains. The example of the great kings who ruled on the Nile and the Euphrates set up a mark for the ambition of strong men among the neighbouring tribes. The military power which resulted from the gathering of much people under one hand showed the tribes the uses of combination. Lesser kingdoms grew up in other lands with courts which copied those of Memphis and Babylon on a smaller scale.

The moment of transition is depicted for us in the case of Israel. Here we see the advantages of the tribal and the monarchical system deliberately weighed in the assembly of the people. On the one hand there is the great gain in order and military efficiency promised by a concentration of power: "We will have a king over us; that we also may be like all the nations; and that our king may judge us, and go out before us, and fight our battles." On the other hand there is the sacrifice entailed upon the people by the compulsion to maintain a court, the tribute of body-service and property, the loss, in fact, of liberty.

By the time that Hellenism had reached its full development the East, as far as the Greeks knew it, was united under an Iranian Great King. The Iranian Empire had swallowed up the preceding Semitic and Egyptian Empires, and in the vast reach of the territory which the Persian king ruled in the fifth century before Christ he exceeded any potentate that this world had yet seen. He seemed to the Greeks to have touched the pinnacle of human greatness. And yet monarchy was a comparatively new thing among the Iranians. The time when they were still in the tribal stage was within memory. Even now the old tribal organization in Iran was not done away; it was simply overshadowed by the preeminent power attained by the house of Achaemenes, whose conquests beyond the limits of Iran had given it the absolute disposal of vast populations. Tradition, reproduced for us by Herodotus, still spoke of the beginnings of kingship in Iran. The main features of that story are probably true; the ambition excited in Deioces the Mede after his people had freed themselves from the yoke of Assyria; the weariness of their intestine feuds, which made the Medes acquiesce in common subjection to one great man; the strangeness of the innovation when a Mede surrounded himself with the pomp and circumstance which imitated the court of Nineveh. After the False Smerdis was overthrown it was even seriously debated, Herodotus assures us, by the heads of the Persian clans, whether it would not be a good thing to abolish the kingship and choose, some form of association more consonant with ancestral customs, in which the tribal chiefs or the tribal assemblies should be the ruling authority.

As an alternative, then, to the rude freedom of primitive tribes, the world, up to the appearance of Hellenism, seemed to present only unprogressive despotism. Some of the nations, like the Egyptians and Babylonians, had been subject to kings for thousands of years. And during all that time there had been no advance. Movement there had been, dynastic revolutions, foreign conquests, changes of fashion in dress, in art, in religion, but no progress. If anything there had been decline. Between the king and his subjects the relation was that of master and slave. The royal officials were the king's creatures, responsible to him, not to the people. He had at his command an army which gave him transcendent material power. Upon the people he made two main demands, and they on

their part expected two main things from him. He took firstly their persons, when he chose, for his service, and secondly as much of their property as he thought good. And what they asked of him in return was firstly external peace, since he alone by his army could repel the foreign invader or the wild tribes of hill and desert, and secondly internal peace, which he secured by being, himself or through his deputies, the judge of their disputes.

It was under these circumstances that the character we now describe as “Oriental” was developed. To the husbandman or merchant it never occurred that the work of government was any concern of his; he was merely a unit in a great aggregate, whose sole bond of union was its subjection to one external authority; for him, while kings went to war, it was enough to make provision for himself and his children in this life, or make sure of good things in the next, and let the world take its way. It was not to be wondered at that he came to find the world uninteresting outside his own concerns—his bodily wants and his religion. He had to submit perforce to whatever violences or exactions the king or his ministers chose to put upon him; he had no defense but concealment; and he developed the bravery, not of action, but of endurance, and an extraordinary secretiveness. He became the Oriental whom we know.

Then with the appearance of Hellenism twenty-five centuries ago there was a new thing in the earth. The Greeks did not find themselves shut up to the alternative of tribal rudeness or cultured despotism. They passed from the tribal stage to a form of association which was neither the one nor the other—the city-state. They were not absolutely the first to develop the city-state; they had been preceded by the Semites of Syria. Before Athens and Sparta were heard of, Tyre and Sidon had spread their name over the Mediterranean. But it was not till the city-state entered into combination with the peculiar endowments of the Hellenes that it produced a new and wonderful form of culture.

The race among whom the city-state bore this fruit was not spread over rich plains, like those in which the older civilizations had their seat. It was broken into a hundred fragments and distributed among mountain valleys and islands. These natural divisions tended to withhold its groups from fusion, whilst the sea, which ran in upon it everywhere, in long creeks and bays, invited it to intercourse and enterprise. Under these circumstances the original tribal villages grouped themselves upon centres which constituted cities. For so large a number of men to enter upon so close cooperation as the city-state implied had not been possible under the old tribal system. But their doing so was a pre-requisite for that elaboration of life which we call civilized. At the same time the city was not too large for the general voice of its members to find collective expression. It was a true instinct which led the Greek republics to be above all things jealous of their independence to fret at any restraint by which their separate, sovereignty was sacrificed in some larger combination.

Hellenism, as that culture may most conveniently be called, was the product of the Greek city-state. How far it was due, to the natural aptitudes of the Greeks, and how far to the form of political association under which they lived, need not now be discussed. It will be enough to indicate the real connection between the form of the

Greek state anti the characteristics which made Hellenism different from any civilization which before had been.

We may discern in Hellenism a moral and an intellectual side; it implied *a certain type of character*, and it implied *a certain cast of ideas*. It was of the former that the Greek was thinking when he distinguished himself as a free man from the barbarian. The authority he obeyed was not an external one. He had grown up with the consciousness of being the member of a free state, a state in which he had an individual value, a share in the sovereignty. This gave him a self-respect strange to those Orientals whom he smiled to see crawling prostrate before the thrones of their kings. It gave him an energy of will, a power of initiative impossible to a unit of those driven multitudes. It gave his speech a directness and simplicity which disdained courtly circumlocutions and exaggerations. It gave his manners a striking naturalness and absence of constraint.

But he was the member of a *state*. Freedom meant for him nothing which approached the exemption of the individual from his obligations to, and control by, the community. The life of the Greek citizen was dominated by his duty to the state. The state claimed him, body and spirit, and enforced its claims, not so much by external rewards and penalties, as by implanting its ideals in his soul, by fostering a sense of honour and a sense of obligation. Corruption and venality have always been the rule in governments of the Oriental pattern. The idea of the state as an object of devotion, operating on the main body of citizens and in the secret passages of their lives—this was a new thing in the Greek republics. It was this which gave force to the laws and savour to the public debates. It was this as much as his personal courage which made the citizen-soldier obey cheerfully and die collectedly in his place. It is easy to point to lapses from this ideal in the public men of ancient Greece; even Miltiades, Themistocles, and Demosthenes had not always clean hands. But no one would contend that the moral qualities which the free state tended to produce were universal among the Greeks or wholly absent among the barbarians. It is a question of degree. Without a higher standard of public honesty, a more cogent sense of public duty than an Oriental state can show, the free institutions of Greece could not have worked for a month.

The Hellenic character no sooner attained distinct being than the Greek attracted the attention of the older peoples as a force to be reckoned with. Kings became aware that a unique race of soldiers, upon which they could draw, had appeared. In fact, the first obvious consequence of the union of independence and discipline in the Greek, as it affected the rest of the world, was to make him the military superior of the men of other nations. At the very dawn of Greek history, in the seventh century B.C., Pharaoh Necho employed Greek mercenaries, and in recognition of their services (perhaps on that field where King Josiah of Judah fell) dedicated his corslet at a Greek shrine. The brother of the poet Alcaeus won distinction in the army of the king of Babylon. Under the later Egyptian kings the corps of Greek mercenaries counted for much more than the native levies. The Persian conquest, which overspread Western Asia in the latter part of the sixth century and the beginning of the fifth, was checked on Greek soil, and the armies of the Great King rolled back with appalling disaster. By the end of the century the Persians had come, like the Egyptians, to place their main reliance on Greek mercenaries. The superiority of the Greeks was displayed openly by the Ten Thousand

and the campaigns of Agesilaus. From this time it was clear that if the Hellenic race could concentrate its forces in any political union it might rule the world.

Besides a certain type of character, a new intellectual type was presented by the Greeks. The imagination of the Greeks was perhaps not richer, their feeling not more intense than that of other peoples—in the religious sentiment, for instance, we might even say the Greek stood behind the Oriental; but the imagination and feeling of the Greeks were more strictly regulated. The Greek made a notable advance in seeing the world about him as it really was. He wanted to understand it as a rational whole. The distinguishing characteristic which marks all the manifestations of his mind, in politics, in philosophy, in art, is his critical faculty, his rationalism, or, to put the same thing in another way, his bent of referring things to the standard of reason and reality. He was far more circumspect than the Oriental in verifying his impressions. He could not always take a traditional opinion or custom for granted and rest satisfied with the declaration, “So it was from the beginning,” or “Such was the manner of our fathers.” His mind was the more emancipated from the tyranny of custom that it might be the more subjected to the guidance of truth.

And here again we may see the influence of his political environment. There is nothing in a despotism to quicken thought; the obedience demanded is unreasoning; the principles of government are locked in the king’s breast. In a Greek city it was far otherwise. In the democracies especially the citizens were all their lives accustomed to have alternative policies laid before them in the Assembly, to listen to the pleadings in the law-courts, to follow opposed arguments. What one moment appeared true was presently probed and convicted of fallacy. Institutions were justified or impugned by reference to the large principles of the Beautiful or the Profitable. The Greek lived in an atmosphere of debate; the market-place was a school of gymnastic for the critical faculty. Plato could only conceive of the reasoning process as a dialogue.

Under these circumstances, in spite of the natural reverence for accepted custom and belief, in spite of the opposition of the more conservative tempers—an opposition which we still hear grumbling throughout Greek literature—the critical faculty came increasingly into play. It came into all spheres of activity as an abiding principle of progress. Of progress, as opposed to stagnation, because it held the established on its trial; of progress, as opposed to random movement, because it regulated the course of innovation. The state, in which this faculty operates, shows the characteristic of a living organism, continuous modification according to environment.

The critical faculty, the reason—in one light it appears as the *sense of proportion*; the sense of proportion in politics, “common sense,” balance of judgment; the sense of proportion in behavior, which distinguishes what is seemly for the occasion and the person concerned; the sense of proportion in art, which eliminates the redundant and keeps each detail in its due subordination to the whole. How prominent this aspect of the critical faculty was with the Greeks their language itself shows; *reason and proportion* are expressed by a common word. “The Hellenes” Polybius says, “differ mainly in this respect from other men, that they keep to what is due in each case.” “Nothing in excess,” is the most characteristic piece of Hellenic wisdom.

We have arrived at this, that the distinctive quality of the Hellenic mind is a rationalism, which on one side of it is a grasp of the real world, and on another side a sense of proportion. How true this is in the sphere of art, literary or plastic, no one acquainted with either needs to be told. We can measure the bound forward made in human history by the Greeks between twenty and twenty-five centuries ago if we compare an Attic tragedy with the dreary verbiage of the Avesta or the relics of Egyptian literature recovered from temple and tomb. Or contrast the Parthenon, a single thought in stone, a living unity exquisitely adjusted in all its parts, with the unintelligent piles of the Egyptians, mechanically uniform, impressive from bulk, from superficial ornaments and the indescribable charm of the Nile landscape.

But notable as were the achievements of the Greeks in the sphere of art, still more momentous for mankind was the impulse they gave to science. With them a broader daylight began to play upon all the relations of human life and the appearances of nature. They submitted man and the world to a more systematic investigation, they thought more methodically, more sanely, about things than any people had done before them. In process of doing so they brought into currency a large number of new ideas, of new canons of judgment, embodied in systems of philosophy, in floating theories, in the ordinary language of the street. The systems of philosophy were, of course, as systems, provisional, inadequate, and full of crudities; each of them had ultimately to be discarded by mankind; but many of the ideas which made up their fabric, much of the material, so to speak, used in their construction, survived as of permanent value, and was available for sounder combinations hereafter. And secondly, besides a body of permanently valid ideas which represented the finished product of the Greek method of inquiry, the Greeks transmitted that method itself to the world. We can see today that the method, in the form to which the Greeks brought it, was as imperfect as the results it yielded. But it was nevertheless an advance on anything which had gone before. The Greek stood far behind the modern scientific inquirer in his comprehension of the means to extort her secrets from Nature, but he arrived at a juster conception of reasoning, he dealt more soberly with evidence, than it had been within the power of mankind up till his time to do. And, imperfect as the method was, it contained within itself the means for its own improvement. Men once set thinking on the right lines would carry the process farther and farther. Hellenism was great in its potency; in its promise it was far greater.

We have attempted to explain what we mean by Hellenism, to place in a clear light what distinguished the civilization developed in the city-republics of the Greeks between the tenth and fourth centuries before Christ from all that the world had yet known. It remains to consider what the fortunes of that civilization, once introduced into the world, had been. It had been developed by the city-state in virtue of certain qualities which this form of association possessed, but which were not possessed by the Oriental despotisms—comparative restriction of size, internal liberty, and the habit of free discussion. But by the fourth century before Christ it had become apparent that these very qualities carried with them grave defects. The bitterness of faction in these free cities reached often appalling lengths and led to terrible atrocities. Almost everywhere the energies of the race were frittered in perpetual discord. The critical faculty itself

began to work destructively upon the institutions which had generated it. The imperfections of the small state were increasingly exposed, and yet the smallness appeared necessary to freedom. Also the Greeks now suffered for their backwardness in the matter of religion. The Jews were left at the fall of their state still in presence of a living God, who claimed their allegiance; the Greek religion was so damaged by the play of criticism that at the decay of civic morality the Greeks had no adequate religious tradition to fall back upon.

Again, the separation of the race into a number of small states, while it had produced an incomparable soldiery, prevented the formation of a great military power. It was in vain that idealists preached an allied attack of all the Greeks upon the great barbarian empire which neighbored them on the east. The Persian king had nothing serious to fear from the Greek states; each of them was ready enough to take his gold in order to use it against its rivals, and the dreaded soldiery he enrolled by masses in his own armies.

It was in the union of a great force under a single control that Oriental monarchy was strong. Could Hellenism remedy the defects of disunion by entering into some alliance with the monarchic principle? Would it be untrue to itself in doing so? What price would it have to pay for worldly supremacy? These problems confronted Greek politicians in a concrete form when, in the fourth century before Christ, MACEDONIA entered as a new power upon the scene.



Macedonia was a monarchic state, but not one of the same class as the Persian Empire, or the empires which had preceded the Persian. It belonged rather to those which have but half emerged from the tribal stage. There had been an “heroic” monarchy of a like kind in Greece itself, as we see it in the Homeric poems. It resembled still more closely perhaps the old Persian kingdom, as it had been when Cyrus went forth conquering and to conquer. The bulk of the people was formed of a vigorous peasantry who still retained the rude virtues engendered by tribal freedom, and showed towards the King himself an outspoken independence of carriage. The King was but the chief of one of the great families, of one which had been raised by earlier chiefs to a position of power and dignity above the rest. The other houses, whose heads had once been themselves little kings, each in his own mountain region, now formed a hereditary nobility which surrounded, and to some extent controlled, the throne. Hut this comparative independence did not impair the advantage, from the military point of view, which came from the concentration of power in one hand. When the King resolved to go to war he could call out the whole ban of the kingdom, and his people were bound to obey his summons. The nobles came to the field on horse, his “Companions” they were called; the peasantry on foot, his “Foot-companions”. The

stout pikemen of Macedonia saw in their King not their hereditary chief only, but a good comrade; and the sense of this made them follow him, we may believe, with a prouder and more cheerful loyalty in those continual marchings to and fro across the Illyrian and Thracian hills.

Philip the Second of Macedonia, having made his kingdom the strongest power of the Balkan peninsula, presented himself to the Hellenes as their captain-general against barbarism. There were many considerations to make this offer one which the Hellenes could with dignity accept. In the first place, the Macedonians, though not actually Hellenes, were probably close of kin, a more backward branch of the same stock. In the second place, Hellenism itself had penetrated largely into Macedonia. Although it had required a certain set of political conditions to produce Hellenism, a great part of Hellenism, once developed—the body of ideas, of literary and artistic tastes—was communicable to men who had not themselves lived under those conditions. We find, therefore, that by the fourth century B.C. Hellenism was already exerting influence outside its own borders. The Phoenicians of Cyprus, for example, the Lycians and Carians were partially Hellenized. But in no country was the Hellenic culture more predominant than in the neighbouring Macedonia. The ruling house claimed to be of good Greek descent and traced its pedigree to the old kings of Argos. The court was a gathering-place of Greek literati, philosophers, artists, and adventurers. Euripides, we remember, had ended his days there under King Archelaus. Philip, who had spent a part of his youth as a hostage in Thebes, was well conversant with Greek language and literature. The man in whom Greek wisdom reached its climax was engaged to form the mind of his son. Alexander's own ideals were drawn from the heroic poetry of Greece. The nobility as a whole took its colour from the court; we may suppose that Greek was generally understood among them. Their names are, with a few exceptions, pure Greek.

Should the Hellenes accept Philip's terms—confederation under Macedonian suzerainty against the barbaric world? In most of the Greek states this question, the crucial question of the day, was answered Yes and No with great fierceness and partisan eloquence. The No has found immortal expression in Demosthenes. But history decided for the affirmative. Philip, who offered, had the power to compel.

So Hellenism enters on quite a new chapter of its history. On the one hand that separate independence of the states which had conditioned its growth was doomed; on the other hand a gigantic military power arose, inspired by Hellenic ideas. The break-up of the Macedonian Empire at Alexander's death, it is true, gave a breathing space to Greek independence in its home, and imperilled the ascendancy of Greek culture in the newly conquered fields. But for a long time the ruling powers in the Balkan peninsula, in Asia Minor, Egypt, Babylon, Irak, the lands of the Indus—of all those countries which had been the seats of Aryan and Semitic civilization—continued to be monarchic courts, *Greek in speech and mind*.

Then when the Greek dynasties dwindle, when the sceptre seems about to return to barbarian hands, Rome, the real successor of Alexander, having itself taken all the mental and artistic culture it possesses from the Greeks, steps in to lend the strength of

its arm to maintain the supremacy of Greek civilization in the East. India certainly is lost, Iran is lost, to Hellenism, but on this side of the Euphrates its domain is triumphantly restored. Hellenism, however, had still to pay the price. The law of ancient history was inexorable: a large state must be a monarchic state. Rome in becoming a world-power became a monarchy.

This, then, is the second chapter of the history of Hellenism: it is propagated and maintained by despotic kings, first Macedonian, and then Roman. The result is as might have been expected. Firstly, Hellenism is carried far beyond its original borders: the vessel is broken and the long-secreted elixir poured out for the nations. On the other hand the internal development of Hellenism is arrested. Death did not come all at once. It was not till the Mediterranean countries were united under the single rule of Rome that the Greek states lost all independence of action. Scientific research under the patronage of kings made considerable progress for some centuries after Alexander, now that new fields were thrown open by Macedonian and Roman conquests to the spirit of inquiry which had been developed among the Hellenes before their subjection. But philosophy reached no higher point after Aristotle; the work of the later schools was mainly to popularize ideas already reached by the few. Literature and art declined from the beginning of the Macedonian empire, both being thenceforth concerned only with the industrious study and reproduction of the works of a freer age, except for some late blooms (like the artistic schools of Rhodes and Pergamum) into which the old sap ran before it dried. Learning, laborious, mechanical, unprogressive, took the place of creation. As for the moral side of Hellenism, we find a considerable amount of civic patriotism subsisting for a long time both in the old Greek cities and in the new ones which sprang up over the East. When patriotism could no longer take the form of directing and defending the city as a sovereign state it could still spend money and pains in works of benevolence for the body of citizens or in making the city beautiful to see. The ruins of Greek building scattered over Nearer Asia belong by an enormous majority to Roman times. Athens itself was more splendid in appearance under Hadrian than under Pericles. But even this latter-day patriotism gradually died away.

It was not only that the monarchic principle was in itself unfavourable to the development of Greek culture. The monarchy became more and more like those despotisms of the older world which it had replaced. We know how quickly Alexander assumed the robe and character of the Persian king. The earlier Roman Emperors were restrained by the traditions of the Republic, but these became obsolete, and the court of Diocletian or of Constantine differed nothing from the type shown by the East.

It is an early phase of this second chapter of Hellenic history that we watch in the career of the Seleucid dynasty. By far the largest part of Alexander's empire was for some time under the sway of Seleucus and his descendants, and that the part containing the seats of all the older civilizations, except the Egyptian. It was under the aegis of the house of Seleucus that Hellenism struck roots during the third century before Christ in all lands from the Mediterranean to the Pamir. We see Hellenic civilization everywhere, still embodied in city-states, but subject city-states, at issue with the two antagonistic principles of monarchy and of barbarism, but compelled to make a compromise with the first of these to save itself from the second. We see the dynasty that stands for

Hellenism grow weaker and more futile, till the Romans, when they roll back the Armenian invasion from Syria, find only a shadow of it surviving. Lastly, we can see in the organization, and institutions of the Roman Empire much that was taken over from the Hellenistic kingdoms which went before.

We have tried to define the significance of the Seleucid epoch by showing the place it holds in ancient history. But we should have gained little, if we stopped short there, if we failed to inquire in what relation the development of ancient history in its sum stands to the modern world of which we form part. The Hellenism of which ancient history makes everything, developed in the city-republics of Greece, propagated by Alexander, sustained by the Seleucids and Rome, and involved in the fall of the Roman Empire—what has become of it in the many centuries since then?

No antithesis is more frequent in the popular mouth today than that between East and West, between the European spirit and the Oriental. We are familiar with the superiority, the material supremacy, of European civilization. When, however, we analyse this difference of the, European, when we state what exactly the qualities are in which the Western presents such a contrast to the Oriental, they turn out to be just those which distinguished the ancient Hellene from the Oriental of his day. On the moral side the citizen of the modern European state, like the citizen of the old Greek city, is conscious of a share in the government, is distinguished from the Oriental by a higher political morality (higher, for all its lapses), a more manly self-reliance, and a greater power of initiative. On the intellectual side it is the critical spirit which lies at the basis of his political sense, of his conquests in the sphere of science, of his sober and mighty literature, of his body of well-tested ideas, of his power of consequent thought. And whence did the modern European derive these qualities? The moral part of them springs in large measure from the same source as in the case of the Greeks—political freedom; the intellectual part of them is a direct legacy from the Greeks. *What we call the Western spirit in our own day is really Hellenism reincarnate.*

Our habit of talking about “East” and “West” as if these were two species of men whose distinctive qualities were derived from their geographical position, tends to obscure the real facts from us. The West has by no means been always “Western.” Before the Hellenic culture came into existence the tribal system went on for unknown ages in Europe, with no essential difference from the tribal system as it went on, and still goes on, in Asia. Then, in the East, the tendencies which promoted larger combinations led to monarchy, as the only principle on which such combinations could be formed. Asia showed its free tribes and its despotic kingdoms as the only two types of association. The peoples of South Europe seemed for a time to have escaped this dilemma, to have established a third type. The third type, indeed, subsisted for a while, and generated the Hellenic spirit; but the city-state proved after all too small. These peoples had in the end to accept monarchy. And the result was the same in Europe as it had been in Asia. If before the rise of Hellenism, Europe had resembled the Asia of the free tribes, under the later Roman Empire it resembled the Asia which popular thought connects with the term “Oriental,” the Asia of the despotic monarchies. The type of character produced by monarchy was in both continents the same. In Greece and Italy

under Constantine there was the same lack of spirit, of originality, of political interest; men's interests were absorbed by the daily business and theological controversy.

The result was the same in the West, one important respect left out of count. Sterile, fixed, encased in an old literature, the intellectual products of Hellenic thought remained—remained as the dry seed of a dead plant, which may yet break into life again in a congenial soil. By the irruption of the Northern races, which began the Middle Ages, Europe went back again to times like those before Hellenism was; again there was the rude freedom of fighting tribes, and from this kingdoms emerged, near enough to the tribal state to retain its virtues—kingdoms resembling the Macedonian. And all through the chaos the seeds of the old culture were carefully nursed: yes, even to some small extent bore fruit in a few ruling minds. Then comes the process we call the Renaissance, the springing of the seed to life again, the seed which could only grow and thrive in the soil of freedom. The problem which had been insoluble to the ancient world—how to have a state, free and civilized, larger than a city—has been solved by the representative system, by the invention of printing which enormously facilitated the communication of thought, and still more completely in recent times by the new forces of steam and electricity that have been called into play.

Men at the Renaissance took up the thoughts of the Greeks again where they had dropped them. The old literature was no longer simply a thing for parrot-learning; it was the seed from which other literatures, other philosophies and sciences, wider and more mature than the ancient, but identical in germ, sprang into being. “We are all Greeks,” Shelley truly said. The Renaissance was four or five centuries ago; it is only so long that the “Western” spirit has been at work in its new incarnation, and it has achieved some notable results. We do not yet see whereto this thing will grow.

There is one particular part of the activity of Western civilization since the Renaissance which lends its principal interest to the history of the Macedonian kings in the East—the extension of European rule in the East of today. It was a consequence of the smallness of the ancient free state that it could not compete with the great monarchies of the world in military power. But this limitation has been done away, and as a result the states of Western culture have risen to a position of immeasurable military superiority. This is one of the capital features of modern history. Instead, therefore, of the internal development and outward expansion of rational culture being processes which are mutually exclusive, they have in these centuries gone on side by side. Free states have been able, without prejudice to their freedom, to bring under their rule the more backward races of the earth. Today an enormous part of the East is under the direct government of Europeans; all of it is probably destined (unless it can assimilate the dominant civilization, as the Japanese appear to have done) to be so at no distant date.

We may say then with perfect truth that the work being done by European nations, and especially by England, in the East is the same work which was begun by Macedonia and Rome, and undone by the barbarian floods of the Middle Ages. The civilization which perished from India with the extinction of the Greek kings has come back again in the British official. What will the effect be? An experiment of entralling

interest is being tried before our eyes. Those who predict its issue by some easy commonplace about the eternal distinction of “East” and “West” have given inadequate consideration to the history of East and West. Hellenism has as yet had very little time to show what it can do.

Whatever the issue be, a peculiar interest must be felt by Englishmen in those Western kings who ruled in Asia twenty centuries ago. And it is not only the continuity of Hellenic culture which links their days to ours. Hellenism lives again, we have said, in the civilization of modern Europe, but Hellenism is not the only animating principle of that civilization. Our religion came to us from Zion. Israel holds as unique a position in the world’s history as Greece. It was under the Macedonian kings in the East twenty centuries ago that Hellenism and Israel first came into contact, under the Ptolemies into more or less friendly contact, under the Seleucids into contact very far from friendly, resulting in wild explosion, which shook the fabric of Seleucid power. It is a meeting of very momentous significance in the history of man, the first meeting of two principles destined to achieve so much in combination. The lands over which the house of Seleucus bore rule, the lands which it overspread with Greek speech and culture, were the lands which the faith of Christ first leavened; in its royal city the word “Christian” was first uttered. Antioch the cradle of the first Gentile church.

CHAPTER II

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Western Asia—all that group of countries which by the last turn of destiny in 323 B.C. had fallen to the Macedonian chiefs to be dealt with at their pleasure—had been the soil of many histories, wonderful and momentous enough for the human race, before the Macedonians had ever known it, and was to be the soil of histories more wonderful and more momentous still. It is marked out by certain general features as a different world from Europe, by features which shape and qualify to a considerable extent the histories enacted in it, and of these the most fundamental, uninteresting as it may sound, is a generally low rainfall. The atmosphere is peculiarly dry.

The consequences of this one peculiarity reach far. In the first place large tracts are either absolutely barren, mere sun-baked stone and sand, or able only to support men who roam with their herds over a large area. But it happens to be traversed by mountain ranges whose summits reach up and, catching the fugitive vapour from the sea, roll it down their sides in the form of rivers. It is only in the neighbourhood of the mountains and along the sea-board that a settled population can sow and reap, or where the rivers generated in the mountains are strong enough to carry their waters far out into the desert, so that men living on their banks can make up for the defect of rain by irrigation. In this contest with the desert many of the rivers of Western Asia are ultimately worsted, and perish before they find the sea.

Take a map of Europe, and the different departments, we see marked out represent tracts available throughout, but in a map of Alexander's Empire only part of each province counts. The rest is waste land—the desolation of the level desert, the desolation of the mountains. The mountains, although they catch and store the rain, are necessarily barren themselves in their higher parts, and only on their lower slopes and foothills can furnish the means of life to a civilized population— a population with more requirements than rude and ill-housed mountain tribes. The belts between mountain and desert, the banks of the great rivers, the lower hills near the sea, these are the lines of civilization (actual or potential) in Western Asia. The consequence of these conditions is that through all the history of Western Asia there runs the eternal distinction between the civilized cultivators of the plains and lower hills and the wild

peoples of mountain and desert. The great monarchies which have arisen here have rarely been effective beyond the limits of cultivation; mountain and desert are another world in which they can get, at best, only precarious footing. And to the monarchical settled peoples the near neighbourhood of this unsubjected world has been a continual menace. It is a chaotic region out of which may pour upon them at any weakening of the dam hordes of devastators. At the best of times it hampers the government by offering a refuge and recruiting-ground to all the enemies of order. Between the royal governments and the free tribes the feud is secular. The ordinary policy of the Asiatic monarchies has been simply to safeguard the great highways of communication. It obviously follows from the restriction of civilized habitation to the narrow belts of territory just described that the main roads are fixed by nature to certain definite lines. The task set before itself by these governments has been, not that of holding an immense continuous area, but the comparatively simpler one of holding these lines. It is important to remember this in connection with rapid conquests like that of Alexander. To conquer the Achaemenian Empire did not mean the effective occupation of all the area within its extreme frontiers—that would have been a task exceeding one man's lifetime—but the conquest of its cultivated districts and the holding of the roads which connected them.

In this eternal contest between civilized government and the free children of mountain and desert the frontiers which divide the two are necessarily shifting. Sometimes a region able, if proper pains be spent on it, to support civilization has been so overrun by the nomads as to fall altogether to their domain. This has been the case with most of the country along the lower Euphrates, once populous and lined with flourishing cities, and now, under the wretched Turkish administration, only the pasture ground of the Bedawin. On the other hand, sometimes civilized government has been able to push its way farther into the desert, higher up the mountain, either by conquest, or, more often, by the strong men of the tribes founding monarchies in imitation of the monarchies of the plain. This was the case with the Persians, highland clans at the dawn of history, but inhabiting valleys which were not unfruitful.

A thorough subjugation, however, of mountain and desert has been beyond the power of any Asiatic monarchy. If the great roads can be protected from marauders, enough seems accomplished. And even this was very imperfectly achieved by the Achaemenian government which preceded Alexander. With the entrance of Alexander upon the scene a new spirit, more vigorous, more alert, and, above all, more consequent than that of Asiatic monarchy, comes into action. It is not Alexander's intention to acquiesce in the defiance to his government offered by the free tribes. The Macedonians knew, by their old experience of Illyrian and Thracian, the habits of such folk. For the hill-tribes of Asia were not very different from the hill-tribes of Europe; they were both peoples who had remained at the same stage of barbarism when the lowlanders had gone on to civilization. It is significant that Alexander, at his first entry into Asia, goes out of his way to chastise the Pisidians and the tribes of Antibanus. When the Hûzha (Uxii) a little later on ask for the immemorial blackmail they have to learn by a sharp stroke that the ways of Alexander are not the ways of a Persian king. The tribes of the wilderness also feel his hand.

On the Scythians of the Central-Asiatic steppe he did actually inflict some salutary blows; he was preparing in 323 to deal with the Bedawin. His policy perhaps envisaged the ultimate subjection of mountain and desert; but little more than a beginning of such a work had been made at his death, and its accomplishment would have taken centuries.

When the day comes for European government to be re-established in Western Asia it will be seen whether its operation, immensely more powerful than that of any Asiatic monarchy, does not bring the old license of mountain and desert to an end. Already weapons of scientific precision are working a transformation in the Nearer East. We hear so much of the decay of the Ottoman and Persian monarchies, and their power in relation to other states is in truth so fallen, that we hardly realize that there has never been a time when they have been so consolidated internally, when the central government has made its authority so effective throughout the realm. Already some of the extreme provinces of Alexander's Empire are once more under European rule; British and Russian administrators are grappling with the problem of the mountain and desert tribes, with the Afridi of the frontier hills and the Kirghiz of the steppe. But instead of the *sarissa* and bow with which Alexander had to work, his modern successors have the rifle and the mountain battery, and who knows but progressive science may put into their hands before long means of mastery more certain still?

From considering the general characteristics of Western Asia we must pass to some review of its arrangement. The enormous plateau of Central Asia is adjoined on the west by a separate smaller plateau, that of Iran, and this again on the west by a third, still smaller plateau, the Anatolian (Asia Minor). The two last of these fall within the political system of Western Asia. All the three plateaus have some features in common. The centre of each is desert, or at best steppe, and they are each surrounded by mountain ramparts. Between the Central-Asiatic plateau and the Iranian intervenes the mountain mass whose nucleus is the Pamir, and whose offshoots, from the Hindu-Kush to the Sulaiman range, spread like a fan over Eastern Iran, the country which corresponds roughly to the modern principality of Afghanistan. The Iranian plateau again is separated from Asia Minor by the mountain mass of Armenia. There is yet a fourth plateau in Western Asia, the Arabian Peninsula; but this, although it did not lie outside the bounds of Alexander's Empire, as he projected it in idea, did lie outside the actual possession of Alexander and his successors, and therefore outside our field of vision in this book. All the sides of the Anatolian plateau slope down to the sea except that towards Armenia. The Iranian plateau, contrariwise, is only bordered by water on its southern side, and along part of its northern, where its rim overlooks the Caspian. Its north-west corner mingles with the "Alpine" country of Armenia, which links it to Anatolia; along most of its eastern side it is bordered by the Alpine country of East Iran (Afghanistan), which links it to Central Asia. At all other points it slopes down to the level desert; at its north-eastern extremity to the deserts of the Caspian and Azov basins (Russian Turkestan); along its south-western face to the desert, which is variously called in its different parts Syrian, Mesopotamian, and North Arabian, but which, since it is altogether the domain of the Bedawin Arabs, we will call simply the Arabian desert; and lastly, at its south-eastern extremity to the sand-drifts of Beluchistan. Between the

deserts which take up so much of the interior of the plateaus and the deserts or seas which stretch outside of them intervene the belts of mountain country which constitute the plateaus' rim. The Anatolian plateau, being comparatively small, has no part beyond the reach of rains—it is not want of water in this case which makes the central region sterile—but farther east the border ranges and the two intermediate mountain groups (Armenia and the Pamir), together with that long line of mountain shot out from Armenia between the Arabian desert and the eastern end of the Mediterranean (making Syria)—these various mountains and hills catch all the moisture which avails to redeem from the desert on either side some productive tracts. Some of this moisture drains down into the interior of the plateaus, making a sort of verdure along the inward faces and the crevices of the border ranges, but since the faces turned towards the sea naturally get most of it, the great rivers of Nearer Asia flow, not into the interior, but outwards to the sea.

Of the rivers west of Iran the mightiest are those two which take their rise in the Armenian uplands and flow through the Arabian desert to the Persian Gulf. Were it not for the Euphrates and Tigris all the space between Syria and Iran would be an area of immense dearth. But these rivers are to the Arabian desert what the Nile is to the Libyan, carrying with them a green line of fertility, and capable of nursing a succession of cities. The Tigris takes the straighter course south-east, parallel with, and not very far from, the ranges which border Iran, swelled as it goes by the waters which these send down their sides. Both the head streams of the Euphrates flow west; then, as a single river, it sweeps round, enters the Arabian desert, and crosses it diagonally. At one point, about 350 miles from its mouth, it seems about to mingle with its brother river on the east. From Baghdad on the Tigris the Euphrates is only 25 miles distant. But thence it again diverges to enter the sea—in ancient times — by a separate mouth; now the two rivers do really join at Kurna. This narrow waist of land between the rivers in the region of Baghdad marks a change in the character of the country. North of it the land between the two rivers is desert—part of the great Arabian desert which sweeps from Syria to the confines of Iran—only the immediate neighborhood of the rivers being habitable. South of it the rivers were connected in ancient times by a network of canals, quickening the soil, dark alluvium, into exuberant fertility. This was Babylonia, a level fat land, like the Egyptian delta, a land of corn-fields and gardens, of osiers and palms. It was the richest country of Nearer Asia, the seat of its oldest civilization, the natural focus of its life.

The Asiatic part, therefore, of Alexander's Empire, with which the Empire of Seleucus at its greatest extent nearly coincided, falls into certain clearly marked divisions:

- (1) The "country beyond the Taurus," *i.e.* the Anatolian peninsula (Asia Minor) without Cilicia.
- (2) Syria, and, closely connected with it, Cilicia on the west and Mesopotamia on the east, *i.e.* the Aramean country.
- (3) The lowlands about the Euphrates and Tigris, the seats of the old Assyrio-Babylonian civilization, together with Susiana (Elam).

(4) Iran.

(5) The Indian provinces, covering a great part of the Punjab.

After narrating the series of events which led up to the virtual conquest of the whole heritage of Alexander by Seleucus, I propose in the first instance to follow the history of his successors up to the death of Seleucus III only in so far as it is concerned with the first of the divisions above mentioned—Asia Minor; then to take each of the other divisions in turn and see what can be gleaned of its life under these Hellenistic kings.

An important contribution has lately been made to the literature bearing on the geography of the Nearer East by Mr. D. G. Hogarth's telling book (*The Nearer East*. Heinemann. 1902)—a book which no one interested in the past or present history of these countries can afford to leave unread. My own chapter naturally purports to do no more than call attention to a single characteristic of this part of the world, which has been of great moment for its history.

CHAPTER III

PERDICCAS

(c. 360-321 B.C.)

It would not be easy to name any other period of ten years in the history of the world beside the reign of Alexander in which as momentous a change passed over as large a part of the earth—a change which made such difference in the face of things. Suddenly the pageant of the greatest empire ever known had been swept away. And the power that took its place was ruled by ideas which were quite new to the most part of mankind, which had hitherto only been current in the petty republics of the Hellenes. In the spring of 323 before Christ the whole order of things from the Adriatic away to the mountains of Central Asia and the dusty plains of the Punjab rested upon a single will, a single brain, nurtured in Hellenic thought. Then the hand of God, as if trying some fantastic experiment, plucked this man away. Who could predict for a moment what the result would be? (May or June 323 BC)

The master was removed, but the instrument with which he had wrought, the new force he had wielded, was still unimpaired—the Macedonian army. It was still only necessary to get command of that in order to rule the world. The Macedonian chiefs took council together near the dead King's body in Babylon. To all of them the prospects opened out by the sudden turn things had taken must have been at that time confused and strange, lightened only by adventurous hopes and shadowy ambitions. The question which required instantly to be met was what head was to be given to the Empire. He must be of the royal house; so far everyone was agreed. But the royal house did not offer a brilliant choice—Philip Arrhidaeus, a half-witted son of the great Philip by a Thessalian wife, the son still unborn of Alexander and the Iranian princess Roxanne (if it proved to be a son), and Heracles, the son of Alexander and the Persian Barsine, a boy of about three years. The last was not yet seriously put forward, being apparently considered illegitimate. None of the vast populations over whom the new king would reign had any voice in choosing him; the Macedonians encamped in the plains of Babylon, men who, eleven years before, knew nothing outside the narrow borders of their own land, now chose a king for half the world as absolutely as if he were to be only king of the Macedonians as of old. Discords immediately appeared. The cavalry, our books say, determined to wait for the son to whom it was hoped Roxanne would give birth; the infantry were bent on having Philip Arrhidaeus. This distinction of cavalry and infantry was not military only, but social. Just as the mediaeval knight was of a higher grade in society than the foot-soldier, so it was the *petite noblesse* of Macedonia who followed the king as troopers, his 'Companions'; the rank and file of the foot were drawn from the peasantry. There are indications that it was especially the

narrow-minded, free-spoken Macedonian pikemen, less open than the class above them to liberal influences and large ideas, who had been alienated by the restless marchings of Alexander and the Oriental trappings he had put on. King Philip was still to them the pattern king; they would not endure to see their old master's son passed over in favor of the half-barbarian, still prospective issue of Alexander. They had, moreover, nothing to gain, as many of the nobles had, by a break-up of the Empire, and they suspected that the proposal to wait for the delivery of Roxanne veiled a design to deprive the Empire of a head altogether. Not till it had come near bloodshed was the dispute settled by a compromise. Philip Arrhidaeus and the son of Roxanne were both to reign conjointly. Perdicas, a member of the old ruling house in the Orestis region of Macedonia, the foremost of all the chiefs gathered in Babylon, was to be Regent.

There were many other great lords and generals in the realm, in Babylon, in Macedonia, in the provinces, to whom the death of Alexander brought new thoughts. Would the Empire hold together, and, if so, what would their position in it be? Would it fall to pieces, and, if so, what could each lay hands on for himself? The agreement between cavalry and infantry was followed by a redistribution of the satrapies. To say nothing of the possibilities of aggrandizement, no one of mark would be safe in such times as those which were coming on, unless he could dispose of some power of his own. And no power could be well grounded unless it had a territorial support—a basis for warlike operations and a source of revenue. It was such considerations which now made several of the great chiefs, whose commands had hitherto been purely military, desire the government of a province. The first to see clearly what was required by the new conditions, our authors tell us, was Ptolemy the son of Lagus, the most cool-headed and judicious of Alexander's generals. It was he, they say, who first proposed a resettlement of the satrapies and brought the Regent over by representing it as his interest to remove possible rivals to a distance from himself. As a defensible base, at any rate, and a source of revenue, no satrapy could have been more sagaciously chosen than the one he marked out for himself, Egypt, fenced as it was with waterless deserts and almost harbourless coasts, and at the same time rich exceedingly, opening on the Mediterranean, and suited to become one of the world's great highways. But for the most part the new settlement was a confirmation of the *status quo*; nearly all the existing satraps were left in possession, the only new appointments which we need remark here being that of Eumenes, Alexander's Greek secretary, to Cappadocia, that of Pithon the son of Crateuas to Media, and that of Lysimachus to Thrace.

Among the notable figures of the great assemblage in Babylon that summer of 323 was one which commands our special attention in this book—a robust young officer of good Macedonian birth, of about an age with the dead King, who had come to win honor under Alexander, as his father Antiochus before him had won honor under Philip. This young man's name was Seleucus. He had accompanied the King at his first setting out into Asia in 334. In the Indian campaign of 326 he had been advanced to a high command. Services for us unrecorded among the hills of Afghanistan and Bokhara had doubtless disclosed to the quick eye of Alexander a substantial ability in this lieutenant of his. He was commander of the *Royal Hypaspistai*, and attached to the King's staff. At the crossing of the Hydaspes one boat carried Alexander, Ptolemy,

Perdiccas, Lysimachus and Seleucus—a suggestive moment, if the later history of these five men is considered—and in the battle with the Paurava king, which followed, Seleucus fought at the head of his command.

He is next heard of two years later (324) at the great marriage festival in Susa, when Alexander, on his return from India, took to wife the daughter of Darius, and caused his generals to marry each an Iranian princess. And the bride allotted to Seleucus shows how high a place the young commander of *hypaspistai* held in the circle about the King. Among the most strenuous opponents of the advance of Alexander had been two great lords of Further Iran, Spitamenes and Oxyartes. When Alexander captured the rock-castle of Oxyartes the family of this chief had fallen into his hands. Oxyartes had then made his peace. His confederate, Spitamenes, had already been killed. The daughter of Oxyartes, Roxanne, was Alexander's chief queen; the daughter of Spitamenes, Apama, was given at Susa to Seleucus.

It has been remarked as curious that of the eight or nine Persian princesses mentioned in this connection only two reappear later on. One of these exceptions, however, is Apama. There can be no question that her marriage with Seleucus was a real thing. She is the mother of his successor, and her husband founded three cities, according to Appian, bearing her name. The Seleucid dynasty, while one of its roots is in Macedonia, has the other in the ancient families of Eastern Iran.

Seleucus was not one of the principal actors in the events of the next ten years. But among the secondary figures he plays a part which now and again arrests our attention. Even did he not, it would be necessary to review in a general way the course of these events in order to understand the situation when the time comes for Seleucus to step forward as protagonist. The first thing that strikes us when we take up a historian of this epoch is that the history of the world seems to have reduced itself to a history of the Macedonian army and its chiefs. But already in 323 two episodes give a sign that the predominance of the Macedonian army is to suffer reduction, that the elements of the old world it has supplanted will perhaps succeed in reasserting themselves. The Empire of Alexander suppressed the old barbarian East, and it suppressed the old free Hellas. At his death the former does not as yet stir; there are no immediate attempts on the part of the Oriental peoples to shake off the Macedonian yoke. But both in East and West the Hellenes think they have their freedom back again. In Greece itself Athens calls the states to arms, and we have the Lamian war, or, as the Greeks themselves called it, the *Hellenic war*. In the far East the Hellenes whom Alexander transported *en masse* to Bactria determine to renew the enterprise of Xenophon and march home across Asia. A great body of them, over 20,000 foot and 3000 horse, breaks away. Both these movements the Macedonian chiefs are still able to repress. Athens and her allies are crushed next year (322) by Antipater and Craterus. The Bactrian Greeks are met by Pithon, the new satrap of Media, and, by the Regent's orders, annihilated. One revolt the Macedonians fail to suppress, that of Rhodes, which, on the news of Alexander's death, expels the Macedonian garrison, and begins to stand out as a free Greek state able to deal on equal terms with the Macedonian world-rulers.

The compromise arrived at by the cavalry and infantry took effect. Roxanne was duly delivered of a son—King Alexander from the womb. But it was not long before troubles began. It soon became apparent that the predominant position of Perdiccas was more than the other Macedonian chiefs would endure. Before eighteen months from the death of Alexander were out, two antagonistic parties had defined themselves in the realm. On the one hand Perdiccas represented the central authority; the simpleton and the baby, who were called Kings, were in his keeping. Olympias, the mother of Alexander, supported him with the whole strength of her influence. The cause of the royal house was in fact bound up with that of Perdiccas. Leagued against him were most of the other Macedonian chiefs. The soul of the opposition was Antigonus, the satrap of Phrygia, but the party included Antipater, Philip's old general, who had commanded in Macedonia since Alexander left it, and had just suppressed the rising of the Greek states; it also included Craterus, one of the chiefs most popular with the Macedonian soldiery, and Ptolemy, the satrap of Egypt. These chiefs did not professedly oppose the royal authority, but Perdiccas only; their action was none the less bent in effect against any central authority whatever. Even among those who remained at the side of the Regent there were many whose hearts, as the event showed, were with the opposition. Of the great men of the realm only one beside Perdiccas was earnest in the royal cause, Eumenes of Cardia, Alexander's chief secretary, who had been given the satrapy of Cappadocia. His invidious position as a Greek among the Macedonian nobles made his chances in a general scramble poor; for him all depended on the authority of the Kings being maintained.

In 321 the antagonism came to open war. The *casus belli*, as far as Antigonus was concerned, was his refusal to obey the Regent's summons, followed by his flight to Macedonia, where Antipater and Craterus openly espoused his quarrel. With Ptolemy the *casus belli* was his seizure of the body of Alexander, a fetich which gave immense prestige to its possessor. Antigonus, Antipater and Craterus took the offensive by crossing from Macedonia into Asia Minor; Ptolemy remained on the defensive in Egypt. To crush this double rebellion the Regent divided his forces. Eumenes was left in Asia Minor to drive back the invaders. Perdiccas himself, with the Kings, marched upon Egypt. Those of the Macedonian chiefs who still obeyed him, but were too powerful to be safe, he kept by his side under observation. He had tried the policy of removing possible rivals to a distance!

And Seleucus, whom we last saw as a young man of brilliant prospects in Babylon—what line was he taking during these first years of anarchy that followed Alexander's death? In the settlement which had given so many of his fellow-chiefs a portion of the conquered lands he had received no province. He had been given instead a high command in the imperial army under the Regent. It can hardly be that, had he wished it, he could not have secured a province like the rest. Lysimachus, who had got Thrace, was perhaps younger than he. Many of the satraps in possession were not persons of sufficient importance to help giving place, should a young man like Seleucus press his claims. It must be that the high command which he took seemed to him more advantageous than a provincial governorship. It was certainly a more splendid office, if the authority of the Kings, of the Regent, held. Yes, there we have it; he had laid his

plans for the continuance of the Empire, he had thrown in his lot with the Regent, he had missed his chance in the settlement of 323.

But that was two years ago, and if he had not then shown the same intelligent anticipation of events as Ptolemy he had been learning since then. He accompanied the Regent in the expedition against Egypt. Perhaps he was among those whom Perdiccas considered dangerous. Pithon, the satrap of Media, went too, and Antigenes, who commanded the Silver Shields, the Macedonian foot-guards. The campaign was to prove an object-lesson of another sort than any the Regent intended. The contrast was to be driven home to Seleucus between his own position, bound as he was by his office to perpetual subordination to the central power, and that of Ptolemy, who demonstrated his ability on a wisely-chosen and wisely-prepared ground to hold his independence against all attacks. Three times Perdiccas made an attempt to cross the arm of the Nile which separated Egypt from the desert, each time with enormous loss. His army was soon completely demoralized; numbers went over to Ptolemy; those who did not looked askance at their leader. In this predicament the temper of the unhappy man passed beyond his control. His relations with the Macedonian chiefs whom he had gathered about him became embittered. It was the last straw. Seeing that his cause was a lost one, and repelled by his demeanor, the Macedonian chiefs quickly agreed to put an end to an impossible situation. Pithon, the satrap of Media, and about a hundred more officers openly mutinied. Seleucus took his stand with the winning side. And he followed up his choice with remorselessly energetic action. He himself led the body of cavalry officers who broke into the Regent's tent. The men of the bodyguard joined them, and Antigenes, their commander, himself dealt Perdiccas the first blow. Then the mass of his assailants flung themselves upon him and ended the work. The army at once made its peace with Ptolemy, and returned with the Kings to join the forces of Antipater and Antigonus which were advancing from the North. Pithon and another chief called Arrhidaeus assumed the command of the army and the guardianship of the Kings.

Craterus, the popular general, who had left Macedonia with Antipater, was now no more. His division had been signally defeated by Eumenes, and he himself had fallen (May 321). But this victory of Eumenes did not make him strong enough to arrest Antipater, who traversed Asia Minor by land, or Antigonus, who moved along its coasts by sea. Antipater found the army, which had been that of Perdiccas, encamped at Triparadisus in Northern Syria.

The Macedonian infantry was still in a chafed and suspicious mood. In the murder of Perdiccas its part seems to have been mainly passive; it was the nobles and the cavalry who had acted over its head. And although it had acquiesced in the change of command, it could not help feeling it was somehow being got the better of by its leaders. It responded readily to Eurydice, the ambitious wife of Philip Arrhidaeus, when she began to complain that Pithon was encroaching upon the rights of its idol, the poor half-witted King. It was pacified somehow by Pithon and Arrhidaeus resigning the regency; they continued only to exercise their powers till Antipater should come, whom the army forthwith elected Regent in their place. Antipater, the great representative of the old days of Philip, would put everything right.

But now that Antipater was come, the result was that he too fell foul of the Macedonian soldiery. It was a question of money, which Alexander had promised, and which Antipater either would or could not immediately pay. Eurydice and the adherents of Perdiccas worked them up into a fury. The army was encamped on the banks of a river. On the other side lay the forces which Antipater had brought from Macedonia. The allegiance of these new recruits was safe enough, but the grand army, which included the veterans who had conquered the world, which had chosen the Kings and considered itself the sovereign disposer of the Empire, was in open mutiny. When Antipater crossed over to reason with them he was received with stones. Two men confronted the angry mob and saved him. One was, like himself, a general of Philip's time, Antigonus, the satrap of Phrygia, the other belonged to the new generation, and stood in the brilliance of youth and military prestige, Seleucus, the commander of the horse. These two had influence enough to hold the attention of the angry multitude whilst Antipater fled over the bridge to his own camp. There the officers of the cavalry joined him, and before the united will of their hereditary leaders the infantry shrank grumbling into submission. The accession of Antipater to the regency brought with it, as the accession of Perdiccas had done, a resettlement of the dignities of the Empire. The functions which had been united in Perdiccas were divided between Antipater, who became guardian of the Kings, and Antigonus, who was made commander-in-chief of all the Macedonian forces in Asia, with the task of crushing Eumenes and the rest of the old royalist party. Antigonus continued, of course, to hold his original satrapy of Phrygia, to which this new general authority was superadded. Various changes were at the same time made in the other satrapies. The value of a territorial base had become far more evident than it had been three years before. Pithon went back to Media; Arrhidaeus got Hellespontine Phrygia. To Seleucus the settlement of Trip paradisi brought back the chance which he had missed at the settlement of Babylon. The part he had lately taken in saving Antipater's life put him in a strong position. There were probably few satrapies he might not now have had for the asking. His choice shows to what purpose he had studied the example of Ptolemy. Resigning his command of the 'Companion' cavalry to Cassander, the son of Antipater, he set out to govern the province which, of all parts of the Empire, had most features in common with Egypt, the province of Babylonia.

In view of the immense importance of Babylonia among the provinces, it is at first surprising to find it assigned in the settlement after Alexander's death to any but one of the greatest chiefs. It had been given to a certain Archon of Pella. The explanation is surely that Babylon was to be the seat of the Regent's government, and Perdiccas did not want any too powerful chief in his immediate neighborhood. The satrap of Babylonia must be a mere subordinate even in his own capital. Archon did not relish his circumstances if we may judge by the fact that he had ranged himself two years later with the opposition to Perdiccas, or Perdiccas, at any rate, believed that he had done so. The Regent—then in Cilicia on his way from Asia Minor to Egypt—sent one of the officers on whom he could depend, Docimus, to supersede him; the ex-satrap was to become merely collector of the provincial revenue. Archon tried to hold his province by force of arms. The Regent's emissary, however, was joined by a portion of the native population, and in an engagement, which took place Archon fell mortally

wounded. After this Babylon received Docimus with open arms, who held it for Perdicas, till a few months later the situation was suddenly transformed. The Regent lay, struck through with many wounds, on the banks of the Nile, and the opposition had triumphed. It could not be expected that Docimus would be left in possession. Babylonia was transferred by the chiefs at Triparadisus to Seleucus.

What ensued at this juncture between Docimus and Seleucus we do not know. Next year Seleucus was in possession of Babylon, and Docimus, with others of the late Regent's partisans, had taken to the Pisidian hills. The position of the satrap of Babylonia had gained in importance by the new arrangements. He was no longer overshadowed by the imperial court. The two chiefs who had succeeded to the power of Perdicas had one his seat in Macedonia and the other in Celaenae (Phrygia). Seleucus was now master in the house of Nebuchadnezzar. On the same terraces where Nebuchadnezzar had walked three centuries before and said, 'Is not this great Babylon which I have built for the royal dwelling-place by the might of my power and for the glory of my majesty?', the young Macedonian now walked as lord, and looked over the same Babylon spreading away to the south, as over his own domain.

2

EVENTS IN THE EAST,

321-316 BC

Babylonia, possessing so many features in common with Egypt, differed in one respect, both to its advantage and its disadvantage—in its central position. By the Euphrates and Northern Syria it was in touch with the Mediterranean and the West, while a few days' journey across the plain separated the Tigris on the east from the mountain-wall behind which rose the plateau of Iran—Iran, where the face of the world and the ways of men were far other than by the waters of Babylon. If one had it in one's heart to rule the whole Empire of Alexander, Babylon was a better seat of government than Egypt; if, on the other hand, the ruler of Babylonia was not strong enough to aspire to more than independence, he was certain to be more entangled in the affairs of his neighbours than the ruler of Egypt. Seleucus would watch with anxiety the course of events both in the lands about the Mediterranean, where the star of Antigonus seemed in

the ascendant, and in Iran, where Macedonian chiefs, Macedonian and Greek armies, were still a problematic element.

The eastern satraps included two chiefs of the first rank, Pithon and Peucestas. Both had belonged to that inner circle of eight, the *somatophylakes*, who stood closest to the late King. These two men were the cardinal personalities at this moment in Iran.

Pithon the son of Crateuas, of Alcomenae in Eordaea, had obtained the satrapy of Media at the partition made in Babylon after Alexander's death. None of those who went to their several provinces seems to have carried with him a heart more full of magnificent projects; none realized more quickly the openings to individual ambition in the new state of things. His province was the most important in Iran. In Ecbatana the first Iranian kingdom had had its seat. Under the Achaemenians it still continued to be one of the great capitals of the Empire, the summer residence of the Persian kings. Media was reckoned the richest of all the Iranian provinces, as is shown by the figure at which Darius assessed it. Its upland plains were excellent pasture; they nourished innumerable herds of horses, the best in the world. Its hills were tenanted by hardy tribes, the ancestors of the modern Kurds, from whom the ruler of Media could draw immense material of fighting men. To an ambitious man the possession of Media opened wide possibilities.

The governor who sat in the golden palace of Ecbatana already held a sort of primacy among the satraps of Iran. To change that to an absolute lordship of Iran, and from that again step—to what? to the throne of Alexander? Thoughts such as these seem to have danced before the mind of Pithon. His first opportunity had come soon after the death of Alexander in the insurrection of the Greeks planted in the Far East. Not only had Pithon been charged by the Regent Perdiccas with the quelling of the revolt, but large accessions had been sent to his troops, and he had been empowered to call upon the other satraps of Iran for contingents. It was then that Pithon had formed the design of winning the revolted Greeks to his own standard—a design which was only frustrated by the astuteness of the Regent in giving up the mutineers as a prey to the Macedonians.

Thenceforward the Regent seems to have thought it prudent to keep Pithon in his own entourage—a change in Pithon's position which accounts for his deserting to Ptolemy in 321. After the murder of Perdiccas, Pithon becomes joint-regent of the Empire with Arrhidaeus. Then after the Partition of Triparadisus, while Seleucus goes to take possession of Babylonia, Pithon returns with increased prestige to Media.

The other great satrap in the East was Peucestas of Mieza in Macedonia. Before he had been added as eighth to the seven *somatophylakes* he had carried before Alexander the sacred shield taken from the temple of Athena at Troy, and had warded Alexander's body with his own in the taking of the Mallian city (*mod.* Multan). It was from Alexander himself that he had received his satrapy, Persis, the country of the ruling tribe among the Iranians, with Pasargadae, the cradle of the Achaemenian house, and Persepolis, the royal city. Peucestas had thrown himself heartily into that scheme so dear to Alexander's heart of fusing the Macedonian and Persian aristocracies. He had, in

dress, in language, in deportment, done all he could to show himself to the people of his province as one of themselves. The death of Alexander found him with a well-rooted power.

The ambition of Pithon was of the kind that cannot wait for the fruit to ripen. The news suddenly flew through Iran that he had seized the adjoining province of Parthia. Philip, the satrap appointed at Triparadisus, he had made away with and replaced by his own brother Eudamus. The other satraps all felt their own seats threatened, and came quickly to an understanding among themselves, with a view to resisting Pithon's aggression. This movement against Pithon gave Peucestas his opportunity to rise to a pre-eminent position in Iran by a less invidious method than his rival. He had but to join the confederate satraps to secure the leadership, for amongst them there was no one of equal standing. He did so, and was voluntarily recognized as chief. The armies of Iran invaded Parthia under his command, and drove Pithon out of the province.

Pithon retired at first upon Media, but he soon felt himself insecure even there. It was now that he appeared with some following in Babylon, and called upon Seleucus to make common cause with him and share gains. Here was an entanglement in prospect. What the interests of Seleucus required was that he should hold aloof from the turmoil till he had consolidated his power. But this was hard to do in Babylon. He might refuse Pithon's suggestion, but fresh complications already loomed in sight. The disturbances in the West were about to become intermingled with those of Iran.

The death of Perdiccas had left his party, the royalist party, who were for holding the Empire together under the central authority of the royal house, apparently doomed. Eumenes, its one remaining champion of any account, was left isolated in Asia Minor. And in the year following the settlement of Triparadisus, Antigonus had conducted the war against Eumenes with great success, and shut him up in the Cappadocian fortress of Nora (320). Then unexpectedly the prospects of the royalist party improved. In 319 Antipater, the Regent, died. He bequeathed his great office to a chief called Polyperchon. It was this transference of the supreme authority which brought about a revival of the royalist cause; for, in the first place, Antigonus now began to take so masterful and independent a line in Asia Minor that many who had supported him from fear of Perdiccas came to fear Antigonus no less. Arrhidaeus, for instance, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and Clitus, the satrap of Lydia, were soon his enemies, and thereby allies of Eumenes and the royalists. In the second place, the son of Antipater, Cassander, had expected to succeed to his father's office, and threw himself into violent opposition to the new Regent. Antigonus and he made common cause. As a consequence, Polyperchon was driven to ally himself with the queen-mother Olympias, whose authority the royalists maintained. The royalists, instead of being hunted outlaws, now had the Regent of the Empire himself on their side.

The effect of these changes was rapidly seen in Asia Minor. The siege of Nora was raised; Eumenes was again recognized by the supreme authority in Macedonia as commander-in-chief of Asia, and the picked corps of Macedonian veterans, the Silver Shields, commanded by Antigenes and Teutamus, put themselves under his orders. He also seized by royal warrant the treasures which had been transferred from Susa to

Cyinda in Cilicia. In 318 he was in Phoenicia preparing a fleet to drive the party of Antigonus from the sea.

But the new hopes of the royalists were dashed by an untoward event—the annihilation by Antigonus of the fleet of Clitus in the Bosphorus. This entirely upset the plans of Eumenes, and even made his position in Phoenicia, between Antigonus and Ptolemy, insecure. That wonderful man, however, whom no reverse found at the end of his resources, turned his eyes to another field, in which he could strike a telling blow. He saw that the situation in Iran, which had been created by the confederation against Pithon, might be turned to account. The confederate satraps had in effect identified their interests with those of the royalist party. The smaller chiefs knew that they would lose far less by being to some extent subject to a central authority than if they were severally swallowed up by Antigonus or Pithon. Accordingly, about the time of the battle in Parthia, Eumenes had moved eastwards, and crossed the Euphrates apparently without opposition. Amphimachus, the satrap of Mesopotamia, was an ally. His winter-quarters (318-317) Eumenes took up within the satrapy of Seleucus, in some villages which went by the name of the Villages of the Carians. So much for any hopes Seleucus may have nursed of keeping the broils from his door!

There were no forces in Babylon whom Seleucus dared to oppose to the Silver Shields, with Eumenes to command them. Eumenes wintered in the villages undisturbed, and summoned Seleucus and Pithon by messengers to come to the help of the Kings. These chiefs still felt a coalition with Eumenes, the detested Greek, to be impossible, and refused to see in him the Kings' representative. But the dispatches he sent to the confederate satraps met with a favorable reception. His post found the united army which had defeated Pithon not yet disbanded. Eumenes appointed the neighbourhood of Susa as the place where it should meet his own forces in the spring.

The agents of Seleucus and Pithon vainly endeavored during the winter to detach the Silver Shields from their allegiance, and with the spring (317) the army of Eumenes was on the move. Seleucus soon learnt that he was encamped on the bank of the Tigris, only 34 miles from Babylon. Eumenes had, in fact, approached nearer to Babylon than was safe; for he had now exhausted the country between the rivers, and could find no more supplies except by crossing to the eastern side of the Tigris. And so near to the capital, Seleucus had it in his power to make the passage of the river next to impossible. But Seleucus, for his part, was by no means desirous to have a hostile army, and that including the Silver Shields, penned up at his doors. To block the march of the army was almost as perilous for him as to allow it to go on to Susiana. All would be well could he only induce the Silver Shields to desert, and in his extremity he desperately clung to this forlorn hope. He sent an embassy on the ships which Alexander had built in Babylon just before his death to make a last attempt; but the Silver Shields still held by Eumenes. The agents of Seleucus then tried a more forcible method of persuasion. They opened an ancient canal, which had silted up, and the camp of Eumenes was flooded. Eumenes was in an ugly position. The next day his force, which was greatly superior to the troops sent by Seleucus, seized the punts in which the latter had come, and the best part of the army succeeded in crossing. Next day a native showed him how

the water could be drained off, and when the officers of Seleucus saw him set about doing it, they withdrew all opposition to his passage.

Seleucus had never (if the view just given is correct) been really anxious to detain him, but the alternative had been to allow Eumenes and the satraps to unite. The combined force could certainly crush him. To meet this peril Seleucus was obliged to call in Antigonus.

Antigonus was already in Mesopotamia on the track of Eumenes when the messengers of Seleucus found him. He had, in fact, wintered there, hoping that when spring allowed military operations to continue he would be able to come up with Eumenes before a junction with the satraps was effected. Being too late for this, he was reduced to remain a while stationary in Mesopotamia, raising new levies for the approaching campaign. In the summer of 317 he came at length to Babylon, and concerted a plan of operations with Seleucus and Pithon. Each furnished contingents. Then the whole force, with the three generals, crossed the Tigris, and the new phase in the great war of the Successors began.

It is no part of our purpose to follow its movements. The satrap of Babylonia ceased at an early stage to act with the main body. The first objective of Antigonus was Susa, and this he reached unopposed. A garrison, however, had been left by the confederate satraps to hold the fortress and guard the treasure. Antigonus, assuming already supreme powers, authorized Seleucus to join the Susian satrapy to his own, and left him with a detachment to reduce the fortress whilst he himself moved to Media. Xenophilus, the commander of the garrison, was perhaps only half-hearted in his resistance. At any rate we find him a year later still occupying his post as guardian of the treasure, but now as the lieutenant of Seleucus.

Within a year from the day that Antigonus crossed the Tigris, the mutual jealousies of the satraps and the treachery of the Silver Shields had delivered Eumenes into the hand of his enemies. Antigonus put him to death. The royalist cause in Asia was thereby extinguished. Antigonus was now the dominant person in all the country from the Mediterranean to Central Asia. Then the Macedonian grandees, who had followed Eumenes so grudgingly, found that with his disappearance the main prop of their defence was gone.

Eudamus, not the brother of Pithon, but the murderer of King Porus, the man whose 120 elephants had given him weight among the confederate satraps, was among the first to perish by the word of Antigonus. Antigones, one of the commanders of the Silver Shields, who had been made satrap of Susiana at Triparadisus, was burnt alive. But it was not his late adversaries only whom the new lord of Asia could not tolerate. With them, if they were unlikely to give trouble in the future, there might be reconciliation. It was not the having fought in the royalist cause which was the damning thing. It was the possession of any power or prestige which might menace the new monarchy.

There was not, for instance, room in the world for both Antigonus and Pithon. Antigonus quartered his troops for the winter (317-316) in Media, and Pithon quickly set to work in secret upon them. Antigonus did not dare to risk an open attack upon his supposed ally. He therefore enticed him to a friendly conference, and then ordered him to instant execution. Lest the possession of Media should lead anyone else to harbor the same designs as Pithon, Antigonus established a double authority there (according to Alexander's system), making a native satrap and appointing a Macedonian to command the troops.

After seizing the bullion in the treasuries of Ecbatana and stripping the silver tiles from the palace, Antigonus moved to Persis. Here in the home of the Achaemenian kings he purposed to make a fresh settlement of the Eastern satrapies. He did not, while a son of Alexander Lived, assume the title of King, but in fact he was King of Asia, and the natives received him with royal honors. It would indeed have been dangerous to strain his authority in the farther provinces, which his arms had never approached, and whose satraps, Macedonian and native, were strong in the affection of their subjects. The satrap of Aria was replaced by a nominee of Antigonus. Amphimachus, the satrap of Mesopotamia, who had joined Eumenes, was replaced by a certain Blitor. Those more remote were allowed to retain their government.

Peucestas, who, now that Pithon was gone, was the most formidable rival of Antigonus in the East, remained to be dealt with. A residence in Persis seems to have brought home to Antigonus how great the popularity of Peucestas with his native subjects was, and how alarming his power. He declared him deposed. This at once raised a storm. A Persian notable had the boldness to tell Antigonus to his face that the Persians would obey no one else. Antigonus put the man to death, but he thought it prudent to use no violence against Peucestas. He rather designed to allure him out of the country by splendid promises. Perhaps Peucestas believed him; perhaps he only thought that his best chance lay in falling in with whatever Antigonus proposed. At any rate, from this time he disappears without a trace from history. A nominee of Antigonus ruled Persis with a strong hand in his stead.

The time was now come for Antigonus to turn his face again to the West. He set out by way of Susiana. On crossing the Pasitigris he was met by Xenophilus, the warden of the city of Susa. Xenophilus explained that Seleucus, the governor of the country, had ordered him to place the royal treasures at Antigonus' disposal. And now Antigonus laid his hands upon the fabulous riches of 'Shushan the palace'. The climbing vine of gold, which had been in the imagination of the Greeks what the Peacock Throne of the Moguls was to our fathers, became his. When he left Susa the 5000 talents he brought from Ecbatana had swelled to 25,000.

Seleucus was the last man left east of the Euphrates whom Antigonus could regard as a rival. The lessons of the fate of Pithon and Peucestas had not been lost upon the satrap of Babylonia. He must have felt bitterly the difference between his position and that of Ptolemy in Egypt. He had done all in his power to keep his province unembroidered, and now he must ask himself whether he was to keep it at all. To hold it by force against Antigonus was out of the question. His one chance lay in conciliating

the conqueror; and if he failed—well, there was nothing for it but to throw up the game and save his life at least for more fortunate times.

The army of Antigonus, with its immense train of wagons and camels bearing the spoils of the East, moved from Susa to Babylon. But an ominous indication of the mood of Antigonus preceded his departure. The province of Susiana, which in the stress of the war he had assigned to Seleucus, he now took away again and put under a native. At Babylon, Seleucus received him and his forces with every form of observance and sumptuous entertainment which might allay his suspicions. But he was on the alert for the least sign of hostility on the part of Antigonus in order to escape the fate of Pithon. He had not long to wait. Antigonus, alleging that some act of his was a breach of order, called for an account of his administration. Seleucus could not, without surrendering all claim to independence, comply. He allowed a discussion to run on for several days, and then, whilst Antigonus was no doubt expecting something which might be a colorable pretext for arrest, he was suddenly gone. He was riding for his life with fifty horsemen to Egypt—the one secure place; Ptolemy had a reputation for generosity. Perhaps he reflected that the very man he was now flying from had himself fled in like manner from Perdiccas.

CHAPTER V

SELEUCUS CONQUERS THE EAST

Seven years had passed since the death of Alexander, and Seleucus found himself at the end of them a landless fugitive. As a whole, these years had served to reduce the situation to a much simpler form. The old royal house of Macedonia was become a practically negligible quantity, although the boy Alexander still lived with the name of King. For in the West also, the years 317 and 316 had sealed the fate of the royalist cause. First, as a consequence of the disastrous battle in the Bosphorus, Greece had been for the most part in 317 wrested from the Regent Polyperchon by Cassander. Then came a split in the royalist party itself, a natural result of the double kingship. The Kings, the child and the simpleton, were cyphers, but Olympias, the grandmother of the little Alexander, and Eurydice, the wife of Philip, stood in fierce opposition. The Regent had lent himself to the designs of Olympias, and in 317 Philip and Eurydice were both made away with. The nominal kingship was now vested in Alexander alone. Before 317 was out Cassander attacked Macedonia itself. The murder of Philip and Eurydice had made the country hostile to Olympias and Polyperchon. When the winter fell, the Regent was pinned by Cassander's forces in Azorus, and Cassander was besieging the royal family in Pydna. In the spring of 316 Pydna fell. Cassander held the King in his hands. He soon made himself master of Macedonia. Olympias was put to death.

It was not only through the suppression of the royal house that the situation was simplified. Out of the struggle of the Macedonian chiefs four now emerged as the fittest or the most fortunate. The rest had either disappeared, like Perdikkas and Eumenes, Pithon and Peucestas, or had acquiesced in subordination to one of the four, as the new satraps in the East to Antigonos, and Seleucus to Ptolemy. And of these four, Antigonos held a position which overshadowed all the rest. His power extended over all Asia from the Mediterranean to Khorasan, whilst of the other three Ptolemy held only Egypt and Southern Syria, Cassander had a newly-grounded and precarious power in Macedonia, and Lysimachus maintained his independence in the semi-barbarous country of Thrace.

It was a curious revolution in the position of Antigonos that he now found himself practically the successor of Perdikkas. So long as the principle of one central government for the Empire had meant an authority over his head, his ambition had set him among its opponents; his ambition, mounting higher, now made him the champion of that principle, but with the difference that the central government should be his own. Accordingly he found himself before long at war with his old allies, and allied with many of his old enemies, the wreck of the royalist party. The history of the next fourteen years (315-301) is the long fight of Antigonos for Macedonia.

Before Antigonus returned to the West in 315 common action had been determined on by Ptolemy, Cassander and Lysimachus. Our authority assigns a great part to Seleucus in prompting this alliance, but the other three chiefs probably needed little instruction to be on their guard against Antigonus. Their ambassadors met Antigonus in the spring of 315 in Northern Syria, and laid before him the demands which they made as his allies in the late war against the royalists. These included a partition of the conquered territory in Asia, Seleucus being restored to Babylonia, and of the captured treasure. Antigonus repulsed these demands with scorn. Then either side got ready for the battle. The peoples of Asia saw the evidence of their monarch's resolution along all their highways, the posts fixed at intervals for rapid communication, the heights crowned with beacons.

The war with Antigonus, as far as Seleucus was concerned, falls into two phases. In the first, 315-312, Seleucus was merely a subordinate, 'one of the captains' of Ptolemy, as the book of Daniel describes him. We hear of him in command of the Ptolemaic fleet, which in 315 menaces the coast of Ionia, when Antigonus is set on gaining mastery of the sea as a preliminary to an attack on Macedonia. Shortly afterwards Seleucus is in Cyprus with Ptolemy's brother Menelaus, combating the partizans of Antigonus in the island. He is again in the Aegean the following year (314). These operations, which form part of a plan of campaign, in which Seleucus is not a principal, do not concern us farther.

Then comes the year 312, the great year of Seleucus, the starting-point of the era, which was established by the kings of his line in the East, and was still used as the 'year of the Greeks' long after his line had passed away. The spring of that year found Antigonus in Asia Minor, believing that the way to Europe was at last open. To secure himself against a flank attack from Egypt, his son Demetrius, the brilliant, dissolute man to whose career the rather hackneyed metaphor of a meteor can be applied with peculiar appropriateness, had been left with an army to hold Cilicia and Syria. Southern Syria (Palestine), as well as Northern, was occupied at this moment by the forces of Antigonus, the troops of Ptolemy having been expelled in 315 at the outbreak of the war. It was determined in the council of Ptolemy that the time was ripe for a forward movement. Seleucus, according to our account, was the main advocate of this step. A large army, led by Ptolemy and Seleucus, moved across the desert upon Palestine. They were met at the threshold of the country, near Gaza, by Demetrius. A decisive battle—one of the great battles of the time—took place. Demetrius was completely beaten. Syria was lost for the time to Antigonus. His movement upon Macedonia was arrested; his whole scheme of operations had to be modified. It was the severest blow that had been dealt him since the beginning of the war.

But its ultimate consequences were to prove more momentous than its immediate effect. The opportunity of Seleucus was now come, and he sprang swiftly. Immediately after the battle he had received from Ptolemy, who favored his enterprise, a body of 800 foot and 200 horse, and with these he set out to recover his old province of Babylonia. The little company moved along the road which struck the Euphrates in Northern Syria. Even for the recovery of one province the force seemed ridiculously small. We are told of the companions of Seleucus that on the way their hearts misgave them. They

contrasted themselves with the great power against which they were going. But Seleucus was not to be discouraged. The history of those eventful days, as it stood in the author followed by Diodorus, narrated by those who looked back upon them in the light of subsequent triumphs, is transfigured by a prophetic halo. Seleucus was sure of his destiny. He reminded his followers of the fall of the Persian power before the superior science of Alexander; and indeed he was right if he saw upon how insecure foundations these monarchies maintained by military force alone, without the cement of nationality, of which the East has seen so many, do really rest. The narrator makes him further sustain his followers' courage by an oracle of the Didymaeon Apollo, which had hailed him King, and by a vision of Alexander. "He also set before them how all that is held in honor and admiration among men is achieved by labors and hazards". It is an occasion when some idealizing touches are justified. In this form, indeed, did those days actually live in the minds of men.

The party of Seleucus crossed the Euphrates into Mesopotamia and appeared at Carrhae, an old town on the high road between Syria and Babylon where a colony of Macedonian soldiers was settled. Some of these were ready at once to join a commander of the reputation of Seleucus, and the rest were not numerous enough to offer resistance. With these reinforcements Seleucus traversed the length of Mesopotamia and entered Babylonia. The hopes he had cherished, that the work of his previous four years there still stood in the disposition of the people, were not found vain. The satrap appointed by Antigonus, Pithon the son of Agenor, had been with Demetrius at Gaza and fallen on the field. The natives flocked to the standards of their old governor. One of the Macedonian officials came over to him with more than 1000 men. The partisans of Antigonus were overborne by the popular movement, and shut themselves up under a commander called Diphilus in one of the palace-citadels of Babylon. Here they still held as hostages those who had formed the adherents and retinue of Seleucus in his governorship. But Seleucus carried the place by assault and rescued all who belonged to him.

This was the moment which the Seleucid kings regarded as the birthday of their Empire.

Seleucus ruled once more in Babylon. But he must expect ere long to have his possession challenged; and he set earnestly to work to form a force of both arms and to confirm his influence with the natives and resident Macedonians. Antigonus personally was busy in the West, but he left the command of all the eastern provinces in the hands of the satrap of Media, Nicanor, who had succeeded the Mede Orontobates. Nicanor was soon on his way to Babylon with an imposing force, drawn from different regions of Iran, of more than 10,000 foot and 7000 horse. To set against him Seleucus had no more than 3000 foot and 400 horse. But making up for this by mobility, he crossed the Tigris before Nicanor had reached it, took him completely by surprise, and routed him. Euager, the satrap of Persis, was among those who fell in the affray. The army of Nicanor came over in a body to Seleucus. Nicanor himself barely made good his escape into the deserts with a handful of his staff, and thence reached his satrapy.

The effect of the battle was immediately to open the East to Seleucus. It was seen how insubstantial the hold of Antigonus upon the East really was. The Greek and Macedonian garrisons by which his nominees had held Media, Persis, Susiana, and Babylon were quite ready, if it appeared profitable, to exchange his service for that of Seleucus. The natives, no doubt, remembered the old governors he had taken from them with regret. The satraps of the further provinces he had never really subdued. Seleucus seems to have annexed Susiana almost immediately, and perhaps Persis, whose satrap had fallen. Then he advanced upon Media itself, to attack Nicanor in his own province.

Meanwhile in the West, Antigonus, warned by the battle of Gaza, had determined to leave Ptolemy unassailed no longer. He had reoccupied Palestine, and, as a preliminary to the invasion of Egypt, had attempted to reduce the Nabataean Arabs, who controlled the road through the desert (311). He had met in this with indifferent success, and had just come to terms when a dispatch from Nicanor, explaining the desperate position of affairs in the East, reached him. Antigonus, even with the risk of losing the East, could ill spare troops for any long time in view of the complications in the West. But he determined to try the effect of one sudden blow at the seat of Seleucus' power. He gave 15,000 foot and 4000 horse to Demetrius, ordered him to make a flying excursion into Babylonia, recover the province, and return as soon as possible. Demetrius assembled this force at Damascus, and moved rapidly upon Babylonia by way of Mesopotamia.

Seleucus had left in Babylon, to hold command during his absence, an officer called Patrocles, no doubt the same person of whom we hear later on as his foremost counselor and the explorer of Central Asia. Patrocles learnt that Demetrius was coming down on him from Mesopotamia. He knew that his forces were too small to risk a battle. But at any rate he meant to save them from defeat or seduction, and ordering a considerable part of them to take refuge in the deserts to the west of the Euphrates or the swamps of the Susian coast, he himself moved with a small body about the province to observe the enemy. At the same time he kept Seleucus in Media continually informed of what took place.

Demetrius found the city of Babylon evacuated, except the two royal palaces which confronted each other across the river. Of these he took and looted one, but the other held out for some days, and the time allowed him was at an end. He was obliged to return with this incomplete result, but he left one of his friends with a quarter of his force to go on with the siege and hold the province. Before leaving he pillaged the country, an act which only served to injure his own cause, so that, as Plutarch says, he 'left the power of Seleucus firmer than ever'.

The incursion of Demetrius was a mere momentary interruption in Seleucus' conquest of the East. Nicanor was unable to make head against him in Media. Appian says that Seleucus "killed the satrap Nicator (sic) in the battle". It may be that Appian had the battle on the Tigris in his mind when Nicanor was defeated and fled; or, of course, Nicanor may have given battle again in Media with his remaining troops and fallen.

The ancient authors have allowed us to follow up to this point with tolerable completeness the progress of Seleucus, the son of Antiochus, towards empire. If the material were before us, we should now have to narrate the actual formation of the Empire in the East with a fullness proportionate to its importance. The observance of such proportions in his narrative is, however, impossible to a historian of the Seleucid house. He has to take his information as he can get it, and it is not always the passages he would most like to know about which are lit up for him by the capricious chances of the records. On an incident which, according to its relative importance, should be disposed of in a sentence he is obliged, in order to make his work complete, to spend a page; about a development, to which he would wish to give a chapter, he can only get enough information to fill a sentence. We have at the point to which we are now come an example of this disability. After the return of Demetrius from Babylon in 311 Seleucus once more repossessed himself of the province, and during the following nine years (311-302) made his authority supreme in Iran as well as in the Euphrates valley, or, in other words, over all the eastern part of the Empire to the Jaxartes and the Indus. *This bare fact is almost all that can be elicited from the documents.*

It is the war with Antigonus in the West which once more draws Seleucus, as king of the East, into the field of vision. There the situation was still very much in 302 as Seleucus had left it in 312. The most important modification was the total extinction of the old royal family of Macedonia in the male line. The child Alexander had been murdered by Cassander in 311, and Heracles, the illegitimate son of the great Alexander, by Polyperchon in 309. Cassander might claim to inherit its rights by his wife, Thessalonice, who was the sister of Alexander the Great. In 306 Antigonus assumed the title of King. In the following year the other dynasts, Ptolemy, Cassander, Lysimachus and Seleucus, followed suit. Seleucus had already been "King" to his native subjects. Now the Macedonians and Greeks admitted to his presence saw him wearing the linen band, the diadem, which had been with the old Persian kings the symbol of royalty, and the official Greek documents ran in the name of King Seleucus.

We may pause to note that the name of king had no *territorial* reference. These kings are never officially styled kings of Egypt or kings of Asia. If they are called so by historians, it is merely for the purpose of convenient distinction. It connoted rather a personal relation to the Macedonian people. Ideally there was one Macedonian Empire as in the Middle Ages there was one Roman Empire. But the dignity of Macedonian King was borne conjointly or concurrently by several chieftains, just as the dignity of Roman Emperor was borne concurrently by the Western and the Byzantine prince. In practice, of course, each of the rivals had to acquiesce in the others being kings within a certain territorial sphere. But their connection with that sphere was never as close and essential as that of the king of England or the king of France with his territory. Ptolemy and Seleucid were to the end Macedonian kings who happened to reign in Egypt and in Asia.

Materially, however, the situation in the West had changed little since 312. Antigonus still held Asia Minor and Syria securely. But his attempts to enlarge his dominion further had met with poor success. He had never succeeded in reaching Macedonia, and his attack on Egypt in 306 had broken down disastrously. He had

wrested Cyprus from Ptolemy, and he had established a fluctuating influence in Greece, but that was the utmost he could do. And during the siege of Rhodes by Demetrius, 305-304, the war between Antigonus and the other dynasts seems to have languished.

But it was in itself a momentous change in the general situation that the rule of Antigonus beyond the Euphrates had been superseded by the rule of Seleucus. It was so much lost to Antigonus in resources, and a fourth independent power had arisen in his rear. If against his three enemies he had been unable to make advance, against four he could not even hold his own ground.

After the failure of his attempt on Rhodes he turned once more in 304 to assail Cassander in Greece. During the distractions of the last three years his hold on Greece had been almost lost. Cassander and his ally, the old Regent Polyperchon, who was now fallen to be a sort of condottiere, had restored their influence almost everywhere, except in Athens; and Athens was hard pressed. Demetrius now returned to Greece, and next year (303), in a victorious campaign, swept the hostile forces from the field. The states of Greece were federated under the presidency of Antigonus and Demetrius against Cassander.

Such victories were useless. Their immediate effect was to revive into activity the alliance of Cassander, Lysimachus and Ptolemy, to which Seleucus now added his strength. While Demetrius had been conquering Greece, Antigonus had remained on the defensive in Northern Syria. In this central region the roads which led to Asia Minor from Egypt and from Babylonia converged, so that his position gave Antigonus equal opportunities for observing Ptolemy and Seleucus. But in the spring of 302 the alliance against him came into play. Lysimachus crossed over from Thrace, and, in combination with a force sent by Cassander, overran the Western part of Asia Minor. When Antigonus marched against him he simply retired into a strong position on the coast near Heraclea and stood at bay. And in the meantime Antigonus had been obliged to leave the roads from Iran and Egypt inadequately defended behind him. In such a predicament it was of no avail that Demetrius was pressing Cassander hard in Thessaly. Antigonus was obliged to call him back to Asia and let Greece go.

During these events in the summer of 302 Seleucus was making his way from the Punjab, marching ever westward over the immense distances which separate India from the Mediterranean lands. When the winter 302-301 closed in he had reached Cappadocia, and there turned his troops into winter-quarters. His force amounted to 20,000 foot, 12,000 cavalry and mounted archers, the latter no doubt from Central Asia, 480 elephants, brought straight from the Punjab, and over 100 scythed chariots. He had with him his son Antiochus, then twenty-two or twenty-three years old.

In the spring of 301 he advanced again along the central highway of Asia Minor. Antigonus failed to prevent his junction with Lysimachus, and at Ipsus, which lay on the highway, he had to meet the united armies of the two kings. Plutarch gives an account of the battle with various picturesque details. It was preceded, he tells us, by omens which portended disaster to Antigonus. In the course of the fight Demetrius, who commanded the flower of his father's cavalry, came into collision with the young prince

Antiochus, and, after a brilliant passage of arms, routed his opponents. But he pressed the pursuit too far. This spoilt the victory. The elephants of Seleucus thrust in between him and the phalanx of Antigonus. The forces of Seleucus and Lysimachus circled round that powerful but unwieldy mass, threatening attack, but trying in reality to frighten the troops of Antigonus into desertion. And in fact a large section voluntarily went over to the winning side. The rest fled. Then a body of javelin-men bore down upon the place where Antigonus himself was stationed. Someone drew his attention to them: "These men are leveling at you, O king". The old man was unmoved "Let them; Demetrius will come to my support". To the end he believed his son was at hand, and kept scanning the horizon. Then the javelins struck him and he fell, pierced with many wounds. Only Thorax of Larissa remained beside the body.

CHAPTER VI

FROM IPSUS TO THE DEATH OF SELEUCUS

The battle of Ipsus is one of the landmarks of the period after Alexander. The Asiatic empire of Antigonus, which had been the great factor in the history of the last fifteen years, was annihilated forever. The house of Antigonus still survived in the person of Demetrius, who fled from the disastrous battle to Ephesus. His power was unbroken on the seas, and many places in the Levant were still held by his garrisons—Cyprus, Caunus, Tyre and Sidon. But for the moment the other four houses had almost driven the house of Antigonus from the field. “The victorious kings proceeded to cut up the empire of Antigonus like a great carcass, taking slices for themselves and adding its provinces to those they already ruled”. It was Seleucus and Lysimachus who gained the most in territory. Seleucus now annexed Syria, and Lysimachus a great part of the territory ruled by Antigonus in Asia Minor; where exactly the new frontier was drawn we cannot say. Cilicia was ceded to Plistarchus, the brother of Cassander.

There was one territorial controversy which the partition after Ipsus bequeathed to later generations—the question between the house of Seleucus and the house of Ptolemy as to the possession of Coele-Syria, the country we call Palestine. Ptolemy had long been concerned to possess Syria south of the Lebanon; during the war with Antigonus he had on several occasions seized this country and again lost it. When the alliance of the four kings had been renewed in 302, Ptolemy had stipulated for it as his share in the gains, and to this the others had agreed. At the same time that Lysimachus attacked Antigonus in Asia Minor, Ptolemy invaded and occupied Palestine. Then on some false report that Lysimachus had been crushed, Ptolemy made haste to evacuate it. This was the action on which the controversy turned. Seleucus, and apparently the other two kings whose forces had fought at Ipsus, contended that this withdrawal of Ptolemy’s was a desertion of the common cause, and that his claim to Palestine in virtue of the original agreement was forfeit. Ptolemy on the other hand maintained that it still held good. When Seleucus crossed the Taurus again after Ipsus to take possession of his new Syrian provinces, he found that Ptolemy had once more occupied Palestine. Seleucus could only obtain the country by superior force. But he felt himself restrained by decency from applying force to Ptolemy, not only an ally of old standing, but the man to whom he owed his own rise. He contented himself with an indignant protest. He declared to Ptolemy that “he would for the present take no active measures for

friendship's sake", but that "he should consider later how to deal with a friend who seized more than his share".

As a matter of fact, Seleucus, in consequence of the battle of Ipsus, had stepped, one might almost say, into the place of Antigonus, just as Antigonus had stepped into the place of Perdiccas. Seleucus now held a position which overshadowed that of all the other chieftains. And accordingly, just as Antigonus found himself in 315 in opposition to his old allies and allied with his old enemies, so it also happened with Seleucus. His neighbours Lysimachus and Ptolemy drew together. Lysimachus took Arsinoe, the daughter of Ptolemy, to wife. On his part Seleucus made overtures to the roving Demetrius. He asked the hand of Stratonice, his daughter by Phila the daughter of Antipater. Demetrius himself was invited to Syria.

This offer came to Demetrius as an "unexpected piece of fortune". He at once set sail for Syria with Stratonice. On the way he raided Cilicia, the province of Plistarchus, and carried off 1200 talents from Cyinda, a residue of the Achaemenian hoards. Demetrius, Phila and Stratonice were received by Seleucus at the coast town of Rhossus. "The intercourse of the two kings was marked from the first by frankness, confidence and royal splendour. They took their pastimes, conversed and lived together with no setting of guards or wearing of arms, until Seleucus took Stratonice with imposing ceremony and went up to Antioch". The new alliance was notified to the Greek cities in the occupation of Demetrius by envoys sent out in the name of both kings.

With his position thus improved, Demetrius began to meditate new aggressions. He occupied Cilicia, Plistarchus withdrawing apparently to complain to his brother, King Cassander. Seleucus would seem to have countenanced this proceeding, for we find him soon after using his good offices with Ptolemy, with whom his relations, in spite of the matter of Coele-Syria, were still friendly, to obtain the betrothal to Demetrius of one of Ptolemy's daughters. But the fresh ambitions of Demetrius showed that the house of Antigonus was not yet eliminated, and this to some extent restored the common antagonism of the four kings to their old enemy. A rupture between Seleucus and Demetrius took place. Its immediate cause was the demand of Seleucus that Demetrius should sell him Cilicia. When Demetrius refused, Seleucus in more menacing terms asked for Tyre and Sidon, which garrisons of Demetrius still retained. He received the proud answer that not even if Demetrius had to live through ten thousand other battles of Ipsus would he wish for Seleucus as a son-in-law on mercenary conditions, and the garrisons in the two cities were strengthened. Soon after this he left the East to restore his fortunes on the other side of the Aegean.

The years following Ipsus were, no doubt, fruitful in the internal development of the Empire of Seleucus. Seated now in Antioch, the new city he had built on the Orontes to replace Antiochia, Seleucus could survey both East and West and consolidate his power throughout the vast regions he had come to rule. But here again all record has perished. One administrative measure only finds mention in our traditions, the division of the Empire into an eastern and western part, the former with its capital in Babylonia, in the new city of Seleucia-on-the-Tigris. Here the son of

Seleucus and the Bactrian Apama is installed as viceroy of the dominion beyond the Euphrates.

This measure, however, owes its mention, not to its historical importance, but to its being connected with a story of that sentimental flavour, tinged with incest, which so pleased the taste of the later Greeks. Appian elaborates the story in greater detail than any other part of the history of Seleucus and his successors. Briefly, the prince Antiochus conceived a passion for his young step-mother Stratonice, and pined in silence. When, however, the court physician Erasistratus discovered the nature of his malady and revealed it to the King, Seleucus, with a paternal devotion considered exemplary, resolved to pass on his wife to his son. He further determined to make over to him at the same time the eastern half of the Empire. An assembly of all ranks of the Macedonian troops at Antioch was convoked, and the King proclaimed to them the betrothal of Antiochus and Stratonice, and their appointment to be King and Queen of the East. To remove any scruples as to a union abhorrent to Greek morality, Seleucus adopted the maxim of statecraft which Herodotus attributes to the royal judges of Cambyses, that the King is above law: "The King's decree makes every action right" (about 293).

Its association with a story of this kind has served to rescue a great political measure from oblivion. Otherwise the history of Seleucus after Ipsus is lit up for us only by the meteoric personality of Demetrius. In 297-296 Cassander died, leaving no strong successor. His eldest son, Philip, died a year after his father; and then came a divided kingship in Macedonia, two other sons, Antipater and Alexander, reigning conjointly, held in leading strings by their mother, Thessalonice, the great Philip's daughter. Such a state of things gave Demetrius his chance. He began once more to make himself master of the cities of Greece. The children of Cassander were not in a position to hinder his progress. Soon there were open feuds in the house of Cassander. Antipater murdered his mother, the last representative of the old royal line, and the two brothers fell to fighting. Demetrius dashed into this chaos and seized the Macedonian throne (293).

It is certainly one of the ironies of history that the object which Antigonus the One-eyed, with all his resources as lord of Asia, had vainly pursued so long should have been attained by his son after that Asiatic empire had perished. But the throne of Demetrius was anything but secure. The other three kings, alarmed at this resurrection of the house of Antigonus, united once more against it. Lysimachus had already driven the forces of Demetrius from a number of the coast cities of Asia Minor, where they had held on after Ipsus; Ptolemy had reconquered Cyprus. The three kings found an instrument in Pyrrhus of Epirus. He and Lysimachus simultaneously invaded Macedonia, whilst Ptolemy's vessels appeared off the coast of Greece. It was perhaps at the same time that Seleucus occupied Cilicia.

Demetrius was driven by the desertion of his troops to quit Macedonia, and the country was divided between Lysimachus and Pyrrhus (287). For a while after this Demetrius mixed in the confused politics of Central Greece, where there were still troops afoot which paid him allegiance, and he had soon collected a sufficient power to annoy Athens. But it was too narrow a world for his ambitions and he was outmatched

by Pyrrhus. Then once more he turned his eyes to the East. With an army of 11,000 foot and a body of cavalry he landed in Asia Minor. He met with some success. Even Sardis fell. The tide of desertion in Caria and Lydia began to set in his favor. But Agathocles, the son of Lysimachus, drew near with a force to redress the balance. Demetrius plunged into the interior. He conceived the daring plan of invading Iran. Perhaps he counted on the favor of his daughter, who reigned as queen of that land. The great difficulty in his plan was to reach Iran at all. It was difficult for two reasons: the mercenaries of those days had a profound objection to expeditions into out-of-the-way regions, whence it was difficult to bring back loot and where there was no opportunity of changing their service; and secondly, Agathocles pressed the pursuit so closely that Demetrius was unable to procure supplies. There was soon famine in his camp. Then he lost a number of men in the passage of the river Lycus. Then disease broke out. His army was, from all causes, reduced by 8000 men.

It was in this predicament that he determined to enter the realm of Seleucus and throw himself upon the compassion of his late ally. He crossed the Taurus into Cilicia and entered Tarsus. But he was careful to show that he did not come as an enemy. The fields through which he passed were left unharmed, and from Tarsus he wrote a letter of appeal to Seleucus in Syria. Seleucus seems to have been a good-natured man, and even apart from that, the age was favorable to acts of showy magnanimity. He at once wrote orders to his generals in Cilicia to furnish Demetrius with all that befitted royalty and to victual his starving troops.

But here another voice was raised, that of Patrocles, the King's chief counselor. He represented strongly to Seleucus the danger of allowing a man of Demetrius' ambition and abilities to take up his residence in the kingdom. His arguments worked so upon Seleucus, that the King completely reversed his first intentions. He marched in person into Cilicia at the head of a large force to complete Demetrius' ruin.

To Demetrius this sudden change of policy was disconcerting. He took refuge among the defiles of the Taurus, and thence dispatched fresh appeals. Might he be allowed to establish himself as the petty chief of some of the free mountain folk? He promised to be content with such a kingdom. At any rate he implored Seleucus to suffer him to maintain his force where it was during the winter (286-285), and not force him back into the clutch of his implacable foe, Lysimachus.

But Seleucus was still under the influence of Patrocles. He gave Demetrius leave to take up quarters for two of the winter months, if he liked, in Cataonia, the highland country adjoining Cappadocia, on condition that he sent his principal friends as hostages. He then proceeded to barricade the passes of the Amanus, just as Agathocles had those of the Taurus, so that Demetrius was penned up in Cilicia with no outlet either into Asia Minor or Syria. But now Demetrius turned fiercely like a beast at bay. He began to waste the fields that he had hitherto spared. He defeated detachments of the troops of Seleucus, including the scythed chariots. He secured the passes, beating the people of Seleucus from the barricades.

With these strokes the spirit of his followers rose. Their tidings caused anxiety at the courts of the other kings. In those days, when power was so swiftly lost and won, it was unwise to underrate the importance of any successes, and the prestige of Demetrius the Besieger was enormous. Lysimachus sent an offer of help to Seleucus. But Seleucus was in doubt which to fear most, Demetrius or Lysimachus. He declined the offer. At the same time he was not over-eager to join battle with the desperate man.

At this critical moment Demetrius fell ill. Thenceforward his cause was lost. When after forty days he was himself again, his army had melted away. Many of his soldiers were now in the ranks of Seleucus. With the few who remained a guerilla war could still for a while be carried on. Even in this extremity his genius secured him flashes of triumph. When the generals of Seleucus believed him about to raid the Cilician lowlands, he suddenly dashed across the Amanus and was in the rich plains of Syria, spreading havoc as far as Cyrrestice, where Seleucus had been carefully planting the new civilization. Seleucus himself brought up a force to run him to ground. His camp narrowly escaped a surprise by night, and the next day Demetrius gained a partial success on one of his wings. But if Demetrius was bold, so too could Seleucus be. He understood where the weakness of Demetrius lay. With courage worthy of an old companion of Alexander, he took off his helmet, and with nothing but a light shield to defend his head, rode straight up to the enemy's lines and himself, in a loud voice, invited them to desert. The effect was electrical. With a shout of acclaim the little band of Demetrius hailed Seleucus king. Demetrius made off with a handful of followers. His one idea was to reach the Aegean. His friends, he hoped, were still in possession of the harbor of Caunus. Till nightfall he took refuge in the neighboring woods, so that he might recross the Amanus in the dark. When, however, his party crept close to the passes they saw them lit up by the fires of Seleucus' pickets. They were too late. The checkmate was achieved. The little party grew still less. All that night Demetrius wandered aimlessly in the woods. Next day he was at last persuaded to surrender himself to Seleucus.

Once more the first impulse of Seleucus was to show himself generous. When he received Demetrius' emissary he exclaimed that it was to him that fortune had been kind in preserving Demetrius alive to this hour, in affording him an opportunity to add to his other glories a signal exhibition of humanity and goodness. His chamberlains were ordered to erect a royal pavilion for the reception of the fallen king. He chose as his envoy to carry his answer to Demetrius a person of his entourage, Apollonides, with whom Demetrius had once been intimate. The King's mood set the tune for the court. The courtiers, by twos and threes at first, then *en masse*, sped to Demetrius, almost tumbling over each other in their eagerness to be beforehand. For the favor of Demetrius, they reckoned, would be particularly worth having at the court of Seleucus in the days to come.

This rush had not been expected by Seleucus. It alarmed him. The enemies of Demetrius got his ear. He began actually to dread that in his own house this magnetic personality might supplant him. Once more, therefore, his generous impulse was revoked by second thoughts. Apollonides had hardly reached Demetrius and charmed away his bitterness by the picture of what Seleucus intended towards him, an assurance

confirmed by the courtiers who came pouring in, when the party found itself surrounded by a thousand men, foot and horse. Demetrius was a prisoner indeed.

He never saw the face of Seleucus. He was carried to the ‘Syrian Chersonese’, the steamy, luxuriant plains about the middle Orontes where the new city of Apamea was rising, and there were royal parks full of all sorts of game. Here, under a strong guard, he was given liberty to hunt and drink.

No material provision for his comfort and dignity was omitted. Any friends who chose were allowed to keep him company. Sometimes people from the court joined him. They brought gracious messages from Seleucus. Antiochus and Stratonice were expected at Antioch, and when they came—it was always when they came—Demetrius would be set free. As a matter of fact, Seleucus may well have wished to keep Demetrius in reserve as a bolt he might, if need were, launch upon the world.

In 285 Lysimachus succeeded in ousting Pyrrhus from his share of Macedonia and in annexing Thessaly. The Empire of Alexander was now become three kingdoms, under the three survivors of that great generation, Seleucus, Lysimachus, Ptolemy. Of these three Seleucus held the most commanding position. It was he whom the popular story represented to have put on the diadem of Alexander. “Seleucus”, Arrian says, “became the greatest of those kings who inherited the Empire of Alexander, the most kingly in his designs, the ruler of more land than any save Alexander himself”. And now his prestige had been raised yet higher by his capture of Demetrius, by his holding the sometime king of Macedonia, the representative of the great house of Antigonus, in a cage.

But the position of Lysimachus at this time was hardly less imposing. He was King in Macedonia, in the original seats of the ruling race. His dominion stretched from the Cilician Gates westward over the tableland of Asia Minor, the Greek cities of the coast, Bithynia, Thrace, Macedonia, Thessaly, to the pass of Thermopylae. Would the three kings acquiesce in the existing tripartite division?

It is probable that Seleucus at any rate nursed the hope of making the whole Empire his. He held in Demetrius an instrument by which the actual king in Macedonia could be assailed with some show of legitimacy. Lysimachus was not insensible to this danger. He sent to Seleucus an offer of 2000 talents if he would put Demetrius to death. Seleucus repelled the suggestion with demonstrative indignation. “Not only to break faith, but to commit such foulness towards one connected with his own house!”. He now wrote to Antiochus in Media announcing his intention to restore Demetrius to the Macedonian throne. Antiochus was to plead for his release, as Seleucus wished that his act of generosity should go to the credit of his son.

Whatever the real intentions of Seleucus with regard to his prisoner may have been, his opportunity to execute them was soon gone. Demetrius sought to drown the bitterness and tedium of his captivity in wild indulgence. In two years he drank himself to death (283).

Seleucus, even with what he had already attained, must still have seemed far from possessing the whole Empire. The houses of Lysimachus and Ptolemy were well provided with heirs. Agathocles, the son of Lysimachus, had won distinction as a commander and had hunted Demetrius himself across the Taurus. Ptolemy, besides his eldest son Ptolemy, nicknamed Keraunos, had several other sons already grown to manhood.

And now Fate seemed to work miracles on Seleucus' behalf and set his rivals to destroy their own defences. A chain of events took place which began with the old Ptolemy abdicating in favor, not of his eldest son Keraunos, but of his son by Berenice, the Ptolemy whom later generations called Philadelphus (end of 285). Keraunos at once fled, and found reception at the court of Lysimachus. But Lysimachus was taking a serpent into his bosom. His court was soon riddled with subterranean intrigue, and Ptolemy Keraunos contrived to awake the suspicions of Lysimachus against his son. Agathocles was assassinated by his father's orders and a massacre of his adherents began. This criminal outbreak had two consequences. In the first place, as soon as the truth came to light and Agathocles was cleared, Ptolemy Keraunos had once more to flee, and this time betook himself to Seleucus. Fate without any effort of his had brought into Seleucus hand the claimant by right of birth to the Egyptian throne. In the second place the murder of Agathocles raised about Lysimachus a swarm of domestic enemies. The father's yoke had never been easy, but the son was universally popular, and now all the hopes which had been fixed upon him had failed. The city-states within the dominions of Lysimachus began to fall away from allegiance. The remnant of the party of Agathocles, his wife and children, had taken refuge with Seleucus. The army was thoroughly disaffected and officers continually made their way to Syria. Even a son of Lysimachus, Alexander, followed the current. Hundreds of voices called on Seleucus to take up arms against the tyrant. Fate had made his way open into the realm of Lysimachus.

Seleucus felt indeed that his moment had come. The world, weary of the long conflict, saw once more, forty years after the great conqueror's death, his two remaining companions, now old men, address themselves to the crowning fight for his inheritance. In view of the danger from Asia, Lysimachus looked, as of old, to an alliance with Egypt. His daughter Arsinoe was given in marriage to the young king Ptolemy. But Egypt seems to have remained true to its reputation as a broken reed. We do not hear of any help sent to Lysimachus from that quarter.

Asia Minor was the theatre of the campaign. We are nowhere told its movements. Whether the capture of Sardis by Seleucus and of Cotyaium in Phrygia by Alexander, the son of Lysimachus, preceded the decisive battle or followed it we do not know. The site of that battle is uncertain; it is convenient to call it, after Eusebius, the battle of Corapedion, the plain of Corus, but where that was we cannot say. The result, however, of the battle we know. Lysimachus fell. A refugee from Heraclea in the service of Seleucus gave the mortal blow with his lance. The widow of Agathocles would have had the victor leave the body unburied, but was mollified by Alexander, who got leave to take it away (Spring 281). The tomb of Lysimachus was visible for many centuries between the little towns of Pactye and Cardia in the Chersonese.

Seleucus had seen his last rival disappear. No doubt, to assume actual possession of the realm of Lysimachus would take some time. The garrisons distributed throughout it, the governments in the various cities may not have instantly accepted the conqueror. But there was no heir of Lysimachus able to offer serious resistance. And in many places the mere news of Corupedion was enough to overthrow the existing regime. The case of Ephesus probably shows the sort of thing that took place in a number of cities. Here Arsinoe, the queen of Lysimachus, was residing when the news of the battle arrived. The whole city was instantly in an uproar, the adherents of Seleucus seized the direction of things, and Arsinoe narrowly escaped in disguise. Already, by the overthrow of the Western king, Seleucus considered the West his. So the dream which had been the motive in all the wars of the last forty years—the dream which Perdicas, Eumenes and Antigonus had perished in pursuing—had come true at last! The whole realm of Alexander from Greece to Central Asia and India was fallen to Seleucus, with the one exception of Egypt, and the claimant to the Egyptian throne by natural right was a pensioner of his bounty. As to Egypt then he could make the claims of Ptolemy Keraunos a specious ground for intervention, and indeed we are told that he intended to round off his work by so doing.

And now that Seleucus had touched the summit of his ambition, his heart turned to the land of his birth. Perhaps it was because his greatness as the last of his peers was so lonely that he was driven to the associations of the past; there might still be about his old home faces he would recognize. He intended, we are told, to resign all his Asiatic realm into the hands of Antiochus, and be content for the remainder of his days with the narrow kingdom of his race.

He pressed eagerly, Pausanias says, towards Macedonia. But Fate, which had given him so much, denied his last desire. His position left no room for any minor independent power. This was a reflection naturally disagreeable to one with the hopes of Ptolemy Keraunos. Keraunos was a man in whom no trace can be discovered of humanity or gratitude. He saw that the immense agglomeration of power rested as yet on one slight support—the person of Seleucus himself. Were he removed, the fabric must collapse, and smaller people would again have the chances of a scramble. The conclusion was obvious. Keraunos was soon at his old trick of intrigue; his plots ramified through the army of the King.

Seleucus crossed the Hellespont into Europe (Summer 281). The main part of the army accompanied him and was quartered at Lysimachia. At a spot not far from the city, a little way off the road, was a rude pile of stones. Tradition called it Argos, and asserted it to be an altar raised long ago by the Argonauts or the host of Agamemnon. The interest of the old king as he passed that way was excited by the story. He turned his horse aside to look at it. Only a few attendants followed him. Of these Ptolemy was one. It was while Seleucus was examining the monument and listening to the legend of remote heroic days which clung to it that Ptolemy came behind and cut him to the ground. Then the murderer leapt upon a horse and galloped to the camp at Lysimachia.

CHAPTER VII

THE PROBLEMS OF ASIA MINOR

1.

The Accession of Antiochus I

THE murder of Seleucus fulfilled the hopes of Ptolemy Keraunos and brought back chaos. Once more the Empire, on the point of regaining its unity, found itself headless. Seleucus indeed, unlike Alexander, left a grown-up heir, but by the time that the couriers, flying post across Asia, had told the tidings in Babylon, other hands had already clutched the inheritance. The army was lost. When Ptolemy suddenly appeared in the camp at Lysimachia wearing the diadem and attended by a royal guard, the mass of the army was taken completely by surprise. Ptolemy had prepared his ground well. He had already tampered with many of the officers. The army, bewildered and without direction, acquiesced in the fait accompli. It put itself at the disposal of the murderer.

Antiochus, the son of Seleucus, found that, instead of succeeding quietly to the great heritage, it was only by a stiff fight he might hope to piece together a kingdom from the fragments. The prince upon whom this task fell had some things in his favor. In the first place, his hold upon the eastern provinces was firm. His mother, it must be remembered, was of Iranian race, and those peoples might naturally cleave to a king who, by half his blood, was one of themselves. Through his mother many perhaps of the grandees of Iran were his kindred. He had actually resided, as joint-king, for the last twelve years (298-281) in the East; and this must not only have confirmed the influence which he owed to his birth, but have made him specially acquainted with the local conditions. It had also trained him in the practice of government. Again, he was not without experience of war. In the battle of Ipsus he, a youth of little over twenty, had measured himself with Demetrius the Besieger; nor can he have been for twelve years ruler of Iran without having to do with the unruly tribes who made the mountain and desert dangerous for travelers. Then he held Babylonia, the richest province of the Empire. He would probably take into the conflict a longer purse than that of any prince, save perhaps the Egyptian Ptolemy.

These were his advantages in the East, but he had some in the West as well. To the Greek states of the coast Seleucus had come as a deliverer from the tyranny of Lysimachus; their hearts were given to his house. At any rate they might be inclined to look more favorably on a rule which was still prospective than on those whose burden they had learned to know. We shall soon examine, so far as can be known, how at this juncture they acted.

All these circumstances would tell on the side of Antiochus in the long run, but they did not counterbalance the immediate inconveniences of his position. In the first place, he was surprised far from the scene of action, embarrassed at the start; in the second place, the defection of a great part of the imperial army left him for the time being terribly short of men. However, he strikes in rapidly, hurrying westward, and the first of all those wars for the restoration of the Empire of Seleucus begins.

For us a great cloud conies down upon the contest. History has mainly forgotten it. We can only see dim glints of armies that sweep over Western Asia, and are conscious of an imbroglio of involved wars. But we can understand the stupendous nature of that task which the house of Seleucus set itself to do—to hold together under one scepter, against all the forces which battered it from without, forces stronger than any by which the Achaemenian Empire had ever been assailed till the coining of Alexander, against all the elements of disruption which sapped it within, the huge fabric built up by Seleucus Nicator. It was a labor of Sisyphus. The Empire, a magnificent *tour de force*, had no natural vitality. Its history from the moment it misses the founder's hand is one of decline. It was a "sick man" from its birth. Its construction occupied the few glorious years of Seleucus Nicator, its dissolution the succeeding two and a quarter centuries. Partially restored again and again, it lapses almost immediately into new ruin. The restorations become less and less complete. But it does a great work in propagating and defending Hellenism in the East till the advent of Rome.

The natural clefts of the Empire, the fissures which were so apt at any weakening of the central authority to gape, followed geographical barriers. From Northern Syria the western provinces were cut off by the line of the Taurus; on the east the desert separated it from the seats of Assyrio-Babylonian civilization, and beyond that again the mountain-wall of Zagrus fenced Iran. To hold these geographically detached members from a single base is the standing problem. The long struggle for each one has a more or less separate history. In the following chapters it is proposed to follow that of the struggle for Asia Minor—the Trans-Tauric Question, if one may use the modern phrase—till the accession of the third Antiochus, the king under whom it was finally settled (281-223).

2.

Asia Minor

It is convenient to speak of the region in question as Asia Minor, although that term for it did not come into use till long after the Seleucids had passed away. To them it was always "the country beyond the Taurus," or "on this side of the Taurus," according to the speaker's standpoint. An oblong peninsula, washed by the Black Sea, the Aegean, and the Sea of Cyprus, it formed one of the main divisions of the ancient world, with a physical character, an ethnology, and a history of its own. In feature it is a

sort of miniature Iran. Both are plateaus connected on the east and west respectively with the mountain complex of Armenia. In both a central desert is surrounded by a hill country, the nurse of rivers. But there is one great difference. At its opposite extremity to Armenia the Iranian plateau is shut in by the inhospitable world of Central Asia, whilst Asia Minor, at its western end, sinks in a series of warm, moist valleys and rich alluvial plains to the friendly Aegean. In size it bore no proportion to Iran; but, insignificant as on the map it appears by the side of its huge neighbor, this corner of their Empire called out the interest of Hellenic kings in ways in which Iran could not. In the first place, it formed the bridge between Asia and their motherland; their hearts always turned westward. In the second place, it was to a Greek full of historical associations; it was the Asia which his fathers had known when Iran was an undiscovered world; its names were familiar to him since his childhood; Ilion, Sardis, Gordium, such places figured large in his traditions as the seats of old-world barbaric principedoms, the theatre of heroic wars. Lastly, Hellenism had already taken firm root there; Greek influence had reached its more civilized races, Carians and Lycians; its western coast was as Greek as the Peloponnesus, occupied by a line of Greek cities which stood little behind Athens in riches, in culture, and in old renown.

During the long history of which it had been an important part, Asia Minor had never had either national or political unity. There was no people of Asia Minor. Since dim antiquity wandering races from every quarter had streamed into it, making the confusion of its motley tribe worse confounded. It has furnished ethnologists, ancient and modern, with a puzzle which has the charm of never being able to be found out. Its predominant languages seem to have belonged to the Aryan family; and there is good ground for believing that the races in its north-western region, Phrygians, Mysians, and Bithynians, were of one stock with the Thracians on the European shore. There had never been a kingdom or empire of Asia, as there had been an Egyptian, an Assyrian, and an Iranian. Perhaps if the Mermnad dynasty in Lydia had had time it might have created such an empire. But it came into collision prematurely with the rising power of Persia and was shattered (547-546 B.C.). Thenceforward over the whole of Asia Minor, with its farrago of peoples, languages, and religions, was drawn the prevalence of one alien race, of an Iranian Great King.

3.

Persian Rule

(a) The Native Races

Persian rule in Asia Minor, however, had ado to maintain itself. It was beset by three great difficulties. One of these was presented by the native races. As a matter of fact, the Persian subjugation of Asia Minor was very incomplete, according to our standard in such things. As in the rest of the Empire, the arm of the central government never reached far from the great highroads. The mountain people went on with their old life and obeyed their hereditary chiefs with the occasional necessity of supplying men or tribute to the Great King. Their independence fluctuated according to the circumstances of the moment, the energy of a neighboring satrap, their own power of resistance. Sometimes the government could save its face and its pocket by recognizing the native chief as imperial satrap in return for a due payment of tribute. But such a state of things has been the normal one, as was said before, in Asiatic empires.

The eastern and northern part of the country beyond the Taurus was known to the Persians as Katpatuka, a name which the Greeks transformed into Cappadocia. The region designated embraced the eastern tract of the bare central uplands and the belt of mountain country, forest-clad, seamed with rivers, which comes between those uplands and the Black Sea. Its native inhabitants belonged to all sorts of different breeds. In old Assyrian days the two great races here had been the Meshech and Tubal of our Bibles, and the remains of them still held on in the land among later comers, and were known as Moschi and Tibareni to the Greeks. Under Persian rule a foreign Iranian aristocracy, priestly and lay, had settled down upon the nearer part, at any rate, of Cappadocia, great barons and prelates, living in castles and burgs, among the subject peoples, like the Normans in England. To these incomers the old inhabitants stood as serfs, tilling their estates, hewing their wood and drawing their water generation after generation. We never hear of any revolt among the Cappadocian peasants. In fact, all communication of the court with the Aegean sea-board by way of the Cilician Gates must go through the Cappadocian plateau, and one or other of the roads that ran through it was always one of the main arteries of the Empire. But in the more outlying parts of the province, among the mountains and along the northern coast, a very different state of things prevailed. Here the King's government was a mere shadow, or less. Even in that part of the Taurus which overlooked Cilicia, in the Cataonian highlands, there were clans which knew no law except their own. Along the Black Sea coast, again, Greek writers give us a catalogue of independent tribes. When Xenophon went that way in 400 he found himself quite outside the sphere of Persian rule. Towards the mouth of the Halys the coast population became more predominantly Paphlagonian, and west of the Halys the Paphlagonian country proper extended to the Parthenius.

The Paphlagonians were barbarians of the same stamp as their neighbors, but they had made a step in the direction of national unity. East of the Halys there was in 400 only a chaos of petty tribes, following each its own will, but strong men had arisen among the Paphlagonians who had hammered them together into some consistency. As a military power even, the Paphlagonian principality was not to be despised; they furnished a fine type of barbaric cavalry. Their chief, Corylas, openly flouted the Great King's ban. Officially, he was by the usual device styled the King's satrap ; it was explained at court that the Paphlagonians had no Persian satrap over them by the King's favor, because they had joined Cyrus of their own accord.

Otys, the successor of Corylas, was equally contumacious (393). Some fifteen years later (about 378) the Paphlagonian prince, Thuys, was captured by the unusually able satrap of Cappadocia, Datames, and for a spell the King's word was of force in Paphlagonia. The importance of this country to the Persian government was derived largely from the trade-route which found its outlet to the Black Sea in the Greek city of Sinope, the great mart of the northern coast. An independent Paphlagonia cut off the government from this gate of the kingdom. And after the capture of Thuys the country seems to have remained to some extent at any rate in the hand of Persian satraps. Datames laid siege to Sinope itself about 369 and got possession of Amisus. Coins are found of the Sinopean type which bear his name in Greek.⁷ Others, of the same type, but apparently somewhat later, bear in the official Aramaic script a name which seems to be Abd-susin. These, it is thought, were struck by a successor of Datames, perhaps by his son, whom Nepos calls Sysinas. Others, still Sinopean, have the name Ariarath (Ariarathes). This last is, no doubt, the same Ariarathes who, at the coming of Alexander, was established in the northern and mountainous part of the Cappadocian province farther east. His castle seems to have been at Gaziura in the valley of the Iris, and he strikes money with the figure and name of the local Baal (Ba'al-Gazir). In what degree of dependence Ariarathes stood to the central government may be questionable; he was at any rate an Iranian lord, and his presence in Paphlagonia and Northern Cappadocia shows that these regions had been penetrated in the last days of the Achaemenian Empire, if not by the authority of the Great King, at any rate by Persian influence. The Paphlagonians do not appear to have been politically under Ariarathes in 336. They had again ceased to pay tribute, and they send, as an independent nation, ambassadors to Alexander.

Beyond Paphlagonia, at the north-western corner of the peninsula, the dark pine forests and mountain pastures which lay above the entrance of the Black Sea were tenanted by two kindred tribes whom the Greeks knew as Thynians and Bithynians. Sometimes they spoke of them by the latter name as a single people. They were Thracian immigrants from the opposite shore, and had the same characteristics as their European cousins, savage hardihood, wild abandonment to the frenzy of religion and of war. The terror of them kept the Greeks from making any settlement along their coast, from Chalcedon to Heraclea, and woe betide the mariner driven to land there! The Greeks on their side took, when they could, fearful reprisals. In 416 the Calcedonians procured the help of Byzantium, enrolled Thracian mercenaries to meet the Bithynians at their own game, and made a raid into their country which was long remembered for the atrocities which marked it.

The Bithynians, like the Paphlagonians, found leaders able to draw together under one head the elemental forces which exist in rude and unbroken races. During the latter part of the fifth century a chief called Doedalsus appears to hold in Bithynia the same sort of position as Corylas in Paphlagonia. In 435 the town of Astacus in the Propontis was refounded as an Athenian colony. It was well fitted by its situation to take a leading part in the coast traffic, but up to this time its advantages had been neutralized by the chronic warfare it had to maintain with the neighboring Bithynians. It had sunk lower and lower. From its new foundation, however, it rapidly rose to new

prosperity. And this was in large part due, we are given to understand, to the rational policy of Doedalsus, who about that time got his wild countrymen into hand, and saw his profit in protecting the Greek cities of the coast. Bithynia was beginning to become conscious as a new-born state and learn the uses of the world. How far the success of Doedalsus in bringing the Bithynians under, his single sway went we do not know, in 409 there is an indication of disunion among the tribes. But Doedalsus established a dynasty which served at all events as the nucleus of a national kingdom. And his house had better fortune than the neighboring Paphlagonian. The power of that the Persian overlord succeeded in breaking, but Doedalsus and his successors were too much for him. The Bithynians were a thorn in the side of the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, to whose government they nominally belonged. Although Pharnabazus might combine with them in opposition to a common foe, like Xenophon's Ten Thousand, he normally regarded their domain as hostile territory, which he was glad enough to see ravaged.⁴ The dynasty of Doedalsus survived all the onsets of the Achaemenian Empire; it outlasted that Empire itself, and in the closing century before Christ, when all the face of the world was changed, and powers that Doedalsus never knew possessed it, his line still reigned, the relic of an older day, beside the Bosphorus.

We have seen that all the mountain country along the north of Asia Minor, from the Phasis to the Bosphorus, was a region from which the authority of the Great King was excluded. It was only now and then that, thanks to the exertions of a Datames, Persian rule could break through this wall at some point to the Black Sea. But the case was just as bad in the south of the peninsula. Here, too, Persian rule was shut off from the sea by a long stretch of mountains which it could never subdue, the mountains lying on the left hand of the road which ran from the Cilician Gates westward. They were inhabited by hardy marauding tribes, whose ethnology indeed may be obscure, but whose general character and manner of life were like that of the other highlanders of Asia Minor. They not only held their country against the imperial armies, but made the King's highroad insecure. The Lycaonians, who lived in that part of the mountains nearest the Cilician Gates, had even descended into the central plain in 401 and made something like a regular occupation of the country. The names which Greek writers apply to these mountain tribes and their several territories are as shifting and uncertain as the relations of the tribes themselves and their frontiers. In the fourth century a name, unknown to Herodotus, embracing all the mountaineers between the coast peoples and the inner plateau, comes into use, that of Pisidians (Xenophon, Ephorus, Theopompus). The name by which Herodotus had indicated the inhabitants of this region, Milyes, was now restricted to those of the most westerly part of it, the Hinterland of Lycia, the region Milyas, regarded sometimes as identical with, sometimes as including, another familiar to Herodotus, that of Cabalis. The people again in the country along the coast between Rough Cilicia and Lycia, where the mountains leave only a strip of level land a few miles broad between themselves and the sea, a people whom the Greeks had always known as Pamphylans, were in reality simply Pisidians somewhat civilized by contact with the outside world and the Hellenes.

West of the Pamphylans the mountains gather into a mass, which bulges in a semicircular projection, 180 miles across, into the sea. The uplands of this

promontory—the region, that is, which the Greeks called Milyas—are shrouded from our knowledge in the times before Alexander by barbarian darkness. Their contours merged in the Pisidian hills, and the hard-faring mountaineers who ranged over them, the Solymi, lived and died, no doubt, in the same sort of way as their Pisidian and Pamphylian neighbors. But along the sea-board of the promontory, and in the three river valleys, those of the Xanthus, the Myras, and the Limyrus, which run up from the coast, dwelt the ancient people of the Lycians. In them we have a very different type from the rude highlanders with whom we have hitherto had to deal. The Lycians, from whatever dim origins they sprang, stood in character near to the Hellenes. It would be straying from our path to discuss the part they play in the heroic age of Greek legend—those mysterious people who seemed to the simple fathers of the Hellenes a race of wizards, able to make enormous stones dance together into magic palaces, whom yet the light of the historic age shows so primitive, that they still reckoned descent by the mother. In the time of the Persian Empire the Lycians did not yet form the developed federal republic which we find described in Strabo. They were distributed under the rule of a number of petty princes, whose names we still read on their coins. Such a state of things must have meant a good deal of internal friction. And we find, in fact, essays on the part of a single dynast to oust the others and make himself chief of the whole nation. Such an attempt was made by the son of Harpagus (his name is obliterated), who put up the *stèle* in Xanthus; he “took many citadels by the help of Athene, the sacker of cities, and gave a portion of his kingdom to his kin.”

King Pericles, who captured Telmessus (about 370?), seems to have almost succeeded for a time. But these efforts failed in the end before internal resistance or foreign attack. At the same time, in spite of the divisions, there appears to have existed among the Lycians some rudimentary recognition of national unity. The symbol which is thought to be connected with the Apollo of Xanthus occurs on all sorts of Lycian coins, and is held to show some kind of sacred Amphictyony formed about a central shrine of the Sun-god.

Two main external influences were at work upon the inner life of Lycia during the Persian period, the Iranian and the Hellenic. It is, of course, impossible to gauge either from the few traces we can now discover. The Iranian influence is shown in the dress of the Lycian princes, as they appear on the monuments and in the names (Harpagus, Artembases, Mithrapatas) which some of them bear. The Hellenic influence, on the other hand, is shown by the name of King Pericles and by the witness of the monuments, some, like the Nereid monument, the very work of Attic masters, and others exhibiting a style in which native elements and Greek are combined.

Between the conquest of Asia Minor by the Persians and the coming of Alexander we can make out four phases in Lycian history. The first is one of subjection to the Achaemenian power. Their resistance at the beginning had been forlornly heroic—one desperate battle against overwhelming numbers, and then the self-immolation of the whole people of Xanthus, except eighty households, who happened at the time to be away. After that they had to pay tribute into the Great King's treasury and give their youth for his armies. The second phase is introduced by the operations of Cimon in Asia Minor (466?), whereby the Persian power in these regions is crippled.

Lycia now throws off the Persian yoke to enter the League over which Athens presides. How long this phase lasted is uncertain. In 446 the Lycians are still paying tribute to Athens; in 430 a third phase has begun, the Lycians are raided as an unfriendly nation by the Athenian admiral Melesander. How far the Lycians in this third phase fell again under Persian influence, how far they attained an independence both of Persia and Athens, is impossible to determine. In 380 the orator Isocrates declares with some inaccuracy that Lycia has never had a Persian master. It is during this period that we have the attempts of the son of Harpagus and of King Pericles to consolidate Lycia under their own rule. This third phase is closed by the Lycians (under Pericles, perhaps) taking part with the satraps in the great revolt against the house of Achaemenes. Maussollus, the Carian dynast who betrayed the confederation, is authorized by the Persian King to add Lycia to his dominions. This he succeeds in doing, and the fourth phase is one of annexation to Caria.

The Carians in the fourth century are in a state of semi dependence upon the Persian King. They are governed by a dynasty of native princes, who are, however, recognized as satraps of the Empire. The loyalty of these princes to the Achaemenian King fluctuates; Maussollus first joins in the rebellion of the satraps and then deserts it in 362. But the Carians are now no longer the race of barbarian fighting men who might be distinguished by their large crests alongside of the Greek mercenaries two or three centuries before. It is on their coasts that some of the illustrious Greek cities stand—Miletus and Halicarnassus,—and the old Carian towns inland have more or less taken on the character of Greek cities themselves. They formed, not improbably, a federation, with the temple of Zeus Chrysaoreus for its religious centre. And these Carian cities seem to have cherished all the Hellenic aspirations after autonomy; the yoke of their princes they found very grievous, and Maussollus lived in a web of conspiracies. But prince and people alike were open to the influences of Hellenism. The decrees of the city of Mylasa are in Greek; Maussollus, who had extended his power over the Greek cities of the coast and made Halicarnassus his capital, was buried in the “Mausoleum,” designed and decorated by Scopas and others of the greatest Greek sculptors.

Cut off thus by barbarian peoples from both the northern and the southern coast of Asia Minor, the King’s government was confined to a strip of country running through the interior. The Cappadocian plateau, the two Phrygian provinces and Lydia, it was only here that mandates from Babylon ran, and even here there were districts, like the Mysian hills, which their authority could not penetrate.² Besides the Cappadocian serfs, it was only the Lydians and Phrygians, now a race of patient husbandmen dispersed in poor villages, though their name had once been greatest among the peoples of the land— it was only these who were beaten flat by the Achaemenian conquest. But though the King’s arm reached over Lydia, his hold on the western coast also was vexatiously restricted. His rule here encountered, not barbarian races, but an obstacle in some ways more formidable still.

(b) The Asiatic Greeks

The second difficulty which beset Persian rule in Asia Minor consisted in the occupation of a great part of the coasts by Greek cities. Here was something which in itself created a problem for any power aspiring to rule Asia. Under any circumstances these Hellenes, with their inbred abhorrence of everything which restricted the sovereign autonomy of each city-state, with their inveterate assumption of a higher culture, were bound to form an indigestible element in an Asiatic monarchy. But, left to themselves, they might be held down by an arm as long and as mighty as the King's. Here, however, came in the circumstance which so dangerously complicated the problem. On the other side of the sea and in the intermediate islands, the free Greeks were established in their sea-faring republics. So that, while on the one hand the Asiatic Greeks had kinsmen at their back whom they might call in, on the other hand the free Greeks found the door held open for them whenever they might attack. To hold the coast against a combination of the Greeks who inhabited it and the Greeks who came in from beyond—fighting men better than any the Asiatic monarch could command—was obviously impossible. There was some method in the madness of Xerxes when he set out to trample down European Greece; it was a measure of self-defense. This was shown by what followed the great failure. During the days of Athenian power in the fifth century the Persian king had even to acquiesce in the humiliation of not being allowed to send any troops within a prescribed distance of his own coast, or ships of war west of the Bosphorus or the Chelidonian promontory.

Then the wars of Athens and Sparta suggested to him a better way of isolating the Asiatic Greeks—the policy of playing off one Greek state against another. And this design the brutal egoism of Sparta made at last successful. By the Peace of Antalcidas (387-386) the Persians regained possession of the western coast of Asia Minor and held it unchallenged by the states of Greece till the coming of Alexander.

We are very imperfectly informed as to the condition of the Greek states under Achaemenian rule, how far the normal functioning of each body politic was interfered with by the paramount power. Generally speaking, the cities were probably no worse off under Persian than under Spartan, or even Athenian, supremacy. In all these cases the two chief burdens were the same—the necessity of paying tribute and the occupation by a foreign garrison. The weight with which the King's hand pressed must have differed greatly from city to city, or even in the same city at different moments. Some, like Cyzicus, seem to have maintained their independence unimpaired by the Peace of Antalcidas. Others from time to time threw off the yoke for longer or shorter periods. Where a city was held by a military force, the garrison was composed probably in most cases, not of Orientals, but of Greek mercenaries. Here and there we have indications of the King's authority reaching the internal administration. Iasus in conferring *ateleia* has to limit its grant to those dues over which the city has control. At Mylasa it looks as if the right of inflicting the punishment of death was reserved to the King. But both Mylasa and Iasus were under the Carian dynast who acted as the King's satrap. Often, no doubt, the Persian government thought it enough to maintain in power tyrants and oligarchies, leaving them a free hand in internal administration so long as they sent in the tribute. When we ask whether the cities were generally prosperous or not in the days

before Alexander, we have conflicting evidence. Isocrates paints their condition in the blackest colors. "It is not enough that they should be subjected to tribute, that they should see their citadels in the occupation of their foes, but besides these public miseries they must yield their persons to worse usage than the bondmen which we buy and sell meet with among us. No one of us puts injuries upon his slaves so bad as the punishments they (i.e. the Persians) mete out to free men". Such a description, coming from Isocrates, is not to be taken too literally; but so much we may gather from it, that the Persian rule provoked a certain amount of discontent. On the other side we have testimonies to the increasing wealth and fullness of life in the Greek cities of Asia given us by their coins, their literary and artistic activity, and the great works whose beginning goes back to this period.

(c) The Provincial Nobility

The mountain tribes and the Greek cities circumscribed Persian rule in Asia Minor; there was a third element there which threatened, not the supremacy of the Iranian race, but the supremacy of the house of Achaemenes. This element was the disaffection of the Iranian nobility in Asia Minor towards their overlord. It had been hard from the early days of Persian rule for the court in Babylon to keep a perfect control over its own satraps in Asia Minor. The satraps had almost the station of petty kings. To remove a powerful governor was a matter in which the government had to proceed delicately, as the story of Orestes shows. Tissaphernes had to be surprised and assassinated. They raised mercenary troops and made war on their own account, sometimes against each other; they issued coins in their own name.

Beside the provincial satraps there were a number of Iranian families settled down on estates, not only in Cappadocia but in the western sea-board. We hear, for instance, in Xenophon of the Persian Asidates, who has a castle in the neighborhood of Pergamum, and the Itabelius who comes to his assistance is probably another Persian lord established hard by. The family of Pharnabazus stands in close connection with Hellespontine Phrygia; to this house all the satraps of the country belong, and the son of Ariobarzanes (satrap from 387 to 362), Mithridates, who does not himself ever become satrap, appears to have ruled a small principality which included the Greek city of Cius. How dangerous to the King this provincial aristocracy might be the repeated revolts are enough to show.

4.

The Macedonian Conquest

These, then—the native races, the Greek cities and the Iranian nobility—were the three elements making up the problem of Asia Minor when the house of Achaemenes was in the ascendant. But by the time that Asia Minor fell to the house of Seleucus to be dealt with, the conditions had been in one circumstance significantly modified. Fifty years before that date Iranian had given place to Greek overlords. By this change the relation of the different elements to the supreme government had been variously affected. One immediate result was that the resident Iranian nobility, as a class distinct at once from the imperial house and the native tribes, disappeared. Some of them joined the train of one or other of the Macedonian chiefs, as Mithridates, the dynast of Cius, did that of Antigomis; others, like the son of this Mithridates, sought to evade the foreign yoke by taking to the hill countries and forming principalities among the native tribes, of the same category as the principalities we have seen in Bithynia and Paphlagonia, only with this feature, that at their courts in remote valleys a distinctly Iranian tradition lived on. When, therefore, one speaks of the problem of the native races under Greek overlords, there are included in the term the dynasties of Iranian as well as those of more strictly native origin.

There were still, however, three elements constituting the Trans-Tauric problem, for the difficulty felt by the Achaemenian court in maintaining a due control over its Iranian subordinates was no greater than the difficulty of a Greco-Macedonian court in controlling from a distant center its Greek subordinates. We have now to consider how up to the time when the house of Seleucus entered into possession these three elements had been dealt with by the new rulers of the world.

(a) The Native Races

The native races, as we have seen, had some of them been completely subjugated by the Persians, others imperfectly, and others not at all. In what measure the first of these, the Lydians, Phrygians, and Southern Cappadocians, were affected by the change of masters we have hardly any means of determining. The Phrygians of the north-west were ordered by Alexander to “pay the same tribute as they had paid to Darius.” Under Antigonus they seem to have found themselves exceptionally well off, or perhaps it was only that they looked back to his days as a reign of gold from the troublous times which ensued. The Carians were left under their native dynasty, represented by the Princess Ada—perhaps only temporarily, as the dynasty has disappeared by Alexander’s death. The unsubjugated races, on the other hand, had cause to feel that a different hand held the reins. A Greek ruler could not tolerate the old slipshod methods, the indolent compromises, which mark the monarchies of Asia. Alexander seems to have made up his mind at once to put an end to the turbulent independence of the highlanders which rendered the King’s highway insecure. In his passage through Asia Minor he found time, although intent on greater things, to make a winter expedition into the hills behind Lycia, the Milyas region, to destroy a fort of the Pisidians which vexed Phaselis, and push his way through the heart of the Pisidian country, storming Sagalassus. A year

later he had crossed the Taurus never to return. But the subjugation of Asia Minor was to be methodically pursued by his generals. They do not seem to have been particularly successful. Galas, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, marched an elaborately equipped force into the Bithynian country, but was overpowered by Bas, the grandson of Doedalsus. Balacrus, the satrap of Cilicia, perished in the attempt to reduce the Pisidian strongholds, Laranda and Isaura.

At the death of Alexander in 323 a good part of Asia Minor had still to be registered as unsubdued. The northern regions had been hardly touched by the Macedonian arms, Alexander in 333, hastening on to meet Darius, had been forced to be content with the formal expressions of homage brought him at Gordium by a deputation from the Paphlagonian chiefs. How far from complete their submission had been was shown by the fact that they expressly stipulated that none of the imperial troops should cross their borders. Farther east, in the valley of the Iris, the Iranian prince, Ariarathes, continued unmolested to form a great power out of the materials supplied him by the hardy mountain races. He had by 323 at his disposal an army of 30,000 foot and 15,000 horse.

To the south the tribes of the Taurus were as independent as ever, unless some permanent occupation of the route opened by Alexander by way of Sagalassus had been maintained. Termessus, the great fortress of Western Pisidia, commanding the road between Perga and the interior, remained, as Alexander had left it, unhumbled. Selge, the rival Pisidian town, had made indeed a treaty with Alexander, but with the express declaration that it was as a friend, not as a subject, that it was prepared to comply with the rescripts. Still farther west, the hills behind Lycia, the regions called Milyas and Cabalis, lay, as far as we can tell, beyond the reach of Macedonian arms. Cibyra, with a population of mixed origins, Lydian and Pisidian, was probably already a strong mountain state under native chiefs. A century and a half later its villages stretched from the Rhodian Peraea and the Lycian valleys to the confines of Termessus, and it could put an army of 30,000 foot and 2000 horse in the field.

East of Selge, the hills as far as the Cilician Gates were, as far as we know, untouched ground. In fact it is impossible to trace any progress in the subjugation of Asia Minor from the date of Alexander's passage to the date of his death. Occupied in distant expeditions, he had hardly time to begin the work of consolidating. The abandonment of schemes of further conquest after his death gave the Regent Perdiccas scope for dealing with the omissions in Alexander's rapid work. In the year after Alexander died, Perdiccas was with the lungs in Asia Minor to support Eumenes, on whom, as satrap of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia, the task of subduing Ariarathes and any other native dynasties had been laid. Together Perdiccas and Eumenes, with the imperial army, advanced into northern Cappadocia. Ariarathes threw his native levies before them in vain. He lost two battles, and found himself and his house in the Macedonians' hands. Perdiccas treated him with the same cruel rigor which Asiatic kings had made the rule in the case of rebels. The old prince, now eighty-two, was crucified and his family destroyed. Eumenes immediately took measures to organize the province.

From dealing with the northern part of Asia Minor, the Regent immediately went on to deal with the highlanders of the south. Laranda was stormed and its population exterminated. Siege was next laid to Isaura. Then the fierce tribesmen who held it acted with the same spirit which was displayed on other occasions by the peoples of the Taurus; they themselves set fire to the town and perished with their old men, their women and children, in one conflagration.

At this point the new rulers seemed to be really in a fair way to carry their empire in Asia Minor to a logical completion, satisfactory to a Greek mind. That this would have been done had the Greek Empire remained a unity can hardly be doubted, just as it was done later on by Rome. But with the death of Perdiccas there ceased to be a single Greco-Macedonian power. The energies of the conquering aristocracy were almost entirely taken up with fighting each other. Asia Minor, it is true, fell, as a whole, under the dominion of a single chief, Antigonus; it was there even that the seat of his government was established; after the reconquest of Babylon and Iran by Seleucus it looked as if a separate kingdom of Asia Minor, under the house of Antigonus, might emerge from the confusion, like the kingdom of Egypt under the house of Ptolemy. But even though Asia Minor formed the peculiar possession of Antigonus, he was too much occupied with his Macedonian rivals to extend, or even to maintain, Greek rule internally.

In the south the conquest of the Pisidian country appears to have been suspended with the death of Perdiccas. Antigonus was drawn thither in 319-318, but it was not to subjugate the Pisidians that he came. It has been remarked that the inconvenience to Asiatic monarchies of unsubdued tracts within their confines arises not only from the depredations of the free tribes, but from the fact that any one opposed to the central government has these standing enemies of the central government to fall back upon for shelter and support. The partisans of Perdiccas, finding themselves after his death a weak minority, had made common cause with the disruptive elements within the realm of Antigonus. Alcetas, the Regent's brother, had long set himself, in view of contingencies, to gain popularity among the Pisidians. The young men who had been drawn from the hills to join the Macedonian armies returned home to report how good a friend they had found in this great chief. And now in the day of his adversity the Pisidians received Alcetas and his companions with open arms. It was to track down his Macedonian rivals that Antigonus pushed with a great force into the Pisidian hills. When Alcetas had been delivered up to him by the old men of Termessus behind the back of the young men, who stood by their friend to the last, Antigonus withdrew satisfied. He did not attempt to reduce Termessus itself or effect anything like a permanent settlement of the country. All his energies were required for the great war.

In the north his measures with regard to the native tribes were equally inconclusive. The heritage of Doedalsus was still in strong hands; Ziboetes, the son and successor of that Bas who had beaten back Alexander's general, himself profited by the troubled times to descend from the Bithynian hills upon the Greek cities. In 315 he was besieging Astacus and Calchedon. Polemaeus, the general of Antigonus, passing that way, compelled him indeed to give up the attempt. But it was no time for reducing Bithynia. Polemaeus was obliged to make some bargain with the Bithynian chieftain,

which was embodied in an alliance. The policy of compromise with regard to the non-Hellenic elements in Asia which marks the rule of Antigonus is seen in another instance—that of Mithridates. This Persian nobleman, whom the Achaemenian government had rewarded for betraying his father in 362-361 by making him dynast of Cius, had been dispossessed by Alexander. Mithridates became, after Alexander's death, a hanger-on of any Macedonian chief whose star seemed to be in the ascendant. At one time he fought under Eumenes. Antigonus, rewarding probably his infidelity to Eumenes, reinstates him in his old lordship of Cius in 309-308; *he actually replaces a Greek city under a barbarian despot*. The son of the old intriguer, a younger Mithridates, became a bosom friend of Demetrius. Antigonus was nourishing a breed destined to play a chief part in reclaiming Asia Minor for the Iranian from the European, in sustaining the last fight which the barbarian fought in Asia Minor against Rome for seven hundred years.

As soon as the cause of Antigonus began to look bad Mithridates was at his old game of treason. Antigonus caught him making overtures to Cassander. He determined then to crush the serpent's brood, to make away with father and son together. The old Mithridates was put to death on his own domain, but the younger got a hint from Demetrius and fled. He plunged into the mountains of Paphlagonia, and established himself at Cimiata under the Olgassys (mod. Ulgaz Dagh). Thence he began fighting his way eastwards along the valley of the Amnias (mod. Gyuk Irmak), across the Halys, along the valley of the Iris (mod, Yeshil Irmak), drawing the hill peoples under him.

About the same time Macedonian rule was driven back at another point. Ariarathes, the son or nephew of the old prince whom Perdicas had crucified in 322, had taken refuge with Ardoates, a petty king in Armenia. He now (302 or 301) appeared upon the scene with a band of Armenians and attacked Amyntas, the general of Antigonus in Cappadocia. Ariarathes was possibly acting in concert with Seleucus and other allied kings, who were drawing their forces together around Antigonus. Amyntas was killed and the Macedonian garrisons expelled. The northern part of Cappadocia, the valley of the Iris, where the old Ariarathes had been strong, the younger either did not occupy or soon abandoned, since it passed within a few years, as we have seen, under the dominion of Mithridates. The principality which Ariarathes II carved out for himself lay more to the south, within the province indeed that the old Ariarathes, according to Diodorus, claimed as his, but covering how much of the later Cappadocian kingdom we do not know.

All this country, which now fell to the two Persians, had been organized twenty years before by Eumenes as a Macedonian province. But after the rapid Macedonian conquest of the East *the tide had already turned; in the reconquest of this territory by barbarians the long ebb of two and a half centuries had already begun*.

With the partition after Ipsus (301) Asia Minor ceases to form part of a single kingdom. Now for the first time Seleucus is brought into contact with the problem of its native races. The Bithynians indeed of the north-west, in so far more redoubtable than the two newly-founded principalities in Cappadocia that they had already sustained the shock of Macedonian arms, fell to the share of Lysimachus between the battles of Ipsus

(301) and Corupedion (281). Lysimachus was to have his turn in tackling them before they engaged the attention of Seleucus or his house. He was not blind to the importance of reducing this turbulent corner to submission; he took in hand the task with earnestness of purpose. Bithynia was still destined to be the grave of reputations; Ziboetes led the tribesmen as ably as his grandfather Bas. Only the outline of events is given us in the few words extracted from Memnon. Lysimachus sends a body of troops; it is defeated and the commander killed. He sends another force; this Ziboetes “chases far away from his own territory.” Then Lysimachus leads an army against him in person; he is worsted. That is all we know. Whether Lysimachus after his repulse acquiesced in the independence of the Bithynians, or whether he was preparing to renew the attack when his reign ended, we do not know. In 297 it appears that Ziboetes assumed the title of king. He had certainly won the right to do so. The dynasty which had proved its ability to hold its own against Persian and Macedonian for a hundred years seems entitled to assume the marks of sovereignty.

Whether the country to the north now being conquered by Mithridates fell within the sphere of Lysimachus or of Seleucus, as the kings drew the map after Ipsus, there is nothing to show. Perhaps it matters little how the official map in this case was drawn, since neither king had apparently any leisure to send troops into those outlying parts or interfere with Mithridates in his work. It was in Southern Cappadocia that Seleucus found himself by the partition with unsubjected tracts on his hands. Two scanty notices point to his activity in this direction. One is a passage of Pliny, in which he quotes Isidorus as saying that King Seleucus exterminated the fierce tribes (*ferocissimas gentes*) of Arienei and Capreatae, in the region “between Cilicia, Cappadocia, Cataonia, and Armenia,” where he founded in memory of their quelling the city of Apamea Damea. This region geographers have not yet been able to identify. The other passage speaks of some forces of Seleucus under Diodorus being lost, apparently after Corupedion, in Cappadocia. Whether the victorious enemy was Ariarathes, or indeed what the relations of Seleucus and Ariarathes were, we are not told. Only the fact stands out that the house of Ariarathes was left in secure possession of part of Cappadocia, and that the part which Seleucus was able to occupy was now distinctly described as Cappadocia Seleucis, to mark it out from the regions held by the two Persian princes.

After the destruction of Lysimachus the whole of Asia Minor is once more brought (by the theory at least of the Macedonian courts) under a single sovereignty. Seleucus has now to determine his relations to the most western of the three native principalities, the Bithynian. He has to recognize King Ziboetes or declare him an enemy of the realm and take measures accordingly. He chooses the latter alternative, as indeed any one aspiring to complete the Macedonian conquest of Asia was bound to do.⁴ Of the hostilities which ensued, the historian of Heraclea mentions only a raid made by Ziboetes upon that city as an ally of Seleucus—a raid in which the historian boasts that he got as good as he gave. With Mithridates too Seleucus would have had soon to deal had his life been longer. At the moment when he dies, Mithridates has already begun to be recognized by the world as a power antagonistic to the Greek king of Asia. The Heracleots open negotiations with him after their rupture with Seleucus.

On neither Ziboetes nor Mithridates has Seleucus the Conqueror brought his power to bear when all his designs are cut short by the hand of the assassin.

The result, then, of fifty years of Macedonian rule in Asia Minor had not been, as one might have expected, to bring it all under a single strong and systematic government. No noticeable advance in this direction had been made on the state of things prevailing under the Persian Empire. The Greek kings had, indeed, brought with them better ideals; Alexander and Perdiccas had begun to level old barriers, but since the break-up of the Empire those ideals had been unrealized and the work of Alexander had been suspended in consequence of the long intestine struggle of the Macedonian princes. So that now in 281 B.C. the Bithynians and Pisidians still defied external control, the old unsubdued tracts on either side of the great high-roads were unsubdued still, and the northern races of the Black Sea regions were not only still free, but were growing into formidable powers under Iranian leaders. Greek rule had never yet had a chance; first it had been checked by Alexander's premature death, then by the long fight between the rivals, then, when at last the Empire seemed to have become a unity again under Seleucus, once more the fabric had collapsed, and the problem of the barbarian peoples of Asia Minor confronted in its old shape anyone who now aspired to take up the burden of Empire.

(b) The Greek Cities

We go on now to examine how the change of *régime* from Persian to Macedonian affected the Greek cities. They obviously were in the highest degree interested in a turn of things which substituted a Hellenic for a barbarian King. The rosiest dreams of Panhellenic enthusiasts, like Isocrates, seemed to have become fact. In truth, however, there was something radically false and incongruous from the start in the position in which the new rulers now found themselves. They claimed to be the champions of Hellenism; they were determined to be paramount kings. The two characters were absolutely irreconcilable. The great crucial question of Hellenic politics—the independence of the several cities—could not be honestly met. The “autonomy of the Hellenes”—it had become already a cant phrase of the market-place; as an absolute principle, no Greek could impeach it with a good conscience; even those who violated it in practice were ready to invoke it, as something sacrosanct, against their opponents—Spartans against Athenians, and Athenians against Spartans; the Persians themselves had been induced to promulgate it in the Peace of Antalcidas. The autonomy of the Asiatic Greeks, understood in the sense of their being freed from the barbarian yoke, had been the ostensible cause in which Alexander drew his sword against Darius. But once lord of Asia, a Hellenic no less than a Persian king wanted to be master in his own house.

We must remember, in order to realize the difficulty of the situation, how genuine and earnest the desire of Alexander and his successors was to secure the good

word of the Greeks. Many considerations would move them. There were firstly those of material advantage. The city-states, although none singly could cope in the long run with such powers as were wielded by the great Macedonian chiefs, had by no means become cyphers. There were still civic forces, land and naval, which they could put in action. There were still moneys in the city treasuries which could procure mercenaries. It was of real importance into what scale Cyzicus or Rhodes threw its weight. Cities like these were capable, even singly, of making a good fight. And their importance was, of course, immensely increased by the division of the Macedonian Empire. Even a small accession of power to one or other of the rival chiefs now told. A good name among the Hellenes, which should make the cities willing allies, was worth striving for.

And it was not the cities only as political bodies which it was necessary to win. Princes who no longer had authority in the Macedonian fatherland, and could no longer call up fresh levies of Macedonian countrymen to make good the wear and tear of war, rulers like Antigonus and Ptolemy and Seleucus, came to depend far more upon attracting to their standards the floating class of adventurers who swarmed, over the Greek world and sold their swords to whom they would. It was of immense consequence to be well spoken of among the Greeks.

But besides these considerations of material gain, a good reputation among the Greeks seemed to the Macedonian rulers a thing to be prized for its own sake. They really cared for Greek public opinion. Yes, practical, ambitious, and hard as they appear, they were still not inaccessible to some sentimental motions. They desired fame. And fame meant—to be spoken of at Athens! The only letters with which they had been imbued were Greek. The great men of the past, the classical examples of human glory, were the men about whom they had learnt when boys in their Greek lesson-books. The achievements of the Macedonian sword seemed to lose half their halo unless they were canonized by the Greek pen. And so the strange spectacle was seen, of the Greeks, after the power of their republics had shrunk and their ancient spirit had departed, mesmerizing the new rulers of the world, as later on they mesmerized the Romans, by virtue of the literature, the culture, and the names which they inherited from their incomparable past. The adulation which the Greeks of those days yielded with such facile prodigality still had a value for their conquerors. The wielders of material power rendered indirect homage to the finer activities of brain.

The interest and the pride of a Macedonian dynast lay no less in his being a champion of Hellenism than in his being a great king. But to be both together—there was the crux! A king could do a great deal for Hellenism; he could shield the Greeks from barbarian oppression; he could make splendid presents to Greek cities and Greek temples; he could maintain eminent men, philosophers, captains, literati, at his court; he could patronize science and poetry and art, but really to allow Greek cities within his dominions to be separate bodies with a will independent of the central power was, of course, impossible. Frankly to acknowledge this impossibility would not have been in accordance with the practice of politicians at any period of history. To cheat the world—to cheat themselves perhaps—with half-measures and imposing professions was the easy course. They could go on talking about the autonomy of the Hellenes, and interpret the phrase in the way prescribed by the example of Athens and Sparta. It was

an uncomfortable thing for a man of Greek education to feel himself the “enslaver” of Greek cities. What the Macedonian rulers would have liked would have been the voluntary acceptance of their dictation as permanent allies by the Greek cities. That was the ideal. And because it was not capable of being realized in fact, the natural course of politicians was, not to discard it boldly, but to pretend that what they desired was true, to preserve the outward forms, to be magnanimous in phrases. Philip and Alexander always veiled the brutal fact of their conquest of European Greece by representing themselves as captains-general elected by the federated Hellenic states. The relation of Hellenic states (European and Asiatic) to the Macedonian king was always, in the official view, one of *alliance*, not of subjection.

The opening campaign of 334 puts Alexander in the place of the Great King in the regions tenanted by the Asiatic Greeks. It is now to be seen how their autonomy takes substance. There is, at any rate, one measure of interference in the internal affairs of the cities which seems to be demanded in the interests of autonomy itself. The control of foreign powers, Hellenic and barbarian, had not in the past, as we have seen, taken the shape of external pressure only. It had worked by placing the party within the city favorable to itself in the saddle. The destruction of the foreign power did not therefore immediately and *ipso facto* liberate the oppressed faction. The tyrants and oligarchies established in the cities by the Persian government were left standing when the hand of the Great King was withdrawn. It is therefore the first business of the liberator to overthrow the existing government in the several cities and establish democracies in their place. In doing this he might justly argue that he was acting for, not against, the sacred principle of autonomy. At the same time, in view of actual instances of this change of constitution wrought by an outside power which are furnished us by the history of the times before and after Alexander, one can see how the practice lent itself to hypocrisy—how easily a ruler could use the very measure by which he pretended to assure the autonomy of a city in order to attach it more securely to himself. Every Greek city was divided against itself; “not one but two states, that of the poor and that of the rich, living on the same spot and always conspiring against one another.” The autonomy might, indeed, be held to consist in the supremacy of the *demos* rather than of the oligarchs; but in practice it was merely one faction against another, a clique of men whose influence was derived from their ability to catch the popular vote, another of men whose influence was derived from family or riches. Inevitably if one of these parties lent on the aid of an outside power, the opposite party sided with that power’s enemies. It was open to any foreign power to represent the party favorable to itself as the true soul of the city. It is no wonder, with so useful an application, that the autonomy of the Hellenes was a phrase often in the mouths, not only of the city politicians, but of foreign potentates.

The Greek cities of Asia Minor, as Alexander finds them, are held by tyrants and oligarchs in the interests of Persia. His first step, therefore, is to establish democracies everywhere. He is careful to keep his hand upon the new constitutions. In a letter to Chios he ordains that the city is to choose *nomographoi* to draw up the amended code, but their *work is to be submitted to the King for his sanction*. And now in what relation does the renovated city stand to the ruler of Asia? There were three main ways,

according to Greek ideas, in which the autonomy of a city could be violated—by the exaction of tribute, by the imposition of a garrison and by the commands of a superior power meddling with the constitution or administration. How far in each of these respects does the autonomy of the Greek cities of Asia hold good under Alexander and his first successors?

First as to the payment of tribute. Alexander is specially said to have remitted in a number of cases the tribute which the city had been paying to the Persian King. To do this he considered apparently an essential part of the work of liberation. At Ephesus he directs that the tribute which had been paid to the barbarians should be paid thenceforth into the treasury of the local Artemis. Aspendus, on the other hand, is ordered to pay tribute to the Macedonians. But the case of Aspendus was exceptional; it was to be specially punished. And even here it is said that the imposition of tribute was not to be permanent, but for a certain number of years only. It is clearly an exception proving a rule.

But we should be too simple if we inferred from the remission of tribute that no money was demanded of the cities. A showy act of magnanimity has not seldom in history covered the old grievance under a new form. A city no longer obliged to pay tribute as a subject might be called upon to make a handsome contribution as an ally. How far this was actually the case under Alexander and his successors eludes our observation. It was, in the case of Aspendus, apparently a requisition of this sort, a demand for fifty talents and the horses maintained by the city for the Persian court, which provoked the quarrel with Alexander. The liberated Chios is commanded to furnish at the expense of the city a contingent of twenty triremes ready manned to the imperial fleet and to provide for the maintenance of the temporary garrison. A rescript of Alexander dealing with Priene specially remits the “contribution”. The money contributed by Mitylene is returned by Alexander as an extraordinary mark of favour. So, too, after the death of Alexander we find Antipater requiring the cities to contribute to the war, and the order is felt by the cities as an unwelcome burden. Antigonus speaks of the heavy expenses of his allies in his war against Cassander and Ptolemy.

The second of the three modes mentioned in which a city’s autonomy might be violated was the imposition of a garrison. That indeed reduced at once the forms of a free state to a comedy. It was the most odious embodiment of brute force. We may well believe that Alexander was unwilling to stultify his own action as liberator in so open a manner. It is only as a temporary measure, or where his hold on an important point is threatened by external enemies, or there has been some mark of hostility on the part of the population, that Alexander permits himself to introduce a Macedonian garrison into a Hellenic city. At Mitylene, for instance, while the Persian fleet still holds the Aegean in 333, we find a contingent of mercenaries sent from Alexander “in fulfillment of the alliance.” At Chios the new democratic régime, including the return of exiles, is carried out under the eyes of a garrison. Till the settlement is complete the garrison is to remain in the city. And we may suppose that the case of Chios was typical, and that the revolutions carried through by Alexander in the Greek states involved in other places also such a temporary occupation by imperial troops. At Priene, for instance, an

incidental notice shows a garrison. Rhodes is saddled with a garrison at Alexander's death.

But even if a city enjoyed immunity from tribute and was unburdened by a garrison, it was impossible that its affairs should not attract the attention of the rulers of the land, or that, attracting it, they should go uncontrolled. Under Alexander, indeed, the representatives of the royal authority in the provinces of the realm, the satraps, do not seem to have been given any regular authority over the Greek cities except in such cases as that of Aspendus. But the King himself was constantly called to interfere; the "royal rescripts" had to break in, as rude realities, upon the dream of independence. Even at the very institution of liberty and democracy in Ephesus (334), Alexander had directed how the money formerly raised as tribute to the court was to be applied, and he had been compelled to restrain by his intervention the furious excesses of the restored democrats, showing at the outset to any who had eyes to see how hollow a pretense under the circumstances of the time autonomy must be. Before the end of his reign he had published the celebrated edict at the Olympic games, commanding the cities of the Greek world everywhere to receive back their exiles. This was to push his interference into the vitals of every state, to override the competence of the city government in a most intimate particular, to set at naught in the eyes of the whole world the principle of autonomy. The real fact of the Macedonian sovereignty, which had been cloaked in so many decent political fictions, is here brutally unveiled.

In spite, however, of these discrepancies with the perfect ideal of autonomy, the Greek cities of Asia spring, with the removal of the Persian yoke, into a richer and more vigorous life. The King himself was a zealous patron in all ways that did not compromise his authority, and public works began to be set on foot, of a larger scale than the resources of the individual cities could have compassed. At Clazomenae, the island to which the citizens had transferred their town, out of fear of the Persians, Alexander connects with the mainland by a causeway a quarter of a mile long. The neighboring promontory, Mimas, on the other hand, with the city of Erythrae, he designs to make an island—an operation which would have put Erythrae in a better position for the coast traffic; unfortunately, the work, after being begun, proved impracticable. The temper of Alexander was such as to make him peculiarly sensitive to historic or legendary associations, and turn his special interest to places glorified by a great past. In Asia Minor he does not stud barbarian regions with new Greek cities, as he does in the farther East, but he pays great attention to the old cities of the Greek seaboard. Above all, his imagination is fired with the project of making the Homeric Ilion once more great and splendid. He found already upon a mound near the coast (mod. Hissarlik) an old temple of Athena, with a little town or village of Greek speech clustering round it. This village asserted its claim to be the very Troy of story. There the ingenuous traveler could inspect the altar of Zeus Herkeios, at whose foot Priam was slain, and shields battered in the Trojan war which were hanging on the temple walls. With such a legend the temple had long been of high prestige among the Greeks. Xerxes, when he passed that way, had sacrificed there with great circumstance. Greek generals had followed his example. The temple, according to Strabo, was small and mean in outward aspect; a statue of the philhellenic Ariobarzanes lay prostrate before it.

Alexander could not fail to visit this historic spot and offer sacrifices there the moment that he set foot in Asia. After Granicus he visits it again, and enriches the shrine with some new dedications. He pronounces that Ilion is now a village no longer, but a Hellenic city of full rights; and in order to make fact conform to this fiat, he instructs the royal officials to create the shell of a city by throwing up buildings of a suitable scale. Again, after the destruction of the Persian power, Alexander writes to Ilion fresh promises of what he means to do for city and temple. His sudden death leaves him time for little more than magnificent intentions. Among the official documents made public at his death is the project of making the temple of Athena at Ilion outdo the wonders of Egypt and Babylon.

To extend the privileges of the Greek temples, to make contributions to their enlargement, their adornment, and maintenance, to fill their treasuries with costly vessels, all this not only showed piety, but was the easiest way in which a king, who had more resources than any private person, could demonstrate his usefulness to the Greek cities without prejudice to his crown. It was not the pride only, but the pocket of the citizens which was touched by the honor of the city shrine. The prestige and splendor of the city shrine were the things which brought worshippers and visitors, which made the festivals well thronged, quickened trade, and brought money into the city. Every motive would impel Alexander to devote himself to the glorification of the Hellenic temples and to press his action upon the attention of the Greeks. According to the story in Strabo (from Artemidorus) Alexander offered the Ephesians to bear the whole expenses of the restoration of the temple, past and current (it had been burnt down on the day of Alexander's birth), if he might inscribe his name as the dedicator of the new edifice—a condition which the Ephesians would none of. An inscription found at Priene is evidence both of Alexander's liberality to the temple of Athena Polias in that city, and of a greater complaisance on the part of the citizens than had been shown at Ephesus, for Alexander appears as sole dedicator.

Under the sun of the favor of the new Great King, with the increase of commerce following the Macedonian conquest, the Hellenic cities of Asia expand into new bloom. The festivals, which formed so important a part in the life of a Greek citizen, and reflected his material well-being, are celebrated with new zest. The great religious union of the twelve Ionian cities had, in the days of Persian rule, shrunk to a union of only nine cities, and had been obliged to transfer its assembly and festival from the Panionion on the headland of Mycale to the safer resort of Ephesus. Under Alexander the old order is restored. The famous shrine of the Didymaeon Apollo at Branchidae in the domain of Miletus, silent and neglected under the Persian domination, is restored to its former honor, and once more utters oracles to glorify the Hellenic King. The light in which Alexander was regarded is shown in the worship of him maintained by the Ionian Body till Roman times.

The break-up of the Empire is not an unmixed good to the cities. If, on the one hand, it opens the way to liberty, if Rhodes can now expel its garrison and Cyzicus defy the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, on the other hand it entangles the Greek states in chronic war, and renders them liable to be seized by one or other of the rival chiefs. They are no longer in face of the irresistible might of a united empire, but the inferior

powers, in the exigencies of the struggle, are far less able to study their sensibilities than an omnipotent and paternal sovereign. The signal in Asia Minor of a new state of things is the attempt made in 319 by Arrhidaeus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, to force a garrison upon Cyzicus. It is now for the first time that a Macedonian chief makes it a part of his policy to introduce garrisons into Greek cities without any preceding quarrel. But the menace from Antigonus seems to Arrhidaeus to leave him no choice. About the same time Clitus follows suit in Lydia, and the Greek cities, from which the Persian garrisons had been driven fifteen years before by the Macedonian liberator, now find Macedonian garrisons taking their place.

This step on the part of the two satraps, even if dictated by strategic reasons, gives a great political advantage to the satrap of Phrygia. He had indeed determined to be supreme lord in Asia Minor, and he is now able to pursue his ambition as the champion of Hellenic autonomy. Antigonus immediately adopts this role before the world, and is careful from this time forward to distinguish his policy by this luminous mark from that of his opponents. Clitus has hardly seized the Ionian cities before Antigonus appears as the deliverer, ejects the garrisons, and wrests the great city of Ephesus from those who hold it. The satrap of Lydia had already abandoned his province and withdrawn to Macedonia. Antigonus acts in like manner with regard to Arrhidaeus. He had immediately on the siege of Cyzicus sent an embassy to read him a lecture on the rights of Hellenic cities, and he soon brings force to bear. By the following year (318) he has himself invaded the satrapy and pinned Arrhidaeus to the town of Cius. The Greek cities of the Propontis—Byzantium, Calchedon, Cyzicus—see in him a friend, and are ready with their help. His naval victory over Clitus in the Bosphorus secures him in possession of the Hellespontine province. What became of Arrhidaeus we do not hear.

The Greek cities over whom Antigonus now throws his shield, as lord of Asia, are, however, exposed to attack by his enemies from the sea. Asander, the satrap of Caria, with whom Antigonus had not yet had time to reckon, has by 315, when Antigonus returns from the East, thrown troops into Northern Cappadocia and laid siege to Amisus. Then when the great war between Antigonus and the other chiefs begins, the Greek cities all along the coast of Asia Minor have to bear the brunt of the hostile forces. That the sympathies of the Hellenes of Asia are generally with Antigonus at this moment is shown in *the permission given him by Rhodes to build ships in its harbors*. But they are in a perilous case. The forces of Antigonus have to move rapidly about the coasts and islands to drive off the enemies who sweep down upon them. Amisus and Erythrae are relieved in 315, Lemnos in 314. Even the Greek cities of the European coast of the Black Sea are embraced in the purview of Antigonus. In 313 he attempts to send a force to the help of Callatis, which has expelled the garrison of Lysimachus and “laid hold of autonomy” in the same year Antigonus presses home his attack on the satrap of Caria. Asander, like Arrhidaeus and Clitus, has occupied the Greek cities of his province with garrisons. Their deliverance is written large in the manifestoes of Antigonus. His generals appear before Miletus, call the citizens to liberty, and drive the garrison out of the citadel. Tralles, whether garrisoned or simply ruled by the partizans of Asander, is taken. Caunus is taken, although the garrison hold out in one of the two

citadels. Iasus is compelled to give its adherence to the cause of Antigonus. Cnidus appears soon after as a friendly state.

Rhodes is at this time rapidly rising to the position of a first-class power, marked out by its character as Hellenic republic to be a champion of Greek liberty, and Rhodes now formally recognizes Antigonus as the paladin of the sacred cause, and makes an alliance, under which it furnishes him with ten ships “for the liberation of the Hellenes! When the great war comes to a temporary pause in 311, a special clause in the terms of the Peace provides that the Hellenes shall be autonomous. To the principle indeed all the Macedonian dynasts now formally declare their adherence; it was still possible to interpret the principle in a way which would not hamper, but would further, their egoistic designs.

The letter, or a great part of it, has been recently discovered, in which Antigonus announces to the city of Scepsis, as one of his allies, the conclusion of the Peace. It is his chief concern to show how all through the negotiations he had made the freedom of the Greeks his first consideration. To secure the adhesion of Cassander and Ptolemy to the principle, he had waived important interests of his own. He wished nothing to stand in the way of a settlement which would put the liberty of the Greeks upon a lasting foundation. The Greeks, we observe, are carefully treated as allies; each state is expected to take for itself the oath in which the Macedonian chiefs, as heads of each federation, have sworn to the principle of Hellenic autonomy and the other terms of the Peace. The comment which history writes to state documents is often an ironic one. Before ten years were out, the people of Scepsis were being driven from their homes by the decree of Antigonus to be merged in the new city he created for his own glory.

Antigonus himself is not able to avoid garrisoning some of the cities. At Caunus, for instance, after he has succeeded in reducing the hostile garrison, he feels it necessary to place in both the citadels garrisons of his own. The consequence, of course, is to give his enemies just the same sort of handle as had been given him by Arrhidaeus and Clitus. Ptolemy now (309) appears on the coast of Asia Minor in the guise of liberator. Phaselis and Caunus are wrested from Antigonus. Siege is laid to Halicarnassus, but this city Demetrius comes up in time to secure. Next year (308) Myndus and Cos appear in Ptolemy's possession, and, passing through the islands, he drives a garrison of Antigonus out of Andros.

A growing coolness between Antigonus and Rhodes is marked by the refusal of Rhodes in 306 to compromise its neutrality by supporting Demetrius in his attack on Ptolemy. Next year (305) comes the attack on Rhodes itself, in which Antigonus openly throws to the winds all the professions he has been making for years. The magnificent defense of Rhodes secures a peace in which it is expressly stipulated that the city shall be autonomous, free from a garrison, and sovereign over its own revenues.

The correspondence of Antigonus with Teos towards the year 304-303, preserved for us in stone, throws an interesting light upon his action with regard to the Greek cities. The matter in hand is the *synoikismos* of Lebedus and Teos. The times were against a large number of small cities, and the lesser ones tended to coalesce or be

absorbed by the greater. This process, which might take place spontaneously, as in the case of Rhodes, Antigonus began deliberately to further, as we shall see in the Troad. Lebedus was a case where a migration of the inhabitants might seem appropriate. Lying between Ephesus and Teos, the little town had failed to hold its own. A transference of the population to Teos might appear an advantage both to them and to the city which received the accession. Such a step, however, involved a number of practical difficulties. Should the new-comers build new houses adjacent to the existing city of Teos, or now that the population as a whole was grown greater, should the city be rebuilt more towards the peninsula? How in the meantime should the people of Lebedus be housed? What would become of the public obligations contracted by Lebedus? How should the outstanding suits between the two cities be settled? Each city having hitherto had its own laws, under what code should the combined peoples now live? On these and similar questions Antigonus pronounces a decision. But there is little in the document to show whether the *synoikismos* is taking place at his command, whether, that is to say, he gives his verdict as the sovereign, or whether he is merely deciding as arbitrator on questions voluntarily submitted to himself by the cities. It was quite in accordance with the practice of the time for the Greek states to refer their disputes to the arbitration of a neutral power. They might naturally choose the Greek king, on whose confines they dwelt, without implying his possession of any sovereign rights over them. His interference with their internal affairs, as voluntarily chosen arbitrator, would be of an utterly different character from the interference of a high-handed over-lord. Antigonus, in the document before us, says little to imply sovereignty. Only once the ugly fact looks through. Alexander had ordered the Chians to submit their new constitution to him for ratification (p. 106). Antigonus thinks it well to exercise the same sort of control. "You are further to send to us" he writes, "the laws upon which you have agreed, and indicate those which were introduced by the *nomothetai* and those which were framed by other citizens, in order that, if any persons are shown to be bringing in laws which are not desirable but the reverse, we may visit them with our censure and punishment". It is no mere arbitrator that speaks there!

Such were the relations, as far as we can now trace them, between Antigonus and the old Greek cities of Asia Minor. But by the side of the old cities there begin under Antigonus to rise the new Greek cities which were called into being by Hellenistic kings. We have no proof of any foundation of a new Greek city in the country north of the Taurus before the time when Antigonus brought it under his sovereignty. Two cities, illustrious in a later age, called Antigonus their founder. One of these rose in the fertile plain at the eastern extremity of the Ascanian Lake, on the high-road between Phrygia, the seat of government, and the Bosphorus. It declared itself, by its very form, a city of the new age, an exact square, each face of the boundary wall four stades long with a gate in the middle, the thoroughfares intersecting at nice angles, and so strictly ruled that from a stone in the central gymnasium every one of the four gates was visible. The other city was designed to become the seaport of the Troad. It was a case of *synoikismos*. The population of the small towns of the neighbourhood were dragged into the new foundation; Larissa, Colonae, Chrysa, Hamaxitus, Cebrene, Neandria, and Scepsis were absorbed. These were the two cities which owed their existence to

Antigonus the One-eyed. To both he gave, with unimaginative egoism, the same name of Antigonía; but it was under another name that each was destined to become famous.

A third city laid out by Antigonus purported rather to be a revival than a new creation. The name of Smyrna had ceased four hundred years before to denote a living city; only a group of villages marked the site of what had once been the seaport of that coast. Its importance had drawn upon it early the attack of the Lydian kings. When the Persians came, all that was left of Smyrna were some old temples, like that of the Nemeses, and the straggling villages. But the fame of the old Smyrna lived on in the songs of the Greeks, and now under Antigonus a new Smyrna began to rise two miles from the old site on the southern side of the bay, built after the admired pattern, with regular streets intersecting each other at exact right angles. Thus Smyrna began a second existence, destined to be a long one. By the irony of fate that city, which seemed earliest to have perished, has survived all its rivals and, still bearing its old name, dominates a coast where Ephesus and Miletus are forgotten.

Two years after the raising of the siege of Rhodes the dominion of Antigonus in Asia Minor begins to break up (302). Over the Greek cities is thrown the shadow of a new personality. Lysimachus, satrap of Thrace since 323, now, like the other dynasts, styling himself King, crosses into Asia. His reception differs in the case of different cities. Of those that hold by Antigonus, it is impossible to say in each instance whether the city's action is determined by a garrison, or by fear, or by real loyalty. Lysimachus, indeed, himself does not spend much time over the Greek cities; his object is to strike at the seat of his adversary's power in Phrygia; he presses on into the interior, leaving it to his lieutenant Prepelaus to deal with the cities. In person he only summons those which lie on his road, Lampsacus and Parium, which voluntarily join him, Sigeum, which he has to reduce by force, and Abydos, the siege of which he begins but does not prosecute. Into Sigeum he introduces a garrison. Of the Greek cities approached by Prepelaus, Adramyttium is overpowered in passing, Ephesus is intimidated into submission, Teos and Colophon give in their adherence, apparently from a sense of weakness, Erythrae and Clazomenae, into which the generals of Antigonus throw forces by sea, hold out. In Ephesus, at any rate, Prepelaus puts a garrison. This garrison is expelled within a few months by Demetrius, who introduces one of his own. When Demetrius goes on to the Hellespont, Lampsacus and Parium again change sides. Meantime Lysimachus has retired northwards and attaches Heraclea to his person by marrying Amestris, who is ruling the city as widow of the late tyrant.³ Heraclea has all these years constituted a singular case among the Greek cities of Asia. Here the old dynasty of tyrants, a relic of Achaemenian days, still survived. This was due to the tyrant Dionysius, who had the good sense to fortify himself with the goodwill of his subjects, and contrived by admirable diplomacy to keep on friendly terms with successive Macedonian rulers. His alliance with Antigonus had been peculiarly close, cemented by a marriage between their two families. At his death, which took place while Antigonus was still ruling Asia, that chief continued to protect his widow, who now ruled Heraclea as regent for his infant sons.

Amestris was a remarkable woman, whose person still connected the present with a vanished past. She was the niece of the last Persian Great King, and had spent her

early life in a royal harem. After the Persian Empire had been swept away by Alexander, she became the wife of the Macedonian chief Craterus. Craterus, after Alexander's death, passed her on to Dionysius. Now, after ruling for some time over a Greek city, she gets a third husband in Lysimachus.

The partition after Ipsus confirms Lysimachus in possession of Western Asia Minor. Some of the Greek cities indeed remain for a time in the hands of Demetrius, notably Ephesus, the most important of all. An inscription records the arrival in that city of an ambassador sent by Demetrius and Seleucus jointly, to notify their reconciliation (about 299). Ephesus appears, of course, in this official document as a sovereign state receiving the envoy of external powers. Not a word to show that a garrison, composed largely of pirates, was all this while determining the city's policy, as appears to have been the case. By 294, however, all or most of these cities have been acquired by Lysimachus; at Ephesus his general Lycus bought over the pirate captain Andron.³ Demetrius in 287-286 is received at Miletus by Eurydice, the repudiated queen of Ptolemy. It is not clear by whose forces, those of Demetrius or Ptolemy, Miletus is at this time held. Other cities perhaps passed after Ipsus into the hand of Ptolemy.

The appearance of Demetrius in Asia Minor in 287-286 leads to his regaining possession of a number of cities, "some joining him voluntarily, and some yielding to force." Which cities these were is not said, but next year Caunus is still held by his forces, and had therefore either never been lost or was recaptured now. This is, of course, a merely temporary disturbance in the domination of Lysimachus, the cities being soon compelled to return to their former "alliance"

There are indications that the hand of Lysimachus weighed more heavily upon the Greeks than that of Antigonos. It is perhaps not mere chance that an inscription shows us now for the first time a governor set by a Macedonian king over the cities of Ionia. In a letter to Priene, Lysimachus speaks of having "sent an order to the city that it should obey his strategos." At Lemnos we are told that the Athenian colonists found Lysimachus play the master in a particularly disagreeable way. We have instances of his autocratic dealing. The city of Astacus he wiped out of existence. Ephesus he determined to replace by a new city, Arsinoea, called after his latest wife, Ptolemy's daughter, on a somewhat more convenient site nearer the sea. When the citizens objected to being haled from their old homes at his pleasure, Lysimachus blocked the drains on a stormy day and flooded the city. This induced the citizens to move. To swell the new city, Lebedus and Colophon were emptied of their population and reduced to villages. The Colophonians, with pathetic audacity, gave battle to the forces of the King, and their feelings found lasting voice in the lament of the native poet Phoenix. The new city of Lysimachus prospered, but it was still Ephesus, never really Arsinoe. The Scepsians, on the other hand, who had been swept by Antigonos into the new city of the Troad, Lysimachus allowed to return to their former seat.

At Heraclea his action was conspicuously capricious. Amestris, after living with him happily for some time, when she found him contemplating the new marriage with Arsinoe, chose to leave him at Sardis and go back to govern Heraclea. When her sons Clearchus and Oxathres reached an age to assume the reins, her adventurous life came

to a tragical end by her putting to sea in a boat which they had specially prepared in order to drown her. Being not only wicked but stupid, they alienated the citizens by tyrannic behavior, and thus lost the advantage of Dionysius in regard to the Macedonian rulers. Lysimachus now intervened amid popular plaudits, put the two wretched criminals to death, and restored the long-desired democracy. The city congratulated itself on having won at this late date its freedom. But it rejoiced too soon, for Lysimachus, the liberator, soon followed the custom of old Persian days in making it over as an appanage to the queen Arsinoe. So the Heracleots now found the former tyrants simply replaced by the queen's agent, Heraclides—a change hardly for the better.

The activity of Lysimachus as a builder of cities left a durable mark upon the country of the Asiatic Greeks. The case of Ephesus has been already described. For foundations, indeed, which were altogether new, Lysimachus did not find room, but where others had begun Lysimachus carried to completion. There were the three new cities of Antigonus, the two Antigonias and Smyrna. To all of these Lysimachus set his hand. The name of the two first, designed to perpetuate the glory of Antigonus, was altered. Lysimachus, having already created a Lysimachia in the Chersonese, did not happily think it necessary to go on giving the same name with dull monotony to all his cities. The Antigonias on the Ascanian lake received the name of his earlier wife, Nicaea the daughter of Antipater; it was the Nicaea or Nice which was to give its title to the Nicene creed. The other Antigonias was renamed Alexandria in honor of his old master and known as Alexandria Troas (or Troas simply) to distinguish it from all the other Alexandrias. The old name of Smyrna was left unchanged. In the case of Ilion also, Lysimachus was at pains to realize some of the good intentions of Alexander. It was now that the city received a temple worthier of its fame, if not quite what Alexander had contemplated, and a wall of forty stades. Its population was increased by a *synoikismos* of the surrounding villages. The new Ilion became in the third century before Christ a place of considerable importance, not indeed as a political power, but as the center of a religious union.

The murder of Agathocles brings the disaffection of the Greek cities towards Lysimachus to a head; they begin openly to invoke the intervention of Seleucus. There is thus an immense advantage secured to the house of Seleucus, in that its first appearance to the Greek cities is in the guise of liberator. It starts with the flowing tide. As the great power of the East, it had indeed already shown its sympathy with the interests of the Hellenic world, especially with the cult of Apollo, from whom it professed to descend. The temple of Apollo at Branchidae was among the great shrines of Pan-Hellenic regard, such as Delphi or Delos. The work of restoration after the Persian tyranny was now going forward. A good Hellene, king or private man, might feel it claim his contributions and offerings. Seleucus, long before he had any political connection with Miletus, had shown himself a zealous benefactor both of the city and the temple connected with it. On becoming master of Iran he had sent back to Branchidae from Ecbatana the bronze image of Apollo by Canachus, which had been carried off by the Persians. A Milesian inscription represents Antiochus, during his father's lifetime, as promising to build a stoa in the city, from the lease of which a

permanent revenue may be drawn to be devoted to the expenses of the temple. Miletus, we saw, was still outside Lysimachus' sphere of power in 287-286, and may never have been acquired by him.

The Delian Apollo was also honored by the house of Seleucus. Stratonice especially seems to have shown herself a munificent votaress of this god. The temple registers show presents from both herself and Seleucus.

To Seleucus himself only seven months are allowed, from the battle of Corupedion to his death, in which to deal with all the questions involved in the relations between the Greek cities of the Asiatic sea-board and the power ruling the interior. In seven months he has time to do little but inform himself of the situation, and of even that little almost all record has perished. He seems at any rate to have addressed himself promptly to the question of the Greek cities, and to have sent out "regulators" to the various districts to report. Such at least is what the historian of Heraclea represents him as doing in the case of the northern cities. It is only by what he tells us that light is flashed upon a single spot in the darkness of these seven months. The commissioner appointed to visit the cities of Hellespontine Phrygia and the northern coast is a certain Aphrodisius. He comes in due course to Heraclea. In this city, as we may suppose in most others, the fall of Lysimachus has previously aroused a ferment favorable to the cause of Seleucus. As soon as the news of Corupedion reached Heraclea, the people rose to shake off the hated yoke of the queen. A deputation waited on the agent Heraclides, informed him that the people were bent on recovering their freedom, and offered to treat him handsomely if he would quietly leave. Heraclides, misreading the situation, flew into a passion, and began ordering people off to execution. There was still a garrison to hold the people down. But the garrison unfortunately had been stinted of pay, and saw their profit in coming to an agreement with the townspeople, by which they were to acquire the franchise of the city and the arrears due to them. Heraclides accordingly found himself lodged under guard. The walls of the fortress by which the city had been coerced so long were leveled with the ground. A leader of the people was chosen and an embassy sent to Seleucus. This embassy has already left when Aphrodisius appears in the city. All seems to promise excellent relations between Heraclea and the King, especially since they are already fighting the battle of the central government against Ziboetes the Bithynian. For some unexplained reason, Aphrodisius falls out with the Heracleots. He returns to Seleucus with a report unfavorable to Heraclea alone of all the cities he has visited. The Heracleot envoys are still with the King, and as a result of the commissioner's report an interview takes place in which an unhappy breach is made between the city and the house of Seleucus. The King begins with high words. Provoked by these, a sturdy citizen breaks out with the retort: "Heracles is the stronger, Seleucus." His Doric is so broad that the King does not understand, stares angrily, and then turns away his face.

The news of the King's averted countenance, carried to Heraclea, brings about a reversal of policy. A league now comes into being, antagonistic to the ruling house. It includes Heraclea, its sister-states, Byzantium and Calchedon, and, more ominously, the Persian prince Mithridates. The enmity between Greek and barbarian was one of the circumstances most to the advantage of a Greek house, desiring to hold these coast

regions where the two elements came into contact. Maladdress in handling the Greek cities might, it is seen, convert the enmity into alliance. The cities of this League form, however, in the present case an exception. With the other northern ones Aphrodisius, as we saw, had no fault to find, and the Greeks of Asia Minor generally seem to regard the house of Seleucus at this moment with feelings of gratitude and hope.

Looking, then, at the history of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, as a whole, from the fall of the Persian Empire to the time when Antiochus is called to take up his inheritance, we must admit that the result of the Iranian, giving place to a Hellenic, power has hardly come up to the forecast of Isocrates. Those whose memories went back to the visions and assurances of an earlier period, whose youth had been fed by the Panegyricus and Letter to Philip, must have felt a certain disillusionment now that nearly half a century had gone by since the morning of Granicus. After all, then, Hellenic civilization was to end in monarchy? The autonomy of the cities seemed as little secure from princes like Lysimachus as from an Artaxerxes or Darius. To “obey the King’s governor” was still a hard word that the cities were compelled to hear. That the cities had to do with kings whose brute strength exceeded their own, that the course of the world was governed, not by the legalities of theorists, but by force majeure, that what the city counted its rights were only held on sufferance, that the sovereignty of the kings over the cities not being recognized in political theory, the action of the kings was not restrained by any constitutional forms but solely by their own discretion—all these were facts which must have been present to anyone who looked below the surface.

On the other hand, it would be untrue to deny that the Greeks had profited enormously by the Macedonian conquest. If the rule under which they had passed was not less autocratic than the Persian, it was far more sympathetic. If the chains were not taken off, they were at any rate charmingly gilded, and to a sensitive people like the Greeks the sparing of their *amour propre* removed half the injury. If some facts were unpleasant to contemplate, the King’s government would help everyone to cloak them over; it would call the cities its “allies” and the money it exacted a “contribution.” The moral and sentimental grievance which the old barbarian rule had entailed was thus mitigated; in the material sphere the cities had gained more unquestionably. We may perhaps distinguish three main ways in which the rule of the Macedonian chiefs was a benefit. Firstly, they had shown themselves, as has been seen, ready enough to use their riches for the good of the cities, for embellishing the shrines and furthering public works. In the second place, they were the natural protectors of the cities against the barbarians, and the barbarians, as we have seen, were still a danger in many parts of Asia Minor. Lastly, if the quarrels of the different Macedonian house's drew in the cities to some extent as allies of one or the other, the establishment of a dominion prevented within its sphere the desolating feuds between city and city. There was one overshadowing authority by whose judgment the relations between the cities were regulated. In compensation then for hurt done to the self-respect and the ambitions of the cities by their subjection, they were given a measure of peace and enlarged resources.

With such advantages balanced against such drawbacks the rule of the Macedonian houses must have given rise to very mixed feelings among the Greeks; the constitution of the individual citizen, the circumstances of the moment, must have made

it appear in different colors, according as light was thrown upon its useful or its unpleasant side. There were numbers of well-to-do people whose material interests prospered, who were little troubled by ideal grievances, and whose main concern was the maintenance of an established order. There were others whose heads were heated by the phrases of orators, and whom nothing could console for the curtailment of their city's sovereignty. One must take account of this vein of feeling as always there, ready, as soon as it is reinforced by any tangible grievance or any general discontent, to break out in the old blind struggle for liberty. As a rule, however, the question before the cities was not between Macedonian rule in the abstract and unqualified independence, but between one Macedonian ruler and another. A diplomatic prince might reap all the profit of another's odium, and to escape from a yoke that bruised them, the Greek cities might willingly accept one more considerately adjusted. They were, at any rate, effusive enough in their professions of loyalty to many of their masters. How much sincerity lay in these professions we can only divine by weighing the circumstances of each case.

It is in this period that a practice begins to become general in the Greek world which forms a prominent feature in the last stage of classical heathenism—the rendering of distinctively divine honors to eminent men even during their lifetime. Alexander had already before his death received from many of the Greek states honors which marked him as divine, and the cities were ready to act in like manner toward his successors. The usual externals of worship—*temenos* and altar, image, sacrifice, and games—were decreed by Scepsis to Antigonus in 310, and honors no less elaborate were tendered Antigonus and Demetrius by Athens in 307. Lysimachus was worshipped during his lifetime by the cities within his sphere of power. Ptolemy and Seleucus were worshipped both before and after their death.

(c) The Provincial Authorities

We have now considered how two of the difficulties which the old Persian rule had encountered in Asia Minor, the difficulty of the native races and the difficulty of the Greek cities, presented themselves in 281 to Antiochus when he found himself called to assert the authority of his house in the country north of the Taurus. A third difficulty which the house of Achaemenes had experienced, that of controlling its own officers, the house of Seleucus also, should it aspire to rule Asia Minor from a seat of government outside it, was likely to experience in its turn. Alexander, had his life been longer—his house, had he left issue under whom the Empire held together—would doubtless have encountered this difficulty in course of time; we may indeed say that the break-up of the Empire after Alexander's death was nothing else but this difficulty destroying the central government altogether. In 281 Antiochus, the grandson of a Macedonian captain and an Iranian grandee, put his hand to the task which had proved too hard for the King of kings.

CHAPTER VIII

ANTIOCHUS I (SOTER)

1

The kingdom

THE course of events in Asia Minor which followed the death of Seleucus is mainly hidden from us. We must not imagine that by the crime of Ptolemy Keraunos and the desertion of the army at Lysimachia the power of the house of Seleucus in the West was instantly annihilated. As the news of the catastrophe travelled from city to city, it would find in many places a population who still saw their best course at this juncture in holding by the King of the East, or a garrison which resolved to abide faithful to their old master's son. Even in Europe, during the short time since Corupedion, the house of Seleucus had begun to make its supremacy effective. Silver coins are found bearing the name of King Seleucus, and stamped with the symbols of the city of Callatis (*mod.* Mangalia in Roumania). And after the death of Seleucus coins are struck for a time in parts of Europe with the name of King Antiochus, some of them showing the anchor in the centre of the Macedonian shield, a declaration that to the house of Seleucus the throne of Philip and Alexander now belongs. The news indeed of what had occurred must have left it quite uncertain in many places in whose hands the government of the world would now rest. It must have depended upon the way in which the authorities in each city, each *condottiere* who had a fortress in charge, each mountain chief, read the signs of the times, who of the various claimants was recognized in those confused days as master.

Ptolemy Keraunos, with the army and fleet gathered at Lysimachia, held indeed a point of vantage for striking at Macedonia. But he had leapt into a dangerous seat. His crime had raised all the moral feelings of the Greek world against him. Antiochus was bound by filial piety, as well as interest, to open war on him. His pretensions to Macedonia made both Antigonus Gonatas and Pyrrhus of Epirus his enemies. His brother of Egypt might now be alarmed for his own security and join his enemies. The last danger Keraunos succeeded in conjuring; he let the Court of Alexandria know that he definitely renounced all claims to Egypt and procured his brother's neutrality. But the attack of Antigonus and Antiochus he had to sustain. These two kings seem soon to have come to a mutual understanding. There were other things besides the common enmity to Keraunos to draw Antigonus and Seleucid together. The House of Antigonus had been lifted from its abasement after Ipsus by Seleucus; Demetrius in his captivity had found at any rate princely treatment and security for his life; Stratonice, the queen of Antiochus, was the sister of Antigonus Gonatas.

Antigonus was nearer the scene of action than his brother-in-law and could strike first. The tidings of events at Lysimachia brought him hurrying north with a land and naval force to occupy Macedonia before Keraunos. The fleet constituted by Lysimachus, and including a contingent from Heraclea, had passed to Keraunos with the army, and this he now opposed to the ships of Antigonus. The encounter was a victory for Keraunos—a result which the historian of Heraclea attributes mainly to the bravery of the Heracleots. After this reverse Antigonus withdrew again to Central Greece, and Macedonia was left exposed.

Any outposts of Seleucid power in Europe had been cut off from succour by the defection of the forces at Lysimachia. Ptolemy Keraunos succeeded in occupying Macedonia, although, if those numismatists are right who assign coins with the name of King Antiochus to a European origin, the process must have been a gradual one, and adherents of the house of Seleucus must have held out for a time here and there. What measures the Seleucid court took in the early days of Antiochus to safeguard its interests north of the Taurus, what form its hostilities against the new Macedonian king assumed, is unknown to us. Antiochus had, as has been said, hurried westward on the news of his father's murder, and a war of some sort between Ptolemy Keraunos and Antiochus came to pass. Antiochus himself did not yet cross the Taurus; he was delayed by the necessity of suppressing the revolt in Syria.

What took place in Asia Minor, in those cities which a few months before had hailed Seleucus as liberator, is unrecorded. From the few things told us we can conjecture that many declared themselves at that crisis adherents of the house of Seleucus, that its popularity stood it in good stead. The Athenian colonists in Lemnos erected temples to Antiochus as well as to his father. If the account of the Ilians a few years later can be trusted, they had immediately begun on the news of Antiochus' accession to offer sacrifices and prayers on his behalf. But the best evidence that the chances of the house of Seleucus seemed good in those days in Asia Minor is that Philetaerus of Pergamos now saw his profit in earning its good-will.

This man was a native of the little Greek town of Tios or Tieum. One account (possibly later court scandal) asserts that his mother was a Paphlagonian flute-girl. At some crowded funeral, to which he was carried as a baby, he had been crushed in his nurse's arms and rendered impotent. In spite of his condition his abilities secured him advancement. He had first mixed in the political game as a friend of that Docimus who had been prominent in the second rank of Macedonian chiefs, the lieutenant first of Perdicas, then of Antigonus, and lastly of Lysimachus. Philetaerus had accompanied his friend in his passages from one camp to another. Lysimachus marked him out as a useful instrument. He was made warden of the treasure which Lysimachus had stored on the strong hill of Pergamos. In the dissensions of the family of Lysimachus, Philetaerus had sided with Agathocles, and after Agathocles' murder he no longer felt himself safe from the vindictive hatred of the queen, Arsinoe. He was among those who invoked Seleucus; the assurance was conveyed to Antioch that the warden and the treasure of Pergamos were at the King's disposal. And now when a great blow had been dealt to the house of Seleucus in the moment of its triumph, Philetaerus, with a judicious eye for the winning side, still showed himself its friend. He begged the body

of Seleucus from the murderer. Ptolemy put his price high, but Philetaerus knew when it was profitable to dip his hand into the treasure of Pergamos. He acquired the body, himself saw to its cremation, and sent the ashes to Antiochus. We may be sure that any party in which Philetaerus is found has many other adherents in Asia Minor.

We may indeed divine that the Seleucid cause in Asia Minor had at that moment to trust rather to the willing loyalty or the far-sighted fears of princes and peoples than to a display of force. Antiochus was probably obliged to gather all his strength to tight for existence in Syria. It was only “by many wars”, Memnon says, that he recovered “hardly and in a diminished form his father's Empire”. As soon, however, as it could be spared, a body of troops was sent to enforce the authority of the Seleucid king in the country beyond the Taurus. How near an interest is felt in this country is shown by the man who now appears there as the King's representative—Patrocles. Only for a moment does this distinguished figure appear in Asia Minor to vanish again in the darkness which wraps the period. The shifting light falls once more upon the Bithynian coast. A lieutenant of Patrocles, one Hermogenes of Aspendus, is here in command of a force with which he endeavours to bring again the revolted Greek cities into allegiance to the Seleucid house. Heraclea, since its rupture with Seleucus, had strengthened itself by allowing its exiles to make peace with the ruling faction and return home, but now, in presence of this instrument of compulsion, it thought best to temporize. By coming quickly to terms the city saved its fields. A more formidable foe of the Greek king was close at hand, the Bithynian chieftain, and against him Hermogenes now turned his arms. A fight between the King's forces and its ancient Bithynian enemy was an event which Heraclea was only too willing to bring about by promising Hermogenes its friendship.

The sight of Macedonian armies fleeing down the valleys before the tribesmen was almost familiar in Bithynia. It was seen once more ere Ziboetes, now an old man of over seventy, left the sphere of his triumphs. The Bithynians were upon Hermogenes when he least expected them; he saw that his reputation had gone the way of his predecessors. Disdaining to survive, he chose at least the death of a brave man. Ziboetes aspired to a greatness which went beyond mere victories of the spear. He had a comprehension of the value of the life which demanded a richer environment than the hill-side village: he wished to rival the Greek kings as a builder of cities. Before he died he had founded a Ziboetium under Mount Lypedrum.

The hostilities between the forces of Antiochus and Ptolemy Keraunos did not last long. Either king was too much threatened at home not to desire a *modus vivendi*. And one was found which must have marked some frontier between the sphere to be dominated from Macedonia and the sphere of Seleucid authority.

Perhaps there were fair hopes at that moment of a period of tranquillity opening for Seleucid Asia. The dangers which had compassed Antiochus at his accession seemed melting away. If the house of Seleucus could confine its ambitions to Asia, there was no reason why it should fear molestation from its rivals. Ptolemy Keraunos, to whom Macedonia had been abandoned, had his hands full in that country, crushing what remained of the house of Lysimachus, and defending himself against his barbarian

neighbors; his brother in Egypt was not aggressive; Antigonus, although checked in Central Greece, served to right the balance of power against the house of Ptolemy; and lastly, Pyrrhus of Epirus had fortunately turned his thoughts westward and quitted the scene to plunge into adventures across the Adriatic. His brother kings, to get rid of him, were forward to give him help—ships, men, elephants; Antiochus, who required all the troops he had been able to raise since the defection of the grand army to hold his outspread provinces, sent money.

And now, at peace without, the house of Seleucus might address itself to the task, for which the Greek kings had never yet had leisure, the task of bringing into subjection the stubborn elements within. Now the strength of a great empire might be turned upon self-styled kings like Ziboetes and Mithridates, and restive cities taught the true meaning of autonomy.

Whether it was before or after the peace that Patrocles took over Asia Minor and the disaster to Hermogenes occurred we do not know. It was probably after it that Antiochus himself, accompanied by his queen, crossed the Taurus.

The presence of the King probably went far towards bringing to an end the anarchic state of things which had prevailed in Asia Minor since the death of Seleucus, and give his partisans in most places assured supremacy. To bring peace to the Hellenic cities and restore authority to his house was the double object which Antiochus gave the country to understand he set before him. To achieve it, he had to make sure of the allegiance of those troops who, in scattered garrisons, held the points of vantage, but whom maladroit treatment might easily cause to sell their swords to another master. Antiochus, if the expressions used by the Ilions in an honorific inscription have any truth, dealt ably and successfully with the situation. But his success did not extend to the most troublesome corner of his realm, Bithynia.

Antiochus had come into Asia Minor determined to avenge Hermogenes and make a supreme effort to vindicate the supremacy of Macedonian arms. Ziboetes, the redoubtable chieftain, had died full of years, and his house was shaken by discords. Nicomedes, his eldest son, had marked himself out as the “executioner” of his brothers. One of these brothers, however, called, like his father, Ziboetes, had contrived to escape massacre and make himself master of the Thynian part of his father’s dominion. It seemed a favorable opportunity for the Macedonian government to intervene. But Nicomedes, however barbarous, had inherited his father's strength of will and understanding. In his predicament he boldly reversed the policy of his house and proposed an alliance to Heraclea against the Seleucid king. Heraclea, who had already negotiated with one barbarian dynast, was not unwilling to listen to the overtures of the Bithynian. Nicomedes is now admitted to membership in the anti-Seleucid League, and even becomes its head.

To secure this end, Nicomedes had astutely ceded to Heraclea that region which was in his brother's possession. This, of course, at once brought the Heracleots into collision with Ziboetes, and a sanguinary battle was fought. The city gained all it

wanted, Memnon says, but Ziboetes continues to appear in possession of a part of Bithynia.

Heraclea was using this moment, in which the Macedonian government was embarrassed and its Bithynian neighbors divided, to extend its power. It set about buying back the places which had once been annexed to it but were now alienated, Tios, Cierus, Amastris. Into whose hands these had fallen is not stated except in the case of the last, where a certain Eumenes appears as master. This man is generally taken to be the brother or nephew of Philetaerus of Pergamos, whose native place Tios was one of the cities which had been drawn into the *synoikismos* of Amastris. Tios had rapidly broken away again and renewed its separate existence. In whose possession Tios and Cierus now were, whether in those of tyrants of their own or of Nicomedes, we are not told—the latter is generally assumed. These towns at any rate Heraclea now succeeds in redeeming, but Eumenes, who seems to have had some special animus against Heraclea (perhaps he was an adherent like Philetaerus of the Seleucid house), refused to sell Amastris on any terms. When Heraclea tried force, he preferred to make the place over to Ariobarzanes, the son of King Mithridates.

Antiochus lost no time in opening war on the Northern League. The Seleucid fleet appeared in the neighborhood of the Bosphorus, but the Heracleot squadron manoeuvred against it and no decisive result was obtained. Now, however, fresh complications arose. An estrangement between Antiochus and Antigonus, his late ally against Ptolemy, came to open war. Antigonus at once joined forces with the Northern League. There was a good deal of fighting of which we have no account in North-Western Asia.

But this phase was not a long one. Antigonus presently made peace with his brother-in-law, and left the League to maintain the struggle by its own strength.

2

The Gauls

But already in Europe the game of politicians and kings had been confounded by a cataclysm, which swept across old landmarks and submerged old feuds and ambitions in a universal terror. Ancient Mediterranean civilization lived all its life on the edge of a great peril, which it forgot perhaps between the moments of visitation, but by which it ultimately perished. From time to time the forests and fens of Central Europe spilt upon it some of their chaotic, seething peoples. They passed—wild-eyed, jabbering strangers—over a land not theirs, which they saw only as a place to devour and destroy. Such a visitation the Greeks knew four centuries before, when Cimmerians and Tretes

had burst upon Asia Minor and left a memorial in the elegies of Callinus. Such a visitation again had come a century before to Italy, when the Gauls had almost stamped the infant city rising on the Tiber out of existence. They were hordes of Gauls, or, as the Greeks called them, Galatians, who now poured southward over the Balkans. Ptolemy Keraunos reaped his reward for seizing the Macedonian throne in having first to meet the shock of the invasion. Less than a year from the time of his deed of blood his head was waving on the point of a Gaulish spear (spring 280). That summer all the countryside of Macedonia was overrun. With winter the wave ebbed, leaving a tract of desolation behind it. The Greek world waited breathlessly for next year. Although not immediately threatened, the Seleucid king shared the general anxiety. Apart even from selfish motives the deliverance of Hellas was a cause in which it flattered the vanity of any Greek king to shine. Antiochus sent a contingent to take part in the defence. The invasion came with terrific force (279). The Greeks massed at Thermopylae. It was the road over Mount Oeta which the five hundred men of Antiochus were posted to hold. There in fact the Gauls at one moment directed their assault, and the contingent distinguished itself in repelling them, with the loss, however, of its commander, Telesarchus. Then the barbarians succeeded in turning the Greek position by the pass which Xerxes had traversed, and Central Greece was overwhelmed. But now the defence prevailed. At Delphi a Greek force inflicted a crushing defeat upon the horde, and the shattered remnants withdrew. Greece was delivered.

The Seleucid court had, no doubt, been following the struggle with anxiety. So far no Gauls had crossed the sea. But they were coming perilously near. A body under Leonnorius and Lutarius had broken off from the rest before the invasion of Greece and turned eastward. They traversed Thrace, levying blackmail as they went. They pushed on to the Bosphorus and harried the territory of Byzantium. Heraclea and the other allies of Byzantium sent help in vain. But the narrow strip of sea seemed to oppose an impassable barrier. They had no boats or skill to make them, and Byzantium refused to give them any assistance. The Gauls next tried the straits at the other end of the Propontis, the Hellespont. They seized Lysimachia by a ruse and overran the Chersonese. But here the Seleucid governor, Antipater, was watching them from the Asiatic shore, and would not give them unconditional passage. Then a great part of the horde returned to the Bosphorus under Leonnorius; a part remained with Lutarius opposite Antipater.

It was the moment when the Northern League was left by Antigonos still in grapple with Antiochus. To either side perhaps the thought occurred of hiring these terrible wild men against the other. Antipater had entered into some sort of negotiation with them, but had not been able to make a secure bargain. Nicomedes, when Leonnorius returned to the Bosphorus, was more successful. A treaty was agreed to by the Gaulish chief, in which he placed himself absolutely under Nicomedes' orders and made himself an instrument of the League. His bands were at once conveyed across the Bosphorus. Meanwhile, Lutarius also had seized some boats in which the agents of Antipater had come over. With these in a few days he got his following over the Hellespont, whether Antipater would or not, and turning northwards rejoined

Leonnorius. The terrified inhabitants of Asia Minor soon learnt that the Galatians were in the land (278-277).

The League, with its redoubtable auxiliaries, first turned upon Ziboetes, who had probably an understanding with the Seleucid court. The Thynian country was given up to ravage and massacre. All that could be moved was carried off by the Galatians. But they had soon passed beyond Nicomedes' control and left the gutted Bithynian valleys far behind them. They knew neither master nor law outside their own horde, and turned to right or left wherever the sight of smiling lands and villages provoked their appetite. No men felt themselves secure or knew whether they might not any day see the frightful apparition of these strong men from the north in their familiar fields.

The figure of the Galatian, as the Greeks of Asia saw him, is given us in the descriptions and in the remains of their art. We are shown the great strapping bodies, sometimes naked, sometimes cased in a strange garb, shirts and trousers of many colours, plaids brooched on the shoulder, the necklets and bracelets of gold, the straw-colored hair stiffened with grease till it stood up on the head like the bristles of a Satyr, the huge shields which covered a man's whole body, the swords as long as a Greek javelin, the pikes whose broad iron heads were longer than a Greek sword. We are told of their full-chested voices, their loud boastings and extravagant gestures, the unreasoning frenzy with which they flung themselves into battle, and which seemed to make them insensible of wounds, their unbridled love of wine, the nameless abominations of their camps.

In such guise did the children of the North introduce themselves twenty-two centuries ago to the civilized, that is to say the Hellenic, world. To the men of the Mediterranean they seemed the embodiment of brute and brainless force, which could by its bulk for a while overbear the higher qualities, but which the "firm, deliberate valor" and disciplined intelligence of the Hellenic character must in the end subdue or use as an instrument for its own ends. On the one side seemed mere volume of force, on the other the mind, by which alone force could be efficiently directed. But what if those Northern races of abounding physical vitality learnt some day of the Southern to think? That question it probably occurred to no one to ask twenty-two centuries ago.

The body of Galatians which had entered Asia numbered, we are told, only 20,000 men, and of these only half were combatants. But the terror of their name caused the heart of the people of the land to melt. Their mobility, their elusiveness, and the extent of their depredations made them seem like a swarm of hornets that filled the land. Of what the native peasantry suffered there is no record. Only a trace here and there—some words on a worn stone or a tale gathered long after from the lips of the people by writers curious of those things—preserves some memorial of the agonies of the Greek cities. An inscription shows us Erythrae paying blackmail to Leonnorius. At Miletus they had a legend of how the Galatians had caught the women of the city outside the walls on the feast of the Thesmophoria and carried off all who could not pay the required ransom, and how seven Milesian maidens had destroyed themselves to escape shame. Some lines of the poetess Anyta of Tegea are preserved which purport to be an epitaph on three Milesian maidens who had won glory by this act. At Ephesus they told

the same story of an Ephesian girl which was told of Tarpeia at Rome. At Celaenae they told a story of how, when the Galatians had beset the city, its river-god Marsyas had risen in flood against them, while the air was filled with a mysterious sound of flutes, and the barbarians had been driven backward. At Themisonium the local story clung to a neighboring cavern. Heracles, Apollo and Hermes had appeared in a dream to the magistrates, and revealed this cavern to them as a hiding-place for the whole population from the Galatian terror. However much fiction may go to make up such legends, they show at least how the memory of those days of fear was burnt into the popular imagination.

The whole question of the Trans-Tauric country, as it lay before the house of Seleucus, was materially affected by the introduction of this new element. The entrance of the Galatians marks the beginning of a new phase. Hitherto we have seen Greek rule, as represented successively by Alexander, Antigonos, Lysimachus and the house of Seleucus, always promising to bring the country under effectual government, but defeated over and over again by some apparently accidental occurrence—the early death of Alexander, war after war between the Successors, changes of dynasty. There seemed no absolute impossibility that a Greek house should succeed in the task if it could only have a period of freedom from external complications. But now the task had become infinitely more difficult. For its achievement it was an indispensable condition that the Galatians should be not only defeated but exterminated or subdued. It was not so much that they hampered the paramount authority as an independent power; they formed indeed no state with a consistent policy of its own. They hampered it—as governments in the East are chiefly hampered by such unassimilated elements—by being always there to furnish material to any antagonist of the paramount power. All the opponents with whom the house of Seleucus had hitherto to deal, all future rebels, had now an unfailing source of strength on which to draw. It was not as a new state but as a great mass of mercenary soldiers encamped in the land that the Galatians—selling themselves now to one employer, now to another, one part of them to the Seleucid king, another to the King's enemies—kept all the conflicting powers in Asia Minor in unstable balance and prevented the establishment of a single supreme lord.

To the Greek cities the result was twofold. On the one hand they had to suffer from the incursions of the barbarians or pay blackmail; on the other the power of the kings to curtail their autonomy was restricted. According as they looked at the matter from this side or that, they saw in the barbarians a danger and in the kings the saviors of Hellenism, or in the kings a danger and in the barbarians a safeguard. It would seem that at first it was the former aspect which presented itself; the early days of the Gallic invasion were probably the worst, before repeated blows had pushed the Galatians towards the interior; and the cities at that time may have sincerely regarded the kings as fighting in their cause against the barbarian. Then as the strokes told and the kings gained a certain advantage, the cities began to forget their sufferings and to look with pleasure on the Galatian adversary who made the King's victory incomplete.

For Asia Minor did not contrive, like Greece, to throw off again the strange element which had entered its system. The Galatians came into Asia to stay. Probably from the first moment of their appearance Antiochus set what forces he could dispose of

(for he was short of men) in action against them. There was also a certain power of resistance in the Greek cities. Meeting with these rebuffs, the Galatians were gradually obliged to put a limit to their vague wanderings and become more or less settled on definite territory of their own. Thence they might still indeed raid their neighbors, but they had made a step from a nomad towards a settled life. The inland regions of Phrygia, inhabited by a peasantry in scattered villages, long accustomed to bow to foreign masters, Persian and Macedonian, lay an easy conquest. And here the Galatians began to make themselves at home. Their bands had consisted of men of three tribes or nations, and each of these took to itself a special territory. They lay one beside another along the north of the central table-land, around the ancient Phrygian towns and the monuments of old Asiatic religions. The Trocmi came to possess the most easterly territory with its centre across the Halys at Tavium; the next tribe, the Tectosages, had their centre in Ancyra; the third, the Tolistoagii in Pessinus, where from time immemorial the Great Mother of the Phrygians was worshipped with fanatic rites. It was with the last, as the most westerly, that the Greeks had most to do.

We can no longer trace the process by which the Galatians were brought to settle down, nor say when or by what steps the organization sketched by Strabo took shape. When the Galatians first came to Asia, they were led, according to Memnon, by seventeen chiefs, of whom Leonnorius and Lutarius were the first in rank. In Strabo a much more regular organization appears. Each of the three tribes is subdivided into four *tetrarchies*; every tetrarchy has a chief of its own, and, under him, a judge, a marshal, and two under-marshals. The twelve tetrarchs are supreme as a body over the whole nation, and are associated with a Council of 300 men, who meet in a certain sacred place. The Council alone has jurisdiction in cases of murder; in all other cases, the tetrarchs and judges. The organization of the horde must have been much looser when it first overspread Asia Minor.

The house of Seleucus played an honorable part in these days as the champion of civilization against the Gauls. It was a *role* in which all the Greek kings were anxious to shine. Even Ptolemy II, when he contrived to make away with a mutinous contingent of Gallic mercenaries, was depicted by his court-poet as sharing with the Delphic god himself the glory of vanquishing these "late-born Titans from the utter West". To such a glory Antiochus might have made out a better claim. It was indeed as *Soter*, the "Savior", or even (if we may judge by his cult at Seleucia-in-Pieria) as Apollo Soter, that he was remembered. He was so called, says Appian, because "he drove out the Galatians who invaded Asia". This Antiochus did not do, but he did win one or more victories, which doubtless had an effect in stemming the Galatian raids on the coast and relieving certain districts. His Gallic War seems to have been sung in an epic by Simonides of Magnesia, but without thereby securing any immortal record. Only the story of one battle, in which the Galatians were scared by the sight of the King's elephants, is preserved in its popular form by Lucian.

On the night before the battle (so it runs) the King dreamed a dream. He saw the great Alexander standing beside him, and then and there Alexander himself gave out the password for the coming day: "Health!"—the ordinary word at parting. Antiochus' heart failed him as the battle drew on. The host of the Galatians counted forty thousand

horse and a great array of chariots, eighty of them scythed, and against all this he had only a small body of troops to set, hastily collected and for the most part light-armed. But the tactician, Theodotas of Rhodes, bade him be of good cheer. The King had sixteen elephants, and Theodotas instructed him to set these in the forepart of the battle. The device answered. For when the elephants moved out, the Galatian horses became mad with fear and swerved backwards. The scythed chariots tore their own ranks. The Macedonians and Greeks followed up with an immense slaughter. Only a few of the Galatians escaped into the hills. The Macedonian army gathered about their King and crowned him victor, raising the shout of *Kallinikos*. But the eyes of Antiochus were full of bitter tears. "Shame, my men", he broke out, "is all that we have got this day. Our deliverance we owe to these sixteen brutes. But for them, where should we have been?" And the King commanded that the trophy should bear nothing but the figure of an elephant.

Whether the action was quite as great an affair as it appears through this epic medium may be questionable. But we may believe that Antiochus did win a notable victory. Against such an enemy as the Galatians, however, one victory is not likely to have gone far, and what the success of Antiochus was in other parts of the war we can only divine from the reputation he left behind him. Whatever it may have been, it was anything but thorough. The Galatians continued to be a menace to the inhabitants of the sea-board, and, according to Livy not only the small communities, but even the Seleucid government was reduced at last to pay blackmail.

3.

Foreign Policy : Antigonus and Ptolemy

A connected narrative of the reign of Antiochus I after the Gallic invasion can hardly be pieced together out of our fragmentary materials, but the general lines of its policy may be discerned. As in Asia Minor, so in the neighboring realms the Gallic invasion *marks the end of an epoch*. The chaotic struggle between the five Macedonian houses is concluded. Two Macedonian kingdoms with firm outlines are now the principal foreign powers with which the house of Seleucus has to do. The houses of Antipater and Lysimachus are heard of no more after the confusion which follows the death of Ptolemy Keraunos in Macedonia (278-276), when Ptolemy, the son of Lysimachus, and Antipater, the grandson of the old Antipater, appear for a moment among the ephemeral kings. Then Antigonus Gonatas strikes in from Central Greece and gradually brings under all hostile elements in Macedonia—rival factions and Gallic swarms.

By 276 he stands before the world as acknowledged King in the Macedonian fatherland. The object for which the first Antigonus had vainly striven his grandson now finally attains. The house of Antipater disappears, except in so far as Antigonus may claim by virtue of his mother Phila to represent that also, or those kings of the Seleucid house who descend from Phila's daughter Stratonice. The house of Lysimachus also disappears. It has been conjectured that the Ptolemy son of Lysimachus, whose daughter is appointed high-priestess of the Seleucid queen in Asia Minor about thirty years after, is the man who had once been for a few days King of Macedonia.

Henceforth the house of Antigonus takes root in Macedonia, as the house of Ptolemy has done in Egypt and the house of Seleucus in Asia. These are the three powers who play the leading part in the lands of the eastern Mediterranean during the rest of the third century before Christ, till all relations are changed by being drawn within the widening sphere of Rome.

If these powers grouped themselves in two opposing camps it meant that two of them must gravitate together against the third. We accordingly find a close understanding during all this period between the Seleucid and the Antigonid houses against the Ptolemaic, with which one or other of them, if not both together, is continually at war.

They were, as we have seen, already connected in the person of queen Stratonice. The beginning of this period of friendship is marked by another marriage. The daughter whom Stratonice, before being passed on to Antiochus, had borne to Seleucus was now of marriageable age. She was called Phila, after her maternal grandmother, the daughter of Antipater. Soon after her uncle Antigonus had established himself on the Macedonian throne she was sent over to Macedonia to become his wife. It was a wedding distinguished apparently by the illustrious throng of philosophers and poets whom the Stoic king called together, a company in which Aratus of Soli made a brilliant figure.

Ptolemy II Philadelphus occupied a strong position which both his brother-kings felt as a menace to themselves. He had in Egypt a territory which experience had shown to be fenced against all attack, and which by its natural wealth and its position on the world's highways, brought him an immense revenue, while its limited area allowed it to be held in the grip of a far more thorough centralization at a far less expense than the sprawling provinces of the Seleucid. But if his realm had been confined to Egypt the other courts might have regarded him as inoffensive. It was as the great naval power that he aroused their hostility. As a naval base for the eastern Mediterranean, Egypt under the conditions of those days was unmatched. It had in Alexandria one sufficient harbour, and the rest of its short coast protected by lagoons.

For the timber indeed necessary to ship-building, Egypt had to look without, but in the dependent island of Cyprus, the southern Lebanon, and the coasts of Asia Minor, Ptolemy possessed an ample supply. A power which created a sea-empire, spreading its influence over all the coasts and islands of the Levant, and interfering in the politics of Greece and Ionia, was not a power which either Seleucid or Antigonid could tranquilly behold.

It is no longer possible to trace the stages by which the house of Ptolemy acquired its possessions over-seas. A beginning had already been made by the first king. Ptolemy Soter had finally reannexed Cyprus about 294, and had brought under his protectorate the Confederation of the Cyclades. It was in war with Antiochus, doubtless, that Ptolemy II won many of the strong places along the coasts of Asia. The immediate origin of war between the two kingdoms is shrouded in obscurity. The relations between them at Antiochus' accession were friendly and regulated by an express treaty made under Seleucus. It seems to have been on the side of Antiochus that the *status quo* was first disturbed.

One of his daughters, called after her Bactrian grandmother Apama, Antiochus had given in marriage to Magas, the half-brother of Ptolemy, who ruled the Cyrenaic province as viceroy. Some time after the Gallic invasion Magas declared himself independent and took up an attitude hostile to Egypt.

Antiochus soon after abjured his neutrality and drew his sword against Ptolemy in alliance with his son-in-law.

Such is the order of events in the sketch of Pausanias, but of their real connexion, the diplomatic to-and-fro which accompanied them, we can only guess. We do not know whether it was Antiochus or Magas to whom the initiative in the rupture with Egypt should be assigned. There were at any rate more selfish reasons to make Antiochus break with Ptolemy than sympathy with his daughter's husband, and it may well be that Apama carried with her to Cyrene the instigations to revolt.

The date of the beginning of hostilities between Antiochus and Ptolemy is fixed by Babylonian inscriptions to the year 38 of the Seleucid era (October 274-October 273 BC). Its effects were abundantly felt in the country beyond the Taurus, upon whose coasts Ptolemy was able, in virtue of his supremacy at sea, to throw his armies, or at any rate swarms of privateers. It was a war in which neither struck a vital part of his adversary, which dribbled on, with pauses and local variations, till it must have seemed the normal state of things.

To the house of Seleucus it meant a fresh complication in the Trans-Tauric problem. There was now an external foe pressing from without, to add to the rebellious elements within. It was such a complication as the house of Achaemenes had found in the attack of the European Greeks. That had compelled them for long periods to abandon the coasts which the Asiatic Greeks inhabited, and the house of Seleucus now found its hold on the coasts become exceedingly precarious and interrupted. Ptolemy, of course, could use the old cry of Hellenic autonomy against the master in possession.

To attempt a chronology of such a war—a multitude of local struggles, strong places wrested now by one side, now by the other, factions oscillating in the cities—would probably be difficult if we had all the facts. Under the circumstances all one can do is to indicate the traces of Ptolemaic rule along the coasts. Our chief literary authority is unfortunately a court-poet, whose phrases cannot be taken too severely. When Theocritus says that Ptolemy “gives the signal to all the Pamphylans and the

spearmen of Cilicia, to the Lycians and the war-like Carians”, it need mean no more than that Ptolemaic garrisons were posted at strong points along the southern coast—places like Selinus and Coracesium—and that many of the cities of Lycia and Caria had been drawn into the Ptolemaic alliance.

To begin with the east, with Rough Cilicia—the end, as the ancients reckoned, of the Taurus barrier—the struggle between Seleucid and Ptolemy has here left its mark in the names of the coast towns. Near the river Lamus, after which, to the west, Rough Cilicia was held to begin, we hear of an Antioch. Then we have Seleucia on the Calycadnus (*mod.* Selefkeh), where there is still room between mountains and sea for a large city—founded, according to its legend, by Seleucus Nicator himself. Next come Ptolemaic towns, Berenice, called after the wife of the first or the third Ptolemy, and Arsinoe, called after Arsinoe Philadelphia, the sister-wife of Ptolemy II, the sometime wife of Lysimachus, or possibly after the sister-wife of Ptolemy IV. Then again we have a Seleucid foundation in Antioch-near-Cragus.

On passing to Pamphylia we are confronted at the entrance by a Ptolemais, and then again in the plain about the mouth of the Eurymedon comes a Seleucia.

In Lycia the Ptolemaic influence seems to have become especially consolidated. Patara, the harbor-town of Xanthus, was enlarged by Ptolemy II as another Arsinoe, though in this case, no less than when her former husband called Ephesus after her, the queen’s name had too famous a name to compete with ever to obtain currency. The possession of Patara probably implies authority over the whole Lycian Confederation. Caria is named by Jerome among the possessions of the second Ptolemy. The towns, more strictly Carian, lying inland, were, as we shall see, held by Antiochus, but we can prove Ptolemaic possession in the chief Greek towns of the coast and some of the adjoining islands. Caunus is found as the station of a Ptolemaic fleet at a moment soon after the marriage of Ptolemy and his sister Arsinoe. Cos, together with the shrine on the Triopian promontory, the religious centre of the Dorian Body, received special attention from Ptolemy, as befitted his birthplace. At Halicarnassus the Ptolemaic supremacy is evidenced by inscriptions.

The Ionian cities Antiochus I seems, as a whole, to have been able to retain. Samos, indeed, had been acquired by Ptolemy some time before 274, and gave the Egyptian fleets an important station in the Aegean, and even on the mainland Miletus, in spite of the favors which the house of Seleucus had showered upon it, had to yield to the superior force of the king of Egypt. The day came when it was the Ptolemaic house whom the obsequious *demos* honoured at Branchidae. At the neighbouring Heraclea also the ascendancy of the Ptolemaic house is indicated by an inscription assigned to the reign of the second Ptolemy. But north of the Latmian Bay evidences of Ptolemaic rule are not found till Antiochus II sits upon the Seleucid throne. In an inscription, which must be later than 269, the Ionian Body addresses itself to the Seleucid court.

This arrest of the Ptolemaic conquest at the Latmian Bay was no doubt due to the action of the Antigonid king. In 272, or soon after, Antigonus joined in the war, and his fleets proved themselves more than a match for the Ptolemaic. His great victory off Cos

created a balance of power in the Aegean, where hitherto Ptolemy had been sole master. This diversion naturally weakened the pressure of the Ptolemaic forces in Asia Minor.

4.

Government of the first Seleucids in Asia Minor

We turn now from considering how Asia Minor was affected by the foreign relations of the Seleucid court to examine what can still be deciphered of the workings of Seleucid government within.

It is perhaps not merely due to the imperfection of our evidence, to the fact that the part of Seleucid history which affected the Greeks stood the best chance of being recorded, that Asia Minor rather than Syria or the East seems, till after Magnesia, the chief sphere of Seleucid activity. One may well believe that it was the part of their dominions to which the Seleucid kings attached the greatest value. It is never so inappropriate to speak of the dynasty as "Syrian" as in these earlier reigns. We cannot even perceive that Antioch on the Orontes held at that time any primacy over the capitals of the West and the East, over Sardis and the Babylonian Seleucia.

Sardis since the days of the Lydian kingdom had held the position of capital of the country north of the Taurus. It had always been the chief seat of the power ruling the interior, Persian or Macedonian, unless perhaps it was superseded by the Phrygian capital, Celaenae, under Antigonos. Under the house of Seleucus, Sardis enjoyed its old dignity. It was there that the government archives were kept. It had been transformed from a barbarian to a Hellenic city.

In the absence of the King, the governor of Lydia exercises a general authority over the whole Trans-Tauric domain.

Of the satrapies into which that domain was divided under the Seleucids we have no complete statement. According to the system which Alexander took over from the Persians, it would have formed six, Greater Phrygia, Hellespontine Phrygia, Lydia, Caria, Lycia, and Cappadocia. Of these only two can be proved by express mention under the Seleucids, Hellespontine Phrygia and Lydia. We have also a satrapy mentioned, which appears to be that of Greater Phrygia.

There is no reason to suppose that the Seleucids, while they continued to hold territory in Caria, Lycia, and Cappadocia, modified the system which they found existing.

While “satrapy” continued to be the official name for the province, the governor in official documents is called by the Greek title of *strategos*. In popular language he was still spoken of as satrap. He was the intermediary in all transactions between the central government and the province. It was to him that the King addressed his rescripts, which the *strategos* communicated in his turn to the subordinate officials who would be concerned with their execution.

What the lower officials were who made up the machine of government in Asia Minor under the Seleucids we are only imperfectly informed. Each satrapy seems to have had a special controller of the finances. An *oikonomos* is mentioned in an inscription recently published, where his duty is to pass on to a district officer an order received by the *strategos* from the King relating to the alienation of a piece of the royal domain. The same inscription gives the title of this district officer as *hyparchos*. This word, of course, in popular speech was quite a vague one, meaning any one who bore authority under any one else, and was even used as a translation of the Persian *satrap*. In the official language *hyparchos* meant the governor of one of those smaller districts, *hyparchies*, into which the satrapy was divided.

Such is about all we know of the framework of government. In what relation did the different elements which made up the population stand to the Seleucid power?

5.

The native Powers and Antiochus I

First we notice that *the north of the peninsula has now been finally abandoned.*

The native dynasties, the houses of Mithridates, of Ariarathes and of Ziboetes—these and the Galatian tribes are left in unchallenged possession of all that lies to the north of the central plateau.

Of the two principalities of Persian origin that of Mithridates soon showed itself the more important. Mithridates already assumed the name of *king* in 281 or 280, and coined in gold—a mark of absolute independence. Neither of these things did Ariarathes venture to do. The kingdom of Mithridates seems from the first to have admitted the lustre of Hellenism; his father indeed and grandfather in the fourth century had been ardently phil-Hellenic, and received the honorary franchise of Athens. The territory he now ruled had bordering upon it Greek cities like Trapezus and Sinope, and Mithridates was in diplomatic connexion with Heraclea.

The principality of Ariarathes, on the other hand, has an out-of-the world, antiquated air about it. Ariarathes II continues to stamp his money with an Aramaic

legend. His court was a region which the vagrant *literati* of Greece, who were found everywhere else, did not explore. It must have seemed by contrast a strangely silent place. A primitive domesticity is the impression we gather from the family annals till Seleucid princesses come to trouble the house with the spirit of a less simple and kindly sphere. The only thing we know as to the part taken by the Cappadocian court in history for a hundred years is that it seems the place where a fugitive Seleucid prince can best efface himself from the sight of the world.

Whether Antiochus I, having recognized the impossibility of ejecting Mithridates and Ariamnes, who seems to have succeeded his father Ariarathes II about the same time that Antiochus succeeded to the Seleucid throne, adopted that policy of close friendship with the two Persian courts which was afterwards the tradition of the Seleucid house we are not told. From faint indications we may conjecture that the tradition goes back in its origin to his reign. The only piece of information we get as to the history of Mithridates I after the accession of Antiochus is that some Galatian bands, whom Mithridates and his son Ariobarzanes had taken into their service, drove a Ptolemaic force which had endeavoured to penetrate into the interior back to the sea, and took the anchors of the Egyptian ships. Whatever historical foundation the story may have, it goes to show the Mithridatic house as an ally of the Seleucid.

In the case of the South Cappadocian court it may show close relations with the house of Seleucus that Ariamnes begins to put a Greek instead of an Aramaic legend upon his coins.

In the hills between Bithynia and the valley of the Amnias the chiefs of the native tribes perhaps already began to assert their independence of any of their great neighbors. It was the country in which Mithridates had first grounded his power, but in the course of the century which succeeded his establishment as king farther east, Paphlagonia seems to have fallen back to the same condition as under the Persian Empire. In the earlier part of the second century before Christ a native chief, Morzias, has his seat at Gangra (*mod.* Changra).

The war between Antiochus and Nicomedes of Bithynia seems never to have been renewed after the Gallic invasion. *That war was the last attempt made by a Macedonian ruler to humble the house of Dozdalsus.* Under Nicomedes the Bithynian kingdom passes from a mere barbaric chiefship to a state of the approved Hellenistic pattern. Ziboetes had already founded a city; under Nicomedes the transformation of Bithynia was carried through. Nicomedes, the “executioner of his brothers”, had a heart as cruel as any barbarian sultan's, but an unregenerate heart has never prevented a barbarian, then or now, from assuming the externals, and even some of the tastes, of a higher civilization. The coins of Nicomedes—for now the Bithynian principality begins to have a coinage—show him a regular Greek king, with the smooth-shaven face which had become the vogue since Alexander, and the simple band of riband to show his royalty. In the great Hellenic centre, Olympia, his form figured in ivory.

In 264 Nicomedes founded the city which was to perpetuate his name. At the end of the most northern of the two inlets on the east side of the Propontis had stood the

Greek city of Astacus. The situation was an important one, lying on the road between the Bosphorus and the interior of Bithynia, just as Nicaea, the city of Antigonus and Lysimachus, lay on the road between the Bosphorus and Phrygia. Astacus had been demolished by Lysimachus perhaps in the interests of Nicaea. Since then its citizens had been homeless. Now, near the vacant site, but on the opposite side of the inlet, enjoying the same advantages of situation as the old city, rose the new Nicomedia. The population of the old city, was settled in the new. In course of time Nicomedia came to be one of the great cities of the world.

But although hostilities between Nicomedes and Antiochus appear to have ceased, the war had left behind it a feeling of estrangement. It was probably believed at the Bithynian court that the house of Seleucus wanted only some accession of good fortune to become again its aggressive enemy. Antiochus on his part may have smarted under some sense of dishonor not wiped away. At any rate Nicomedes at his death committed his infant children to the protection, not of the Seleucid King, but of Antigonus, Ptolemy, and the neighbouring cities.

At Pergamos, during all the time that Antiochus, the son of Seleucus, was combating Ptolemaic and barbarian enemies in Asia Minor, the astute eunuch Philetaerus remained master of citadel and treasure. He seems to have seen his interest in maintaining to the end his policy of friendship with the house of Seleucus. The earliest coins of the Pergamene dynasty, those probably which were struck under the rule of Philetaerus, exhibit the head of the deified Seleucus. And Antiochus on his side probably thought it wise to purchase the adherence of Philetaerus by moderating his claims. So that all through the twenty years of his rule Philetaerus was able to go on quietly consolidating the power of his house. At the very beginning of the reign of Antiochus, when Pitane contracted a debt of 380 talents to the King, we find Philetaerus forward to advance them a portion of the sum, and thereby secure some influence over that city. An inscription just published (1902) records his gifts to the city of Cyzicus, to make good the losses it had suffered in some war (with the anti-Seleucid Northern League?) and from the ravages of the Galatians. And his family, drawing no doubt on his support, were meanwhile acquiring power in the country. The Eumenes who was in possession of Amastris about 280 was probably his brother, and by the time that Philetaerus came to be an old man of eighty, the son of this Eumenes, called also Eumenes, had established himself as dynast in the region adjacent to Pergamos. The other brother of Philetaerus, Attalus, contracted a marriage which must have advertised to the world the standing which the house of Philetaerus had attained. His wife was Antiochis, the daughter of Achaeus, a cousin of the Seleucid King.

In 263-262 Philetaerus died at the age of eighty, and Pergamos passed to his nephew Eumenes, who now united with it the principality of which he already stood possessed. This concentration of power in the hands of a younger ruler than the old eunuch was followed by a rupture with the house of Seleucus. It was probably inevitable that the Seleucid King should not suffer this new power to grow up without first testing his ability to prevent it. Eumenes, when hostilities had once been opened, struck straight for the Seleucid capital. A battle was fought in the neighborhood of Sardis, at which Antiochus would seem to have commanded in person. It issued in a

decisive victory for the Pergamene forces. This happened only a short while before Antiochus I died.

Of the way in which Antiochus dealt with the free tribes of the Taurus, of any action of the Seleucid house in Lycia or Pamphylia, we know nothing except what can be inferred from the names which stamp some cities as Seleucid foundations.

6.

The Greek Cities and Antiochus I

The relation between the King and the Greek cities was still formally what it had been since Alexander. They did not in theory form a part of his dominion, but a series of independent states, with whom the King, the lord of the barbarian interior, had entered into *alliance*. The Empire was not in this view a monarchy, but a federation, of which the King and a number of free republics were members. It was unnecessary for official language to take account of the fact that one member of the federation was so immensely more powerful than the rest that his sole word was law. Still, as under Alexander, the King's territory was distinguished from the territory of the cities. Of the occupiers of his own land, the Phrygian and Lydian villagers, the King, as supreme proprietor, exacted regular tribute. He had no such rights over the territory of the Greek cities. The frontiers between these two spheres underwent continual modification. Of instances in which the King acquired or seized territory belonging to the cities there is no record; such an act there would be little motive to register. On the other hand, it was in the interest of the new possessors to have clear documents to point to in cases where the King alienated some parcel of his domain. Of these, therefore, some trace has survived. The alienation is seen taking place in two ways. Sometimes the King makes it an affair of business, raising money by a sale. At the very beginning of his reign Antiochus I sells a piece of ground to the city of Pitane for 380 talents; the transaction is engraved on stone, and records of it laid up in the temples of Ilion, Ephesus, and Delos.

Another instance of sale is that recorded in a recently published inscription. It was perhaps a somewhat abnormal case, for the purchaser is here not a Greek city or a citizen of one, but the sister-wife herself of King Antiochus II, Laodice. Whether it was usual for Seleucid queens to buy themselves appanages with money paid into the royal treasury, or whether the transaction in question sprang from the peculiar state of things, when Queen Laodice was living in divorce, we do not know. In this case also the sale

was to be recorded not only in the government archives at Sardis, but by *steles* in the temples of Ilion, Samothrace, Ephesus, Branchidae, and Sardis.

At other times the kings alienate parcels of their territory by way of *grants* to individual Greeks. Such grants of land to reward good service were an old custom of the Macedonian monarchy. The hordes of adventurers from all corners of the Greek world who flocked to the Seleucid court had in view similar rewards among the rich fields of Asia. But any one who found himself in possession of land *within* the King's realm would of course have to pay the tribute which was ordinarily paid by the barbarian cultivators. To do this would injure not only the pocket, but the dignity, of a Greek. In the cases, therefore, which we can examine of such alienations the territory is removed from the realm altogether. The new possessor is allowed to annex it to the domain of one or other of the allied cities, to hold it as a citizen or *metoikos* of that city, not as the subject of a king, and to pay money only indirectly into the royal treasury, in so far as he contributes to whatever the city is obliged, as an ally, to furnish. Both Laodice and Aristodicides of Assos—in the two cases under our observation—are allowed great latitude in choosing the city to which their property is to be attached. It need not necessarily be a city of the immediate neighbourhood. There are in fact known cases in which cities possessed lands altogether detached from their main territory, and surrounded by the possessions of other states.

To what extent the reality answered to the form by which the Greek cities took the rank of free states, we have not the means to determine. We find at any rate many of the cities still disposing of military and naval forces of their own. Two inscriptions from Erythrae contain honors voted to the civic *strategoï* for organizing the city's forces, and from one of them we learn that these forces consisted to some extent, like all armies of the time, of mercenaries. An inscription of Priene seems to indicate a mercenary force maintained by the people in the citadel. Smyrna has troops in the middle of the third century with which it can garrison neighbouring towns. Alexandria Troas in 216 can launch a force of 4000 men against a Galatian horde. Calymna about the same time possesses a fleet.

With the means of levying war on their own account, the cities to some extent pursue an independent policy. In the disturbed times which immediately preceded the conquest of Asia Minor by Seleucus we hear of a petty war between Magnesia-on-the-Meander and Priene. There were probably various gradations of freedom, depending partly on geographical position, partly on the circumstances of the moment, between the complete liberty of great states like Heraclea or Rhodes and the subjection of a royal residence like Ephesus under Antiochus II.

In whatever cases the King was strong enough, if he chose, to demand tribute, to set a garrison, to meddle with the constitution, the city lived with an uneasy sense of holding all that it most valued on sufferance. The inscriptions which record the benefactions of the kings say nothing of the cases where he used his power to curtail liberty. But the effusion with which they acknowledge his moderation is significant. Priene, a story says, was "enslaved" by Antiochus I for a time, and liberated again through the influence of its citizen, Sostratus the dancer. Perhaps already the exaction of

tribute, which under Alexander had been, as we have noted, only an exceptional punishment, was becoming common, as it appears to have been in the time of Antiochus III, or it may have been that the name of tribute began to be bluntly applied to the forced benevolences. For demanding such contributions the Seleucid kings had a good pretext in the Galatian peril; it was indeed only fair that the cities should pay their quota towards the cause which was theirs as well as the kings'; but the pretext may have been used immoderately; whether it was or not, the cities felt the demand a burden.

To judge, however, by the inscriptions, Antiochus I and Antiochus II were ready enough to meet the wishes of the Greeks. In a somewhat ambiguous phrase the envoys of the Ionian Body to Antiochus I are instructed to exhort the King "to take the Ionian cities under his most earnest care, in order that henceforth, enjoying free and popular government, they may at last be secure in the possession of those constitutions which their fathers have handed down to them; and the envoys are further to represent to the King that in so doing he will confer great benefits upon the cities and will also adhere to the policy of his ancestors". It does not read as if a danger to the laws and liberties of the cities were apprehended from the King himself; it seems rather as if it were against external enemies that the Seleucid is entreated to become protector. One might guess that the occasion of the decree was some withdrawal of the Ptolemaic forces, or a defeat of the Galatians, or the suppression of some local tyrants. In the case of one of the Ionian cities, Erythrae, an inscription informs us that its freedom was respected by Antiochus I, as it had been by Alexander, Antigonus, and Seleucus; Antiochus even remitted the contribution to the Galatian war.

There were two ways by which the cities might bring influence to bear upon the King. There was firstly the direct method of diplomatic intercourse. Envoys were continually going to and fro between the several cities and the court. The royal embassies were given precedence of all others in the cities save the sacred ones. The kings, on their part, appear continually receiving embassies from the cities. The expenses of this intercourse formed a very serious item in the civic budgets. The ambassadors to court could not go empty-handed. Those, for instance, sent by Erythrae to Antiochus I have to carry a crown, presumably of gold, and gold for presents. The expenditure on such embassies ranked with that on theatres, temples, and great public works. The other, and probably more effectual, means of securing their ends the cities found in obtaining the advocacy of persons powerful at court. This advocacy had often without doubt to be purchased, and the presents to the King's friends were perhaps as severe a drain on the city's resources as the presents to the King himself. Sometimes, however, there was no necessity to pay for the services of an advocate. Civic patriotism was an unfeigned virtue among the Greeks, and those who won influence over the King no doubt thought in the first place of exercising it for the benefit of their native city. The case of Sostratus the dancer has been already mentioned. Demodamas, the explorer of the Far East for Seleucus and Antiochus I, did not cease to act as a citizen of Miletus.

It was specially as arbitrator in the quarrels between city and city, or faction and faction, that the King was appealed to. We find the Seleucid King intervening in the intestine feuds of Bargylia, and perhaps in the secular quarrel between Samos and Priene. It was of course not absolutely necessary that the King to whose empire cities at

variance were attached should be the arbitrator chose; it might be a neutral city. The usual course seems to have been for the King, even when appealed to, not to adjudicate the disputes himself but to nominate a neutral party, some friendly city, as arbitrator.

The relations, however, between the earlier Seleucids and the old Greek cities do not exhaust the relations of that house with Asiatic Hellenism. For Hellenism was spreading far beyond its original sphere. It was under these Greek kings—perhaps it was their greatest glory, though historians were far more interested in their battles, their vices and their *amours*—it was under them that the process went on by which Hellenism pushed its way far into the interior. Cities with Greek names, of Greek speech and life, rose one by one where before only ignoble Phrygian or Cappadocian towns had huddled round temples and bazaars.

Antiochus I has been described by a well-known authority as that “great city-builder who has almost faded out of our tradition”. A view of that work we shall never recover, except imperfectly. From time to time archaeology will fill in fresh details of that mighty plan by which the successors of Alexander, Greek and Roman, multiplied the centres of Hellenism in the land. It is part of the difficulty that even when we have ascertained the existence of a Greek or Macedonian colony in a particular place it remains in a large number of cases doubtful who planted it there, and when.

A certain mark of Seleucid foundation (or refoundation) is given by the names of some of the cities, Seleucia, Antioch, Laodicea, and so on. The cities so named are found to go mostly along the two main lines of communication between Syria and the Aegean, the water-way along the coast—where we have seen the Seleucid competing with Ptolemaic foundations—and the great high-road which ran from the Cilician Gates westward between the inner steppe and the Pisidian hills to Lydia and Ionia.

The Seleucid cities on this road are placed, as no doubt had been the native settlements before them, at the points of junction where other roads run in from either side.

First, going from the east, is the Laodicea called “the Burnt-up”, where a road comes in from Cappadocia, the realm of Ariarathes, and the Upper Euphrates. Then after turning the northern end of the mountain obstacle, Paroreia (now called Sultan Dag), the highway ran on to the Phrygian capital, Apamea. Its predecessor was the Phrygian town of Celaenae, a strong mountain city of the old-world sort in whose very market-place the Marsyas rushed from a sacred cavern to join the Meander, that river also having its source in a neighbouring tarn. Here roads came in from all sides, from Northern Phrygia and from Pisidia; it was the central point of the interior. Here Antigonus had had his seat of government at a time when he aspired to rule Asia. Perhaps he had already begun the new Greco-Macedonian city lower down towards the foot of the hills, which from the time that Seleucus conquered Asia Minor was known as Apamea, a memorial of the Iranian queen. From Apamea the great high-road ran down the Lycus valley. Where that valley opens out before the junction of the Lycus and Meander, in the fat plains which nourished innumerable flocks and yielded the softest wool to the Greek market, two chief roads diverged. One ran north-west to the

valley of the Hermus and the royal city of Sardis, the government centre of Asia Minor; the other led the trains of merchantmen down the Meander valley to the commercial centre, Ephesus.

Above the plains of the Lycus where these roads diverged we find the third great Seleucid city, Laodicea, rich and increased with goods from the traffic which passed through it and the exchange of its wool, looking on the one hand down the Meander to the Aegean, and on the other through the Syrian Gate down the long road that led ever eastwards. On the road between Laodicea and Sardis no certain trace of a Seleucid foundation has been discovered, though such there may have been. The traffic on the other road to Ephesus was no doubt much greater, and here the Seleucid foundations succeeded one another at short intervals. First came an Antioch, Antioch-on-Meander, a place that gave its name to a brand of dried figs, then a day's journey brought one to Nysa, which was for a time renamed Antioch, and another day's journey to Tralles, to which the same indiscriminating name as well as the other of Seleucia was attached. From Tralles Ephesus was only thirty-five miles by road.

Such were the cities with Seleucid names through which the main artery of commerce between the Ionian coast and the Farther East ran. It remains to enumerate those which commanded the side lines.

The main road, as we have seen, turned the north of the Paroreia (by Philomelium, Holmi, Chelidonia, and Metropolis; on the south side of the range was set an Antioch, from which a side-road ran into the main road at Apamea.

Whether at the time when this Antioch was founded there was an alternative road to the main road on the south of the Sultan Dagh, leaving the main road at Iconium and rejoining it at Apamea, or whether Antioch was rather the terminus of a road pushed out from Apamea, an outpost of the Seleucid power towards the Pisidian hills, we do not know. Antioch in Pisidia was one of those cities which succeeded an older religious centre of the Phrygians, in this case a sanctuary of the Moon god, endowed with a great property in lands and slaves. The new settlers, planted presumably by some Seleucid king to form the substance of his Greek city, were drawn from Magnesia-on-Meander. Another road came into Apamea from a Seleucia, surnamed "the Iron", planted on the western side of Lake Egirdir (its name still survives as Selef). This may also have been intended to keep a watch on Sagalassus and the Pisidian towns to the south. Still more to the west we find a city whose foundation is fixed by its name of Themisonium (mod. Kara-euyuk Bazar) to the reign of Antiochus II, accessible by a roughish pass from Laodicea on the Lycus, and looking across the valley of the Indus towards the mountain state of Cibyra. A station of guard-troops or constabulary and settlements of military colonists, probably Seleucid, is proved by an inscription to have existed in the valley below on the road to Cibyra, at Eriza (near Dere-Keui) and the neighbouring villages.

Going westward still, we find a road connecting Tralles-Antioch on the main road with the harbors of Southern Caria, Physcus, and Caunus. It was the further connection of these harbors with a great commercial state like Pthodes, which indeed came to possess them as dependencies, that the importance of this road across Caria lay.

It passed through the old centres of Carian life, through Alabanda and by the temple of Zeus Chrysaoreus, the religious centre of the Carian people, in which the federal parliament assembled, composed of delegates from the various groups of villages.

In both places the Seleucid government made establishments. Alabanda for a time became Antioch. By the temple of Zeus Chrysaoreus arose a new Macedonian city, Stratonicea, founded no doubt by Antiochus I in honour of his wife. The Macedonian settlers took part in the national assemblies and cults at the neighboring temples.

To find the other colonies, which are certainly Seleucid, we must go northwards to those roads which bind the capital, Sardis, to the Troad—the highway, that is, between Sardis and Europe—and to the Propontis. Travelers to either destination would go in company till a place was reached some ten miles from the ridge which divides the waters of the Hermus from those of the Caicus. Thence the roads forked, one entering the Caicus valley and running down it to Pergamos, the other crossing the valley higher up and striking over the hills to Cyzicus. It was at this point that a colony of Macedonians took possession of the native town of Thyatira. These Macedonians claimed the great Seleucus as their founder, but the story they told of the city's origin is discredited by modern etymology, and the real founder may have been Antiochus I.

The road from Thyatira down the Caicus valley was the thoroughfare between Sardis and Pergamos, continued beyond Pergamos in the coast road of the Troad. On this no Antiochs or Seleucias are to be found. In this region the earlier Seleucid kings were willing to tolerate the authority of the rulers of Pergamos. Already, in the reign of Antiochus I, there rose a Philetaeria under Ida and an Attalia.

A rupture between the courts of Sardis and Pergamos must have broken communication between the Seleucid government and the Hellespont by the natural way that followed the Caicus. Under such circumstances the road leading north from Thyatira to the district of the modern Balikisri, whence one can reach the Troad by striking off to the west, must have assumed great importance. It is on this road that we find a Stratonicea where it crosses the Caicus valley. It remains only to note that in the Troad itself the town of Cebrene is proved at one period by its coins to have entitled itself Antioch. It must have recovered an independent existence after Antigonus had transferred its population to Ilion, thanks possibly to the good-will of a Seleucid king.

The new cities of the Greek kings differed generally from the old native towns in being on lower ground. The old towns had been rather citadels than dwelling-places, fortresses perched on the edge of precipices, to which the cultivators of the neighboring fields might flee in stress of war. Considerations of commercial convenience and easier living made it a point to have the new cities accessible rather than inaccessible. The new cities seemed to have slid down from the heights to come into touch with the plains. It was still unusual to build them in an altogether exposed position, although in a country securely pacified like Lydia it might be done. Thyatira lay flat upon the marshes of the Lycus.

But the favorite position was the foot of some hill half plain and half slope, a compromise between convenience and security. This was notably the case with the colonies along the great eastern highway, Laodicea the Burnt-up in a bare “theatre-shaped recess in the outer skirt of the mountains”, Apamea below the old Celaenae, set on a foot-hill where the Marsyas breaks into the plain, Laodicea on the Lycus on the slopes which rise from the river to Mount Salbacus.

7.

The End of Antiochus I

Between July 262 and July 261 Antiochus Soter died, after having wrestled with the task bequeathed him by Seleucus for nineteen years. He was sixty-four years old.

We hear of six children, the two sons of Stratonice, Seleucus and Antiochus; the two daughters of Stratonice, Apama, who had married Magas of Cyrene, and Stratonice, who was still unmarried at her father’s death; and, lastly, we hear of a son and daughter of Antiochus by another (perhaps earlier) wife, Alexander and Laodice. This daughter was destined to play a prominent part in Asia Minor; she became the wife of her half-brother Antiochus.

Already in the reign of Antiochus I an evil had appeared in the Seleucid house, to which no less than to any overmastering circumstances its ultimate ruin was due—the division of the house against itself. The elder son of Antiochus I, bearing the name of his grandfather Seleucus, had been designated the successor. From the earlier years of the reign of Antiochus till some time between 269 and 265 he had been associated with his father as joint-king, and had perhaps been given the government of Babylon and Iran. Then there came a dark suspicion between father and son. Antiochus gave command that the prince was to be put to death; and it was done. His younger brother Antiochus stepped into his place and was made partner in the throne.

It is hardly possible from our scanty materials to arrive at any idea of the personality of the first Antiochus, to penetrate to the real man whose work we have been attempting to follow. He seems indeed to be typical of his house, indefatigably busy in keeping the unwieldy empire together, hurrying from one end of it to the other, fighting almost incessantly. Nor was he a mere spectator in the battles fought under his conduct. At Ipsus, a young man of twenty-five, he had commanded the wing attacked by Demetrius Poliorcetes; and even as King he took his share of danger like the Macedonian and Iranian chiefs from whom he sprang. A stone found at Ilium contains a decree of that city conferring honors on the physician Metrodorus of Amphipolis because he had successfully treated King Antiochus for a wound in the neck, got in

battle. He may also be credited with a prudent sense of the limits of his power, an honest recognition of facts, abandoning, for instance, a useless hostility to the Persian houses which had cut off for themselves provinces of the realm, and holding out to them instead the hand of friendship. His coins show us a homely face, practical, unideal, of a sort of wizen shrewdness, the eyes somewhat screwed up, the lips pursed together. The gossip that caught at any suggestion of irregular *amours* did not fail to detect a side of weaker sensuality in Antiochus; it dwelt on the story of his enervating passion for his stepmother, on the influence exerted upon him by the flute-player Sostratus. But there were not many princes of whom gossip did not find similar stories to tell.

CHAPTER IX
ANTIOCHUS II (THEOS)

It was Antiochus II, now a young man of about twenty-four, who took up the Seleucid inheritance in 262.

In him, the grandson of Demetrius Poliorcetes, the sensual strain was more strongly pronounced than in his father. At least the scandal-mongers found him a richer theme. He was a hopeless drunkard; he slept off his morning bouts, only to begin again in the evening. Those admitted to his presence on official business rarely found him in anything but a shocking condition. Vile creatures ruled him by the most discreditable sort of influence, such as the Cypriot Aristus and his brother Themison. Themison assumed the name and insignia of Heracles and became the object of a regular cult. When he entered the lists at public games he was proclaimed as Themison a Macedonian, the Heracles of King Antiochus. When any person of distinction offered sacrifice on his altar, he condescended to reveal himself, disposed on a couch with a lion-skin thrown about him, a Scythian bow and club at his side. Two other persons who enjoyed high consideration at the court of Antiochus were Herodotus the buffoon and Archelaus the dancer. The face of Antiochus upon his coins, with its full protruding chin and gross jaw, betrays the sensual element in his character; but we should do well to accept the stories of the scandal-mongers with some reserve, or at any rate to remember that there was probably a great deal more that might have been said about Antiochus II. What sort of idea should we have of Philip of Macedon or Julius Caesar if all we knew about them were the stories on which gossip loved to dwell?

In Asia Minor the reign of the second Antiochus seems, from what we can see, to have been till the peace with Egypt merely a continuation of the reign of Antiochus the First. There were the same questions for the Seleucid court to deal with—the internal ones presented to it by the lesser principalities, Cappadocian, Bithynian, Pergamene, by the hill-tribes of the Taurus and by the Galatians, by the Greek cities, and the external ones constituted by the relations of the Seleucid court with Ptolemy and Antigonos. It is not possible to discover anywhere a change of policy consequent upon the new reign, except that the quarrel with Eumenes of Pergamos seems to have been dropped and a *modus vivendi* to have been discovered which allowed the ruler of Pergamos to hold his extended principality as a subordinate or ally of Antiochus. With the two dynasties in Cappadocia the relations of the Seleucid court continued friendly. To the house of Ariarathes indeed it gave its recognition in the way that was most impressive by uniting it with the Seleucid house in marriage. The Greek king recognized a brother in the

barbarian prince. It was during the first four or five years of the reign of Antiochus II that Ariamnes began to be styled king. It was about the same time that his son, Ariarathes, whom he had associated with himself on the throne, married the daughter of Antiochus II, Stratonice. A passage of Strabo seems to indicate that the region of Cataonia was ceded by Antiochus to the new Cappadocian kingdom as his daughter's dowry. In the case of the dynasty of Pontic Cappadocia it is to be observed that after Mithridates the Founder, who was succeeded by his son Ariobarzanes in 266, the kings cease to coin in gold—an indication that they are willing to purchase the friendship of the Seleucid house by some formal recognition of its suzerainty.

Of the relations of Antiochus and Bithynia we are told nothing. About 250 Nicomedes died, and fresh family feuds distracted the princely house. He left a wife, Etazeta, and some infant sons, but besides these he had by an earlier wife, a Phrygian, Ditizele, a grown-up son called Ziaelas. Under the regime of Etazeta, Ziaelas had been discarded; he had even found his father's court no safe place for him and had vanished out of the land. Nicomedes left his kingdom to Etazeta's children, placing them by his will under the protection of Ptolemy and Antigonus, of Byzantium, Heraclea, and Cius. But now Ziaelas, who had been living all this time with the king of the Armenians, suddenly reappeared in Bithynia at the head of a body of Galatians, Tolistoagii. A civil war at once raged over the country. The adherents of Etazeta were supported by troops from the states under whose protection her children had been placed. Ziaelas succeeded, however, in conquering first a part, and then the whole, of his father's realm. Heraclea, which had taken a prominent part in opposing him, was raided by his Galatians. We hear presently of a son of Nicomedes called Ziboetes as an exile in Macedonia; this is no doubt one of the sons of Etazeta who had taken refuge with his guardian, King Antigonus.

With the two other Macedonian kingdoms the relations of the Seleucid continued to be the same under Antiochus II as under Antiochus I—friendship with the house of Antigonus, a state of war with Ptolemy. The former was to be still more complicated with the house of Seleucus by another marriage. Demetrius, the son of Antigonus Gonatas and Phila, fetched in his turn a bride from the Seleucid court, Stratonice, the daughter of the elder Stratonice and Antiochus the First, a princess who—so involved were now the relations—was at once the half-sister and the niece of his mother and the niece of his father.

The war with Ptolemy was still, as far as Asia Minor was concerned, a war of which the Greek states of the coast and the neighboring islands were both the theatre and the prizes of victory. It continued to fluctuate without discoverable progress. In the latter years of Antiochus I, or early in his son's reign, Ephesus, the commercial centre of Asia Minor, passed from Seleucid to Ptolemaic possession. A son of King Ptolemy's, himself called Ptolemy, commanded the garrison which held it—a garrison composed largely, we understand, of half-wild men from Thrace. This gain, however, to the Ptolemaic side was quickly overbalanced by losses. Miletus, which we saw lately obsequiously dedicating an image of Ptolemy's sister, about this time fell away under a tyrant called Timarchus. It has been suggested that this man was the Aetolian *condottiere* who once descended on the coast of Asia and defeated a general of King

Ptolemy's. This is very probable, and if so, Timarchus must have seized Miletus by a *coup de main*. At any rate Timarchus the tyrant had no idea of being subordinate to either Ptolemy or Seleucid. It seemed possible at that moment that the rivalry of the two houses might allow petty princes to maintain their independence in the midst. At Ephesus the young Ptolemy abjured his allegiance to his father and set up for himself. He and the tyrant of Miletus made common cause. But they had miscalculated the forces with which they had to do. Miletus was recaptured by Antiochus II, and the demos now turned the stream of its flattery upon the Seleucid house. The surname of "God", by which Antiochus II was afterwards distinguished, is said to have been first pronounced in Miletus. The rule of young Ptolemy at Ephesus also came to an abrupt end. His Thracian guards, knowing the weakness of his position, broke out in mutiny. Ptolemy fled with his mistress Irene to the great temple of Artemis. The Thracians, undaunted by its sanctities, followed him up and there slew him. Irene, holding with one hand to the knocker of the door, so as herself also to claim the protection of the goddess, with the other sprinkled her lover's blood upon the holy things till she too was cut down. Ephesus passed once more to the Seleucid.

There are two isolated notices which our ignorance of the time does not allow us to bring into relation with each other or with contemporary events, but which seem to show that at some time under Antiochus II the activity of the Seleucid house extended to Europe. One of these is the statement abstracted from Memnon that at one moment hostilities were on the point of breaking out between Antiochus and Byzantium. The Northern League, which we saw combating Antiochus I, seems to have been still in existence. For at this juncture Heraclea sent a contingent of forty triremes to Byzantium, and the war "advanced as far as threats only".

The other notice is one which shows us the Seleucid King in person on European soil. He is besieging or has taken the Thracian town of Cypsela. Numbers of the old Thracian nobility have rallied to his side. Antiochus had perhaps espoused the native cause against the new-come Galatians who had founded a separate kingdom in this region. He gave at any rate princely entertainment to the Thracian chiefs who joined him. When the Thracians of Cypsela see their countrymen walking about the Greek king, ablaze with ornaments of gold and silver arms, they declare themselves ready, not only to submit, but to fight under his banners. [Against whom? Byzantium? the Gauls of Tylis? Ptolemaic forces?]

We have no details as to the treatment of the Greek cities by Antiochus II except his liberation of Miletus. In that city a hundred years afterwards the day still lived in the imagination of the citizens when Hippomachus the son of Athenaeus, an Erythraean who had found favor at the Seleucid court, appeared clothed with the royal authority to restore freedom and democracy. When Rome had come to bear rule in Asia, the Ionian Greeks still spoke of Antiochus II as "the God", and appealed to the decrees by which he had granted them constitutions, as if in fact he were the author of their liberties. Nevertheless, it is under Antiochus II that we find the most opulent and splendid of the Ionian cities, Ephesus, after it has been recovered from Ptolemy, subjected to direct control. It has been suggested that Laodice after her divorce maintained at Ephesus a

separate court of her own. There appears at any rate at the time of Antiochus' death a royal official who is expressly spoken of as being set over Ephesus.

It is to the reign of Antiochus II that the important inscription found eighteen years ago (1884) at Durdurkar (near the ancient Eriza) belongs. It is the one document we possess which tells us something of the worship of the sovereign established by imperial authority in the realm. The cities, as we saw, already offered divine honors to Alexander and his successors of the first generation. And instances of such civic cults recur during our period. There was a priest of Antiochus I at Ilium before 277; the Ionian Body joined the worship of Antiochus I, his son and joint king Antiochus and Stratonice to that of "the god Alexander"; and games were celebrated by Erythrae in honor of Antiochus I after his death, in which he was worshipped by his divine name of Saviour. At Smyrna, Stratonice was worshipped as Aphrodite Stratonice, and her son Antiochus II was in course of time joined with her; Miletus, as we saw, hailed Antiochus II as "God". But all these were cults established by the cities; they were not organized by the imperial government.

We have no mention of an imperial cult of the King and Queen except in the inscription of Durdurkar, and hence it is often inferred to have been an innovation of Antiochus II. The accidental fact, however, that our one document belongs to his reign is not sufficient to establish such an inference; it may indeed have been so; on the other hand, such a cult may quite well have existed as early as the reign of the first Seleucus. The document in question is a rescript of Antiochus II to Anaximbrotus, presumably the satrap of Phrygia, which Anaximbrotus forwards with a covering letter to the district officer Dionytas. The King's rescript states that his worship is already established in the several satrapies of the realm, under a high-priest in each satrapy, by whom legal instruments are dated, and whose office is therefore probably annual. The King has now determined to institute a similar worship of the queen Laodice, for which each satrapy is to have a special high-priestess. For the satrapy of Anaximbrotus the high-priestess appointed is Berenice, the daughter of Ptolemy the son of Lysimachus, and in her grandfather we may perhaps see the great Lysimachus. Suddenly in the last years of Antiochus II we find a complete revolution in the relation of the powers. The dreary war between Seleucid and Ptolemy, which had seemed to have become a permanent feature of the world, ceased. It not only ceased, but was succeeded by close alliance. Things had not gone altogether well with the house of Ptolemy. Its successes had been in many cases evanescent. We have seen the case of Ephesus and Miletus. It had had another disappointment which touched it more nearly. The rebel viceroy of Cyrene, Magas, Ptolemy's half-brother, who had been the ally of Antiochus I, had been brought to a composition with the King of Egypt about 258. His daughter by Apama, Berenice, was betrothed to the young Ptolemy, the heir of the Egyptian throne—an arrangement by which the Egyptian and Cyrenian kingdoms would once more coalesce. Unfortunately for Ptolemy, Magas, after making this treaty, almost immediately died, and the Queen-Mother, Apama, coming thereby to power, immediately abjured the compact and fetched a husband for her daughter from the anti-Ptolemaic court of Macedonia, Demetrius the Fair, the brother of King Antigonus, came to reign in Cyrene. The influence of the Seleucid queen-mother continued paramount, for Demetrius, although

nominally the husband of Berenice, formed a liaison with Apama herself Cyrene was still a thorn in the side of Egypt.

It is implied that Ptolemy took the initiative in proposing a peace to Antiochus. He seems to have made it worth the Seleucid King's while. He offered the hand of his daughter, another Berenice, to Antiochus, who undertook on his part to repudiate in her favor his present queen, Laodice. The hand of Berenice was to bring with it large advantages; *phernophoros*, dowry-bringing, became her popular description.

What these advantages were one can only speculate. They may not improbably have included territorial concessions. By comparing the list which Theocritus gives of the countries under Ptolemaic influence with those which Ptolemy III states (in the description of Aduli) that he inherited from his father, it is observed that Cilicia and Pamphylia, which appear in the former, are absent from the latter. It is therefore likely that the Ptolemaic claims to these regions were abandoned in this treaty; Ptolemy indeed may have already been obliged to evacuate them.

An immediate change came over the Seleucid court. Laodice disappeared; a rival appeared to her sons, Seleucus and Antiochus, in a child whom Berenice bore to Antiochus. It may be that the residence of the court was now more regularly fixed at the Syrian Antioch, towards the Ptolemaic realm, instead of in Asia Minor, where Laodice was strong. Friendly offices between the houses became at any rate the order of the day. The physician, Cleombrotus of Ceos, sent possibly from the medical schools of Alexandria, was rewarded by Ptolemy with a hundred talents because he had treated Antiochus successfully. Casks of Nile water were carried systematically to Berenice in her new home; it has been pointed out that it had a great reputation for rendering fertile.

All seemed to go smoothly. But the divorced queen was not a woman to sit down tamely in her humiliation. She worked fiercely to be reinstated, and at last succeeded, for if policy bound Antiochus to Berenice, his heart, it is said, belonged to Laodice. In 246 Berenice was sitting solitary in Antioch, and the King was across the Taurus living once more with his former queen. Then he suddenly died at Ephesus. Laodice (or so it was believed) had cut short his life by poison, to prevent the succession of her children being anymore endangered by the fluctuations of his mood.

The peace of Asia, so recently secured, instantly vanished.

CHAPTER X

SELEUCUS II (KALLINIKOS) AND SELEUCUS III (SOTER)

1

The War of Laodicea

The Seleucid power had ceased to be a unity. It was represented by two rival Queens, both masculine, resolute women, after the fashion of these Macedonian princesses, Laodice across the Taurus, Berenice in Syria. The son of Berenice, who was probably proclaimed King in Antioch, was of course an infant in arms; the eldest son of Laodicea, Seleucus, was a youth nearing manhood.

Seleucus was proclaimed King in Ephesus and Asia Minor. To support his right, as against the child of Berenice, Laodice resorted, according to one story, to the device of dressing up a certain Artemon, who bore a close resemblance to King Antiochus, and causing him to be laid in the royal bed before the King's death was known, in order that in the presence of the magnates of the court he might solemnly declare his son Seleucus the true heir. Laodicea proclaimed her son King, but she kept the reins of government in her own hands.

It must come of course to an internecine straggle between the two Queen-mothers. In the kingdom itself Laodicea, the old Queen, was the stronger; Berenice had at her back the might of Egypt. It all depended on whether Laodicea could strike quickly enough. Even in Antioch she had partisans, among them Genneus or Caeneus, one of the chief magistrates of the city. She hit on the bold thought of kidnapping the child of her rival. Her emissaries, flying perhaps to Antioch almost with the post that brought the news of the King's death, arranged the plot. It succeeded. The young prince vanished.

In this extremity Berenice showed the spirit of a lioness. The child was believed to have been carried to a certain house. Berenice instantly mounted a chariot, took in her own hand a spear, and galloped to the spot. On the way Caeneus met her. The Queen aimed her spear at him. It missed. Nothing daunted, Berenice followed it with a stone, which brought her enemy down. A crowd, partly hostile, surged about the closed doors, behind which the prince was understood to be. But they fell back before the fierce approach of the Queen. And here the story is broken off. Another author takes it up at a later point. The fate of the young prince is still mysterious; it is not known whether he is alive or dead. Obviously the popular feeling in Antioch is so strongly on the side of Berenice that the murderers dare not avow what they have done. To this body of sentiment Berenice appeals. She shows herself to the people in the guise of a suppliant, and the storm of public indignation is so strong that the guilty magistrates are obliged to

dissemble. A child is exhibited to the people as the infant King and surrounded with all the due pomp; they have still authority enough to keep this child in their own hands. But they are obliged to come to some agreement with the Queen and allow her to establish herself in a defensible part of the royal palace at Daphne with a body of Galatian guards.

This was an awkward turn for the plans of Laodicea. Everything depended on crushing Berenice before the Egyptian force could be brought to bear in her favour. And shut up in the palace at Daphne, Berenice could gain time. The Ptolemaic power was at this moment in a position to strike strongly. The Cyrenaean difficulty had been at last settled to its satisfaction. The young Queen, Berenice the daughter of Magas, had discovered the relations of her husband Demetrius with her mother, and displaying the characteristic spirit of her race, caused him to be assassinated in Apama's bed under her own eyes. She had then renewed her interrupted betrothal with the heir of the Ptolemaic throne. About the time that the other Berenice, her cousin, was defying siege at Daphne, the old King of Egypt died; the government passed into young and vigorous hands. Ptolemy III ascended the throne, married Berenice of Cyrene, and prepared to intervene with the whole force of his kingdom in his sister's defence. At the same time the struggle between the two Queens was being watched breathlessly throughout the Seleucid realm. A number of the Greek cities of Asia declared for Berenice, and put on foot the civic forces. Contingents began to glide out of their harbors or to move along the road to Antioch. Berenice had only to sit still in her fortress and wait.

The hope of Laodicea to reach her seemed desperate. But even so she succeeded. It seems an incredible folly on the part of Berenice that she exposed herself—to be instantly cut down. But she was led to trust to the oath of her enemies, and her physician Aristarchus, by whom she was guided, was really Laodice's tool. And here we are told another of those strange impersonations which give the whole story of these events such a mythical complexion. Berenice's women, it is said, after they had done their best to shield her with their own bodies and several of them had fallen, concealed her corpse, and put one of their number who was wounded, but not mortally, in her place, keeping up, till the advent of the King of Egypt, the delusion that the Queen and her son were still alive.

Meantime Laodicea was strengthening herself in Asia Minor. Miletus is found hastening to declare its adherence to Seleucus II; its embassy conveys to the young King a wreath of bay leaves, plucked in the sacred enclosure of the Didymaeon temple. Many of the other Greek states must have acted likewise.

But the attack of Ptolemy III came with terrific effect upon the divided kingdom. He appeared at the head of his army in Syria, before the death of Berenice and her son was certainly known, and in many quarters was regarded rather as an ally than a conqueror. The states which had flown to arms in Berenice's defence, finding themselves too late, had no option, now that they had compromised themselves, but to join him.

The great events of the following years are obscured by the character of our sources. In their loose description we seem to see a conquest of Asia which goes beyond the old invasions of Tothmes, and even resembles the triumphant march of Alexander. If we look more closely, however, we shall form, I think, a more moderate estimate of the exploits of Ptolemy Euergetes. The war called by contemporaries the “Laodicean War”, falls into two divisions—the maritime war and the land war. Of these the maritime is really the more important, and here the successes of Ptolemy are more solid. It was on the sea that the Ptolemaic power really lay; it had already, as we have seen, secured a number of *points d'appui* over the coasts and islands of the Levant, and what Ptolemy Euergetes did was to carry to its farthest extent the traditional policy of his house. On the coasts of Phoenicia, Lycia, and Caria, Ptolemy was already predominant; he possessed Cyprus and the federated Cyclades. The maritime war of Ptolemy III rounds off the work of his father and grandfather. What had been lost in recent years, the Cilician coast, for instance, and Ephesus, are recovered. The line of Ptolemaic power is carried still farther along the coasts. Even the acquisitions of the house of Seleucus in Thrace, from which it was necessarily cut off by a power dominating the sea, pass to Egypt.

A moment of this war is lit up for us in a curious way. The commander of a Seleucid squadron on the coasts of Asia sent home a sheet of papyrus giving a narrative of his operations. This paper, or pieces of it, worn but still partly decipherable, came the other day into the hands of modern archaeologists.

Where the dispatch begins to be decipherable the capture of some town by a detachment of the Ptolemaic forces is described, apparently one of the towns of Cilicia. A party among the inhabitants seem to have had an understanding with the attacking force, and the town was taken by a night surprise. A garrison was put in to hold it under an officer called Epigenes. Then, after a gap, the document seems to speak of a squadron of five ships in the Seleucid service, who, acting on the orders of “the Sister”, *i.e.* Laodicea, had collected all the money they could along the coast and deposited it in (the Cilician) Seleucia—1500 talents in all. In Seleucia the Seleucid governor of Cilicia, Aribazus, was commanding, and his purpose was to forward the moneys now collected to Laodicea at Ephesus. Before, however, he could do so, the town of Soli and the subordinate *strategoi* of Cilicia, the district officers, went over to the Ptolemaic side, and in concert with them a Ptolemaic force, under Pythagoras and Aristocles, attacked Seleucia. The town, even the citadel, was stormed. Aribazus essayed to escape across the Taurus, but fell into the hands of the native tribes who lived about the passes; they cut off his head and brought it presently to Antioch.

The rest of the document narrates operations on the Syrian, not the Cilician, coast, in which the writer would seem to have taken part in person. A Ptolemaic squadron of as many sail as the harbour of (the Syrian) Seleucia was understood to be capable of holding, puts to sea in the first watch of the night. Its place of starting is conjectured by Kohler to be Salamis in Cyprus. About three o'clock the following afternoon it strikes the Syrian coast at Posidium, a fort some twenty miles south of Seleucia. There it remains for the night, and at the next daybreak moves to Seleucia. Here it is received with open arms. The priests, the magistrates, the populace, the troops

of the garrison flock down the road to the harbour to meet it in festival array. From Seleucia the Ptolemaic force moves upon Antioch itself, which was in those days accessible by water. In Antioch there is a considerable military force, and the district officers, the “satraps” of the neighboring country, seem to have gathered within its walls. And it looks as if Antioch had thought at first of offering some defence. But the sight of the Ptolemaic force convinces it that to do so is hopeless. Antioch, like Seleucia, receives the invader. A procession of the chief men, satraps, captains, priests, and magistrates, accompanied by the “youths from the gymnasium” and the populace, all wearing crowns, comes to meet the Ptolemaic force. “They brought all the animals for sacrifice into the road without the gate; some shook our hands, and some greeted us with clapping and shouting”. There the document leaves off, having shown us the chief city of Seleucid Syria in the hands of King Ptolemy.

For the land war our chief authority is the *Monumentum Adulitanum*, an inscribed stone seen at Aduli in Abyssinia in the seventh century AD by Cosmas Indicopleustes, who has left us a copy of it. It was a monument put up by some Ptolemaic official at that remote station on the Red Sea giving an account of the King's conquests. It describes how he advanced upon Asia with foot and horse and ships, “and elephants”, the official is careful to note, whose chief business in Aduli was no doubt to replenish the supply, “from the Troglodyte country (*i.e.* the Red Sea coast) and Ethiopia, which his father and he himself were the first to cause to be captured in these parts and brought down to Egypt, and to train for service in war, how he made himself master of all the country this side of the Euphrates (*i.e.* Northern Syria), Cilicia, Pamphylia, Ionia, the Hellespont and Thrace, and of all the forces in these countries and the Indian elephants, and made all the petty despots in these regions subject to him, and then how he crossed the Euphrates and plunged into the distant world of Iran,

It will be observed that till the passage of the Euphrates no country is mentioned as conquered which is not open to attack by sea. *The Ptolemaic land forces never crossed the Taurus*. Having once secured the road through Northern Syria (Antioch itself succumbed, as we saw, to an attack *from the sea*) they passed east. In Asia Minor, which hitherto rather than Syria had been the Seleucid base, the court of Laodicea and Seleucus was safe from molestation, except on the coast. And even the coast was only partially conquered by the Ptolemaic fleet. Ephesus indeed, where Laodice was still established when the Ptolemaic captain penned his dispatch, passed before long to Ptolemy, the Seleucid court returning, no doubt, to the safer distance of Sardis. But Miletus and Smyrna remained in the Seleucid alliance.

The loss of Ephesus can perhaps be traced in the story taken from Phylarchus. The court is residing at some place other than Ephesus, which is not mentioned, but which must surely be Sardis. Ephesus, however, is still held, as Sophron, the governor of the city, has been called to the royal presence. He has somehow incurred the displeasure of Laodice, and she has determined to make away with him. Among Laodicea's women, however, is Danae, the daughter of that famous courtesan Leontion who had shone among the companions of Epicurus : Danae is always at the Queen's side; all the Queen's purposes are open to her. In past days Sophron was her lover. When Sophron stands before the Queen, Danae is sitting by the Queen's side. As

Laodicea and Sophron talk, the truth breaks upon Danaï that Laodicea is inviting him to his destruction. She makes him a quick imperceptible sign. It is understood. He feigns to agree generally with the Queen's proposals but asks for two days further to consider. Laodicea assents. The next night Sophron flies for his life to Ephesus. Then Laodicea understood what Danae had done. Instantly old friendship was swallowed up in vindictive fury. Danae was haled as a criminal before her, but the questions which Laodicea put to her she met with disdainful silence. She was led away to be hurled from a high place. As she went she made an utterance which those about her thought worthy of record. "The common run of men make small account of religion, and they are quite right. I saved the man that was my lover, and this is the recognition I get from the Powers which dispose of us. Laodice killed hers, and she is thought to deserve all that honor".

Sophron fled to Ephesus. That was no safe place, if it was still to be in Laodicea's possession. It was probably Sophron who now called in the Ptolemaic forces. It is found at any rate a few years later occupied by a Ptolemaic garrison, and a Sophron appears in command of a Ptolemaic fleet.

The young king Seleucus seems early to have gone at the head of an army across the Taurus to defend or to regain the Syrian and eastern provinces. It went hard in his absence, and the absence of the troops which followed him, with the adherents of his house along the coast. Smyrna, for instance, was exposed to attack, not only from the Ptolemaic fleets, but from its neighbor, Magnesia-on-Sipylus, where there was a great military settlement which declared against Laodice and Seleucus and harried its fields. Smyrna, at any rate, stood fast, and in this region the Seleucid cause held its own. The Magnesian colony was compelled to return to the old alliance, and at some subsequent date was incorporated by the Smyrnaeans in their own state.

On Smyrna in return for its fidelity the King was concerned to shower favors. He gave the usual promise that the city should continue autonomous and be free of tribute. He also guaranteed it in the possession of all the territory it already stood possessed of, and promised to restore any it had formerly owned. More than this, he interested himself warmly in what was the chief interest of the city, its great temple of Aphrodite-Stratoniceis. Smyrna would secure a great advantage if it could shield itself by the sanctity of its shrine, if it could be treated as "holy and inviolable". It could only obtain this advantage in so far as the independent powers of the world, any who had the material force to molest it, would consent to recognize its sanctity. To obtain this recognition was the object it had in view. It began by procuring a pronouncement of the Delphic oracle in favor of its claims. Armed with this, it approached the Seleucid king. Seleucus threw himself heartily into the cause of the faithful city. He addressed letters to all the states of the Greek world, "to kings and rulers and cities and nations", asking them to recognize the temple of Aphrodite-Stratoniceis as a sanctuary and Smyrna as a city holy and inviolable. One of the answers has been preserved, that of the city of Delphi, which, as the original oracle had proceeded from them, is naturally favorable. It charges the *theoroi*, who were sent round the Greek states to invite them to the Pythian games, to bestow special commendation on King Seleucus both for his piety in obeying the oracle and his honourable treatment of a Greek city.

Ptolemy did not continue to direct the Asiatic campaigns in person. After his raid into the eastern provinces he returned to Egypt, where troubles had broken out which called for his presence. But the war did not thereby come to an end. Ptolemy left officers to govern in his name both in the West and in the East, in Cilicia his “friend” Antiochus, in the provinces beyond the Euphrates “another general, Xanthippus”. One would like to know on what principle Ptolemy at this juncture framed his policy. He has been commended for wise moderation in withdrawing after his triumphal march. And indeed the traditional policy of his house was to set a prudent limit to ambition. But the texts hardly show the action of Ptolemy III in this light. *His personal return is no evacuation of the conquered countries.* In that moment of intoxicating glory, in the prostration of the rival house, Ptolemy III seems really to have contemplated making himself king of Asia as well as of Egypt. He actually intends to govern Iran from Alexandria as a dependency. It is not his prudence, but the force of circumstances, which makes him abandon the idea.

But although the return of Ptolemy to Egypt did not mean a suspension of hostilities, the absence of the King relaxed the pressure upon his enemies. Seleucus now took strenuously in hand the reconquest of Northern Syria and the revolted cities of the coast. A great armada was fitted out in one of the harbours of Asia Minor, and presently took the sea. It met, however, with a storm which completely shattered it—as the fleet of Seleucus’ son was later on shattered in the same dangerous waters—and few, according to Justin, beside the King himself escaped to land. After this, Justin goes on, the cities were so sorry for him that they joined him of their own accord—a passage over which modern writers make very merry, perhaps undervaluing the part which sentiment plays even now in human politics. As a matter of fact, it seems probable that the cities of Northern Syria were really attached to the house which had planted and fostered them, and that they had conceived themselves, not so much to be revolting against that house, as standing by its wronged representatives, Berenice and her son, in whose name the King of Egypt had summoned them. It would therefore be natural that as soon as it became apparent that the house of Seleucus was to be crushed altogether, and that they were to be annexed to Egypt, a great wave of compunction should sweep over them.

Of this phase in the war, that which is marked by the Seleucid house recovering Northern Syria, no detail is preserved except the bare statement of Eusebius that in the year 142-141 Orthosia on the Phoenician coast, which was being besieged by a Ptolemaic force, was relieved by Seleucus, who brought up reinforcements.

In the next phase of the war Seleucus passes from recovering his father’s share of Syria to attacking the Ptolemaic. The war of defence became a war of reprisals. An encounter, somewhere in Palestine, took place between the two hosts. Seleucus was completely beaten. He withdrew the shattered remnant of his army of invasion to Antioch. His position was once more critical, for he had no force left wherewith to meet the counterstroke of his enemy.

The operations in Syria had drawn the Seleucid King for the most part to the regions south of the Taurus; they had made Antioch on the Orontes rather than Sardis or

Ephesus the pivot of his kingdom. But meantime the Queen-Mother, Laodicea, was still reigning in Asia Minor, and had her younger son, Antiochus, joined with her, a boy at that time of some fourteen years. In his extremity Seleucus now addressed an entreaty to his brother to cross the Taurus to his assistance. This request seems to show that a certain independent authority was exercised by Antiochus in Asia Minor, or rather by those who governed in the boy's name, his mother Laodice and her friends. And this inference finds a separate confirmation in an inscription from the temple at Branchidae, which contains a list of offerings made to the shrine by "the kings Seleucus and Antiochus". The Antiochus here is therefore one who shares the royal authority; that he does so as a subordinate is shown by the fact that the letter accompanying the gifts runs in the name of King Seleucus alone.

To secure the co-operation of his brother's court, Seleucus offered to make a partition of the Empire, to cede the trans-Tauric country to Antiochus. Whether the cession was to be absolute or whether he reserved to himself any right of suzerainty we are not told. If his mother and her friends were already the real rulers of that region, the offer of Seleucus amounted simply to a recognition of existing facts. The events which followed this proposition are touched on so summarily by Justin that it is scarcely possible to follow the connexions between them. At first the court of Sardis closed, or feigned to close, with it. The forces of Asia Minor were set in motion to join those in Syria. This co-operation between the two Seleucid courts seems not to have entered into Ptolemy's calculations, although why it should not have done so, when it seems the most natural thing to expect, we cannot say. Perhaps there were already signs of rivalry and dissension between them. At any rate, on getting word of the advance of the trans-Tauric army, Ptolemy, instead of following up his recent victory, concluded a peace for ten years with Seleucus.

2

The Fraternal War

Antiochus, however, did not join his forces with those of Seleucus. The concession made by the elder king seems to have been used to bring all power in Asia Minor more absolutely into the hands of the court of Sardis. As soon as that had been done, the mask was thrown off and a claim was advanced to the whole Seleucid Empire. The people, who were acting behind the boy Antiochus, were of course the Queen-Mother Laodice and her friends. Amongst these the chief place was held by the Queen's brother, Alexander, who probably performed the functions of viceroy of the trans-Tauric country.

With this breach between the brother kings there began for Asia Minor a period of civil war which must have dealt the country far deeper wounds than the war between Seleucid and Ptolemy, which affected only its seaward fringes. Seleucus, crippled as he had been by his recent defeat in Palestine, had still enough authority in the Empire to

gather a force about him with which he crossed the Taurus to crush this new rebellion. Nowhere along the great high-road did the partisans of Antiochus arrest his march onwards. He was already in Lydia before his army met that of his brother. The first battle went in his favor. He fought another, and again successfully. But his victory was stayed by the strong city of Sardis, where the party of Antiochus found a sure retreat.

It was now, however, seen what danger to the central government lay in all those independent elements in Asia Minor. A disturbance such as the rebellion of Antiochus Hierax communicated unrest to all the peninsula. The task of Seleucus was indefinitely complicated. Antiochus had only to hold up his hand to bring up hordes of Galatians. In some quarters the cause of Antiochus and the Queen-Mother was more favorably regarded than that of the elder king, who indeed had been for much of the time since his accession absent from the country.

We last saw the dynast of Pontic Cappadocia employing Galatian bands against the Ptolemaic forces, apparently in alliance with the Seleucid King. Since then Mithridates the Founder had died in a good old age of eighty-four years, and had been succeeded by his son Ariobarzanes (in 266). Of the reign of Ariobarzanes we know nothing except that he got into difficulties with his Galatian mercenaries and has left no coins. He died about 250, and was followed by another Mithridates, who at his father's death was still a boy. Under such circumstances the Galatian troubles grew worse, and the Pontic territory was so harried that famine stared the population in the face. Heraclea, whose friendly connection with the Mithridatic house continued, sent what help it could, and had in consequence to bear a Galatian attack in its turn. And now, some ten years later, the breach in the Seleucid house brings the Pontic king once more upon the stage. With this Iranian dynasty also, as with that in Southern Cappadocia, the great Macedonian house had mingled its blood. One sister of Seleucus II was the wife of Ariarathes; the other sister he gave in marriage to Mithridates II, with Greater Phrygia (or so the Pontic house afterwards asserted) for dowry. At this juncture Mithridates declares in favor of his younger brother-in-law, Antiochus, and enters the field at the head of a great army of Galatians.

The intervention of the Pontic king and his fierce mercenaries gave a new turn to the struggle. A great battle, one of the landmarks of that confused epoch, took place near Ancyra. The forces of Seleucus were swept down by the Galatian onset. Twenty thousand are said to have perished. At the end of that day of blood Seleucus himself was nowhere to be found. The news ran through the host of the victors that he was dead. The youth who by such an event became the sole and unrivalled possessor of the Seleucid throne displayed or affected great sorrow. Antiochus put on the garb of mourning and shut himself up to bewail his brother. Then the tidings came that he had lamented, or rejoiced, too soon. Seleucus was still alive. He had disguised himself as the armour-bearer of Hamactyon, who commanded the Royal Squadron, and had escaped so from the fatal field. He was now beyond the Taurus, safe in Cilicia, rallying once more about him what remained of his power. Antiochus came out of his retirement, offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving for his brother's welfare, decreed public festivities in the cities subject to him, and sent an army to cross the Taurus and crush Seleucus before he had time to recover.

One story which the Greeks remembered in connection with this battle was that of Mysta, Seleucus' concubine. Like the old Persian kings, the Seleucids took women with them in their camps. As soon as she saw the day was lost, Mysta also disguised herself. She had been dressed as a queen; she now put on the habit of a common serving-maid and sat among the huddled women, who fell after the battle into the victor's hands. She was put up for sale with others, bought by some slave-merchant, and carried to the great market of Rhodes. Rhodes was soil friendly to Seleucus, and once there she made herself known. The Rhodian state instantly paid her price to the merchant and sent her back with every due observance to the King.

3.

Antiochus Hierax and Attalus of Pergamos

The battle of Ancyra shattered the cause of Seleucus II in Asia Minor. It would be out of the question for some time to come for him to attack his brother. But the disappearance of Seleucus meant less the reign of Antiochus than anarchy. The Galatians knew their power; it was easy by their help to overthrow any existing authority, but it was not possible to base upon it any secure throne. Antiochus himself found his life full of vicissitude enough; at one moment marching over the Phrygian uplands at the head of his Galatian bands, levying a blackmail which can only by courtesy be described as the tribute due to the royal treasury; at another moment bargaining for his life with the same bands, or by hairbreadth escapes breaking away from them and throwing himself into friendly cities, like Magnesia; then meeting and beating them in open battle; then again raiding, as before in their company.

The unhappy Greeks of Asia looked round for a deliverer from the deluge of anarchy and barbarism. This then was what the Macedonian rule, which had ousted the Persian with such fair promises, had come to. There were two powers which seemed to offer resistance to the barbarian storm in the land of the Asiatic Greeks, the Ptolemaic and the Pergamene. Ptolemy saved at least the cities he held, like Ephesus and the Carian harbors, from barbarian dictation. We even hear, on an occasion when Antiochus had broken with his mercenaries, of help being sent him from a neighboring Ptolemaic garrison. But it was Attalus of Pergamos who now came forward as the main champion of Hellenism and order.

The figure of this man, who had succeeded his cousin Eumenes in 241-240, embodying so much of that age, is obscured for us by the defects of our tradition. And yet even so he is significant for us, connecting in his person an epoch that was passing away with one that began a new state of things. Now when he first appears in the eye of

the world, the great Macedonian houses, the heirs of Alexander, are the cardinal powers of the Eastern Mediterranean; his last breath is spent in exhorting the peoples of Greece to accept the hegemony of Rome. It was his wars on behalf of civilization in Asia Minor against the barbarian tribes which first made him a name. These wars are a glorious, but almost forgotten, episode of Greek history. We may indeed believe that they were somewhat artificially magnified by the Pergamene court, which loved to put them in the same order as the classical struggles between light and darkness, order and chaos, Hellenism and barbarism, to set them beside the battles of Gods and giants, of Athenians and Amazons, of Greeks and Persians. It was these scenes, together with those of the Galatian wars, which the sculptors commissioned by the rulers of Pergamos had to set before the eyes of the Greek cities. But that the glory claimed by Attalus he did to a large extent deserve, there is no reason to deny. A genuine sentiment seems to have thrilled the Greek world as the contest was victoriously carried on. A current oracle, cited by Pausanias, represents Attalus as a deliverer divinely raised up for the Asiatic Greeks, almost a demi-god himself —

Then having crossed the narrow strait of the Hellespont

The destructive army of the Gauls shall pipe; they shall lawlessly

Ravage Asia; and God shall make it yet worse

For all who dwell by the shores of the sea

For a little while. But soon the son of Kronos shall stir up a helper for them,

A dear son of a Zeus-reared bull,

Who shall bring a day of doom on all the Gauls.

In days when art had begun to languish because the old enthusiasms were dying away, the struggle with the barbarism of Asia Minor called a new and original school into being, not indeed reaching the serene heights which the children of those who had fought at Marathon and Salamis attained, but displaying a vigorous realism, a technical mastery and a lively feeling for dramatic effect.

No narrative of these wars remains. Historians mention them summarily. When even the Seleucid house had come to pay blackmail to the Gauls, "Attalus", says Livy, "first among all the inhabitants of Asia refused. His bold resolution was, contrary to the expectation of all, backed by fortune. He met them in fair field and came off victor". "His greatest achievement", Pausanias says, "was compelling the Gauls to retreat from the coast into the territory which they still occupy". Sometimes a particular battle is spoken of, "a great battle", Strabo calls it; a battle at Pergamos is mentioned in a *Prologue* of Troilus. According to the text of Justin the battle took place immediately after the battle of Ancyra, before the victors had had time to recover from the effects of that great day, Antiochus himself being still with the Galatians—if indeed it be the same

battle which is meant in the narrative of Justin and in the *Prologue*, or the phrase “*saucios adhuc ex superiore congressione integer ipse*” be not an antithesis thrown in for mere rhetorical effect. It is difficult to see how the victorious army of Ancyra should have engaged Attalus at Pergamos, more than 250 miles away, before they had recovered from the wounds of their former battle.

When, however, we turn from the historians to what remains of the stones of Pergamos, the wars of Attalus appear no affair of one battle and instant victory. They show Attalus making dedication to the gods of trophies from a great number of battles. Sometimes the state of the stone allows us to read the denotation of the enemy and the site of the battle, sometimes both are conjectural. It is at any rate impossible to arrange the battles in any connected narrative or even to fix their order in time. In one Antiochus and two of the Galatian tribes, the Tolistoagii and the Tectosages, are coupled together; it is the battle fought “near the Aphrodisium”; unfortunately it is impossible to identify the Aphrodisium in question. In another the Tolistoagii are mentioned alone, the battle “by the sources of the Caicus”. In another Antiochus is mentioned alone, the battle in Hellespontine Phrygia. One inscription speaks of a battle in which Attalus defeated the Tolistoagii and Antiochus a second time, whether identical or not with any of those just mentioned we do not know. From all this we can gather little except that the struggle of Attalus with the forces of anarchy was prolonged and swept over the country between the valley of the Caicus and Bithynia.

This contest lifted the Pergamene dynast to an altogether new position in Asia Minor. As he had taken over from the house of Seleucus the work which they professed to perform in that country, the protection of Hellenism and civilization, so he stepped into their dignities. After the battle of Ancyra indeed, with the elder Seleucid king driven across the Taurus, and the younger turned into a captain of freebooters, Seleucid authority ceased in Asia Minor. In that part of the country which had once obeyed mandates from Sardis or Antioch it was now the armies of Attalus who marched along the roads, and his officers who began to claim the tribute of Lydian and Phrygian villages. From this time the dynast of Pergamos assumed the title of King.

To the Greek cities the substitution of the Pergamene for the Seleucid house was probably welcome. The Aeolian cities at any rate, as well as Alexandria, Ilion and Lampsacus, became his cordial allies. Even Smyrna, which had been so eminent for its loyalty to the Seleucid house, now changed about, swore fidelity to Attalus, and was henceforward altogether alienated at heart from the Seleucid cause. Attalus presented himself to the Greeks in the most attractive light. Not only was he their champion against barbarism, as indeed the house of Seleucus in its better days had been, but he did everything to show himself an ardent Hellenist and to exhibit at his court a wholesome family life which would form a contrast in the eyes of the Greek *bourgeoisie* to the barbaric vice and cruelty which were rife in the Seleucid and Ptolemaic courts. His mother Antiochis was a kinswoman of the Seleucid house, and his maternal aunt Laodice was the wife of Seleucus II, but Attalus himself elected for his queen Apollonis, the daughter of a plain citizen of Cyzicus, “a woman”, says Polybius, “deserving for many reasons remark and admiration, who rose from a private station to royalty, and kept her high place to the last by means of no meretricious seductions, but

by a plain and sober dignity and goodness". Instead of the fraternal feuds and family murders which seemed to be elsewhere the rule in royal houses, the children of Attalus and Apollonis showed the world a delightful picture of simplicity and natural affection. And whilst the house of Attalus recommended itself to the moral sentiments of the Greek republics, it did so equally to their literary and artistic susceptibilities. "Pergamos", says the historian of Alexandrine literature, "was in all probability the source of that renewal of Atticism to which we owe in great part the preservation of the masterpieces of Attic prose". Attalus maintained close relations with a number of the great literary men of his time, especially with the philosophers of Athens. An Athenian poet, Ctesiphon, was given a high place in his civil service. Research into the peculiarities of his own dominion was encouraged. Polemon of Ilion cast his essay on the local cults and deities into the form of a "Letter to Attalus". Attalus himself wrote; from one work of his a fragment is still preserved, describing a certain pine-tree in the Troad. The school of artists, which developed under his patronage, has been already mentioned. And not only did Pergamos itself become a city gloriously beautified to the eyes of the Greeks with the monuments and altars which commemorated the Galatian wars, but works of art in other cities testified to the munificence of the Pergamene king. Athens especially he delighted to honour. If the ideal of the phil-Hellenic king, which had been more or less pretended to by all the successors of Alexander, was capable of realization at all, it seemed to be realized in Attalus.

On some points we are imperfectly informed. What were the relations between this new-grown power in Asia and the house of Ptolemy, which had so many footholds on the coast? We do not even know what the relations were between Attalus and Seleucus. Was the king who reigned on the Orontes content to see a new king arising in Asia Minor to counterbalance Antiochus Hierax, and the territory which he himself could not wrest from his brother passing at any rate out of his brother's hands?

All this time Sardis continued to maintain the semblance of a Seleucid capital. How long Laodice reigned there we do not know. According to Appian her end was to be killed by Ptolemy Euergetes. The court over which she had presided continued to subsist as that of King Antiochus. If Attalus was supported by the Hellenic element in Asia Minor, Antiochus was in close association with the barbarian powers. He married a daughter of Ziaëlas, the Bithynian king. He was also, as we have seen, in alliance with Mithridates, and seems to have contemplated at some time before his death marrying a daughter of the Pontic king, whether in succession to, or side by side with, the Bithynian queen we do not know.

A daughter of Mithridates, at any rate, whom we may by her name, Laodice, conjecture to be the issue of Antiochus' sister, is found to be at one time in his hands. Among the Pisidians Antiochus had his friends; Logbasis, a prominent citizen of Selge, was among his familiars, and it was at Selge, among the Pisidian hills, that Laodice, the Pontic princess, whom he probably intended to marry, grew to womanhood. Even with an Armenian petty king, Arsames, he had relations of close friendship. Pushed on the west by the victorious arms of Attalus, Antiochus began to think of restoring his fortunes at his brother's expense in the east. He attempted to turn the position of Seleucus in Syria by crossing the Euphrates high up and then descending upon

Mesopotamia by way of the friendly kingdom of Arsames. But in the plain the armies of his brother were waiting to receive him. They were led by Achaeus and his son Andromachus, two persons of the highest rank in the kingdom, for Achaeus was the father-in-law of King Seleucus. Antiochus fared badly at their hands. After his defeat a discreditable abuse of those courtesies which in ancient warfare were connected with the burial of the dead enabled him to cut down four thousand of his brother's troops unarmed; but his cause was none the less lost. He took refuge at the court of Ariamnes in Cappadocia, where his sister Stratonice was queen. But he had not been there long before he discovered that though all was smiles about him, his host had an understanding with Seleucus, and was preparing to deliver him up. He once more fled. It seems that he made one last desperate attack upon Attalus (229-228). We hear of four battles, two "in Lydia", one by Lake Coloë, and one in Caria. They only served to complete his ruin. Nowhere in Asia did he now seem safe from capture by either Attalus or his brother. He crossed into Europe, to Thrace, which had been held since the Laodicean War by Ptolemaic forces, and threw himself upon the generosity of the King of Egypt (228-227). On the orders of the Alexandrian court he was held under close guard. By the help, however, of some girl, whose heart had been won by the captive prince, he eluded his keepers. But the wild mountains of Thrace were no safe place for fugitives. His little company encountered a marauding band of Gauls, and by the hand of the Gauls, with whom he had had all his life long so much to do, Antiochus Hierax came to his end. A story was told by the contemporary historian Phylarchus that the horse of Antiochus, when the Gallic chief Centaretus mounted it, leaped over a precipice and avenged its master.

The disappearance of Antiochus Hierax from the scene extinguished the separate Seleucid court in Asia Minor. Attalus was left in possession of what had once been the Seleucid domain north of the Taurus. It remained for Seleucus Kallinikos to decide whether he would acquiesce in the severance of that country from his house or demand its restitution by force of arms from the Pergamene king. What he actually did we do not know with certainty. He was given but little time to do anything. A year after the death of his brother, Seleucus II perished by a fall from his horse (227-226). He had never come to his own again in the land where his reign had begun.

4

SELEUCUS III SOTER

The task of restoration, which devolved upon his successor, was a hard one. The geographical centre of the Empire, Syria, Babylonia, and the nearer Iranian provinces, were still held, but in the west and east great members had been broken away. The

Ptolemaic power ruled the coasts of southern Asia Minor, even to some extent of Syria, possessing Seleucia and the mouth of the Orontes; the Pergamene power ruled the Ionian and Aeolian coasts, and as much of the interior as was not in the hands of barbarian princes. For this task the youth who succeeded Seleucus Kallinikos was little fitted. He was the elder of the two sons of Seleucus II by Laodice, the daughter of Achaeus. He had hitherto been known as Alexander, but on ascending the throne assumed the dynastic name of Seleucus. Seleucus Soter was his official style. He was of weak bodily constitution, liable, if one may judge by the nickname of Keraunos, which the soldiers gave him, to fits of uncontrolled passion. He seems, however, to have addressed himself without delay to the work of recovering his kingdom in the west. His younger brother Antiochus was apparently sent to represent the royal authority in the eastern provinces.

Of the two enemies in the west, the Pergamene king is the only one whom Seleucus III is said to have directly attacked. He seems to have prepared to strike a blow from the instant of his accession. The inscriptions of Attalus record victories over the generals of Seleucus.

Presently the young King himself crossed the Taurus with a large army. From this time to the day of his death he was warring in Asia Minor. Was anything done meantime against the Egyptian power? In the Book of Daniel (11, 10) *both* the sons of Seleucus II are said to be “stirred up”, *i.e.* against the King of Egypt, and to “assemble a multitude of great forces”. If we had any ground for supposing an alliance between Pergamos and Egypt, the attack on Attalus might be considered an indirect attack on Ptolemy. But we have no ground. Niese supposes that hostilities between the Seleucid court and Egypt had again broken out before the death of Seleucus Kallinikos, and that they were closed by a definitive peace under Seleucus Soter. It is at any rate likely that preparations were made by Seleucus III for a renewal of the war with Egypt, especially as his chief minister, Hermias the Carian, was the main advocate of an aggressive policy against Egypt a few years later under Antiochus III. If Seleucus III made the war with Pergamos take precedence of the war with Egypt, it may have been that the attack on the Ptolemaic power was left by an understanding to the allied court of Macedonia. About the same time that Seleucus engaged Attalus in the interior of Asia Minor, Antigonus Doson, reigning as Regent in Macedonia for the infant Philip, whom the death of Demetrius about 230-229 had made King, descended upon the coasts of Caria and expelled the Ptolemaic garrisons.

How the war between Seleucus III and Attalus went we do not know. Seleucus was at any rate unable to maintain order in his own camp. The result was a conspiracy against the King's life, of which the leading spirits were Nicanor, no doubt a Macedonian officer of the King's entourage, and Apaturius, a chieftain of the mercenary Gauls. Seleucus was in Phrygia in the summer of 223, when the design against him was brought to pass. His life was suddenly cut short, by poison according to one account. One disaster after another had come upon the house of Seleucus, and its extinction must have seemed at that moment a possibility of the near future.

CHAPTER XI

SYRIA

THE reigns of the first Seleucids have hitherto been traced in regard to Asia Minor; they have appeared but as a long struggle for the possession of that country. But while it is in this light that the surviving records show them, while this perhaps they principally were, the successors of Seleucus wished also to preside over the life of that remoter world which the Greek had come to know beyond the Taurus, to be the sovereign power over the ancient Aramaean and Babylonian peoples, over the husbandmen and horsemen of Iran. But of the work they did there, of the cities they built, of the Hellenic communities they planted far and wide, of the way in which the native peoples looked upon this new element thrust into their midst and upon their alien overlords—of all that what memorial is left?

The Seleucid domain towards the east consisted, as we have seen, of three main divisions, the lands immediately to the south of the Taurus—that is Cilicia, Northern Syria, and Mesopotamia—the lands of the lower Euphrates and Tigris—that is, the Assyrio-Babylonian country—and lastly, Iran. We will take each of these separately and see what can be made out of Seleucid rule there up to the accession of Antiochus III. For all of them our evidence is two-fold, literary and archaeological, both sorts scanty enough. In the remains of historians only a notice here and there occurs relating to some part of these countries, as they were touched by the interminable wars; from the geographers the names of cities can be gathered which bear witness to the Hellenizing activity of the Seleucid kings, and sometimes show on what main pivots geographically the life of those days turned. The archaeological evidence may be multiplied in time by the traveler and excavator; but at present practical difficulties have prevented the examination of most of this field, and we have no series of Seleucid inscriptions, as in Asia Minor. The coins, lastly, can tell us something, although the extreme uncertainty which hangs about their places of minting makes this line of evidence a seductive, rather than a safe, guide.

The land which we call Syria is created by the line of mountain which goes from the Taurus on the north as far as the Gulf of Akaba in the Red Sea. These mountains prevent the Arabian desert, traversed by the Euphrates and Tigris, from extending quite to the eastern shore of the Mediterranean. They interpose a belt of habitable country between the expanse of sea and the expanse of sand. From its position Syria has always been the bridge between Egypt and Asia. But it was not only traversed by a world-route going north and south, it was crossed east and west by the routes from Babylon and the

Further East, which found on its coasts their nearest outlet to the Mediterranean, and in the Cilician Gates their natural door into Asia Minor. *It belongs to the Mediterranean lands, and at the same time is of those lands the most closely connected with the great seats of Asiatic civilization.*

The line of mountain on which Syria is formed is a double one. From end to end a depression divides two parallel ranges. Sometimes the floor of the depression rises with the mountains to a considerable height above the sea, as in Al-Bika (Coele-Syria in the narrow sense) between the Lebanon and Antilibanus; sometimes it sinks even below sea-level, as in the Jordan valley. The mountains themselves have different names in different parts of their line. Sometimes they are too high and rugged to be habitable near the summit; in that case they come as a barrier between the people who inhabit the depression and those of the outside slopes; sometimes they are low enough to be habitable in all their breadth; Judaea covers the high ground between the Mediterranean and the Dead Sea. The depression makes the bed of different rivers, the Orontes, Al-Litani, the Jordan; the two former burst through the western range to the Mediterranean; the Jordan ceases before finding an exit.

The name of Syria, however, extends somewhat farther than the two parallel ranges and the lands which thence draw their water. It covers those adjoining lands on the north which receive their water from the Taurus and its foot-hills, and which extend eastwards as far as the Euphrates, where it most nearly approaches the Mediterranean. They rise above the level of the desert, and of the plains in which the depression just spoken of ends to northward. Between these plains and the Euphrates they intervene as a sort of plateau pushed out from the Taurus. The plains are the natural center of Northern Syria, receiving the Orontes from the south as well as streams from the Taurus on the north, communicating through the gorge of the Lower Orontes with the coast and by an easy ascent with the plateau of inner Syria. The climate of the plateau is other than that of the plains and coast. It is a more arid and barer world. The soil yields under labor, but is apt to be stony. There are here longer winters and more parching summers. But it is crossed by the roads to the Euphrates, and it is in Aleppo that the life of modern Syria finds its center.

The administrative system according to which Northern Syria was divided under Seleucus and his first successors cannot be traced with any clearness. We know that the Seleucis consisted of the four satrapies of Antioch, Seleucia, Apamea and Laodicea, and outside of this there lay to the north Cyrrestice and Commagene. To the south the frontier between Seleucid and Ptolemaic Syria was probably, on the coast, the river Eleutherus, and in the interior some point in the valley called Marsyas or Massyas.

In this country the invasive Greek element soon made itself thoroughly at home. Syria became a "new Macedonia." Its districts and rivers were renamed after those of the motherland. The mountain region north of the mouth of the Orontes, perhaps from some resemblance to the mountains north of Tempe, became Pieria, the Orontes itself Axius, and so on. Local attachments had to be found for the old Greek legends. At Daphne, four miles from Antioch, the place was shown where the nymph Daphne, pursued by Apollo, was changed into a bay-tree. It was in this region that Typhon was

blasted by Zeus; the river-bed, in fact, had been formed by his writhings. The wandering heroes of Greek mythology were especially useful in making these connections. On the Amanus mountains Orestes had been delivered from his madness, as the name proved—Amanus, “a-mania.” lo naturally had left traces of herself, and Triptolemus, as we shall presently see.

The establishment of Hellenic communities in barbarian Asia was not, of course, the outcome of spontaneous immigration only; we see in it rather the fixed policy of the kings. A Greek population could not exist except as grouped in Greek cities, and these cities the kings were zealous to build. Their citizens, no doubt, were to a considerable extent Greeks driven from their old homes by political or economic causes, or drawn by hopes of advantage, but they consisted also of soldiers, Greek and Macedonian, settled by royal order, and also, one must believe, of natives and half-breeds, who had put on the externals of Hellenism. The lower classes were perhaps frankly barbarian; but whatever the real parentage of the citizen-body, it was in theory and guise Macedonian or Greek. It was in the Orontes valley that the life of Seleucid Syria pulsed most strongly. Of the four great cities established by Seleucus Nicator, three were here, Seleucia, Antioch, and Apamea.

Seleucia-in-Pieria guarded the mouth of the river. The coast of Northern Syria, ramparted by hills which jut out to sea in rocky promontories, offers little friendliness to ships. But where the Orontes breaks through this wall, a bay, some ten miles across, reaches from Mount Coryphaeus (mod. Jabal Musa) on the north to the great landmark of the coast, the towering Mount Casius (mod. Al-Akra) on the south. Along the inner recess of the bay lies a crescent-shaped plain, presenting to the sea a fringe of sand-dunes and salt pools, but a little inland covered with corn-fields, with figs and pomegranates, and enfolded by the rich background of wooded hills. At the southern extremity of this plain, close under Mount Casius, the Orontes flows into the sea; at the northern extremity, about five miles off, was built the city of Seleucia, above what was in those days the principal harbor of the coast. The mountain here rises from the sea in a series of ledges or terraces. From the quay one ascended to a level which stood some 20 or 30 feet above the waves, beyond which a much higher shelf rose in rocky walls of 400 or 500 feet. It was on this shelf that the upper city of Seleucia lay. Behind it were the wild contours of the Pierian range. At its feet along the level was the lower city, containing the harbor, the warehouses, and the “outer town”. Set upon precipices, Seleucia was remarkable for its strength. Mighty walls, the work of kings, supplemented the cliffs. Climbing streets and rocky stairways connected its upper and lower parts. Its temples and buildings were displayed in their full magnificence by the rising ground. It was worthy to be the gateway of a great kingdom.

The legend of the founding of Seleucia by Seleucus Nicator after sacrifice on Mount Casius is given by a late writer. That it was really the first Seleucus who founded it is open to no doubt. Bearing his name, the city worshipped him as its god. It was granted the possession of his body by Antiochus I, and a temple was built over his sepulcher, with a sacred precinct attached, the Nicatorium.

It was not necessary for those voyaging to Antioch to disembark at Seleucia. Till as late as the Crusades the Orontes was navigable as far as Antioch itself. From the mouth of the river the traveler would ascend, having on his left the plain of Seleucia and on his right the base of Mount Casius. This region was once full of human life. Casius was vested in immemorial sanctity as the holy mountain of some Semitic Baal whom the Greeks, of course, called Zeus. Its summit was too sacred to be mounted. The festivals of the god periodically called forth gay throngs of worshippers from the capital. Today it is a wilderness, given up to the jackal, though the remains of ancient works and once well-trodden roads can still be found among its growth of oleanders. Presently, as the traveler continued to ascend the river, the mountains would close in on the left as well; he would be in the gorge, some six miles long, by which the Orontes cuts through the coast range to the sea, a place of extraordinary and romantic beauty, not unlike the Thessalian Tempe. From the gorge he emerges upon the plains of inner Syria. The spur of Casius, however, on his right, continues to keep close to the bank, splendidly covered with timber and flowering shrubs, and sending down a thousand torrents into the river. The chain ends in Mount Silpius, round which the Orontes makes its westward bend, coming from the south. Beyond Mount Silpius to the east is open country, the plain of Amyce, with the great levels of the lake of Antioch beginning some ten miles farther on.

Under the northern slopes of Silpius rose the new Seleucid city. The beauty for which Antioch was notable was derived in part from its setting, the near background of wild mountain contrasting delightfully with the rich culture of its well-watered plain. Its position was favorable to growth in greatness and riches. The climate, except in the matter of some malignant winds from the north, was excellent; the soil was very fertile; and, in addition to these advantages, it was admirably placed with regard to the commerce of the world. The Orontes valley here opens out into the plains which, as has been said, are the natural center of Northern Syria. Along this way went the regular land-routes from Babylonia and Iran to the Mediterranean. It suffered indeed from certain inconveniences. The most serious was the frequency of earthquakes in Northern Syria. Besides this the numerous torrents from Silpius, which added to the city's charm and made it singularly fortunate in its supply of good water, had the drawback of being sometimes swollen and intractable, when they spread devastation on the slopes.

Before Seleucus, Antigonus had chosen this region as the site of one of his principal cities. But the two designs did not exactly correspond. Seleucus found the infant city of Antigonía *north* of the Orontes on a stream (Arceuthus, mod. Kara-su) which carried to the Orontes the overflow of the Lake of Antioch. He marked out Antioch along the southern bank of the Orontes on the level strip, two miles broad, between river and mountain. He avoided building on the slope for fear of the torrents. The city was designed by the architect Xenarius, according to the practice of the time, on a regular plan with straight-ruled thoroughfares. It formed an extended oblong, the main street running through it parallel with the river, and making a long vista from end to end.

The legend of the foundation of Antioch, as given by Malalas, represents what the Antiochenes liked to be believed as to the origin of their city. In naming the

different constituents of which the first population was formed it perhaps reflects some historical facts. According to this legend Antioch had a claim to be held one of the first-born Greek colonies, no *parvenue* of Macedonian creation. It claimed affinity with Athens and Argos; Io, the daughter of Inachus, had died there, and the party of Argives, led by the Attic Triptolemus, who had gone in quest of her, had settled on Mount Silpius, and their descendants had made the nucleus of Antioch. They appealed to the name which the native Aramaeans gave the great city, *Ione*, as the Greeks pronounced it; it meant, of course, in reality no more than “city of the Greeks (Javan).” That there was an Athenian element in the population first settled by Antigonus at Antigonion and transferred by Seleucus to Antioch is quite possible; both the coins and the monuments of Antioch put forward the connection with Athens. It is allowed by Malalas that a good part of the original colonists were Macedonians. Cretans and Cypriots are also mentioned.

During the reigns of the first successors of Seleucus Antioch grew. To the original city of Seleucus a second city was added with its own separate wall—a foundation, according to Strabo, “of the resident population,” whatever that may mean. A third quarter was founded on an island in the Orontes opposite the existing double city, when Seleucus II, driven from Asia Minor, made Antioch his residence. It was perhaps in this island quarter that the palace of the later Seleucids lay. A bridge, of course, connected it with the mainland, and Antioch was thus become a *tripolis*. Seleucus II probably only began to build, since the island city is represented by Libanius as the work of his son, Antiochus III.

It would seem that at the foundation of the new cities of that age a cult was instituted of the Fortune of the city, that is, the spiritual personality of the city, and an image of it was set up. According to stories told in later times a virgin was actually sacrificed, and thereby identified in some way with this soul of the city; but the stories possibly have no basis but the image itself. The image of Antigonion, when Seleucus destroyed the foundation of his rival, was transferred to Antioch and worshipped in the new city till it was again removed to Rhossus on the coast. But Antioch had a Fortune of its own. The sculptor, Eutychedes of Sicyon, a pupil of the great Lysippus, was commissioned to make its image. Of all the great works of art with which Antioch the Beautiful was adorned this is the only one which retains a visible form for us today. A copy of it in marble exists in the Vatican, just as it is shown on many of the coins of Antioch. The personified Antioch sits with a certain noble freedom, holding an ear of corn in her hand, her head crowned with flowers, and a small figure, representing the river Orontes, rising out of the ground at her feet. The original must have had all that dramatic effectiveness which stamps the products of Greek sculpture in the third century B.C.

A chief glory of Antioch was the paradise of Daphne, which lay between river and mountain some four or five miles below the city. The place today is notable for its rich greenery and rushing streams—the “House of the Waters” (Bait-al-Ma). In ancient times these streams ran through the gloom of giant cypresses which encompassed the temple of the Pythian Apollo. Under their shadow, or among the bay-trees and oleanders, the population of Antioch spent their hours of pleasure. A course for games,

of which the god was patron—an imitation of the Pythia of Greece—was made near the temple, and Daphne was continually filled with the noise of festivals and the glitter of gay processions. The image of Apollo, put up by Seleucus I, was the work of the Athenian Bryaxis. It represented Apollo in his form as Musagetes with the lyre and the long garment down to the foot. Other lesser temples rose among the trees. The place was a sanctuary, and as such, one would think, did not tend to diminish the criminality of the great city close by. Its whole circuit was eighty stadia.

The high-priesthood of Apollo at Daphne was a position of ease and dignity. It seems not to have been annual but permanent, since we find Antiochus III conferring it upon a distinguished servant who, after the long campaigns in Asia Minor, was too broken for further fatigues.

The third great city of Seleucus, Apamea, dominated the middle Orontes. The course of the river between the neighborhood of Apamea and the point where it issues from the mountains to make its westward bend round Silpius is very ill known. About Apamea the valley widens out into a swampy basin. Continual streams fall into it from the hills on the east and produce a rank vegetation. Alongside of the river stretch reedy lagoons. It is a district which seems hardly to belong to dry Syria. Apamea stood on the lower slopes of the eastern hills. South of it comes one of those depressions in the range which opened out easy communications between the Orontes valley and the east. Seleucus seems to have found here an earlier settlement of Macedonian soldiers, who called their city Pella after the Macedonian capital. Whether the altar of the Bottiaean Zeus, at which the city worshipped, was really put up by Alexander himself, as the tradition asserted, may be questioned. Apamea became the military headquarters of Syria, if not of the Empire. Here was the central office for the army and the military schools. Here were the government studs, which embraced at one time more than 30,000 maxes and 300 blood stallions. Here Seleucus placed the 500 elephants which he got from the Punjab.

The neighborhood of Apamea seems to have been dotted with settlements of soldiers, which formed petty townships dependent upon the great city. Strabo gives the names of Casiani, Megara, Apollonia, and Larissa. The sites of none of these are known except that of Larissa. This was the modern Shaizar, set upon a rock of reddish-yellow limestone, which stands up precipitously above the Orontes on its western bank. Just south of this the river issues out of a narrow gorge that has been compared to the Wye at Chepstow, and Larissa is thus a position which must have been always strategically important as guarding the entrance into the Apamea basin. The settlers in Larissa were Thessalians, and it was after the Thessalian Larissa that the township on the Orontes was called. They furnished horsemen to the first *agema* of the royal cavalry, and their descendants seem to have kept up for more than a hundred years at least after the death of Seleucus the tradition of horsemanship and prowess.

The remaining one of the four great cities was not in the Orontes valley, but at one of the few safe harborage along the rocky coast—Laodicea, called after Laodice, the mother of Seleucus. It stood on the coast about in a line with Apamea in the Orontes valley, and communicated both with it and Antioch by roads across the mountain. These

roads, however, are said to be difficult in winter, and Laodicea did not possess the advantages of Seleucia and Antioch in standing on a great commercial route between the Mediterranean and the East. It offered, however, a good harbour, nearer than Seleucia, to ships coming from the south or from Cyprus, and it had its own produce to export. This consisted mainly in wine. The hills behind the city were terraced almost to the top with vineyards, and Laodicean wine found a large market in Egypt.

These four cities show us the chief centers of life in the Seleucis. But they were only the first of a growing number of communities, Greek in speech and structure, which overspread the country during the rule of Macedonian kings and Roman emperors. The hills and valleys are full of the remains of this departed life. But the very names of the towns have mostly perished. A few gathered from ancient authors cannot in most cases be certainly fixed to particular sites. On the coast in the Bay of Issus was a foundation of Alexander's, Alexandria, the modern Alexandretta. Its relative importance, of course, was not so great as it is to-day, when it is the main port of Northern Syria. We hear of a Heraclea and an Antioch in Pieria, of Meleagru-charax in the plain of Antioch, of Platanus on the road through the hills from the great Antioch to Laodicea of Lysias and Seleucobelus, which seem to have been among the dependent townships of Apamea. The ancient Arethusa, a colony of Seleucus I according to Appian, is represented by Arrastan. In the region of the Upper Orontes and the Lake of Kadesh, round which are the remains of a once numerous population, some of them classical, we have Laodicea-on-Lebanon. South of it the Lebanon and Antilibanus close in and make the narrow valley, called by the ancients Marsyas. In this there was a Chalcis, and near the sources of the Orontes, Heliopolis (*mod.* Baalbek).

The great desert east of the Orontes valley made a blank for civilization. Only in the neighborhood of the hills which divide the desert from the valley is a strip of country, treeless and bare-looking, but covered in the spring with grass and flowers, and repaying the toil of irrigation. Along this also are abundant remains of the people who dwelt here in the days of Greek and Roman ascendancy—their sepulchers, their buried cities, and dry cisterns. Towards the north the desert ceases as the land begins to rise. We reach the plateau of inner Syria. Here the traces of a great population are thicker than ever. In Al-Jabal al-Ala, the most northerly of the hills which bound the Orontes valley to the east, merging on the side away from the valley by gradual declivities with the plateau, there are “twenty times more Greek and Roman antiquities than in all Palestine.” The road from Antioch to the modern Dana, to the north-east of Al-Ala, is one series of ruins on both sides of the way. It is here that a traveler asserts he was never out of sight of architectural remains, of which he could sometimes see from ten to twelve heaps from a single point of view.

The plateau is divided by the river Chalus (*mod.* Kuwaik), which flows from the hills of Cyrrestice and loses itself in a salt swamp on the confines of the desert. From the hills which divide the plateau from the plain of Antioch as far as the Chalus valley, the undulating country is capable of cultivation, and was once populous. It is now neglected and to a large extent waste. The valley of the Chalus is much more fertile. Where it opens out into a rich plain, stood, no doubt, long before Seleucus, the Syrian city of Chalep. This became a new Greek city with the name of Beroea. The route from

Antioch to Hieropolis passed through it, and it must have drawn its resources from the road as well as from its fields. Aleppo, as we call it, is to-day the most important centre in Northern Syria. Near Beroea, and apparently to the north of it, Strabo mentions a Heraclea whose site has not been identified. Beside the route from Antioch to the Euphrates, which crossed the Chalus valley at Beroea, there was one more to the south, reaching the Euphrates at Barbelissus (*mod.* Balis). This route crossed the Chalus only one mile above the salt marsh in which it ends, and here on a lower terrace of the hills which overlook it was the city of Chalcis. The modern Kinnasrin, the frontier town towards the desert, which corresponds in position to Chalcis, holds a very inferior place with respect to Aleppo. Under the Seleucids the relative importance of the two cities was perhaps reversed. We know almost nothing of the life of inner Syria in those days, but we may conclude something from the fact that the region of the lower Chalus was called, not after Beroea, but Chalcidice.

Between the Chalus and the Euphrates the country is today almost unoccupied, one "level sheep-tract". We hear of a Seleucid colony, Maronea or Maronias, which seems to have been on the road from Chalcis to Barbelissus. But the great place of this region was the ancient Syrian town Mabog, about twelve miles from the Euphrates. It stands in the center of a rocky plain, some 600 feet above the river, without running water or any advantage likely to create a place of importance. Its greatness had a religious ground. Men had congregated here about a famous temple of the Mother-goddess, whom under different names the Semites adored, here as Atargatis. Under Greek rule its name was temporarily Hieropolis, Seleucus himself according to one statement having made the innovation. It strikes coins under Antiochus IV, and had therefore been certainly Hellenized before that time. Its old name in the Greek form of Bambyce was still in use, and survives as Mambij to this day.

The plateau of Beroea stood to the east of the plain of Antioch; to the north of the plain rose the lower spurs of the Taurus. The upland tracts among them were not an unfavorable field for Hellenic colonization. Although the soil was generally light and stony, the spring crops were productive, and the climate was healthier than in the plain. At the beginning of the reign of Antiochus III the troops drawn from this region, consisting no doubt of Macedonian and Greek settlers, numbered 6000 men, and formed an element of account in the royal army. The whole political situation in Syria might be affected by the disposition of these colonies. These things would point to a liberal plantation of Hellenic communities in the region in question. We cannot, however, get from our authorities the names of the new foundations, except one or two. Cyrrhus, the city after which the whole region was called Cyrrhestice, borrowed its name from Cyrrhus in Macedonia. Later on, another city, Gindarus, in a valley opening out into the plain of Antioch, seems to have taken the first place. Strabo calls it the "acropolis of Cyrrhestice." In the disordered times of the later Seleucids it probably became what Strabo describes it, a robber-hold. One Greek city of these hills goes back perhaps to Alexander himself, Nicopolis. It stood on the eastern slopes of the Amanus, in the valley of the river now called Kara-su, on the place where Darius had pitched before he crossed the Amanus to meet Alexander at Issus. North of Cyrrhestice the hill country of Commagene lay above the Euphrates. Here Hellenism was probably later in establishing

itself. How soon Samosata, the capital, became a Greek city we do not know. The Antioch mentioned in Commagene may have been founded by one of the later Seleucids, or even by the semi-Iranian dynasty which reigned here in the last century B.C. and used Antiochus as a royal name to show its affinity with the house of Seleucus. Whether Doliche and Chaonia were Greek cities is a question.

There is a line of Greek foundations along the Euphrates at the places of passage, and in coming to those on the eastern bank we enter upon the province of Mesopotamia. By this name the Greeks understood the country between the Euphrates and Tigris above Babylonia. Only that part of Mesopotamia which lay far enough north to receive water from the Taurus was habitable land, and this region was divided from Babylonia by the great desert. From Syria on the other hand it was separated only by the Euphrates, and thus by geographical position, as well as by the homogeneity of their population, Syria and Mesopotamia formed almost one country.

The most northerly place of passage on the Euphrates was at Samosata in Commagene, and here on the Mesopotamian bank opposite Samosata stood a Seleucia. A much more important passage was that where a bridge of boats crossed the river on the direct route between Antioch and Edessa. Either head of the bridge was held by a Greek town, a foundation of the first Seleucus. On the Syrian bank was Zeugma, called after the bridge, on the Mesopotamian Apamea (mod. Birejik), with a rocky fortress of exceptional strength. Where the road from Syria to the East by way of Hieropolis struck the Euphrates was a Europus, called after the native city of Seleucus I, and near it a Nicatoris. The ancient route between Syria and Babylon crossed the Euphrates at Thapsacus, and some twelve miles lower down, on the opposite bank, was Nicephorium, founded, according to Isidore and Pliny, by Alexander, and according to Appian by Seleucus I. Whether the Kallinikon, said by the Chronicon Paschale to have been founded by Seleucus II Kallinikos, was identical with Nicephorium is a matter of dispute. There seem to have been other Greek cities in this neighborhood. The immense importance of the ford at Thapsacus, as one of the cardinal points in the traffic of the world, no doubt made the Greek rulers wish to secure it strongly. Amphipolis, described as a foundation of Seleucus I, is identified by Pliny with Thapsacus. It was perhaps adjacent to the old native town. A city called Aenus is also mentioned as opposite or close by. Near Nicephorium, a Zenodotium is mentioned. On the Euphrates below Thapsacus we can point to no more Greek cities till we reach Babylonia except one, Europus, about half-way between Nicephorium and Babylonia. It was the native town of Dura Hellenized, and the old name continued in use with the people of the land.

We come now to the Greek cities of the interior of Mesopotamia. Their appearance gave the country a new character. Under the old Oriental empires the immemorial village life had predominated, although there had been towns like Haran and Nisibis. Now new centres of life sprang up everywhere in the Greek cities. It was along the river valleys, as we saw in Syria, that these cities were for the most part built. In Mesopotamia, the most westerly of the streams sent down from the Taurus and its foot-hills combine in the Belichas (mod. Al Balikh) before they fall into the Euphrates by Nicephorium. Moving up the Belichas from the Euphrates, we come, at a point where another stream comes into the Belichas from the west, to Ichnae, called after a

city of Macedonia, and described as “a Hellenic city, a foundation of the Macedonians.” At the time of the campaign of Crassus it was apparently little more than a fortress. In the valley of the western tributary we have Batnae, a gathering-place of merchants, since here the great eastern road from Hieropolis crossed the valley, described as a Macedonian colony, and near the source of the tributary Anthemusias, the first station on the road from Apamea to Babylon. In the valley of the Belichas itself, understood to include that of the Scirtus (mod. Daisan), we have the two important cities of western Mesopotamia. They were both old native towns transformed. The more northern, Urhai, or as the Greeks wrote it, Orrhoe, was given the new Macedonian name of Edessa. The native element was allowed to retain its place here to a larger degree than was usual in the new cities. According to Malalas, Seleucus first made it an Antioch. In later times it was one of the chief seats of Syriac letters, proud of its pure dialect. In the modern Urfa the old name survives. The other city on the Belichas was Haran, associated in our minds with the story of Abraham. Its transformation to the Macedonian colony of Carrhae seems to be rightly attributed to Alexander himself. Seleucus, as we saw, found a body of Macedonian soldiers settled here in 312. It became one day tragically famous by the disaster of Crassus.

In the valley of the Chaboras (Al-Kabur), and along those many streams which go to form it, we cannot show Greek cities as we can to the west. That they existed is highly probable, but if so, their names have perished. There is one exception, Nisibis. It became an Antioch. Part of the new population is said to have consisted of Spartans. An inscription speaks of it as the “holy city, which Nicator built, upon the stream of Mygdon, in a land of olives” It was a great junction of roads. The highway of communication between Syria and lands beyond the Tigris ran through it. In this case also the old name prevailed in the long run over the new. The district, in which Nisibis-Antioch was, got from the Macedonians the name of Mygdonia after their home. Antioch-in-Mygdonia was the city’s official name. We may perhaps infer that the district was more completely appropriated by the new civilization than we could guess from the one city, whose existence is established.

We have followed what can still be traced of the network of Greco-Roman cities cast by the new rulers of the East over the country of the Aramaeans (Syria and Mesopotamia). We should like to know more than we do of the inner life of these communities. The political forms of the Greek city-state were, of course, maintained. We should have found in each the periodically elected magistrates, a *boule* and a *demos* passing decrees after the usual pattern and inscribing them on tables of brass and stone. The social organization of the citizens also probably followed the Greek type. At Antioch the people was divided into tribes, and we may infer the same thing in the other cities. The gymnasium, with the body of *epheboi* attached to it, was an essential feature. But to what extent the old Hellenic spirit survived in these forms, to what extent the new settlers preserved their type in the new environment, escapes our discovery. According to a speech which Livy puts into the mouth of Manlius (189 B.C.) there had been rapid degeneracy. “Just as in the case of plants and live-stock, breed alone will not maintain the quality against the influences of soil and climate, so the Macedonians of Alexandria in Egypt, of Seleucia and Babylonia, and all the other scattered colonies

throughout the world, have degenerated into Syrians, into Parthians, into Egyptians.” Titus Flamininus said of the armies of Antiochus III that they were “all Syrians.” Whether this testimony is biased, or again whether there was the same degeneration in the smaller cities as in great cosmopolitan centres like Antioch, we have not the means of making out. The Syrian Greeks were regarded as inferior by the Greeks of the motherland.

It must be admitted that we do not get a favourable picture of them from their fellow-countryman, Posidonius of Apamea (circ. 135-51 B.C.); and even if his description be true only of the later days of the Seleucid dynasty, the decline must have begun long before. “The people of these cities are relieved by the fertility of their soil from a laborious struggle for existence. Life is a continuous series of social festivities. Their gymnasiums they use as baths, where they anoint themselves with costly oils and myrrhs. In the *grammateia* (such is the name they give the public eating-halls) they practically live, filling themselves there for the better part of the day with rich foods and wine; much that they cannot eat they carry away home. They feast to the prevailing music of strings. The cities are filled from end to end with the noise of harp-playing. Consonant with this picture is the account Posidonius gives of the war between Apamea and Larissa—some petty war of two neighbor cities which is not otherwise known. He narrates the setting out of the Apamean force. “They had caught up poignards and javelins which were indistinguishable in rust and dirt. They wore hats with broad brims, exquisitely adjusted so as to shade the neck without keeping off the cool breeze. Behind them trailed a string of asses, laden with wine and all sorts of viands, alongside of which might be seen pipes and flutes, the instruments of revelry, not of war.”

It is possible, of course, that Posidonius caricatured his countrymen. The fact that he himself was of Apamea shows that the stock could still produce men capable of taking the highest place in the literary and scientific world. But the traces of intellectual activity among the Syrian Greeks are, it must be admitted, scanty. The only way in which we can estimate it is by noting which of the memorable names are coupled with a Syrian origin. And this is an unsure method. For the literary world was cosmopolitan, and a man’s activity might not lie in the place where he was born. There is, however, this to be said, that some degree of culture must be supposed in the early environment of men who left their native place to seek learning or literary fame, something to have stimulated them to such a quest.

Looking, then, at the list of remembered names in all departments of culture, we find that Antioch, the greatest of the cities, contributes during the Seleucid epoch only a Stoic philosopher, Apollophanes, and a writer on dreams, Phoebus. Cicero describes Antioch as a “city once much resorted to, and abounding in men of the highest education and in the pursuit of liberal learning.” Seleucia-in-Pieria produced Apollophanes, who was body-physician to Antiochus III, and made some valuable contributions to ancient medicine. The only Syrian city to whose name any literary luster attaches is one which did not pass under Seleucid supremacy till the time of Antiochus III, Gadara. This is leaving out of count the Phoenician cities, to which we shall come presently.

One question which naturally suggests itself about this Syrian Hellenism is whether the newcomers were influenced to any extent by the people of the land, whether they adopted their traditions and modes of thought. We have very few data to go upon. The matter of language, which is a capital point, must be largely conjectural. The educated classes in the cities of course spoke Greek. But was it usual for them to have any real knowledge of the native language, without which a communication of ideas must have been very scanty? That they picked up common words and phrases, as an Anglo-Indian does of Hindostani, is to be taken for granted, but does not prove much. It is somewhat more significant that the nicknames of some of the later Seleucids (Balas, Siripides, Zabinas) are Aramaic. The Antiochene populace with whom they started was, no doubt, bilingual.

The only distinct borrowing of native tradition which we can point to is in the cults. The ancients thought it prudent to honor the gods of a land into which they came, even when they came as conquerors. Most, if not all, of the new cities stood where native towns or villages had stood before them, each with its local Baal or Astarte. These cults were, no doubt, in most cases retained, the Greeks, of course, giving to the native deities the names of their own gods.

At Antioch there was a temple of Artemis Persike, that is, one form of the great Mother-goddess worshipped by the Semites and peoples of Asia Minor.

At Seleucia-in-Pieria there appears from the coins to have been a temple whose deity was represented by a conical stone, and that it was an old local god is shown by the name of Zeus Casius, which is often attached to the symbol. Zeus Casius was the god of the neighboring mountain, worshipped from time immemorial by the Phoenician coasters. Sometimes the epithet on the coins is not Casius but Keraunios, and this suggests that the thunderbolt, the sacred emblem of the city, may be connected with the old worship, and the Greek story of the foundation of the city have been invented later to explain it.

At Laodicea-on-the-Sea the coins show an armed goddess, identified by numismatists as Artemis Brauronia, whose image had been carried away from Attica by the Persians in 480, was found by Seleucus at Susa, and presented to his new colony. This does not exclude the possibility that in the native township, Kamitha, or Mazabda, which had preceded Laodicea, a goddess of this type had been worshipped, and that this was the motive which led Seleucus to choose Laodicea as the recipient of the venerable idol; or the whole story of the image may even have been invented in later times by the Laodiceans to give an Oriental cult a respectable Attic parentage.

The great example of an ancient cult continuing to flourish under Greek rule was in Bambyce-Hieropolis. The deity here was Atargatis, *i.e.* Astarte (the wife) of Ateh. The temple and ritual are described at length by Lucian in a special work, *De Syria Dea*. According to the story told him by the priests, the actual building was the work of Stratonice, the queen of Seleucus I and Antiochus I. The story told about her is certainly fabulous, and it is therefore possible that an old legend may have become accidentally attached to her name from its resemblance in sound to that of Astarte. A prominent

feature of the religion of Atargatis was the sanctity of fish. There was a pond with the sacred fish beside the temple, some of them with pieces of gold attached to their fins. On certain holy days the images of the gods were carried down to the pond. The priests were, of course, native Syrians, and there was a great body of consecrated eunuchs.

A goddess of the same type as the Ephesian Artemis, certainly a form of the Mother-goddess, is seen on coins of one of the late Seleucids; she was, no doubt, worshipped in the place where these coins were minted. On other coins of the same epoch is a bearded deity in a conical cap, holding an ear of corn in his hand. The Baal of Doliche in Cyrrhestice did not only continue to be worshipped by the Greeks, but his cult, as that of Zeus Dolichenus, was spread into foreign lands, and became one of that farrago of Oriental superstitions, cults of Sarapis, of Isis and Mithra which were so much in vogue throughout the Eoman Empire in the latter time of paganism. The same thing happened in the case of another Syrian god, Baal Markod, the “lord of dancing.” At the village of Baetocaece there was a miraculous shrine of the local god (Zeus Baetocaeceus), which obtained from a King Antiochus a grant of land and a sanction of its inviolability, as his letter (of which a copy made in Roman times was found on the spot) declares at large.

It is difficult to trace the action of their new environment upon the Greeks and Macedonians of Syria; it is no easier to follow the workings of the old Aramaean civilization and life under the strange forces which now came to bear upon them. The country-side retained its old speech, this much we know. In the cities the populace was largely, and perhaps mainly, Aramaean. Even as an official language Aramaic did not quite die out, as is shown by its use later on in Palmyra and among the Nabataeans. There were still circles, in such places presumably as Edessa, in which Aramaic literature continued to be cultivated. The oldest works in Syriac which have come down to us (Christian) show the language in a fixed and developed form. They were not first essays in a new medium.

But although Aramaic speech and literature survived, they were discredited among the upper classes. They shrank with a sense of inferiority from contact with the Muses of Greece. Greek throughout Seleucid Syria was the proper language of official documents, of literature and of monuments. The Syrian youth, who aspired to be counted wise, found the wisdom of his fathers no longer of any savour, when he might put on the Hellenic dress and talk Zeno or Epicurus in the porticoes of the new cities. Meleager of Gadara seems to have been of native Syrian origin. Even where the old language of the land was used, the thought was, no doubt, largely Greek, as is the case with the dialogue *On Fate*—one of the oldest Syriac works we possess, written early in the third century A.D. by a disciple of the heretic Bardesanes, and continuing possibly a pre-Christian tradition. It is not really surprising that that literature should have perished. Driven into the background by Greek literature as barbarian during the pagan period, it was annihilated in the Christian period as pagan.

We have hitherto left aside that Semitic people of whom we know more than the Aramaeans, the Phoenicians of the coast. Greeks and Phoenicians had known each other since the prehistoric centuries. The Phoenicians, like the coast-peoples of Asia Minor,

had already undergone some degree of Hellenic influence before Alexander. They had also before Alexander had a long experience of foreign rule.

But under their various foreign masters, Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, the Phoenicians had maintained from time immemorial their nationality and local independence. The cities had their own constitutions or kings. In opposition to Alexander, to the advent of a power far more penetrating and transforming than that of the earlier monarchies, history sees the national spirit of the Phoenicians blaze up for the last time in its original seat. In Africa, indeed, it was still to meet Rome for life or death. But the siege of Tyre, which delayed Alexander for some eight months in 332, was the last of those sieges of Phoenician cities of which history remembered so many, the last in which the defenders were the natives themselves, animated by a national or civic spirit against a foreign king. Sidon had been crippled twenty years before by the fearful vengeance taken by Artaxerxes Ochus for its revolt; Tyre was crushed finally by Alexander. With some few exceptions, all its inhabitants who could not escape were killed or sold for slaves. Some of the old population may have drifted back, strangers came in to fill the gaps, Tyre became again a great commercial town, but the old spirit never returned, the ancient tradition was broken for ever.

In the new population the Hellenic element was probably considerable. At any rate the old Phoenician cities now undergo the same sort of transformation into Hellenic cities as we have seen in the case of the Aramaean cities. The Phoenician tradition would seem, however, to have been less completely suppressed by the new culture. Not only are Phoenician inscriptions put up by private citizens under the Macedonian rule, but the coins of Tyre, Sidon, Aradus, Laodicea-Berytus and Marathus bear Phoenician legends alongside of Greek legends and the heads of the Macedonian rulers. As late as the Christian era there were many people in Tyre who did not even understand Greek. At the same time, the Hellenism which took root here became in time more vigorous and productive than that in the Aramaean domain. Several of the prominent philosophers of the last centuries B.C. are described as being of Tyre or of Sidon. In the closing century before Christ, the development of the Greek epigram, "when it had come to a standstill in Alexandria, reached its completeness on the Phoenician coast, on a soil, that is, properly Semitic but saturated with Greek culture and civilization."

There is another region which we have to consider in connection with Syria.

We have seen that Cilicia went, according to ancient geography, rather with Syria than Asia Minor. The Seleucid kings who wished to reign in both naturally looked upon Cilicia as theirs. As a matter of fact the Cilician plains were cut off both from Syria and from the rest of Asia Minor by tremendous mountain barriers, communicating with Asia Minor only by the narrow doorway of the "Cilician Gates," with Syria by a pass equally narrow between mountain and sea, the "Syrian Gates," or by the difficult roads over the Amanus. Cilicia, whose native population was probably akin to the Aramaeans of Syria, had a history which went back like that of Syria into the days of Assyrian supremacy, and had, like Syria, its cities of old fame, Soli, Mallus and Tarsus, the seat under the Achaemenians of those semi-independent native princes who bore the name of Syennesis. But the Hellenic influence had come to work earlier in this region;

the old cities had already become more than half Hellenized by the time that Alexander arrived, and thought it decent to appear as Greek colonies. Actual Greek colonists may indeed have come to settle in them. Soli claimed Argos and Rhodes as its mother-cities. Tarsus called sometimes the Greek hero Triptolemus, sometimes the Assyrian king Sardanapallus its founder. Mallus had been founded in the dim days of Greek legend by Mopsus and Amphiloehus. Mopsus, indeed, as a wandering hero figured largely in the myths of the Greek colonies along the south coast of Asia Minor, and the most important town of the interior of Cilicia after Tarsus bore in Greek the name of Mopsuestia, the Hearth of Mopsus.

The Hellenism of the cities of Cilicia vindicated itself in the third century by its fruits. Just as at the very beginning of Greek philosophy, in the case of Thales, there had been matter supplied to Hellenic thought by the Phoenician tradition, so now it was on this ground, where Hellenic cities had grown up among a Semitic people, that the great philosophic school of later Hellenism, the Stoic, took its rise. The founder, Zeno, was a native of Citium in Cyprus, the Phoenician Chittim; but his follower, Chrysippus, who developed and systematized the doctrine, the "second father" of the school, was a Cilician Greek, of Soli, born just about the time that Seleucus Nicator wrested Asia Minor from Lysimachus. Tarsus became a principal seat of the Stoic school. Zeno, the successor of Chrysippus, was of Tarsus, so was Antipater, head of the school somewhat later; the fellow-pupil of Antipater, Archedemus; the disciple of Antipater, Heraclides, and Nestor. Among the Stoics of a still later generation we hear of the Cilicians, Crates of Mallus, and his disciple, Zenodotus of Mallus, and several of those philosophers who were associated as friends and teachers with the leading men of Rome in the last age of the Republic were natives of this region. Some of the Cilician philosophers inclined to other schools than the Stoic. One of the greatest names among the leaders of the Academy in Athens was that of Crantor of Soli, and we hear of a Diogenes of Tarsus as an Epicurean. Tarsus by the last century B.C. had become one of the great "universities" of the Greco-Roman world. "Such an enthusiasm for philosophy and all the other parts of a liberal education has been developed in the people of this city," says Strabo, "that they have surpassed Athens and Alexandria and all other places one might mention as seats of learning and philosophical study. Here all the students are natives, and strangers do not readily come to reside. They have schools for all branches of literary culture." It is not only in philosophy that Cilicia produced great names. Soli, whose Hellenic character was of an older standing than Tarsus, produced men of letters in the first century of Macedonian rule who attained world-wide fame, Castorion of Soli was even commissioned at Athens (309-308) to compose hymns for public festivals. A still greater name is that of Aratus, the author of the astronomical poem which we still possess, the model for numerous imitations by later writers, Greek and Roman. The tragic poet Dionysiades of Mallus or Tarsus is by some reckoned among the "Pleiad" of Seven which shone at the court of the second Ptolemy. Apollodorus of Tarsus was known as a commentator on Euripides and Aristophanes.

As to the working of native Cilician influence upon Cilician Hellenism, we have the same indications as in Syria of the continuance of the old cults. On coins of Mallus, struck under the Seleucids and Romans, appears the goddess of the neighboring

Megarsus, the usual Semitic Mother-goddess, whom the Greeks here called Athene. So, too, on the coins of Tarsus a common type is a curious pyramidal monument or shrine with a barbarian male-deity depicted upon it, whom Babelon conjectures to be Zeus Dolichenus.

Of the events which took place in Syria and the adjoining provinces under Seleucus and his earlier successors we know almost nothing. These regions had, of course, formed part of the realm of Antigonos till the battle of Ipsus. After that Syria passed to Seleucus, but Cilicia was at first handed over to Plistarchus, the brother of Cassander, and the garrison set by Antigonos in Tyre and Sidon held firm for Demetrius when the news of Ipsus reached them. As we saw, Demetrius expelled Plistarchus from Cilicia and occupied the country in 299, at the time when Seleucus and Demetrius were friends.

But it was exactly because Seleucus wished himself to be master both in Cilicia and on the Phoenician coast that the rupture between them occurred. Demetrius refused on any terms to part either with Cilicia or the Phoenician cities. Then in the following years, whilst Demetrius was busy in Greece and Macedonia, Seleucus succeeded in making Cilicia his. At the same time Demetrius lost Tyre and Sidon. Into whose hands did they fall? They lay close both to Northern Syria, which belonged to Seleucus, and to Palestine, which had been occupied by Ptolemy. We have not yet any conclusive evidence to show which of the rival houses at this juncture obtained possession of them.

The score of years, however, during which Seleucus Nicator ruled Syria, if they have furnished no matter to the historians, were far from unimportant. A great work of organization, of Hellenization, as to which the historians are silent, must have been carried through. The four great cities of Seleucid Syria, Antioch, Seleucia-in-Pieria, Apamea, and Laodicea, as well as a large number of the lesser Greek communities, were founded and started in life. The division of the country into districts, such as Seleucis, Cyrrestice, and Commagene, and of Seleucis again into the four satrapies corresponding to the four great cities, presumably goes back to the reign of Seleucus. Thenceforth these Greek communities were the active and determining element in the population.

As soon as the death of Seleucus became known, a faction hostile to his house raised its head in the Syrian cities. Antiochus I found the Syrian Macedonians and Greeks largely in arms against him. "In the beginning of the reign of King Antiochus," says the Sigeon Inscription, "at the instant of his accession he adopted an honorable and glorious policy, and whereas the cities in Seleucis were troubled in those days by those who had made insurrection, he sought to restore them to peace and their original well-being, to do vengeance on the rebellious, as justice would, and to recover his father's kingdom. So, cherishing an honorable and just purpose, and not only finding the army and the court zealous to carry his cause to victory, but having the favor and assistance of heaven, he brought back the cities to a state of peace and the kingdom to its original well-being" Through these high-sounding official phrases we must see all that can be seen of the truth.

From this moment till Seleucus II is driven out of Asia Minor by the battle of Ancyra, the history of Syria is a blank, except in so far as it is involved in the long wars between Seleucid and Ptolemy. War indeed seems to have been opened by a battle, in which the Seleucid army was commanded by King Antiochus I in person, somewhere in Syria—although, if Antiochus was the aggressor, most probably in the Ptolemaic province south of the Lebanon. At least, a Babylonian inscription says that in the year 274-273 B.C. King Antiochus, who had come east of the Euphrates, returned to the “land beyond the River” against the army of Egypt. Ptolemy’s strength lay on the sea, and perhaps the interior of Syria was less involved in the war, even on the frontier, than the coasts. The only recorded incident of which inland Syria is the scene is the capture of Damascus. Damascus was held by a Ptolemaic garrison under Dion; King Antiochus (the First, no doubt) was with an army at some days’ distance. Antiochus knew that Dion was receiving intelligence of his movements, and accordingly caused his army to celebrate a Persian festival and in appearance give themselves up to jollity. This deceived Dion and threw him off his guard. Antiochus crept round upon Damascus by mountain and desert solitudes, fell upon it unawares, and took the city. In 242 Damascus is in Seleucid possession. Whether the Seleucid kings kept their hold on this important place all the time from its capture by Antiochus till that date, or whether it changed hands with the varying fortunes of the war we do not know.

It is in the provinces open to the sea that the struggle was probably fiercest. The possession of Cilicia and the Phoenician coast, with their wealth in timber, was especially important to a power like the Egyptian.

Cilicia seems to have changed hands at least three times. If the poem of Theocritus is any evidence, the second Ptolemy before 271 had ousted the Seleucid. He gives the signal to the warriors of Cilicia. Then Antiochus II seems to have recovered it, since it is not among the countries inherited by Ptolemy III in the Inscription of Adule. Then again it is conquered by Ptolemy III in the campaign for which we have the Ptolemaic officer’s dispatch. And in Ptolemaic possession it still was on the accession of Antiochus III.

From the Gurob papyrus we get a fragmentary view of the organization of Cilicia as a Seleucid province in 246. It is, as we saw, under the *strategos* Aribazus, divided into smaller districts with hyparchs of their own, whom the Ptolemaic captain describes likewise as *strategoï*; that is, the same general form of government appears as we find in the rest of the Empire. The town of Seleucia is, for the moment at any rate, the headquarters of the administration. Soli is seen to take a line of its own, shifting its allegiance to the house of Ptolemy at discretion.

From the outbreak of the war, during the time of the two first Antiochi, Tyre and Sidon are under Ptolemaic influence. Tyre strikes coins of Ptolemy with an era dating from 275-274, that is, from about the time when hostilities were opened in Syria. Sidon also strikes coins of Ptolemy II with dates which run from 261 to 247. A certain Philocles, son of Apollodorus, who commands Ptolemaic forces in the Aegean, is described as “king of the Sidonians.” Phoenicia is mentioned on the monument of Adule as one of the countries inherited by Ptolemy III from his father. The more

northern Phoenician cities, on the other hand, were probably Seleucid from the battle of Ipsus. Some of the coins of Antiochus I bear the monogram of Aradus. The year 259-258 is the starting-point of a new era for Aradus, and this is generally thought to show the concession of complete autonomy to the city by Antiochus II. In the "Laodicean War" an attempt was made by Ptolemy to capture these northern Phoenician cities, but unsuccessfully. Orthosia, which was beleaguered by his forces, was relieved by Seleucus Kallinikos in 242-241. Later on Aradus secured fresh privileges by declaring for Seleucus against Antiochus Hierax. In recompense for this, the obligation to deliver up fugitives from the Seleucid realm was remitted, and such right of sanctuary, in times when political fugitives of wealth and influence were numerous, proved extremely profitable to the city.

We have already in a former chapter dealt with the occurrences on the coast of Cilicia and Syria in the opening stage of the Laodicean War.

The expulsion of Seleucus Kallinikos from the country north of the Taurus shifted the center of gravity in the Empire. The disreputable court of Antiochus Hierax at Sardis could not claim equality with the court of the elder brother, which was now fixed in the Syrian Antioch. By this change Antioch rose at once in dignity. And the change made itself apparent in the outward aspect of the city. Seleucus Kallinikos added a new quarter.

Of the events which took place in Syria in these days we know only the incident of Stratonice and her rebellion, Stratonice was that aunt of Seleucus who had been married to Demetrius, son of the King of Macedonia. In 239 Demetrius succeeded to the throne and was moved to contract a new marriage with an Epirot princess. To Stratonice the idea of remaining at the Macedonian court under the new régime was not unnaturally repugnant. She departed, studying revenge, for the court of her nephew. Her scheme was that he should marry her and declare war on her late husband. When, however, she proposed it to Seleucus he displayed a mortifying unwillingness to marry his aunt. For this attitude on his part Stratonice had been wholly unprepared. But her spirit was not broken. She waited her time. The Antiochenes came to know the figure of an unfortunate princess who moved amongst them as an injured and angry woman. Her opportunity came about 235, when the King was absent on an expedition into Iran. She then summoned the city to revolt, and so well had she played her game that the city responded and took up arms on her behalf against Seleucus. When the King returned from the East he was reduced to the necessity of recapturing his capital. Stratonice was unable to offer a prolonged defense. When she saw that the city must fall she fled to Seleucia. Thence she might have escaped, but was induced by an adverse dream to put off sailing. As a result of this delay she was caught by the people of Seleucus and put to death. The story certainly proves that the restiveness which the Syrian Greeks had shown at the accession of Antiochus I was not extinct under Seleucus Kallinikos.

CHAPTER XII

BABYLONIA

At a time beyond the vision of history some members of the human family found the country about the lower reaches of the rivers Euphrates and Tigris—then a swampy wilderness— good to live in. They began to cast seed into the black earth and to dry lumps of it in the sun for the building of houses. Presently they went on to improve Nature's distribution of the water, digging new channels which carried it from the swamp, where there was too much of it, to the desert, where there was too little. The area of serviceable land gradually extended. Here and there the mud-brick houses clustered into villages. Then the villages became cities, with great temples and palaces and towers for star-gazing. Society became more complex; there were rich and poor; rich, who wanted a variety of things to make their life easeful and beautiful; and poor, whose myriad hands were busied in their manufacture. The communication of thought between man and man or between one generation and another, which the complexity of society now required, was made possible by the fixing of speech in written signs. All this process was already accomplished by the time history becomes cognizant of human things. The cities and their civilization were already there; not Babylon only—for Babylon was but one of many sisters and not the first-born, though in time she eclipsed them all—Ur, Eridu, Uruk, and many others stood once on an equal footing. Who the people were, who first lived in these cities, what their affinities were with other branches of the human race, history cannot say. The people who possessed the land later on were Semites, cousins of the Jew and the Arab, but these Semites, It is believed, were not the original inhabitants; they broke in from the desert upon the older people and overwhelmed them, but became themselves assimilated in manners and traditions to the conquered race, using its old-world tongue as a sacred language alongside of their own living Semitic Idiom.

This branch of the Semitic peoples did not occupy the alluvial country about the lower Euphrates only—the seat of that primeval civilization of which we have just spoken. Its settlements were pushed up the Tigris to the point where it issues from the Armenian highlands. At intervals on its banks cities arose whose language and culture did not differ essentially from those of Babylon. In process of time two great monarchical states shaped themselves: a northern one, whose center was first at Asshur and then at Nineveh— what we know as the Assyrian kingdom—and a more southern one, in the alluvial country about the lower Euphrates, whose center was in Babylon. In the day of their greatness the northern Semites, the Assyrians, were able to subjugate their cousins of the south; but the yoke was impatiently borne. At last it was finally broken. About 607 B.C. the Assyrian kingdom succumbed to a combined attack of

Babylonians and Medes. Nineveh fell. Under Nabopolassar (625-605) and Nebuchadnezzar (605-562) Babylon had a new period (brief enough) of independence and glory.

During all these centuries the Semitic kingdoms on the Euphrates and Tigris had been the focus of civilization in the East. They were to the peoples of mountain and desert round about them what the Roman Empire was afterwards to the peoples of Central Europe. There was no other area of cultivation in Western Asia so wide and productive as Babylonia; there were no other cities so large and populous as those on the banks of the two rivers; no centres of industry to compare with those great hives of labor; no wisdom like the wisdom of the Chaldaeans; no king so exalted as the “King of kings.” The influence of Babylon radiated as far as the Mediterranean on the west and India on the east. From all parts of the world there was a demand for its wares, especially for its embroideries and rich, tissues, “goodly Babylonish garments.” The river, which created its fertility, made at the same time a great highway through the desert, by which it communicated with the lands to the north and west, with Syria and Asia Minor and Egypt; on the east roads ran from it through Assyria or through Elam up to the Iranian plateau. And by these routes Babylon not only exported its own products; it was the central mart, through which the products of one end of the world found their way to the other. In its bazaars merchants perhaps chattered for wares of India which were destined to be used by the peoples of the far-away Aegean.¹ Babylon was thus the commercial capital of the world, the heart in which all the arteries of traffic met. Its unit of weight, the *manah*, set the standard for all nations; the Greeks measured by the *mna*, the Indians of the Rigveda by the *mana*—a witness to the universal authority of Babylon.

It was not commerce only which brought Babylon into contact with foreigners, but in a lesser degree war as well. The Babylonians, being an industrial not a martial people, were obliged to have most of their fighting done for them, like the Carthaginians. Hard by on the east the lower slopes of the Iranian border range nourished a people who made excellent soldiers, and could be hired for money, predecessors of the modern Bakhtiariis. From how far afield they drew their mercenaries under the second Babylonian Empire is shown by the case already mentioned of the brother of the Lesbian poet Alcaeus.

Men from every quarter were thus drawn to Babylon and the other great cities of the Euphrates and Tigris, Phoenician merchantmen, nomads of the desert, and hardy fighting men from the hills of Asia Minor and Iran. Before their eyes were displayed the riches and glory, the handicraft and science of these settled kingdoms. It is no wonder that many nations learnt in their infancy from Babylon, that traces of Babylonian influence may be found in the primitive traditions of Canaan and India and Iran.

In the sixth century B.C. the long dominion of the Semites in Western Asia came to an end. Kurush, whom we call Cyrus, the chief of a Persian clan, led his countrymen forth from their mountains to seize, first the hegemony of the Iranian race, and then the empire of the world. On the 3rd of Marheshwan (about October 20) 539 Cyrus entered Babylon as a conqueror. But Babylon did not thereby lose its imperial dignity. Its

greatness was too well based on its old renown, its geographical position, its immense population, its commercial and industrial supremacy. It could not but be still the capital of the world, the seat of the “King of kings,” even though that title now belonged to a foreigner. During the hot Babylonian summer indeed the Iranian monarch used to withdraw to his own high country, to Persepolis or Ecbatana; but for the seven cooler months of the year the Persian court resided at Babylon.

The Babylonians did not think without regret of the days of Nebuchadnezzar. They were troubled with memories of old empire. More than once they rose in revolt—in vain revolt. It was this disposition which moved the Persian kings to break their spirit by a series of rigorous measures. The Babylonians looked on ruined temples, the evidence of their master’s vengeance, or saw their golden images carried off to satisfy his greed. Xerxes, after one of their revolts, forbade altogether the carrying of arms; let the Babylonians keep themselves to their harps and flutes, the life of the brothel and the bazaar. But although under unsympathetic rule, Babylon continued to be the greatest of cities, not so much a city in dimensions as a nation.” The population of Babylonia was the densest known, with elements drawn from every nation under heaven. Agriculture, manufactures and trade, three unfailing springs of wealth, made Babylonia the richest province of the Empire. As to the first, it was a chief duty of the satrap to regulate that elaborate canal system upon which Babylonian agriculture depended, and immense bodies of men were employed upon the works. Herodotus tells us what Babylonia was like in the middle of the fifth century, after a hundred years or so of Persian rule. He saw its flat expanse, intersected by canals, stretching away in endless fields of wheat and millet and sesame, dotted with clumps of palm. For corn, “the fruit of Demeter,” he knew no land like it. Wheat crops yielded from two to three hundredfold, and the size which millet and sesame attained, “I could say, but I will not, because I know very well that even what I have already said about its corn has gone far beyond the bounds of belief of such persons as have not been to the land of Babylon”. The industries of Babylon were still busily plied. Its many-coloured embroidery was as much in demand under the Persians as centuries before in the time of Joshua, or centuries after under the Roman emperors.

With regard to trade, Babylon held its place as the great mart of Asia. Herodotus describes the boats which regularly brought merchandize down the river and unloaded in Babylon. In the hot summer nights merchants from cooler lands could be seen in its crowded Mums, trying to secure a little relief by lying on skins filled with water. The traffic with India naturally continued under an empire which extended over all the intervening country.

There are nevertheless indications that the conditions were not as favorable to trade under Persian rule as they might have been. The important water-way of the Tigris was blocked by “cataracts” which Alexander found it an easy matter to level, and which the local tradition asserted to have been made by the King’s order, on purpose to bar the way to hostile ships. The sea-route, again, between the Persian Gulf and India seems to have been forgotten; one would gather, from the accounts of Nearchus’ voyage, that it was of the nature of a re-discovery, and this is all the more remarkable since these waters had been explored for Darius Hystaspis by the Greek Scylax, and Herodotus

expressly declares that the sea-route was thereafter in use. One might conclude that a weak commercial policy had marked the Persian government only in its declining days. We have an incidental sign of its slipshod administration at the end of the dynasty in the circumstance that a law which imposed a duty of 10 per cent on imports into Babylon, although it had never been repealed, had fallen into general neglect by the coming of Alexander.

Some estimate of the relative importance of the Euphrates and Tigris regions to the Persian king can be formed from the revenue table of Darius, as given by Herodotus. The Empire is divided for purposes of revenue into twenty districts, of which Babylonia and "the rest of Assyria" form one. When we deduct from the total annual revenue of the King the tribute in gold-dust, 360 talents, from the Indian district, we get a total of 7600 talents of silver (about 19,773,848 rupees) from the remaining nineteen districts. And of this the single district of Babylonia and Assyria yields 1000 (about 2,864,980 rupees). Egypt alone competes with it, yielding 700 talents. Besides this tribute in money, the various provinces were required to make contributions in kind to the support of the King and his army. The part taken in this by Babylonia exhibits its importance in a more striking way still. "There being twelve months to the year," says Herodotus, "or four of them the land of Babylon supports him, and for the other eight all the rest of Asia. Thus the Assyrian country is according to its capacities a third part of Asia." The governorship of this province, he goes on to say, was the most lucrative appointment in the Empire. One satrap, whom he mentions, drew from it a daily income of an *artabe* (a bushel and a half) of silver.

Closely associated with Babylonia in past history was a land to the east of it, the torrid river-country which intervenes between the ramparts of Iran and the Persian Gulf, watered by the Choaspes (Kerkha), the Copratas (Dizful), and the Eulaeus (Karfin). It is described today as "a malarious labyrinth of meandering rivers and reedy swamps". Once it was the seat of a unique civilization, of a people as alien from the Semites of Babylonia as from the races of Aryan speech on the farther table-land. According to one theory, they had come across from Africa. For centuries their kings were the antagonists, sometimes the conquerors, of the neighboring Semitic powers. They were known by many names, to the Semites as Elam, to the Persians as Huzha, to the early Greeks (Herodotus, Aeschylus) as Kissioi. When the Macedonians appeared in this part of the world, some of the Huzha maintained themselves as a robber people among the hills, but the Elamites of the lowland had probably forgotten the far-off days of their independence and glory. For hundreds of years they had borne the yoke of the stranger, Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian. So completely had they been assimilated to their rulers that the Greeks could see no difference between their manners and customs and those of the Persians. Their country became in fact almost the central province of the Persian Empire. Its favorable position, near the cradle of the ruling race, and yet enough removed to free the monarch from the inconvenient aristocratic tradition of Iran and to overlook the western half of the Empire, led the Persian kings to make Susa ("Shushan the palace") a chief residence of the court during the delicious Elamite spring and one of the principal treasuries of the realm.

In the autumn of 331, two hundred and eight years after the triumphal entry of Cyrus into Babylon, the city witnessed another triumphal entry. This too registered a new epoch in human history: after the Persian the man of Javan, the Hellene, the progenitor of the modern world, had come to reign in the seats of the old civilization. Alexander had two courses open to him after the victory of Gaugamela, to pursue Darius into his native Iran, or, in the first place, to seize Babylon. The latter was the course which Darius had rightly conjectured he would take; to possess the capital of the Empire was the thing most immediately essential; the rich cities of the plain, Babylon and Susa, were the real "prize of the war." Therefore Alexander pressed on south. Mazaeus, the greatest of the western satraps, who united under his governorship Cilicia, Syria and Mesopotamia, and to whom the disastrous battle of Gaugamela (Arbela) had only brought fresh credit, had thrown himself into Babylon with the wreck of his forces. But on Alexander's approach he at once surrendered; no assault had to be made upon the famous Babylonian wall. Mazaeus was rewarded by being made satrap of Babylonia under the new Great King.

Babylon thus passed under Greek rule, just ten years before Seleucus came to govern it. The change did not make much difference in the appearance of things there. A Persian grandee still held the place of satrap. It was rather as the restorer of the old order than as an innovator that Alexander presented himself to the Babylonians. He ordered the ruined temples to be rebuilt as in the days of Nebuchadnezzar, and in thirty days was gone again for fresh conquests. Only among the motley crowd of the bazaars one might now see here and there the mailed figure of a Macedonian soldier; and behind the caparisoned Persian satrap stood the real holders of power, Apollodorus of Amphipolis, the commander of the military forces of the province; Agathon of Pydna, the commandant of the citadel; Asclepiodorus, who was over the tribute.

Whether Alexander intended Babylon to be ultimately capital of his Empire, or Alexandria in Egypt, or Pella in Macedonia, we do not know—whether even he intended to make one capital for the whole. Babylon, at any rate, seems to have been regarded as the capital for Asia from its conquest to the time of his death. It was the headquarters of Harpalus, chief treasurer of the Empire; and Alexander returned there in 323 to plan a new scheme of enterprise, and to make a new organization of the imperial army. Then Babylon, which had seen the glories of the oldest conquerors remembered by man, saw the youngest conqueror die. In Babylon the army and its chiefs made a new settlement for the Empire.

We proceed to inquire how the conquering European race and this most ancient world acted upon each other. Alexander, as we saw, presented himself here, as in Egypt, as the restorer; the evidences of Persian tyranny, ruined and impoverished temples, were to be no more seen. The gods of Babylon were to share in the impartial liberality of the universal King. But his magnificent projects were slackly prosecuted in his absence; the Babylonian priests enjoyed the temple revenues, so long as the temples lay waste, and they felt a tenderer interest in their money-bags than in the honor of their gods. Here, too, Alexander had time only to adumbrate his policy.

The pupil of Aristotle and the educated men who accompanied him looked with interest at the physical character of the lands into which they came. In Babylonia they were drawn to experiment in the acclimatizing of the plants of their native land. In this they had been anticipated to some extent by the old Eastern kings, who were zealous to collect the fauna and flora of remote countries in their gardens.

Now under the Macedonian supremacy the culture of the vine was attempted in Babylonia and the land of Elam on a new method adapted to the peculiarity of the soil. Harpalus vainly attempted to make ivy grow in the gardens of Babylon.

But in a much more vital respect the aspirations of the old national kings were fulfilled in the larger and more systematic designs of the man of the West. Nebuchadnezzar, according to an account which perhaps emanates from Berossus, had shown interest in the coast traffic of the Gulf. He had attempted to make solid harbors in the swamp, and had built the town of Teredon towards the land of the Arabs.

The Persian government, as we have seen, had cared little for such things. But now in the mind of Alexander the idea of a mighty sea-traffic between Babylon and India shaped itself. The expedition of Nearchus from the Indus to the Persian Gulf subserved this policy. The latter months of Alexander's life were almost entirely taken up with examining the water-ways of lower Babylonia, regulating the canal system, and framing a scheme for the exploration of Arabia. Near Babylon itself he began to dig a gigantic basin capable of containing a thousand vessels of war with the corresponding docks. New cities of Greek speech even in this overpowering climate began to rise, one among the pools west of the Euphrates, in which a number of Greek mercenaries and broken veterans were planted, another to the east on the lagoons of the lower Eulaeus (Karun)—an Alexandria populated partly with natives from an old "royal town", partly, like the other city, with broken soldiers.

Babylonia and the land of Elam, called by the Greeks Susiana, from Susa, its capital, formed two satrapies under Alexander.

In 321-320 Seleucus becomes satrap of Babylonia, and Antigenes, who commands the Silver Shields, satrap of Susiana. Till 316 Seleucus governs Babylonia. Of his administration during those four years we know next to nothing. One thing had become clear: in the dissensions of the Macedonian chiefs the native element was not a negligible quantity. It was largely owing to the support of natives that Docimus had overthrown Archon. To this fact Seleucus was no more blind than Antigonus or Ptolemy or Pithon in the case of their respective provinces. The one point told us as to his first period of rule is that "he bore himself honorably towards all men, evoking the good-will of the people, and preparing long beforehand partisans to help him, should he ever get an opportunity of striking for power."

Can we form any idea of Babylon, as it appeared in the last days of its greatness, when Seleucus reigned as satrap in the palace of Nebuchadnezzar?

Babylon had many features in common with London—if we can think of London under an Oriental sun—its size, its industrial ferment, its great brick wharves with a label of foreign seamen. It lay on either side of a river, a flat city of brick (so much more prosaic than a city of stone), with straight streets and houses three or four stories tall. Unlike London, it was protected by a system of enormous walls from an invader. The whole province of Babylonia in the first place was shut off from Mesopotamia by the “Median Wall,” which ran across the neck of land between the Euphrates and Tigris, 20 feet broad and 100 high, according to Xenophon. Coming down the left bank of the Euphrates, one passed through it by the “Babylonian Gates,” out of the Mesopotamian desert into the rich fields of Babylonia. Dominant in this expanse, the mighty circumvallations and towers of Babylon soon showed themselves. In the days of Nebuchadnezzar the city had lain in a square tract enclosed by an outer and an inner wall, known respectively as Nimitti-Bel (“Foundation of Bel”) and Imgur-Bel (“May Bel show mercy”). But under the Persians the outer wall had been breached and suffered to fall into decay; Imgur-Bel was still standing when Mazaeus delivered up the city to Alexander. Its compass is given by the Greeks as 360 stadia, or 38 miles; its height as 50 cubits, or about 75 feet, and its breadth as 32 feet, so that two chariots of four horses could pass each other upon it. All the space within this immense barricade of brick, over 90 square miles, was not taken up by building. It embraced royal hunting grounds and pleasantries, and even tracts of corn-land, which might make the city independent, if need should be, of external supplies.

The flatness of the city had been redeemed under the Babylonian kings by artificial erections. The Babylonian plain-dwellers delighted above all things in gigantic towers. Their temples took this form; their citadels were not nature’s work, but piles of brick; in the famous “Hanging Gardens” art had striven to reproduce by a series of ascending terraces, supported on arches and covered above with mould, the aspect of a mountain with all its romantic caverns and waving trees—the work of one of the old kings, tradition asserted, whose queen had come from a land of hills. Another great pile was the palace on the right bank of the river—a city in itself, shut off from the common gaze by a wall of its own, and connected with the tower-temple called E-sagila. This inner “Royal City” was doubtless one of the two “citadels” which are spoken of in the days of Seleucus. Where the other citadel is to be placed is more questionable. But there is a strong presumption that, since we hear in the story of Alexander’s last days of two “palaces,” the other citadel is the same as the other palace. And this is borne out by the description of Diodorus, who says (following Ctesias) that the two palaces were built in order that from them the sovereign might “overlook the whole city, and hold the keys of its points of vantage”. Now the local relation of the two palaces is fixed beyond mistake. They lay over against each other on opposite banks of the Euphrates, joined, according to one account, by a tunnel which ran under the river. Each of these palaces was fenced off from the city of the people, one of them by as many as three walls. They rose, these walls, the second above the first, and the inmost above the second, their faces of brick variegated with hunting scenes in bright enamels, and above all the copper roofs under a Babylonian sun crowned the Royal City with a crown of fire. It was in one of these palaces that Alexander was stricken with his mortal sickness; in the other he died.

Below these palace-citadels the city of the common people spread on either side of the river. Although the days were long past when the Babylonians had borne rule in Asia, and history, concerned almost entirely with courts and wars, has little to say about them, the Babylonian people and the Babylonian civilization existed still. The cities which had been cities when Ecbatana and Persepolis, when Athens and Pella were not, were still hives of busy life. In Babylon itself, in Barsip (Greek Borsippa), Erech, Sippar, the old life went on and the old industries were plied. All over the Mediterranean lands, in the temples and houses of the new rulers of the world, might be seen splendid fabrics, covered with strange beasts and fantastic branchwork, upon which brown hands in the cities of the Euphrates had labored after an immemorial tradition. Borsippa hummed with a multitude of looms which turned the flax of the Babylonian plains into linen cloth for the merchantmen. The old formalities of law and business were observed; those stamped clay tablets which record transactions done under Macedonian kings are of the same type as those made under Nebuchadnezzar.

The old gods, although they could no more give their people the lordship of the nations, had not ceased to be served with sacrifice and prayer. The learned and priestly caste—Chaldaeans the Greeks called them—continued to hand down the ancient lore— theology, mythology, astrology, magic—and to write in the cuneiform character. Schools of them seem to have been connected with some of the great temples; we hear of such in Borsippa, Erech and Sippar. How far the Babylonian (Semitic) language remained in popular use cannot be exactly known. It had, to a large extent at any rate, been supplanted by Aramaic, the lingua franca of Western Asia. For legal and priestly documents the old language and character were employed as late as the last century before Christ.

Babylon had a bad name for its moral atmosphere. There was all the vice inseparable from a great city, made more rank by the absence of national or civic enthusiasms, by an enervating climate, by an abundance of the means of luxury. There in the warm nights, while eye and ear were allured by flame-lit colours and artful music, sensuality put on its most seductive glamour. The lascivious city threatened to engulf the northern soldiery of Alexander like an evil morass.

Seleucus reaped the fruit in 312 which he had sown during his first administration. Babylon received him back with open arms. As we saw, he had soon brought the neighboring Susiana also under his authority, and after conquering the East was satrap of Babylonia no longer, but King. From 312 for 175 years Babylonia and Susiana were under the house of Seleucus. We still have only fragmentary information of the Hellenic rule in this quarter.

Babylonia and Susiana continued to be two satrapies.

The extent of Babylonia is, so far as I know, quite uncertain. In the district between the rivers it was, of course, divided from Mesopotamia by the desert, and the actual frontier was perhaps the Median Wall. But on the east of the Tigris lay a long strip of land from Susiana in the south to Armenia in the north—the country of the Assyrians—and it is nowhere said in our authorities under what government it was

placed. From the fact, however, that Babylonia as a geographical term is sometimes found to include this country, it may be inferred as probable that the satrap of Babylonia had under him Assyria east of the Tigris as well. This strip of land is sometimes called Parapotamia, and it had perhaps by 218 a separate strategos from Babylonia.

To the south of Babylonia the region next to the sea appears to have been detached before the time of Antiochus III as a separate province, called after the “Bed Sea” (i.e. the Persian Gulf). This seems to be identical with the region which we find later called Mesene.

There was one respect in which Seleucid rule left a conspicuous and lasting impress upon the country — the destruction of Babylon. Sennacherib had razed it to the soil, and it had risen again to new glory. Cyrus and Alexander had conquered it, and it was still the capital of the world. But Seleucus Nicator brought its doom upon Babylon at last. It had subsisted, we have seen, through all changes of empire owing to a prerogative which was founded upon natural conditions. But the prerogative belonged to the land rather than the particular city. It was a natural necessity that there should be in this alluvial region a great center of human life, and if Babylon were merely dispersed, as by Sennacherib, the human swarm again gathered. There was only one way by which Babylon could really be undone—by the creation of another center. This was what Seleucus did. Forty miles north of Babylon, on the Tigris, about fifteen miles below Baghdad, Seleucus marked the foundations of a new city, Seleucia-on-the-Tigris. It was a favorable position for commanding the traffic of both rivers, for it was here that the space between the rivers narrows to twenty-five miles. It was a better “focus of continental trade” than a city on the Euphrates. From this moment Babylon was doomed.

The legend of the founding of Seleucia, as narrated by Appian, represents the wise men of Babylon as being conscious of all that the marking out of the new walls meant for them. When they were required by King Seleucus to fix the lucky day and hour for beginning to build, they purposely gave him a wrong time. Only when the lucky moment came, a sudden inspiration thrilled through the Greek and Macedonian troops, so that with one accord and in disregard of the royal heralds they flung themselves upon the work. Then the wise men saw the finger of God. “O King, there is neither man nor city that can change the thing decreed. Even as men, cities have their hour and their appointed end.”

Seleucia, chosen for the capital of the eastern half of the Empire, grew apace. It was soon what Babylon had been, one of the largest cities of the world. The estimate of its free population, preserved in Pliny, made how soon after its founding we do not know, is 600,000. Elements from all quarters must have entered into the human mass which jostled in its streets. Its prevailing tone, no doubt, was Greek; in later times, under barbarian rule, it prided itself on keeping the Hellenic tradition. But the native population of old Babylon, no doubt, were driven or drifted into the new city. In a way, therefore, what Seleucus did was less to destroy Babylon than transfer it to another site. It was usual, as Strabo observes, to describe a man of Seleucia as a “Babylonian.” Perhaps no city has left so little memory of itself in proportion to its size and

consequence as Seleucia. Babylon and Baghdad are both familiar names to our ears with great associations, but to how many people does Seleucia mean anything? So little trace is left of those great multitudes, akin in civilization to ourselves, who for centuries lived and worked beside the Tigris.

As to the political constitution of Seleucia, some people called Adeiganes are mentioned, who are taken to be a magisterial body of some sort. If so, it is significant that their title is not Greek. But Seleucia, as a royal capital, had its autonomy openly curtailed by its being put under an *epistates* and watched by a garrison. The *strategos* of the province (Babylonia) sometimes holds the office of *epistates* of the city as well. Democrates the son of Byttacus is *strategos*, *epistates* of the city, and commander of the garrison all at once. But the inscription which mentions him proves at any rate that Seleucia could, as a city, pass honorary decrees.

And while Seleucia grew, the old Babylon decayed. The famous walls, slowly crumbling, enclosed deserted, crumbling streets. Only in the midst of the desolation the huge temples still rose, and societies of priests clustered about them, performing the ancient rites and cultivating the traditional wisdom. The policy of Alexander in honoring the gods of the nations was followed by Seleucus and his house. In March 268 Antiochus laid the foundation for the rebuilding of the temple of Nebo at Borsippa. His inscription proclaims: "I am Antiochus, the Great King, the Mighty King, the King of the armies, the King of Babylon, the King of the lands, the restorer of the E-sagila and E-zida, the princely son of Seleucus, the Macedonian King, the King of Babylon."

It was not Seleucia only which displayed in this quarter the colonizing activity of the new rulers. There were the Alexandrias founded by Alexander near the coast (i.e. in Mesene). There was an Apamea also in Mesene. The Assyrian country east of the Tigris got its complement of new foundations. Opposite Seleucia was Ctesiphon, under the Seleucid kings apparently only a place of cantonments, but destined to be refounded by the Arsacids as their chief city. Sittace is described by Pliny as of Greek origin, but we hear of Sittace in Xenophon as a great city, so that it was only a case of Hellenization. In the same region as Sittace (Sittacene) was an Antioch and an Apamea, Apollonia, Artemita, and perhaps a Laodicea. A Seleucia-on-Hedyphon, a Seleucia-on-the-Red-Sea, and a Seleucia-on-the-Eulaeus are also mentioned.

The Greeks of Babylonia seem to have contributed their proportion of great names to Hellenic literature and science. Diogenes of Seleucia, called "the Babylonian" (about 243-155) listened to Chrysippus, and became in time head of the Stoic school. Apollodorus of Artemita was in Strabo's time the great authority for Parthian history. But what is above all interesting is to see the ancient Babylonian mind caught in the movement of new ideas and exercising itself in the field of Hellenic culture. Berosus, the priest of Bel, aspires to the distinction of a Greek historian, and writes the fables and the history of his race for these Western people to read, encouraged by the grace of King Antiochus I. From the work of Berosus almost all that was known of Babylonian history, till the inscriptions were found and deciphered, was ultimately derived. There is another figure of peculiar interest in this connection. A native of lower Babylonia, of the region near the sea, he is drawn to the great centre of Seleucia, takes the Macedonian

name Seleucus, and goes deep into the mathematical science of the Greeks. His writings were given to the world about the middle of the second century B.C.; they were still known to Strabo and Plutarch. They seem to have been indeed of a high scientific order. Not only did he advance true views about tides, but he set about proving that the earth and the planets really go about the sun. The Babylonian, quickened by contact with Hellenism, anticipates Copernicus.

While the Babylonians were drawn to the light of Hellenism, the Greeks on their part were sensible of that fascination which the darkness of the ancient East has often had for the children of light. Alexander paid attention to the counsels of Babylonian magic; so did his successors. When Alexander fell ill, a number of the Macedonian chiefs, among them Seleucus, consulted a Babylonian oracle. Antigonus changes his mind at once on a warning from the “Chaldaeans.” Seleucus, as we saw, is represented by the legend as applying to the Babylonian wise men to fix the lucky hour for his city’s foundation. Throughout the later epoch of classical paganism the roving Babylonian enjoyed great prestige as a diviner. Such men were found, no doubt, in all the great Greek cities, muttering strange words and magical formulae under the patronage of rich women, very much as the Indian gum may get a circle of curious listeners in the drawing-rooms of Europe and America today.

CHAPTER XIII

IRAN

The plains of the Euphrates and Tigris are bounded on the east by the long mountain walls which, one behind the other, fence the tableland of Iran. This name, of course, belongs to an ethnological, rather than a physical, demarcation of the earth —the country possessed by Iranian man. And in this sense Iran embraces more than the tableland; it includes the mountainous country which forms a bridge between the tableland and the Pamir; it includes also the regions to the north of the bridge as far as the Jaxartes (Syr-daria); to use modern political divisions, it includes, besides the kingdom of Persia, which coincides with the tableland, the principalities of Afghanistan and Bokhara. Within this region, in the dim centuries which precede recorded time, a peculiar national type had shaped itself as distinctive as that of the kindred Indians farther east, or as that of the Semitic kingdoms on the west. Into this old Iran, when the tribal organization of society had not yet been overlaid by an imperial system after the Assyrian model, we can get barely a glimpse. The Greek historians and Old Testament writers, to whom well-nigh everything we know of the Median and Persian Empires is due, show us almost exclusively the Iranian monarch in his relation to the foreign peoples dwelling west of Iran, his subjects, his enemies, or his allies; they show us the Achaemenian court established for the most part outside Iran on the ground of those older monarchies which it imitated, in Babylon, or in Susa; beyond the court, into Iran itself, into the land and the life, in which the Achaemenian house had its roots, they give us little insight.

The Iranian people, before Deioces the Mede built an Empire, were split into a number of small princedoms and clan chieftainships. Their necks had not been bent under the yoke of a Great King. They stood in very much the same stage of social development as Macedonia up to the days of Philip, or as the mediaeval princedoms of Europe. We see in all of these an aristocracy of great houses, of chiefs ruling by virtue of blood and inherited authority in the tribe, the clan, or the family. The typical Persian nobleman was known for his magnificent airs. His manner of life was very like that of his Macedonian counterpart. He had the same passion for dogs and horses, for hunting and the profession of arms. He had the same love of wine and night-long wassails, although he combined this with a great capacity for abstinence, where need was, in forced marches through the starved regions of Iran. Lying was the cardinal sin, and the chaffering of the marketplace he held a thing with which only lower breeds of men would have to do. But to till the ground in ancestral fashion and tend flocks and herds was labor honorable and well-pleasing to God.

None of these qualities are, however, very distinctive. Most warlike aristocracies are proud in bearing, devoted to sport and good company, and contemptuous of trade. To find the distinctive expression of the old Iranian spirit we must turn to the Zoroastrian religion. It is certainly impossible to determine how far the actual religion of Achaemenian days conformed to the true Zoroastrian type. The royal houses of Media and Persia, as we can gather from some of the proper names in use, from the fact that the Achaemenian kings worship Ahuramazda as the One Creator, were professed Zoroastrians. But certain salient differences appear between their practice and what was, later on at any rate, held orthodox—their custom of burial, for instance. In the worship of the clan deities we may see a survival of old pre-Zoroastrian heathenism, in the cult of Anabita the adulteration of the Faith through foreign influences. But even if we cannot infer that this or that prescript of Zoroastrianism was observed in the Persia of Darius Codomannus, the Avesta sheds a flood of light on the fundamental religious conceptions, on the peculiar religious temperament of old Iran. And we are led, I think, to place it high in the scale. The earliest form of Zoroastrianism to which we can get back is practically monotheistic. And not only is God one God—the Egyptians and Indians spoke sometimes of the One in a pantheistic sense—Ahuramazda is a Person, a strongly moral Person. He differs altogether from the old non-moral nature gods whom even the ordinary Greek still worshipped, and equally so from the non-moral abstractions into which the old nature-gods became resolved by the speculative thought of Greek and Indian philosophers. And with such a God, the attitude of the Iranian to the world and its ways formed a strange contrast to that which we loosely talk of as “Oriental,” to the attitude of his Indian kinsman, for instance. The material world was not a vain process, a burden from which the wise man would, as far as possible, withdraw himself; it was that which Ahuramazda created good, though the wicked spirits were now doing their best to spoil it. We speak of the “brooding East”; the religion of Zarathushtra was above all things a religion of honest work. Its supreme object was that “the Cow” (*i.e.* agriculture generally) should no longer, through the craft of lying spirits, suffer neglect. It is true that the piety required by Ahuramazda was to some extent narrow and formal, that no voice in old Iran proclaimed, “Bring no more vain oblations; incense is an abomination unto me; your new moons and your appointed feasts my soul hateth.” But it is also true that in the Zoroastrian conception of God and His service we, who have derived our thoughts of God from Jerusalem, find something strangely responsive.

Two centuries of empire made indeed a great difference in the aristocracy of Iran. The Persian nobles who fought against Alexander were very unlike the rude highland chiefs who had gathered round the standard of Cyrus. The good things of the world, the riches and refinements of great industrial cities, the precious wares of India and Ionia, had not been laid open to their fathers in vain. Even in the time of Cyrus the Persians had discarded their primitive kilts for flowing robes, such as the Medes had already borrowed from Assyria, for the purples of Tyre, and the rainbow embroideries of Babylon. Their inbred passion for carousing and hunting was gratified in artificial modes on a magnificent scale. A Persian banquet became to the Greeks the type of extravagant luxury. All Asia was ransacked to furnish the table of the Great King. Armies of cooks, confectioners, and butlers waited on a Persian nobleman. His

banqueting hall must be richly hung, and blaze with gold and silver plate. The couches must be overlaid with gold and spread with costly fabrics. In fact, the art of spreading couches was brought to such nice perfection that to satisfy the Persian sense required a special training, and when the King made a present of valuable carpets to Greek visitors, the couch-spreader was an indispensable adjunct. So too with the Persian love of hunting. Huge parks were now enclosed, stocked with all manner of game, for his diversion—a declension, it seemed to the fine instinct of the sportsman Xenophon, from the true spirit of the field, “like slaying beasts chained up.” Horse-breeding was passionately studied, and horses, in the estimation of a Persian, among the most honorable presents he could give or receive. The Indian hounds kept, in the time of Herodotus, by the satrap of Babylon were so numerous that their maintenance was the sole charge laid upon four substantial villages.

And yet, sumptuous as the Iranian nobility had grown in its style of living, much of the old spirit survived. There was still a social code which prompted the Persian baron to adventure himself hardily in battle and to close with great beasts. The fresher spirits of the Greek world, men like Xenophon and Alexander, found much in the better type of Persians to admire. There was indeed such a fundamental resemblance between the tastes and ideals of the Macedonian and Iranian aristocracy as to naturally create a kind of fellow-feeling. And the struggle which brought Macedonian and Persian into close contact led, as we know, in the case of Alexander himself, and those of his entourage who were in sympathy with him, to a generous eagerness to make friends. It is no part of Alexander’s policy in the latter years of his life to depose the Iranian race from its position as the ruling race of Asia. He aspired to make of Iranian and Macedonian and Hellene one people. Device after device is put forth in order to promote their fusion—intermarriage, association in the army, transportation in the mass. When his schemes are cut short by his death, the situation in Iran is one of counterpoise. Some of the satraps are natives, some are Macedonian. A Hellenic element has been introduced by the planting of new cities; in the villages, no doubt, and along the countryside the authority of the old families is still cherished.

The great geographical divisions into which Iran, according to the usage prevalent at the time of the Macedonian conquest, fell were twelve: two on the west and south-west of the central desert—(1) Media (Mada) and (2) Persis (Parsa, mod. Fars); two to the north and north-east of it, (3) Hyrcania (Varkana) and (4) Parthia (Parthava); on the east of the desert, adjoining the mountain country which connects Iran with Central Asia, came (5) Aria (Haraiva) and (6) Drangiana (Zaranka); the mountain-country itself fell into the two divisions of (7) Paropanisidai on the north, including the Cophen (Kabul) valley, and (8) Arachosia on the south; the region which sloped down, north of the Paropanisidai, to the Oxus formed (9) Bactria (Bakhtrish, mod. Balkh); the country between the Oxus and Jaxartes (10) Sogdiana (Suguda, mod. Sughd); and, lastly, along the south of the Iranian plateau lay (11) Gedrosia and (12) Carmania (mod. Kirman). The number of administrative provinces or satrapies which these twelve regions constituted varied naturally according to the convenience of the hour. At Alexander's death we can probably make out eight: Parthia and Hyrcania were under one satrap, so were Aria and Drangiana, Arachosia and Gedrosia, Bactria and Sogdiana.

Of the rule of Alexander's successors in this part of the world we know even less than of their rule in Syria. The native tradition, as it was gathered in later centuries under Mohammedan rule, had forgotten even the names of the kings who ruled Iran between Iskander and the Sassanians. We can discern the work of the Seleucid house only in the Greek cities which here also are shown us by the geographers. But we can gather further from the history that this Greek element was an extremely important political factor in Iran.

Media, as has been said, was the most important of the Iranian provinces. Alexander had put in a native nobleman as satrap, controlling him by the presence of Macedonian commanders. At his death this arrangement was changed by the chiefs in Babylon. Media was now divided into two satrapies. The principal part of it, from Persis northward as far as the river Amardus (mod. Kizil Uzen), containing Ecbatana and Rhagae, its two most illustrious cities, was made over, as we saw, to Pithon the son of Crateuas. The northernmost part, the country at the corner of the Iranian plateau, about Lake Urumiya, was divided off as "Lesser Media" and left in the hands of Atropates, the satrap appointed by Alexander.

Lesser Media is a lovely "Alpine" land, belonging by its character to Armenia almost as much as to the Iranian plateau. By the action of the chiefs it was abandoned more or less to native government. Atropates was the father of a dynasty, and the country came to be called Atropatene after him, a name which still cleaves to it in the form Adharbajjan, although Atropates and his house have long been forgotten there. It is a holy land in Zoroastrian tradition. When Kai-Khosru, the legend ran, destroyed an idol-temple in the land, the divine fire, Adar-Gushasp, played about his person—an occasion commemorated by the great temple of Adar-Gushasp upon Mount Asnavanta (mod. Savelan). There were other religious centres in the land, Vespaspe (mod. Ardebil), called after the heavenly Being worshipped there, and the great fire-temple, Adarakhsh, at Gazaca (mod. Takht-i-Sulaiman), the capital of Atropatene, and, according to one tradition, the birthplace of Zoroaster. Whether this prestige of Atropatene is due to the dynasty of Atropates, or whether it is of earlier date, has not, as far as I know, been determined.

In the other part of Media, "Greater Media, the work of Hellenization was prosecuted vigorously. The hills, indeed, were left to the warlike Kurdish tribes who inhabited them. It was, in fact, their neighborhood which led Alexander and his successors to protect civilization in these parts by multiplying new foundations, although the hill-tribes, it must be remembered, did not only appear to the kings as a menace, but as a valuable element to be incorporated in their own armies. The case of the Greek cities of Media shows with peculiar force how unsafe it is in this department to be guided by the fullness with which our fragmentary authorities inform us of any matter in estimating the real proportions of things. It is not possible to gather more than the names of one or two cities. And yet Polybius expressly tells us that "Media was covered with Greek cities after the plan prescribed by Alexander, to form a defense against the neighboring barbarians." Whether Ecbatana received a Greek colony is doubtful. Polybius makes it an exception, but he may mean no more than that it was not a new foundation of the Macedonians. Pliny says that "King Seleucus built it." The

magnificent cedar palace of the Achaemenians, covering over twenty-five acres with its colonnades, was left standing, and was an occasional residence of the Seleucid kings. Rhagae (mod. Ehei), the older capital of Media, is distinctly said by Strabo to have been refounded by Seleucus Nicator as a Greek city, and given the name of Europus—his own birthplace. Apparently near Rhagae was the Heraclea founded by Alexander, and restored by Antiochus (the First, presumably) with the new name or surname of Achais. We hear further of a Laodicea and an Apamea Rhagiana.

The course of things in the province which adjoined Media on the south-east, *Persis*, where lay the seats of that part of the Iranian race which had so long held the supremacy, and the royal burg in which the Achaemenian kings had been at home, is involved in complete darkness during the rule of the Seleucid house. That the national or tribal feeling was strong in these valleys we may see by the case of Peucestas, who found it good policy to adopt the guise of a Persian when satrap, and the bold declaration of the native nobleman in the council of Antigonos, that if Peucestas were deposed no other Macedonian governor would be accepted. And that this feeling continued under Seleucid dominion we may see by the fact that as soon as the authority of that house weakens, the country is found under the government of native princes. The work of the Seleucids can be discerned only in the frontier city of Laodicea, founded by Antiochus, the Antioch-in-Persis of which we know by a decree which its citizens once passed in their *ekklesia*, the Stasis, “on a huge rock,” which again is connected with the name of Antiochus I and, if we can argue from its Greek name, Methone. At some time or other a revolt seems to have broken out among these soldier-colonists in Persis, like the revolt among the Bactrian Greeks after Alexander’s death. The stratagem is described by which Oborzus, apparently a Persian employed by the Seleucid government, had 3000 of them put to the sword.

On the north the Iranian plateau is fenced by the high line of the Elburz range from the Caspian. Along the southern, that is, the interior, face of this range runs a narrow belt of habitable country which forms the connection between Western and Eastern Iran. Here the province of Media adjoined Parthia, the country which included the easternmost part of the belt just named as well as the mountains which bend southwards in a sort of crescent from the Elburz to meet the mountains of Aria. It corresponded with the modern Khorassan, or the northern part of it. It is a country of which the greater part is barren—sterile ranges bordering the great desert, but with tracts here and there in the valleys of extreme fertility. Such was the region of Nisa—one of the places cited as especially blessed in the Zoroastrian scriptures, in which an Alexandropolis is mentioned by Pliny as having been founded by Alexander. Hecatompylus, the capital of the province, owed its name, according to Polybius, to the roads from all quarters which here converged; in a land where the lines of communication are so restricted the centre of a road-system is all the more important. That such a point, therefore, should have been secured by the Macedonian kings is a matter of course. And indeed we find Hecatompylus reckoned among the foundations of Seleucus Nicator. The only other Greek city in Parthia whose name has come down to us is Calliope, likewise founded, according to Appian, by the first Seleucus. It must

have been on the extreme west of the province, since it is said by Pliny to have been at one time a frontier fortress against the Medes.

Closely connected in the administrative system with Parthia was the country on the northern side of the Elburz range along the southern shore of the Caspian, Hyrcania (mod. Mazanderan). Physically, no contrast could be greater than that between the regions to the north and those to the south of the Elburz. Instead of the arid terraces of the Parthian side, the Hyrcanian slopes, receiving moisture from the Caspian, are clothed with rank forest. The sea-board at their feet has an almost Italian character. The exuberant fertility of the country is described by Strabo. Its inhabitants were perhaps of another stock than the Iranians, and the hills were tenanted here, as elsewhere, by unruly tribes, Mardi and Tapyri. Several "considerable cities" are mentioned by Strabo as being in Hyrcania, and as the names are native, we may perhaps infer that the fertility of the country had favored the growth of larger communities even before the Macedonian conquest. The chief place at the time of Alexander is Zadracarta (probably where the modern Asterabad stands). Polybius in the time of Antiochus III speaks of Sirynca as the seat of government and Strabo uses the same expression of Tape. Whether these are different names of the same place is impossible to say. Of Greek towns in this region, although such must needs have existed, in view of the country's richness and the interest taken by Seleucus and his son in the navigation of the Caspian, we have no names given us except that of Eumenea. It is noticeable, however, that there was a community of resident Greeks at Sirynca in 209.

Hyrcania and Parthia, by the system which obtained at the death of Alexander, were under a single satrap, a native, who was replaced by the Macedonian Philip in 321. This was the man whom Pithon killed in 318 in order to put in his own brother Eudamus. Eudamus was almost immediately ejected by the confederate satraps, and after the triumph of Antigonos in 316 the province seems to have been annexed to Bactria, and to have formed part of the governorship of Stasanor. A few years later it passed with the rest of the East to Seleucus.

The eastern half of the Iranian upland consists, as we have said, not of a central desert surrounded by mountains, but of a mountain mass pushed out from Central Asia. The backbone of this mass is formed by the Paropanisus (Hindu-Kush), and round about it are the provinces fed by the rivers which it sends down. On the west of it, adjoining Parthia, was the province which drew its life and its name from the river Arius (mod. Hare-Rud), the province of Aria (old Pers. Haraiva). The name bears witness to the grateful contrast of its well-watered valleys with the neighboring desolation of mountain and desert. It was a land of vineyards, among the six blessed regions of the Vendidad. Here Alexander began the work of colonization by planting an Alexandria, and the old capital Articoana was rebuilt in more splendid fashion by Antiochus I. From Alexandria-of-the-Arians two important roads diverged. One ran round the north side of the mountain mass to Bactria, the other went south to Drangiana, and thence reached India by way of Alexandria Arachoton (Kandahar). Alexandria Arion was thus a station through which all traffic between Western Iran and the lands farther east must almost necessarily pass, a knot where the great lateral lines of the world's communications were drawn together.

Two other Greek cities are found in Aria bearing witness to the activity of the Seleucid government, Achaia, whose founder Achaeus was no doubt the general and father-in-law of Seleucus II, or an elder Achaeus of the same family, and Sotira, called probably after Antiochus I Soter. The Charis mentioned by Appian must also have been either in Parthia or here.

Two regions geographically distinct from the valley of the Arius seem to have been included in the satrapy as it was marked out under Alexander and his successors. Somewhat east of the Arius, another river, the Margus (mod. Murghab), comes down from the mountains and flows out into the desert parallel with the Arius, where it meets with the like fate, perishing in the sand. But it does not disappear before it has created in mid-desert the oasis which the ancients called *Margiana* and the moderns call Merv. Under careful irrigation this spot was turned into a paradise. It also was among the blessed lands of the Vendidad. "Report affirms," said Strabo, "that vines are often found whose stock it takes two men to compass, with clusters two cubits long". To balance its advantages, the oasis was by its position more than ordinarily exposed to be ravaged by the nomads of the desert. The Alexandria placed here by Alexander was actually overwhelmed within a few years of its foundation. The city rose again under the hand of Antiochus I as an Antioch, "Antioch-in-the-waters," standing among its network of canals. Its new founder took the precaution of surrounding the whole oasis with a wall, 1500 stadia long (about 173 miles). Thenceforward Merv, under various masters, Macedonian, Parthian, Mohammedan, maintained its contest with the children of the desert. These in the long run got the better of every wall. Century after century the swarms broke upon it, till at the coming of the Russians the other day it was found little better than a heap of desolations.

The other region attached to Aria lay to the south of it. The rivers on the southern slopes of the Afghan country tend south-westerly, and find their ultimate meeting-place in the swampy basin of Seistan, where they form a lake of varying extent. This lake, which is now called Hamun, was known to the old Iranians as Daraya, the "Sea," in the eastern dialect Zaraya, and the people who dwelt about it were called Daranka or Zaranka, the dialectical variation giving rise to the two Greek names of Drangai and Zarangai (in Herodotus Sapdyees). The chief city of Drangiana became already under Alexander a Greek colony, with the name Prophthasia, which at once commemorated the discovery of the plot of Philotas and rendered something of the sound of the native name, written by Stephen of Byzantium as Phrada. It was the principal station on the road to India between Alexandria of the Arians (Herat), and Alexandria of the Arachosians (Kandahar).

Aria, together with Drangiana, and presumably Margiana, had at Alexander's death Stasanor, a Cypriot of Soli, for governor. By the partition of Triparadisus, when Stasanor was transferred to Bactria, his place in Aria was taken by another Cypriot, Stasander. This man appears among the confederate satraps who were beaten by Antigonus in 316, and in the case of Aria, Antigonus was able after his victory to make a change of satrap in his own interest. The province, being next to Parthia on the main road east and west, was perhaps more accessible than Carmania and Bactria. Nominees of Antigonus, first Euitus and then Euagoras, replaced Stasander. Whether Seleucus

found Euagoras still installed in Alexandria-Arion when he brought the province under his authority we do not know.

On the east of Drangiana came *Arachosia*. The Erymanthus (Haitumant, mod. Hilmend) perhaps constituted the frontier for part of its course. Arachosia, corresponding to the southern part of modern Afghanistan, is a land of mountain ranges running south-west from the watershed, which divides the tributaries of the Kabul and the Hilmend. On its eastern sides the valleys run steep down to the Indus. Its inhabitants, like their descendants, the Afghans of today, formed a connecting link between the pure Iranians and the races of India. They called themselves, as the Afghans do now, Pakhtun. The Greek name Arachosia, in use after Alexander, was taken from the main eastern tributary of the Hilmend, the river Harahmti, which the Greeks called Arachotus (mod. Argandab). Here, too, the hand of Alexander was busy. Kandahar was once undoubtedly an Alexandria. Through Alexandria of the Arachosians, the capital of the province, went the great road to India.

We know of only one satrap of Arachosia between the death of Alexander and the rise of Seleucus, Sibyrtius. He was among the confederate satraps, but having conspired to supplant Eumenes, he was accused before the army and barely escaped with his life. Antigonus naturally looked upon him as an ally, and restored him to his province in 316. Megasthenes, the historian of India, had resided at the court of Sibyrtius before he was employed as the ambassador of King Seleucus to the Indian king.

Not only Arachosia, but the country to the south as far as the sea, belonged to the province of Sibyrtius. This country consisted of *Gedrosia* (Beluchistan) and the coast, inhabited by races different from those of the interior. The Iranian plateau falls to the sea in wastes of shifting sand. Although Gedrosia has its habitable valleys and its caravan routes, “in which one can always rely after a day’s march, at least, on a well of brackish water and a little fodder for the camels,” in an area of 100,000 miles there are less than 500,000 inhabitants. The prevalence of desert all along the sea-board from the Indus to the Persian Gulf diverted commerce to other roads. Gedrosia seems, therefore, to have been an unknown land to the Greeks before Alexander. Herodotus calls the people of this part of the world Parikianioi, a Greek form of the Persian term, which described them as “worshippers of the Pairika,” the unclean spirits of the desert. After Alexander the Greeks called them Gedrosoi, a name of unknown origin and meaning. They were of another stock, probably, than the Iranians. The Beluchis, who now inhabit the land, do belong to the Iranian family, but they represent a drifting of the Iranian race eastwards in later centuries. There is, however, a people of darker skin, the Brahui, who live alongside of the Beluchis in the land, and these are supposed to be the remnant of the ancient Gedrosians. Their affinity is with the black Dravidian peoples of India. An extension of the Aryan civilization of India to this country in ancient times is indicated (if it is safe to build anything upon a proper name) by the name of the chief city of the Gedrosians, Pura, which seems to be good Sanskrit for “city.”

But whilst Gedrosia was of little consequence for land traffic, the coast formed part of the maritime high-road between India and the West. It was inhabited by different

peoples again from the Gedrosians, Arbies and Oritae, belonging, like the Gedrosians, to the Indian group, and west of these, in what is now called the Mekran, people whom the Greeks described simply as Ichthyophagoi, Fish-eaters—a race of squalid beings living in huts by the shore and catching the fish in which that sea is peculiarly rich. The intense interest taken by Alexander in the sea-route to India could not fail to stir his activity in this region also as a city-builder. But here, too, the scattered notices of the ancients do not make clear how many cities were founded by Alexander and his captains, or even satisfy us to which of the landmarks of today the names they use refer. Rambacia, the principal village of the Oritae, was transformed into a city by Hephæstion on Alexander's direction, a city for which Alexander divined a great future; an Alexandria rose on the coast near a place of good harborage; Nearchus founded a city at the mouth of the river Arbis; but whether all these passages as well as the statement of Curtius refer to one city, or to several, is debatable. Distinct, at any rate, must be the Alexandria in Macarene (Mekran), near the river Maxates (Mashkid).

The mountain-mass of Afghanistan north of Arachosia is cloven from its centre down to the Indus by the valley of the river Kabul. This valley must always be important as the main way of entrance from the west into India, its door being familiar to English ears as the Khaibar pass. By it Alexander entered, and the highway of traffic under the Macedonian kings struck north from Kandahar (Alexandria) across the hills to Kabul, instead of following the directer, but more difficult tracks by the valleys of the Bolan or the Gumal. From Kabul (the ancient name is written by the Greeks as Ortospana) a road ran down the valley to the Khaibar. Another great road entered the Kabul valley from the north, from Balkh, making by its junction with the Kandahar-Kabul-Khaibar road the "Three-ways from Bactra". The importance of holding strongly this country north of the Kabul valley, the Paropanisus (old Persian, Paruparanisana; mod. Hindu-Kush), with its passes commanding the communication between the Kabul valley and Bactria, led to its being constituted a separate satrapy, described as that of the *Paropanisidai*. At the death of Alexander the satrap was Oxyartes, the father of Roxane; he continued to hold his place through the partitions both of Babylon and of Triparadissus, and was even unmolested by Antigonus in 316, although he had sent troops to the confederate army. It is after this that the cloud comes down upon the East, in which the conquests of Seleucus Nicator are involved.

Here, too, as in Beluchistan, the people of Iranian stock (Afghans), who are the ruling race today, are late-comers. At the time of Alexander the population of the Kabul valley was Indian, Gandara; the hills, of course, were then as now held by fierce fighting tribes, who gave Alexander considerable trouble on his way to India. It was their neighborhood, like that of the Kurds in Media, which led presumably to the multiplication of new foundations, which we seem to discern in the Paropanisus. The chief of these, Alexandria-on-the-Caucasus, seems to have stood in one of the side valleys leading up from the Kabul to the passes into Bactria. In the old Buddhist books Alasanda is spoken of as the chief city of the Yonas (Ionians, Greeks). The other cities mentioned are Cartana, afterwards called Tetragonis, Cadrusi, and Asterusia, a settlement of Cretans, called after the Cretan mountain.

North of the Hindu-Kush lay the last region towards the wildernesses of Central Asia, in which the Iranian man had, till the coming of the Greeks, borne rule. Beyond was the outer darkness of Turanian barbarism. So long as the great rivers, the Oxus (Amu-darya) and Jaxartes (Syr-darya), are accompanied by offshoots of the mountain mass whence they take their rise, the country about them can nourish a settled population. This land of hills between the sand-wastes on the west and the mountains on the east formed the two outlying provinces of *Bactria* and *Sogdiana*, Bactria being in fact the lower slopes of the Hindu-Kush towards the Oxus, and Sogdiana the country between the two rivers.

In both these provinces the ruling race at any rate was Iranian. They formed not only a genuine part of Iran, but a most illustrious part. According to one view here were the oldest seats of the Iranian civilization. The Zoroastrian religion had perhaps its cradle in this region; at any rate its stronghold was here. Nowhere else did the Iranians offer so desperate a resistance to Alexander. Again and again cities like Cyrescheta on the Jaxartes rose in rebellion. Intersected, too, as the country was by spurs of the lofty ranges to the south and east, it furnished the great lords like Oxyartes with castles lodged high on precipitous crags where they could long defy the Macedonian. The two provinces were similar in their physical character and their population. In Sogdiana there seems, as one might expect to have been the case, some infusion of Turanian elements. Under the Achaemenian kings their governor was commonly a son of the Great King, or a prince of the blood-royal. Even so the great resources of the country and its outlying position had tempted the rulers of Bactria and Sogdiana to revolt from the central authority on almost every opportunity. The case was not altered when a Seleucid was substituted for an Achaemenian king.

Bactria (the northern part of the principality of Afghanistan), although it contains some barren tracts, and the lowlands by the river have a bad name for malaria, is on the whole singularly favored by nature. Strabo describes it as producing everything, except the olive, and quotes Apollodorus of Artemita, who called it the "pride of all Iran". Its eastern end, the modern Badakshan, is rich in minerals, in rubies, and lapis lazuli. But its special fame, has in all times rested upon its breed of horses. In the old Indian epics we hear of the "Turanian" (*i.e.* the Bactrian) steeds, and today the horses of Andkhoi are a name in Asia. The ancient capital Zariaspa itself recalls by its name (*açpa*, a horse) the prominent place of the horse in Bactrian life. And it was not only from its own soil that Bactria drew its wealth. It was well placed for commerce, one of the countries binding India to the West. For besides the road we have seen, skirting the southern side of the mountains of Afghanistan and reaching the Kabul valley by way of Kandahar, there was an alternative road from Alexandria-Arion (Herat) by way of Bactria and the passes of the Hindu-Kush.

The country on the other side of the Oxus, included under the name Sogdiana, is divided into three strips by the double range of mountains sent through it lengthwise from the mass of Central Asia. The southern strip slopes down to the Oxus, and coincides with the modern Bokhara, the northern to the Jaxartes, and between these lie the parallel ranges, making a sort of trough down which the river Polytimetus (mod. Zarafshan) flows toward the desert, where it disappears. This middle district, the valley

of the Polytimetus, is the most fertile of the province. Here was the capital Maracanda, destined, as Samarkand, to bear the finest flower of Mohammedan learning.

In these two provinces, so important from their resources and their character as frontier provinces against the Scythians, and yet so difficult to hold because of their remoteness and the proud spirit of their inhabitants, Alexander established masses of Greeks. Strabo gives the number of cities as eight, Justin as twelve. But the most striking figures are those of the army formed by these colonists, when after Alexander's death they attempted to return—more than 20,000 infantry and 3000 horse. The names of most of the new cities are no longer recoverable. We know of an Alexandria Eschate on the Jaxartes (mod. Khojend) looking across the river into the illimitable wilderness—the last outlying station of Hellenism, in whose market-place, in the centuries after Alexander, the Greek trader from the West saw the Indian caravans which had come across the snowy ridges of the Tian-shan mountains, bringing the new substance of silk and stories of the great cities of the Silk-people, which lay in some distant world far away to the east. We hear also of an Alexandria Oxiana, of an Alexandria-by-Bactra? of perhaps another Alexandria Eschate on the upper Oxus towards the Pamir, and of an Antioch in Scythia. Lastly, the capital of the southern province, Zariaspa, or, as the Greeks called it, Bactra, was in all probability occupied by Greek colonists even before a separate Greek kingdom came to exist in this quarter, when indeed Bactra was a royal capital, fortified so strongly as to make its siege by Antiochus III one of the great sieges of the age.

At the death of Alexander a certain Philip is over both Bactria and Sogdiana. The experiment of leaving the farther province under a native satrap had not succeeded, and since the first revolt of the Greek colonists in 325 Philip had governed both provinces. By the partition of Triparadisus (321), Stasanor, the Cypriot of Soli, was transferred from Aria to Bactria and Sogdiana. It may well have been that a governor *who was a Greek*, not a Macedonian, was more likely to manage the restive Greek colonists. In fact we are told expressly that in 316 Antigonos did not dare to disturb Stasanor; “it was not easy to depose him by a letter, as he had dealt adroitly with the natives, and he would have many friends to fight in his cause.” It has been noticed that the “one piece of information on record as to the way in which Seleucus Nicator came into possession of the Upper Satrapies is that he subdued the Bactrians by force of arms.”

We have still one province of Iran to speak of, that which lies on the south side of the plateau between Persis and Gedrosia, the province of *Carmania*, corresponding with the modern Kirman and Laristan. The description of Carmania closely coincides with that of Bactria. It is a land of hills and rivers. Here, too, everything prospered, according to Strabo, except the olive. It was famed for its noble trees, and a sort of vine with immense clusters. Here, too, was much mineral wealth, river-gold, and mines of silver, of copper, and vermilion. The division between Carmania and Persis was probably an artificial one; the physical character of the two regions is similar; the Carmanians did not differ sensibly from the Persians of Persis, except that they maintained less impaired the fighting qualities of their ancestors. The only Greek town which we know of for certain in Carmania is an Alexandria. Harmuza, the port, whose name was to become famous in the markets of the world, was perhaps a foundation of

the Greeks; at any rate it would seem that Nearchus found no settlement here in 325. Carmania, as has been remarked, was not on the principal line of traffic between east and west, which went along the north of the Iranian plateau. It remained undisturbed by the political convulsions which followed Alexander's death. The satrap appointed by Alexander in 325, Tlepolemus, continued to hold his position till the cloud comes down upon the East after the departure of Antigonus in 316. Tlepolemus had taken part, indeed, with Eumenes and the confederate satraps, but he also, like Stasanor, had rooted his position too well in his province for Antigonus to overthrow him by a letter from Persepolis.

Such fragments can still be made out of that system of Greek cities with which Iran, like Syria and Babylonia, was overspread by Alexander and his first successors. Besides the name of Alexander himself, two others recur among the founders, those of Seleucus Nicator and his son, the first Antiochus. It may not be mere chance that while Alexander appears as founder over the whole tract, Seleucus and Antiochus (except in the case of Antioch in Scythia) do not leave traces east of Merv and Herat. That the further provinces were under their authority is of course unquestionable, but their main activity as founders was perhaps in Media, Parthia, and Aria. It is impossible to draw a line between the foundations of Seleucus and those of Antiochus. The activity of Antiochus in Iran belonged, no doubt, in great measure to the time when he reigned in the East as viceroy, and his acts might be indifferently ascribed to himself or to the father whom he represented.

Of the elements of which the population of the new cities was composed we have some sparse indications. It is noteworthy that in some of the foundations of Alexander a body of natives is said to have been incorporated with those Greek or Macedonian soldiers who were to give the city its Hellenic character. In the case of Alexandria Eschate we are told that the population was composed (1) of a body of Greek mercenaries (settled, no doubt, by compulsion); (2) of all the natives who voluntarily associated themselves in the new city; (3) of the Macedonian veterans who were past service. The population of the city or cities near Alexandria-on-the-Caucasus consisted of (1) 7000 natives; (2) 3000 of the camp followers, and (3) all the Greek mercenaries who wished to join. So too we are told of the city founded among the Oritae that a body of Arachosians were settled there. That the Hellenic character, however, continued in the case of these cities to be dominant may be inferred from the way in which Alexandria-on-the-Caucasus is referred to, as we saw in the Buddhist books, as a city of the Ionians. The European colonists were, of course, either Macedonians or Greek mercenaries—the latter therefore, no doubt, of those Greek races in the main which sent out most soldiers of fortune, Cretans, Arcadians, Aetolians, and so on, or men of the Thessalian horse, or, thirdly, they belonged to some of those less civilized nations of the Balkan peninsula, Thracians and Illyrians, which furnished contingents to the Macedonian king. It was not for the first time in these cities that a Greek population and a barbarian coalesced.

An extremely interesting document in this connection is the decree passed by Antioch-in-Persis, which a stone found in Asia Minor has preserved for us. It is dated by the eponymous magistrate of the year, who in this city is the priest of the deceased

Seleucid kings and the reigning kings, Antiochus III and his son Antiochus, and shows the normal forms of the Greek city-state, a *boule* and an *ekklesia*, who introduces the decree in the popular assembly, and who put it to the vote. The occasion is a request sent by Magnesia-on-the-Meander to the cities of the eastern provinces to recognize as a festival of Panhellenic standing that celebrated by Magnesia in honor of Artemis Leucophryene. To this Antioch gives a cordial answer, and praises Magnesia for its zeal in Hellenism and its loyalty to the Seleucid King. It also recalls the old ties of kinship between the Greeks of Antioch-in-Persis and the Greeks of Magnesia, and in so doing throws light upon the procedure of colonization. The city of Antioch was called after Antiochus I Soter; whether it was his own foundation or an earlier colony renamed we do not know; but Antiochus at any rate was concerned to increase it by a fresh body of colonists. To do this he makes an appeal to Magnesia-on-the-Meander (and others, presumably, of the Greek cities of the west) to send out some of their citizens. It is a matter which touches the glory of Hellenism, and the Magnesians respond by sending out men “adequate in number and distinguished for virtue” who go to reproduce the Hellenic life among the hills of Iran. And locked within those hills, we cannot doubt, are many similar decrees, awaiting the modern European excavator to reveal the European civilization which once flourished there.

Once, then, in its long past has Iran—including regions which today are a shut-up land to Europeans—been for a brief space under “western” rule. And it is striking to observe how the ancient world was as conscious of the essential difference between this rule and the spirit of Oriental government as we are in our own time. Then also it was the characteristic of the western rulers that they must be carrying things forward, curious to discover the nature and conditions of the country under their hands, restless to develop and improve. “Considerate management” was what the countries got from them, and could not get from Asiatic kings. In speaking of Hyrcania and the Caspian, Strabo describes their undeveloped resources. The considerate management has here been lacking. “And the reason is that the rulers have here always been barbarian (i.e. non-Hellenic), Medians, Persians, and, last and worst of all, Parthians.” In this long history the period of Macedonian rule was a momentary taste of better things, but too brief, and spoilt by the continual wars.

We may then probably think of the reigns of Seleucus Nicator and Antiochus Soter as a period when a new spirit of inquiry and enterprise was active in Iran. Obscured as those days are for us, we have seen some indications of that activity in the building of cities and such works as the great wall of Merv. We have further evidence of it in the work of exploration and research connected with the two names of Patrocles and Demodamas. Already under Alexander the best information as to the measurements and local conditions of the Empire had been collected by qualified agents and laid up in the royal archives. This valuable body of documents was in time handed over by Xenocles, Alexander’s treasurer, to Patrocles, the minister of Seleucus. Patrocles carried the work further. We have already seen this man taking a prominent part in the affairs of the kingdom. At one time he held a command in the eastern provinces, when he was commissioned to explore the coasts of the Caspian, and report on the possibility of a northern waterway to India. The development of trade-routes was a main concern of the

Hellenic kings. Alexander had ordered the exploration of the Caspian shortly before his death with this end. An exploration, imperfect indeed and obviously provisional, was actually carried out by Patrocles. Patrocles seems to have made two voyages from some port at the south-west extremity of the sea, one in which he proceeded as far north as the mouth of the Cyrus (mod. Kur), another in which he sailed up the east side of the Caspian to some point impossible to determine with certainty. He embodied the result of these voyages in a book, a *Periplus*, which was thenceforward the standard authority for these regions. Strabo speaks of Patrocles with great respect, of his trustworthiness and knowledge of scientific geography, and contrasts his sober report with the fabulous stories of Megasthenes and Deimachus. The curious thing is that this authority, so conscientious and intelligent, should have fixed for generations the error that the Caspian did communicate with the ocean, and that it was possible to sail that way to India.

While Patrocles explored the Caspian, his contemporary, Demodamas of Miletus, was employed by Seleucus or Antiochus to investigate the course of the Jaxartes. As in the case of the Caspian, commercial interests were no doubt largely the motive of the enterprise. The Jaxartes might be a waterway, connected with a landway from India across Central Asia. That India, at any rate, fell within the purview of Demodamas is suggested by the fact that the one express quotation from his writings refers to a town in India. By the side of the Jaxartes, on the edge of the Scythian waste, Demodamas erected altars to the Didymaeon Apollo, the god of his home.

Of a piece with this policy of discovering or opening trade-routes along the north of Iran is the intention which is ascribed to Seleucus Nicator at the end of his reign of making a canal between the Caspian and the Black Sea. It may well be that the first voyage of Patrocles to the mouth of the Cyrus had relation to this scheme, and that it was his discoveries which showed its impracticability. But in fact it was not one scheme only, it was the whole system of policy, which collapsed with the Bactrian and Parthian revolts. The exploration of the Caspian was only begun by Patrocles; had Seleucid rule lasted in these regions the work would surely have been completed, but the great Hellenic Empire was broken up before it could bring its vast designs to accomplishment.

The danger from the unsettled peoples beyond the pale— this constituted the main preoccupation of civilized rule in Iran, just as in the West a similar danger was forced upon the attention of the Greek kings in the irruption of the Gauls. The danger in the East confronted the heirs of Seleucus in an ominous form when an independent dynasty established itself, defying their authority, in Parthia. We have very divergent statements as to the rise of this Parthian dynasty; when it became great in the world, its origins gathered round them a halo of mist. Its rise also proceeded gradually, by successive advances, and it was possible, no doubt, for different traditions to take different moments in this process as its true beginning. But certain facts stand out. It was not a revolt of the native Parthians. That province, consisting, as we saw, of sterile mountains, with a few fruitful valleys and plains, could not nourish a large population. Its inhabitants were homogeneous with the other peoples of Iran; they are mentioned in the inscriptions of the Achaemenian kings as one of the peoples of the realm; in the

revolt they play, as far as our existing records show us, a merely passive part. The blow is struck by a tribe issued out of the dim wilderness to the north, who seize the Parthian country and reduce the natives to the position of serfs. It was no doubt by continual reinforcement from the north that the power of the invading tribe grew. It consisted of Parni, a division of the people whom the Greeks called Daae, and who ranged the steppes to the east of the Caspian. The Daae are described as a “Scythian” people, but this tells us nothing of their affinities, since the name Scythian was applied by the Greeks to all the peoples of Russia and Turan indiscriminately. When they entered the Parthian province and wrested it from the body of the Seleucid Empire, a separate Parthian dynasty may be said to begin, in the sense of a dynasty with its basis in that province, but that moment had been led up to both by events in Parthia and by the earlier history of the family which now came to rule there. Parthia itself had showed a tendency before the Scythian irruption to break away from the Empire; at least something of the sort is to be inferred from the coins which Andragoras, the satrap, strikes in his own name. On the other hand the Scythian chief Arsaces seems, before his invasion of Parthia proper, to have established a petty sovereignty in the neighboring region of Astabene, with his seat at a place called Asaak. The conquest of Parthia did not, apparently, take place till the battle of Ancyra (soon after 240) had crippled the Seleucid power in the West. It was, however, an earlier moment in the history of the dynasty, perhaps that of the establishment of Arsaces at Asaak, or some victory won over the army of a satrap, that the later reckoning fixed upon as the birth-year of the Arsacid power. And this much is at any rate plain, that as the difficulties of the house of Seleucus in the West had not begun with the battle of Ancyra, but for the thirty years preceding it the wars with Egypt and the Gauls drained its strength, its hold upon the East had already begun to relax under Antiochus II, and that the earlier stages in the formation of the Arsacid power go back to his reign.

It is these earlier stages which the later tradition wrapped in an atmosphere of romance, through which it is difficult to detect the truth of things. Beyond the Arsaces who conquered Parthia looms the shadowy figure of another Arsaces, his brother, whose image, as that of the divine founder of the kingdom, all the Parthian drachmae bear; he sits, bow in hand, upon the *omphalos*, from which he has ousted the Seleucid Apollo. Only two years did this first Arsaces reign on the confines of the desert. He was succeeded by his brother, whose personal name was Teridates, but who assumed his brother’s name, Arsaces, on his accession, this becoming thenceforth the royal name of all the dynasty. It was this second Arsaces, Teridates, who conquered Parthia soon after 240.

It may, however, be questioned whether, in the case even of the first shadowy king, Arsaces was a personal name, and not rather adopted deliberately in order to affiliate the new dynasty to the old Achaemenian house. For Arsaces had been the name of Artaxerxes II (Mnemon) before his accession, and we are expressly told that the Arsacid dynasty drew their descent from “the Persian king Artaxerxes”. It was the same motive which made the court tradition give five companions to the brothers Arsaces and Teridates in their assault upon the Macedonian power, their enterprise being thus assimilated to the overthrow of the False Smerdis by the Seven.

The story of their rebellion, as we have it in a mutilated form, says that in the reign of Antiochus II they attacked Pherecles, the satrap appointed by the Seleucid government, because he had offered a gross insult to Teridates, the younger of the two brothers, and slew him. Of what province, however, Pherecles was satrap the abstract of Arrian given by Photius does not specify; we may presume he was really eparch or hyparch of the district in which Asaak was situated. That the establishment of the Scythian tribe in this region involved some collision with the Macedonian officers, especially if it maintained itself by marauding, is no doubt true.

About the same time that the house of Arsaces emerged from the wilderness, the provinces of Bactria and Sogdiana ceased to obey the Seleucid King. We have already seen that the new colonies in this region, being mainly composed of Greeks, had shown themselves impatient of Macedonian rule, and a leader who could play upon this national feeling could make himself very strong. Diodotus the satrap, probably a Greek like his predecessor Stasanor and his successor Euthydemus, abjured allegiance to his Seleucid master and declared himself an independent king.

We do not know whether the revolt of Diodotus preceded or followed the appearance of Ptolemy III in the eastern provinces, which must have loosened the whole fabric of Seleucid government in that part of the world. Nor do we know what order of things Ptolemy left here on his retirement, except for the statement that he confided the government of the East to his general Xanthippus. If his conquest consisted in little but his obtaining the recognition of his authority from the existing administrators of the country, the Seleucid authority, such as it was, would be quietly re-established so soon as the provincial magnates thought it advisable to regard Seleucus once more as their overlord. In this way the Egyptian conquest would be a mere transitory phase, which, except in weakening the power and prestige of the Seleucid court, would not permanently modify the situation.

This situation, then, as it appears in the early years of Seleucus II, presents three more or less independent powers in the Far East, that of Andragoras in Parthia, of Diodotus in Bactria, and of Arsaces in the region of Astabene. The relations of the three to each other cannot be distinctly made out. Arsaces seems to have been regarded by Diodotus as one would expect the Hellenic ruler of Bactria to regard the marauding chiefs of the wilderness. The fields and villages, no doubt, suffered. The district of Astabene was perhaps one which had been attached to the Bactrian province, and was considered by Diodotus part of his legitimate domain. One account, Strabo tells us, spoke of Arsaces as "a Bactrian", and asserted his attack on Parthia to have been due to the pressure of the power of Diodotus. The relations of Arsaces to Andragoras are still more problematical. On the one hand, Andragoras is spoken of as holding Parthia against Arsaces and his Scythians till he is swept away by their onset; on the other hand, Justin says elsewhere that from Andragoras, the satrap put over Parthia by Alexander, the "kings of the Parthians" professed to descend.

The conquest of Parthia by Arsaces Teridates made the situation in the East far more grievous for the house of Seleucus. The province was of great importance as the link between western and eastern Iran. And if Andragoras had been semi-independent,

the new ruler of the country was not only independent but aggressive, and already styled himself king. He had soon conquered, not only Parthia proper, but Hyrcania, so that his power reached from the interior desert to the Caspian. Seleucus Kallinikos had not long rallied in Syria the broken forces left him by the battle of Ancyra before he set out to win back the East. About this time Diodotus of Bactria died and was succeeded by his son Diodotus II. The Greek ruler of the lands by the Oxus had now to choose whether he would range himself with Seleucus or Arsaces. On either side there was danger: Seleucus would hardly allow a rebel to retain his authority, and the reestablishment of Seleucid rule must probably mean the disappearance of Diodotus; on the other hand, by the Scythian occupation of Parthia, Bactrian Hellenism was cut off from connection with the Hellenic powers of the West, and left isolated among barbarians. Arsaces feared that Diodotus would make his peace with the Seleucid King, and that he would be attacked on both sides. The elder Diodotus had been his enemy, but the accession of the son seems to have brought a change of policy. Diodotus II granted the new Scythian power a treaty which left Arsaces at rest as to his eastern frontier.

Seleucus advanced. Before the disciplined armies of Macedonian Syria the barbarian chief thought it the better strategy to vanish into the desert out of which he came. He took refuge in the camping grounds of a tribe whose name is given as Apasiacae. It was the eternal trick by which the arm of Oriental governments is evaded. Whether Seleucus plunged into the waste in pursuit of him we do not know. Some fighting between his army and the Scythian hordes took place, but it can hardly have been the desire of Arsaces to come to close quarters, unless he had got his pursuer in a tight place. In after times the anniversary of some encounter was celebrated in the Parthian kingdom as of the victory which had been "the beginning of liberty." Whether it was in reality a skirmish or a great battle we do not know. No decisive result had been obtained when troubles in the West compelled Seleucus to withdraw. This was equivalent to complete failure. Diodotus, as far as we know, he never reached.

Immediately, of course, that Seleucus was gone, Arsaces reoccupied Parthia, and there was none now to hinder the consolidation of his power. He worked hard at putting the country into a thorough state of defense, organizing his rude Scythians as a regular army and fortifying strongholds. Among the latter Dara in the region of the Apaorteni is especially mentioned. Any new attempt to establish Seleucid authority in the East was not likely to find the task any easier for the expedition of Seleucus Kallinikos. And with his retirement we leave Iran in obscurity till we follow Antiochus, the son of Seleucus, into the eastern provinces some twenty-five years later.

It remains to ask what traces we have of the relations of the native Iranians to the Hellenic kings. The indications do not point to altogether friendly ones. In Alexander, as in the British rulers of India, the "western" spirit had to deal with practices which are abhorrent to it, and with a great desire in both cases to show extreme tolerance, there are certain limits beyond which the superior civilization has to repress by force. The British have abolished Sati (Suttee); Alexander prohibited the custom, which the extravagant form of Zoroastrianism followed in Bactria prescribed, of exposing persons at the point of death, while still alive, to the sacred dogs. It is perhaps due to this and similar actions on the part of the Greek rulers that we find Alexander appearing in the Zoroastrian

tradition in a light which is strangely at variance with his main policy. Alexander, who was concerned above all things to patronize the national cults and conciliate the native priesthoods, here figures as the great enemy of the religion, the destroyer of the sacred books.

Perhaps this conflict between Hellenic humanity and barbarian religion was confined to the east of Iran; but in the west the memories of their former position must have worked in the hearts of Medes and Persians. Of actual revolts we are not told much. Thespias, the native nobleman, threatened Antigonos with one in Persis, under any other satrap than Peucestas. The revolt which broke out in Media after Pithon's removal, although led by the Macedonian and Greek adherents of Pithon and Eumenes, drew in a part of the natives and may have been supported by the national feeling. One, at any rate, of the leaders themselves was a native Mede.

We are told definitely of one revolt among the Persians under the house of Seleucus. Siles, the officer representing the Macedonian king (whether it was the first Seleucus or the second there is no indication, and does not much matter), enticed 3000 of them into a village called Rhanda among marshes, where he surrounded them with Macedonian and Thracian troops and made away with them all.

On the other hand, numbers of Persians served both as administrators and soldiers under Seleucus and his successors. The satrap of Cilicia at the beginning of the reign of Seleucus Kallinikos is proved by his name Aribazus to have been an Iranian. Another Aribazus is the governor of Sardis under Achaeus. Oborzus, who crushes the revolt of katoikoi in Persis, is by his name a Persian. The Smyrnaean inscription mentions "Omanes and the Persians under Omanes" among the troops stationed in the neighborhood. A force commanded by Antiochus I in Syria celebrates a Persian festival. There was a Zoroastrian temple on Mount Silpius at Antioch—a temple of the Eternal Fire. Considering that our whole knowledge of the organization of the Seleucid kingdom is derived from chance notices gathered here and there, such references as those above indicate a larger Iranian element than we can actually trace with our imperfect sources. These references are enough to prove that the policy of Alexander, which set Macedonian and Iranian side by side, was not altogether abandoned by those who inherited his throne.

CHAPTER XIV

INDIA

THE realm of Seleucus and his successors did not include the Indian provinces of Alexander's Empire; but with the princes who ruled there they had to do as neighbors, and it is therefore part of our business to inform ourselves of what was going on in this region in the century after Alexander's death. In doing so we enter a field which has a peculiar interest for Englishmen.

In the year 326 B.C. a glitter of strange spears, a mailed line of men, issued out of the Khaibar pass into the land of the Five Rivers. These men had trodden, step by step, the whole way from the shores of the Mediterranean, and for the first time Greek and Indian looked upon each other's face. Many things in the India discovered to Alexander and his soldiers were like the things seen in India today—the wide dusty plains, the naked ascetics sitting by the wayside. But in some respects the aspect of things was different. None of those intricate carven temples or figures of curious gods which we associate with the India of today were to be seen; the sculptured rocks were then plain; it was from this new people that the Indian would get the impulse to build and carve in stone.

No kingdom of any large dimensions existed in India. The peoples were divided into hundreds of petty principalities, often at war with one another. The two most considerable princes with whom Alexander had to do were those whom the Greeks called Taxiles and Porus. The principality of Taxiles lay between the Indus and Hydaspes (mod. Jehlarn), that of Porus farther east, between the Hydaspes and Acesines (mod. Chenab). Taxiles from the outset made friends with the strange and terrible invaders; Porus tried conclusions with them and was defeated in the hard-fought battle beside the Hydaspes. After that he also, as one brave man with another, made friends with the Macedonian king. Both Taxiles and Porus got their reward in an extension of their territories. The first effect of the Macedonian conquest in the Punjab was *to break down the boundaries which divided one little kingdom from another, and create two realms of larger dimensions than India had yet known*. Porus became king of all the country between the Hydaspes and Hyphasis (Beas)—containing, according to one account, 5000 towns not smaller than Cos—and was only so far limited in his sovereignty that his kingdom was counted a province of the Macedonian Empire, and he himself had the standing of a satrap, with the implied obligation of paying tribute. But no Macedonian troops seem to have been stationed in his sphere. Taxiles, who also had his territory enlarged, was more directly subject to Macedonian control. A Macedonian satrap, Philip, remained at his side, and his capital, Taxila, was held by a garrison.

On the lower Indus, below the confluence of the Acesines, the native princes, who had shown themselves untrustworthy, were not left in possession. Here an Iranian

nobleman and a Macedonian chief, Pithon the son of Agenor, ruled side by side. To this satrapy certain regions on the west of the Indus which had belonged to the Persian Empire (the Gandava region ?) were attached, their population probably being Indian, not Iranian.

Alexander, of course, rooted Greek civilization here as in other parts of the East by a line of new cities along the course of the Indus.

We distinguish thus three Indian provinces: (1) that of the upper Indus to its junction with the Acesines, governed by Taxiles and Philip; (2) that of the lower Indus, governed by Oxyartes (?) and Pithon; and (3) that of the country beyond the Hydaspes, governed by Porus.

The troops settled by Alexander in India seem, in part at any rate, to have been, not Macedonians, but Greek mercenaries; and just as in Bactria a national Greek movement against the Macedonians took place, so in India, soon after Alexander left it, there was a conspiracy of the Greek captains against the Macedonian Philip, which culminated in his assassination. But the conspirators were killed and the insurrection suppressed by the Macedonian guards. Soon afterwards Pithon had taken the place of Philip, and the province of the lower Indus had been added to the realm of Porus, which thus reached the sea. This is the situation at Alexander's death (323).

The rivalries which then convulsed the Empire reached to India. Eudamus, who had held command of a Thracian contingent in the province of the upper Indus, now came to the front. Like the satraps of Further Iran, he embraced the royalist cause in 317, whilst Pithon the son of Agenor is found as an adherent of Antigonus. Eudamus seems to have formed the design of creating a yet larger Indian realm by uniting all the provinces under his own hand. Pithon had probably fled to join Antigonus, and Porus was entangled in the snares of Eudamus and murdered. Eudamus was now supreme in the Punjab, master of a force of the elephants which were held to be the strength of the Indian armies. But in 317 he left India to join the united satraps with Eumenes, and he never returned. He was put to death by Antigonus.

But the fever with which India, from its contact with the disturbed area of western Asia, had been infected still worked. The idea of the great kingdom was in the air. It had been in part realized. The old order had been confounded and the old landmarks trampled down. It was the sort of chaos which gives the strong man his opportunity. And the strong man appeared in a native Indian, Chandragupta, who had not read the signs of the times in vain.

The origin of a great personality gathers quickly about it in India a rank growth of legend. The real Chandragupta has ceased to be distinguishable at all in the myths as they are set down in later Indian books. In our classical sources the process is only in its earlier stages; the stories were such as were told to Greek travelers a generation or two after the great man's time. Chandragupta, according to their account, was of a low caste, the prototype of Sivaji the Mahratta. As a boy he had seen Alexander, the invincible splendid man from the West. Later on, when he became a great king, Chandragupta

worshipped Alexander among his gods. Like Sivaji and many others who have risen to power in India, Chandragupta began his rise as a captain of marauders. He had offended the king of the district where he lived, Nanda or Nandrus, and had taken to the jungle. A lion, it is recorded in the legend as given by Justin, had come upon him when sleeping outworn, and licked him without doing him any hurt. He flung himself into the chaos which prevailed in the Punjab after the death of Eudamus in 316. If a great king was to arise in India, he might be a native as well as a Macedonian. Chandragupta presented himself as a national leader. Successes surrounded him with a superstitious halo. It was believed that the elephant he rode was a wild one which had knelt of its own accord to receive him upon its back. The Macedonian dominion in the land was broken. But its work in doing away with the little principalities stood. The Punjab was one great kingdom. A new power had arisen in India also out of the ruins of Alexander's Empire.

But Chandragupta's possession of the Indian provinces was, of course, challenged when Seleucus, between 312 and 302, established his authority in the East. Once more a great Macedonian army pushed victoriously into the Punjab. But it was at the moment when the situation in the West was coming to a crisis, and Seleucus was needed to throw his weight into the scale against Antigonos. He had no time to ground his dominion in India. So he agreed with Chandragupta quickly. The new Indian king was left in possession, and he on his part promised alliance, if not allegiance. A marriage cemented the two houses, and Chandragupta furnished Seleucus with 500 elephants to be used in Asia Minor. Those regions on the west of the Indus, which had been detached by Alexander from the Iranian province to which they had belonged, Seleucus now ceded to the Indian king. Thenceforward the relations of the house of Seleucus and that of Chandragupta seem to have been of the friendliest.

But the tendency towards the formation of a great realm, which the Macedonian conquest had set in motion, was not yet arrived at its completion. Chandragupta passed from the Punjab into that more eastern India watered by the Ganges and its tributaries, and carried all before him. His conquest reached to the Bay of Bengal. From the Indus to the mouth of the Ganges was now a single empire, whose centre and seat of government was fixed by the conqueror at Pataliputra (mod. Patna).

And wherever Chandragupta ruled, there the influence of Alexander could be traced. We have seen that the new Indian realm sprang directly out of Alexander's Empire, and that Chandragupta acknowledged its origin in his worship of the Macedonian king. At the altars which Alexander built beside the Hyphasis when he turned back westward it was long the custom for the kings who ruled on the Ganges to offer periodic sacrifices according to Greek rites. Intercourse between the court of Pataliputra and the Greek courts of the West was maintained. Megasthenes resided for a time at Pataliputra as the ambassador of Seleucus to Chandragupta, and left the standard work on India to later generations of classical antiquity. Deimachus of Plataea went as ambassador to the son and successor of Chandragupta, Bindusara Amitraghata, and also put the information which he gathered on record. An ambassador of Ptolemy II to India, Dionysius, is mentioned as a third authority. We may presume that Hindoo envoys were likewise to be seen at the Seleucid and Ptolemaic courts even before Asoka sent his missionaries.

Intercourse between far separated branches of the human family must have been advanced in an altogether new degree when the whole length of Asia from the mouth of the Ganges to the coasts of the Mediterranean was occupied by two friendly empires! And it must be remembered that a Greek merchantman would not now come into India as into an altogether strange land. In the Punjab also under the Indian king he would find the Greek population settled by Alexander. Greek was perhaps widely diffused as a language of commerce in western India and Afghanistan. Of the movements in the commercial world—what we should now so like to know of the mingling of nationalities at the great centres, the life of the road-side and the khan, our authorities tell us nothing. They see nothing outside the courts and camps. But even at the courts we discover a curiosity of Hellene and Indian with regard to each other's worlds. We hear of the strange drugs sent by Chandragupta to Seleucus, and of the letter of Bindusara to Antiochus asking to be furnished for a price with the sweet rich drink which one of the Greek processes of wine-making produced, with a quantity of dried figs for which Asia Minor then as now was famous, and with a teacher of Greek learning, a "sophist." "The figs and the wine," Antiochus wrote back, "shall be sent, but a sophist is not, according to the custom of the Greeks, an article of sale."

But how far-reaching in its effects the Macedonian intervention in India was destined to be began to be seen when the third king of the new Indian realm, Asoka the son of Bindusara, embraced Buddhism. The teaching of Gautama Sakyamuni, after having been for some 200 years the doctrine of one of the innumerable Indian sects, was now lifted to a position of world-wide importance. The creation of a single great kingdom in India had made possible the extension of a single religion. To the Macedonian conquest therefore the rise of Buddhism in India and the subsequent conquest by Buddhism of Central and Further Asia was in the first instance due. When we hear so often the cheap wisdom uttered with an air of profundity, which depreciates all "Western" influence upon the East as essentially transitory and evanescent, it is interesting to observe the opinion of one who speaks with authority— that "upon the institutions brought in by Alexander the whole subsequent development of India depends"

King Asoka was ardent to propagate the Doctrine in all the earth. In the Greek cities of the West, as far as Cyrene and Epirus, one might have had glimpses of dark men, with the monkish tonsure and the long yellow robe, who were come to roll onward even here the Wheel of the Kingdom of Righteousness. Perhaps the kings themselves—the wine-sodden Antiochus II, the literary and scientific dilettante Ptolemy Philadelphia, the grave Stoic Antigonus — were summoned by the envoys of Asoka to walk in the Eightfold Path—right belief, right will, right word, right deed, right life, right effort, right thought, right self-withdrawal—and to receive the Four Truths concerning the pain in the world and its taking away. "Open your ears, ye kings, the Redemption from death is found". The record of the sending out of these missionaries is established by Asoka himself, graven on the rocks of India; it is a pity that we have no western account of the impression which they made. They must have trodden the same roads which three hundred years later were trodden by the apostles of another Faith and another Redemption.

CHAPTER XV
THE FIRST YEARS OF ANTIOCHUS III
(223-216)

WE return from our survey of the East to that point in our narrative when we saw the Seleucid King struck down in Asia Minor whilst engaged in recovering his inheritance from Attalus of Pergamum. By the assassination of Seleucus III the royal army was suddenly deprived of its head in the enemy's country; but a successful retirement across the Taurus was effected by the skill of the general Epigenes.

For a while the succession to the vacant throne appeared doubtful. Antiochus, the younger son of Seleucus II Kallinikos, then a youth of about eighteen, was far away in Babylonia, and some time must expire before he could appear in the West. Meanwhile the direction of affairs had been at once assumed upon the King's death by his cousin Achaeus. He had acted vigorously against the party responsible for the murder, and had put Meaner and Apaturius to death. He was strong, able and popular, and public feeling ran in favor of his assuming the diadem. But Achaeus remained true to his absent cousin, proclaimed him king, and himself undertook a new campaign in Asia Minor to restore the authority of the Seleucid house.

The popular voice of the Macedonians in Syria now called for the presence of the young King, and Antiochus moved west. The first dispositions of the new reign were the delivery to Achaeus of full powers in the trans-Tauric country and a similar delegation of the royal authority beyond the Tigris to Molon, the satrap of Media, and his brother Alexander, the satrap of Persis. Antiochus III, however, was not yet his own master. The real director of the affairs of the kingdom was the prime minister, Hermias. He had shown himself a minister of the type familiar at despotic courts, greedy of power, intolerant of rivals, and murderous in his rancors. His influence was a menace to all prominent persons in the kingdom. Epigenes, the beloved general, was the especial object of his jealousy. Such a régime naturally brought its nemesis in the disaffection of the King's high officers. It was generally expected that Achaeus would renounce his allegiance. Molon and Alexander made haste to secure themselves, as they imagined, by rebellion (221). Their neighbors on the east, Arsaces in Parthia, Diodotus in Bactria, showed an example of successful defiance. Molon also now declared himself a king and essayed to turn away from the house of Seleucus the hearts of the Greek colonists and native tribes in Nearer Iran.

The weaknesses in the frame of the Empire, which ultimately proved fatal, were already indicated in this crisis—its relinquishment of Asia Minor and Iran foreshown. But as yet it did not seem past hope that a strong hand might renew the broken bonds.

Achaeus might still with skillful management be retained. In the East one element in the situation made powerfully for the house of Seleucus—its popularity with the Greek cities. Encompassed by alien peoples, the Greeks in the East looked to Antioch for the protection of Hellenism. It was the great advantage the house of Seleucus possessed, and again and again in the course of these times barbarian conquerors and rebel captains found it a permanent force to be reckoned with. The line of policy by which the crisis at this moment could be met was plainly marked out—to avoid all further entanglements, to conciliate Achaeus, and to turn the disposition of the eastern Greeks to account. It only required a firm will to carry it through.

Unfortunately the throne was occupied by a youth and swayed by a corrupt minister. At the council held to consider the rebellion in the East, Epigenes advised an immediate advance on the satraps, and urged the passion of loyalty which the appearance of the King in those regions would arouse. Hermias replied with a fury due in part to his hatred of Epigenes, in part to terror of the war. He roundly accused the general of wishing to deliver the King's person into his enemies' hands. The Council were frightened by this outbreak into acquiescence, and only a force under Xenon and Theodotus (nicknamed "One-and-a-half") was sent against Molon. Hermias, however, was still uneasy lest the King might be induced to go to the eastern provinces, and to prevent it he conceived the plan of reopening the controversy with Egypt as to Coele-Syria, which would keep the King's hands full, and at the same time would not, in view of the character of the reigning Ptolemy, entail much danger. For about this time (winter 222-221) the Egyptian throne, which had been occupied by three great rulers, passed to the contemptible Ptolemy Philopator. It became the interest of Hermias to present before the King's eyes the danger in the west of the Empire in the liveliest colors. The success which Achaeus had met with in Asia Minor gave him an opportunity. Already the Pergamene power had been broken, and Attalus was being driven within ever narrower limits; already Achaeus was to all intents and purposes master of the trans-Tauric country. It was easy to work upon the King's fears and make him see a great conspiracy threatening the Empire on all sides—a league which embraced the king of Egypt in the West as well as the revolting satraps in the East. Hermias removed all doubts by producing a letter (which he had forged) from Ptolemy to Achaeus, urging him to assume the diadem.

In the marriage of the young King, which now took place, we may see the Seleucid court actuated by the motive of securing its more than ever precarious hold on Asia Minor. The policy initiated by Antiochus II was still followed. The bride chosen for Antiochus III was Laodice, the daughter of Mithridates I of Pontic Cappadocia. She was, no doubt, his first cousin, her mother being that aunt of his whom Mithridates had espoused. She was escorted from Cappadocia by the admiral Dioguetus, and the nuptials were celebrated at Seleucia on the Euphrates Bridge, where the court was at the time residing. As soon as the marriage was over, the court moved to Antioch, and preparations for an attack on Egypt were pushed forward.

The position of Molon meanwhile in the East grew increasingly formidable. In his own satrapy of Media he had a defensible country, guarded by mountain and desert, and, as we saw in the case of Pithon, well adapted for the formation of a great military

power. He had taken measures to bind the neighboring satraps to his cause. The native princes, outside the sphere of Macedonian authority, of whom the greatest was Artabazanes of Lesser Media (Adharbaijan), were ready to support an antagonist of the Seleucid power. The inherent loyalty of the Greek and Macedonian settlers to the royal house Molon fought by largesses, severity, promises and forged dispatches, tending to show the King in an evil light. The generals sent by the court, Xenon and Theodotus, did not dare to offer battle and sat down behind fortifications. Molon became master of Apolloniatis. Then he even marched on Seleucia. The city being on the western bank of the Tigris, he could not reach it without crossing the river, and this Zeuxis, the satrap of Babylonia, prevented by seizing all the boats. Molon had to be content to take up his winter-quarters (of 221) in Ctesiphon, the military station opposite the city on the other bank, and there wait his opportunity.

These movements of Molon caused a fresh tension at the court. But Hermias still carried his point. Only a general should be sent against a rebel. Kings should go to war with none but kings. Accordingly, late in the summer of 221, whilst the invasion of Coele-Syria was set on foot under the leadership of the King in person, Xenoetas, an Achaean adventurer, led a new force eastwards. He was given supreme authority over the provincial commanders to conduct operations at his discretion.

Xenoetas marched to Seleucia, where he found Zeuxis. The governors of Susiana and the "Red Sea" province, Diogenes and Pythiades, who were still loyal, joined him by command. He pitched beside the river on the western bank over against the rebels. The information brought him by deserters, who swam the river, showed how strong the royal cause still was in the East. The rank and file of Molon's regular forces, drawn, no doubt, from the Greek or Macedonian colonies, were, they reported, at heart far more attached to the King than to their leader. Xenoetas had only to cross the river and the mass of Molon's army would come over to his side.

The subsequent events do not allow us to think much of the diligence or watchfulness of either of the opposed commanders. Molon was first so slovenly in his patrolling that Xenoetas was able by night to throw across a body of troops nine miles downstream and take up a strong position among the marshes without opposition. The main camp on the west bank was left in charge of Zeuxis and Pythiades. An attempt of Molon to dislodge Xenoetas failed, owing to his defective topographical information, and his detachments floundered helplessly in the morass. When Xenoetas advanced to give the rebel army an opportunity to desert, Molon abandoned his camp and took the road to Media. The advantage which Xenoetas had won by his enemy's negligence it was now his turn to throw away by his own. Considering all danger over, he occupied Molon's camp at Ctesiphon, brought over his cavalry for the pursuit, and suffered his troops to give themselves up to riotous indulgence. Then Molon turned swiftly and took the division of Xenoetas by complete surprise. A great part were massacred in drunken slumbers, others, mad with panic, tried to regain the camp of Zeuxis by swimming the Tigris, and in most cases perished. An impressive and fantastic spectacle was offered by the scene on the river, not only men swimming, but horses, pack-beasts, shields, dead bodies, stuff of all kinds, carried on the surface. The panic spread to the opposite shore,

Zeuxis and the other division incontinently fled, and Molon crossed the river, without meeting any resistance, to occupy the original camp of the royal army.

The retirement of the satrap of Babylonia left Seleucia exposed. Even Diomedon, the governor of the city, had accompanied his flight. The eastern capital of the Empire fell forthwith into the rebel's hands. Babylonia was Molon's, and, passing down the river, he took possession of the "Red Sea" province, whose governor, Pythiades, had probably, like Diomedon, fled with Zeuxis. Diogenes, on the other hand, had hurried back to defend his province, and contrived to throw himself into the citadel of Susa, although Molon was already investing it when he arrived. Molon could not afford to stay long in Susiana; leaving therefore a detachment to prosecute the siege, he returned to complete the conquest of the riverlands north of Babylonia, the provinces of Mesopotamia and Parapotamia.

The news of the disaster reached the King at a moment when he was on other grounds disposed to suspend operations against Ptolemy. He had about the same time that Xencetas left for the East moved out from Apamea, the military headquarters of the Empire, to accomplish the invasion of Coele-Syria. The gate of that province towards the north was the narrow and swampy valley, called Marsyas, between the Lebanon and Antilibanus mountains. It was commanded on each side by the fortresses of Gerrha and Brochi, and these were held for Ptolemy by Theodotus the Aetolian. In vain the royal army attempted to break through; the lieutenant of Ptolemy brought the Seleucid King to a foolish stand at the very threshold of that province it was proposed to claim by arms. Under these circumstances the news arrived that the army of Xenocetas had been annihilated.

The quarrel, of course, between Hermias and Epigenes now flamed up afresh. Events were confounding the policy of the prime minister. In spite of his raving denunciations, Epigenes had too strong a case not to carry the Council with him. It was resolved that the King should advance against Molon in person. Hermias had the sense to embrace the inevitable; if, however, he could not hinder the expedition, he was determined his rival should win no laurels in it. But to remove him was doubly difficult, since on the one hand his reputation made the King his friend, and on the other he was an idol of the army. When the forces for the East were mustered at Apamea, an occasion to overcome both these obstacles at one stroke offered. The troublous times under the last kings, combined with the loss of the eastern provinces, had acquainted the Seleucid court with what in later times was to become its standing embarrassment—want of money. The pay of the troops fell into arrear, and they began to use the urgency of the present crisis to press their claims. Hermias now came forward and proposed to the King a bargain with which he had no choice but to close; he undertook to satisfy all the demands of the soldiery on condition that Epigenes did not accompany the expedition. This action represented him at the same time to the army as its champion, and attached it to his interests. Epigenes retired into private life. Only the troops drawn from Cyrrestice (6000 in number) stood by the fallen hero, and their disaffection was not disposed of till after a pitched battle the following year (220), in which the majority of them perished. Even in his retirement Epigenes was an object of fear to the guilty minister. He compassed his death on the charge of corresponding with Molon, a charge

which he supported by causing a forged letter from the rebel to be slipped among Epigenes' papers. The hush of terror prevailed in the *entourage* of the King.

The royal array crossed the Euphrates at the end of 221, and traversed Mesopotamia by the route which led close under the northern hills to Antioch (Nisibis) in Mygdonia. In this city a halt of six weeks was made during the most severe portion of the winter, and with the first approach of spring (220) the advance was continued to the Tigris. From this point two alternative routes presented themselves. Hermias wished to march directly upon Molon in Babylonia, following the course of the river on the western bank. The satrap of Babylonia, who was now with the King, was able, from his special knowledge of the country, to show the inconveniences of this plan. Amongst other things, the southern part of Mesopotamia was desolate steppe, where only the wandering Arabs spread their tents, and it would be impossible for the army to find fresh supplies. Having passed through this, a march of six days, they would come upon the elaborate canal system by which Babylonia was at once irrigated and defended, and if this were held by the enemy it would effectually bar their way; the only alternative would be retreat through the steppe in the face of the enemy, and probably without provisions.

Zeuxis therefore urged that they should cross to the eastern side. There, as soon as they reached Apolloniatis, the country was under regular cultivation, and they would be in the midst of plenty. The hold which the house of Seleucus had upon the hearts of the settlers, who were intimidated only into supporting Molon, would be turned to account. Above all, by threatening to cut off Molon from his base in Media they would compel him either to offer battle or run the great danger which a delay, in view of the doubtful temper of his troops, would bring. Before the reason and authority of these arguments Hermias was constrained to give way. The army crossed the Tigris in three bands and advanced southwards.

At Dura they reached the northern limit of Molon's conquests in Parapotamia, and found his troops still besieging the town. These they drove off and proceeded for eight days more, when, crossing the ridge of Oricus, they saw at their feet the rich district of Apolloniatis.

Molon was now finding out how precarious his defences were against the magic of the King's person. He could not trust the populations of the provinces he had lately conquered. He could not trust his own army, not at any rate the Greeks and Macedonians, who constituted the bulk no doubt of his regular troops. He saw himself in danger of having his communications with Media cut. Hastily recrossing the Tigris, he purposed to arrest the progress of the royal army in the rugged defiles of Apolloniatis, and placed his chief reliance on the Kurdish irregulares who served with his army as slingers. In this region, accordingly, the two armies met, and some indecisive skirmishes took place between the scouting parties on either side. But the neighborhood of the King made it enormously harder for the rebel to prevent his army breaking up in his hands. How to use this instrument without losing it became the problem; Molon did not know what wave of feeling might not rush through his troops if the youthful king of the old and glorious house were seen claiming their allegiance. He determined to strike

by night, but when, riding out with a picked body, he saw ten young soldiers make away in a body towards the royal camp, his nerve was shaken, and he returned at dawn, a doomed man. The decisive battle was fought on that day.

The royal left, where Hermias and Zeuxis commanded, was driven back by Molon, but on the right Molon's brother Neolaus found himself opposed to the King, and all that Molon feared took place. As soon as the King was seen, the troops went over. Molon saw that the game was up, and, together with the other ringleaders in the rebellion, committed suicide. Neolaus hastened to the province of Persis, where his brother Alexander was waiting the event with the remainder of the family of Molon, his mother and his children, and made haste to consummate the self-destruction of his house. The body of Molon was crucified in the Callonitis on the road over the Zagrus, the most conspicuous spot in Media. It was understood that in the punishment of rebel leaders the house of Seleucus followed the practice of the old Achaemenian kings.

The rebellion had been shipwrecked on the respect which the royal name commanded in the popular heart throughout the Greek east. It now remained to settle the affairs of the reconquered districts. To the soldiery who had followed Molon the King had first addressed a severe reprimand; they then shook hands in honest Macedonian fashion and made up the quarrel, and the troops were led back to Media by officers specially appointed to reorganize the province. Antiochus himself moved to Seleucia, to hold his court in the eastern capital. And now his individual personality began to emerge in distinction from that of his minister. Hermias was for turning the punishment of those who had taken part in the rebellion into a debauch of cruelty. Upon Seleucia, which had after all only yielded to superior force in joining Molon, the prime minister was forward to gratify his frightful appetite. The "Adeiganes" were banished. Others of the principal citizens were put to death, or mutilated, or racked. A fine of 1000 talents was laid upon the city. The bent of the young King was all the other way. Prudence and generosity together urged him in the direction of mildness, and he was able to some extent to restrain the minister's enormities. The fine was reduced to 150 talents. Diogenes, who had distinguished himself by his defence of Susa, was rewarded by being transferred to the governorship of Media, and was succeeded in Susiana by Apollodorus. Pythiades was superseded in the "Red Sea" province by Tychon, the *archigrammateus* of the royal army.

Antiochus considered that the moment of prestige should be used to assert the authority of the house of Seleucus in the neighboring country, or the work would be left half done. He designed in the first place to attack Artabazanes of Lesser Media, who was now in extreme old age. Again Hermias took fright at eastern expeditions and played the old card of Coele-Syria. But on news arriving that the Queen had been delivered in Syria of a son, a new prospect of power opened before him in case of the King's decease, and he now advocated the eastern expedition as making that contingency more probable.

The King accordingly left Seleucia, and led the army across the Zagrus into the Urumiya basin, where the Iranian dynasty had reigned, since the time of Alexander,

undisturbed. On the novel appearance of a royal army in these regions Artabazanes bowed to the occasion, and accepted the terms which Antiochus imposed.

For a complete reconquest of the eastern provinces the time was not yet ripe. It would be hazardous in the extreme for the Seleucid King to plunge into distant lands while the hearth of the Empire was threatened by Achaeus and Ptolemy. But before the King set out homewards an event of importance took place in his immediate circle. The dark hopes which Hermias was nursing were penetrated by the royal physician, Apollophanes, between whom and Antiochus a real affection existed. To broach his suspicions to the King was, however, still dangerous, since it was not known how far the influence of the minister over the young man's mind extended. Apollophanes nevertheless ran the risk, and pointedly adjured the King to remember his brother's fate. To his relief, Antiochus confessed that he himself secretly regarded Hermias with aversion and dread, and prayed Apollophanes to make for him a way of escape. There was no lack of persons in that society ready to bear a hand in the destruction of the hated minister. But even with the King's countenance Apollophanes had to work by stealth. On the pretext that Antiochus was suffering from certain disorders, the physician was able to regulate the admissions to the royal apartments, and the King's chamber became itself the rendezvous of the conspirators. Then it was given out that Antiochus had been ordered to walk abroad at dawn, to take the cool air of morning, and Hermias seized the occasion to come at the King's person. It was a trap; the only others present at that unusual hour were those who were in the plot. The King chose for his early walk a path which led them to a lonely spot outside the camp, where he made an excuse to retire. Immediately the conspirators dispatched Hermias with their swords. The news of the prime minister's fall was received with a transport of joy throughout the kingdom. Wherever the royal army came on its homeward march, the King was met with expressions of satisfaction. At Apamea in Syria, where the family of Hermias was residing, his wife was stoned to death by the women of the place, and his children by the children.

By the time that Antiochus returned to Syria (end of 220) the danger from the West had declared itself in a sufficiently palpable form. Even the comparatively short expedition to Adharbaijan had emboldened Achaeus to throw off the mask. He designed to recross the Taurus, and counted on the support of Cyrrhестice when he appeared in Syria. Leaving Sardis, the seat of his government in Asia Minor, he took the road to Syria. At Laodicea (in Phrygia) he publicly assumed the diadem and the royal name. But immediately he had to meet the same difficulty which had thwarted Molon, the feeling among the Greco-Macedonian soldiery which forbade them to lift their spears against a Seleucid king. Achaeus was obliged to dissimulate the objective of his march. But as the troops moved ever forward towards the Cilician Gates the suspicion of the truth broke upon them, and in Lycaonia they were on the verge of mutiny. Like Cyrus the Younger in somewhat similar circumstances, Achaeus had to cover his real purpose by pointing against the Pisidians—the untamed mountaineers who were at chronic war with all civilized government in Asia Minor. His foray, which yielded a considerable amount of loot to the troops, had the further advantage of regaining their good-will. But

he was forced to abandon the idea of an invasion of Syria at the present moment, and retraced his steps to Lydia.

This was the situation which confronted Antiochus on his return from the East. He saw that Achaeus had committed a blunder in uncovering his hostile designs whilst restrained from carrying them out. Syria need fear no attack from Asia Minor for some time to come. In regard, therefore, to Achaeus, Antiochus confined himself for the present to protests and menaces; he turned to deal with the other party to the league, Ptolemy. Once more Apamea hummed with the preparations for an attack on the Ptolemaic power in Palestine.

Polybius tells us that at the council held to discuss the plan of campaign Apollophanes, the physician, first pointed out that, before embarking on an invasion of Coele-Syria, it was of prime importance to recapture the harbor-city of Seleucia, which since the wars of Seleucus II had been in Egyptian possession. The surprising thing is that the urgency of this step was not immediately plain. One would have thought that a hostile garrison established some 12 miles from Antioch, commanding its communication with the sea, to say nothing of the loss of the strongest city in the kingdom, the place where the founder of the royal line reposed, would have been felt as an intolerable burden. It is almost inexplicable that while this remained, enterprises in other directions should have been contemplated. Apollophanes was himself a citizen of Seleucia, exiled probably under the Ptolemaic régime, and this lent warmth to his arguments. The Council was brought to see the obvious. Whilst Theodotus *One-and-a-half* was sent to occupy the passes towards Coele-Syria and prepare for the invasion, the King himself moved from Apamea to Seleucia and took up a position in the suburbs of the city. Diognetus, the admiral, was at the same time to operate against the city by sea.

The attempts of Antiochus to buy over the governor Leontius, who controlled the city in the Ptolemaic interest, failed, but he succeeded in corrupting some of his subordinates. It was agreed that if the Seleucid army could gain possession of the outer city which adjoined the harbor, the gates should be opened. On this side alone was it possible to scale the walls. Accordingly, whilst the other generals, Zeuxis and Hermogenes, attacked the gates on the landward side (the Antioch Gate and the Dioscurium Gate), Ardys forced his way into the outer city, supported by Diognetus, who simultaneously brought his squadron to bear on the docks. The officers within the city, who were bought by Antiochus, now prevailed on Leontius to ask for terms. Antiochus agreed to the condition that the free population (6000 in number) should be spared, and the city was surrendered. Those citizens who had been exiled, no doubt the warmer partisans of the house of Seleucus, were restored to their homes and property; otherwise the citizen-body was left undisturbed. A strong garrison was, of course, installed to hold the harbor and citadel. On the side of Egypt no attempt seems to have been made to avert a blow by which their position was so seriously impaired.

Antiochus now received tidings which put a very new complexion upon affairs in the south. It will be remembered that the Ptolemaic governor in Coele-Syria was Theodotus the Aetolian. His singular success in repelling the attack of Antiochus in 221 had, in the altered conditions at the Egyptian court under the miserable government of

Ptolemy Philopator, only made him the mark of petty jealousies. He was summoned to Alexandria, and he knew well what that meant. In this strait he turned to the Seleucid King. Antiochus received an intimation that Theodotus was ready to deliver the town of Ptolemais (Old Testament Accho; modern Acre), the official residence of the governor of Coele-Syria, into his hands. Panaetolus, a subordinate of Theodotus, would likewise surrender Tyre. This decided Antiochus to defer dealing with Achaeus still longer and to act in the matter of Egypt at once. He once more threaded the Marsyas valley and sat down before Gerrha and Brochi. But here the intelligence reached him that Egypt was taking measures swiftly to crush Theodotus before he could arrive. Nicolaus, himself too an Aetolian, and a soldier who had seen many wars, had been appointed by the Alexandrian court to secure the province, and Theodotus was now closely besieged in Ptolemais. There was no time to be lost. Antiochus left his heavy troops to continue the siege of Brochi, and, taking with him only the light-armed, set out to reach Ptolemais by the more rugged road which runs down the Phoenician coast. On the news of his approach Nicolaus retired, but ordered his lieutenants, Lagoras, a Cretan, and Dorymenes, an Aetolian, to occupy the pass by Berytus. The King, however, succeeded in dislodging them, and, once master of the pass, could afford to wait in position for the rest of the army. Then he advanced and was soon joined by the partisans of Theodotus. The gates of Tyre and then those of Ptolemais were opened to him according to the undertaking, and with the cities he got possession of their naval arsenals and considerable stores. He was able to make over to Diognetus, the admiral, no less than forty vessels, half of which were decked ships of war, of three banks of oars and upwards.

In the flush of these first successes Antiochus contemplated an immediate invasion of Egypt itself. But the accounts he received of the Egyptian muster at Pelusium to secure the frontier made him defer an enterprise which had baffled the companions of Alexander, Perdiccas and Antigonus. It seemed more prudent for the present to complete the conquest of Coele-Syria, a process which consisted in the reduction of the cities one by one.

It was, however, in reality a false move. Egypt was in a state of utter unpreparedness, and an immediate attack would probably have succeeded. The slow conquest of Coele-Syria gave the Ptolemaic court just that respite which it needed. It used it well, hiring the ablest captains of Greece to reorganize its forces, and pressing forward its preparations with feverish activity, whilst by invariably receiving foreign embassies at Memphis and making a show of *laissez-faire* it contrived to hoodwink the world completely as to what was on foot. It engaged the good offices of the Greek states, Rhodes, Cyzicus, Byzantium, and the Aetolian League, to mediate in the quarrel, and the diplomatic running to and fro which ensued all served to gain time.

Winter (219-218) found Antiochus still occupied with the siege of Dora, the chief fortified harbor between Carmel and the Philistines. The city, supported from without by Nicolaus, defied his efforts. During the cold season the hardships of the besiegers would be doubled. An aggressive move on the part of Achaeus was again dreaded. Under these circumstances Antiochus agreed to an armistice of four months and hastened back to Seleucia. Garrisons were left in the various strongholds south of

the Lebanon, which he had acquired, and the charge of Seleucid interests in that region committed to the old governor Theodotus.

The winter was used by the Egyptian court to continue its preparations, and the drill sergeant was busy at Alexandria. The Seleucid court, on the other hand, reposed upon the contemptuous estimate generally formed of the reigning Ptolemy. As soon as Antiochus had reached Seleucia the troops had been dismissed for months of idleness in their winter-quarters. The time of truce was wasted in futile negotiations. All the old controversy as to the treaties which preceded and succeeded the battle of Ipsus was gone over again. Then no agreement could be arrived at as to Achaeus; the Egyptian court required that the peace should extend to him also, whilst Antiochus stood out that it was monstrous for Ptolemy to interfere between himself and a rebel subject. Warlike operations were accordingly resumed on either side in the spring (218). Antiochus reassembled his forces to complete the subjugation of Coele-Syria, whilst a Ptolemaic army mustered at Gaza under Nicolaus. Ample reinforcements and material of war were sent from Egypt, as well as a fleet under the admiral Perigenes, to co-operate with the land-forces.

It seems curious that on his retirement at the end of the previous year's campaign, Antiochus had not secured the passes between Lebanon and the sea, especially since communication with the numerous garrisons in Palestine could only be maintained by way of the coast. Nicolaus was able to occupy in advance the passage at its narrowest point. At Platanus a precipitous ridge bars almost the whole strip of land, already narrow enough, between the mountain and the sea. This naturally strong position for a defender, Nicolaus strengthened further by artificial works and guarded by a large body of troops. He himself remained in support by the town of Porphyreon. The Ptolemaic fleet was stationed in the neighbourhood under Perigenes, who assisted zealously in the plans of the general.

Antiochus advanced, and on the way renewed the alliance of his house with the Phoenician republic of Aradus. Then he passed Theuprosopon, Botrys, which he took, Berytus, Trieres and Calamus. The two latter towns were fired. From Calamus he sent an advanced party ahead under Nicarchus and Theodotus (the Aetolian or *One-and-a-half?*) to occupy the passage of the Lycus, and moved himself with the heavy troops more leisurely to the river Damuras (*mod.* Nahr-ad-Damur), where he awaited the return of Nicarchus. The admiral Diognetus at the same time brought his fleet to anchor beside the army. After their return the King went in person to reconnoiter the position of the enemy at Platanus, and on the following day, leaving the heavy troops behind under Nicarchus, himself led the light-armed to the assault of the ridge. The opposed fleets simultaneously engaged close to shore, so that the land and sea fight presented, Polybius says, a single line. In both, the Ptolemaic forces had at first the better, but Theodotus succeeded in gaining the top of the ridge inland, where it joined the lower slopes of the Lebanon, and then attacked the enemy from above. This turned the day; the force of Nicolaus, evacuating the pass in confusion, fell back upon Sidon. The Egyptian fleet, although still victorious, drew off and accompanied the retirement of the land-forces. Antiochus had succeeded in breaking open the door of Palestine.

The Seleucid army pursued its march along the Phoenician sea-board. From the walls of Sidon the defeated army saw the invaders' tents spread close by. Antiochus did not stop to besiege Sidon—that would have been an immense undertaking—but passed on southwards. It was probably when Ptolemais was reached that he ordered Diognetus, who had hitherto waited on the land-forces, to take the fleet back to Tyre, in order to hold the Ptolemaic fleet, which still kept the harbor of Sidon, in check. The King himself struck up inland to Philoteria on the Sea of Galilee. It was his plan before going farther to establish a belt of Seleucid power across central Palestine. There was direct communication between the coast at Ptolemais and the Greco-Macedonian colonies beyond Jordan. Some of the roads traversed the skirt of the Galilean hills, and were commanded on this side of Jordan by Philoteria and the fortress Atabyrium on the isolated conical hill of Tabor; another road went by way of the rich plain which divides the hills of Galilee from those of southern Palestine, and this was barred on the edge of the Jordan depression by the strong city of Scythopolis (Old Testament, Beth-shan; modern, Baisan).

Philoteria and Scythopolis submitted on conditions to the Seleucid King and received his garrisons. Atabyrium had to be reduced. A successful stratagem delivered the town into Antiochus' hands. The fall of Tabor following on the surrender of Philoteria and Scythopolis produced a profound impression in the country. The officers in the Egyptian service began to go over, Ceraeas and Hippolochus among the more notable. The latter was a Thessalian *condottiere*, who brought 400 horse along with him.

Antiochus now crossed the Jordan into a region dominated by a galaxy of Greco-Macedonian cities. Pella, proclaiming its Macedonian origin by its name, Camus and Gephros received the invader, and the prestige which accrued thereby to the arms of Antiochus attached the Arab tribes of the neighboring country to his cause. Their adherence was a distinct gain, especially in view of the provisioning of the expedition. The partisans of Ptolemy threw themselves into Abila under Nicias, a kinsman of Menneas, but this city too was compelled to open its gates. The most illustrious of all these cities, Gadara, surrendered on the threat of a siege. To complete the work of the campaign it was necessary for Antiochus to strike out about fifty miles to the south. There in the city of Rabbath-Ammon or Philadelphia the defenders of the Egyptian cause had congregated, and were harassing the friendly Arabs by raiding their grounds. So strong was the city that although Antiochus subjected it to a regular siege and battered down the walls in two places, he was unable to take it till one of the prisoners showed the underground conduit which supplied the garrison with water. The reduction of Rabbath-Ammon brought the campaign of 218 to a close. Nicarchus was left with an adequate force beyond Jordan; Ceraeas and Hippolochus were detached to protect the adherents of the house of Seleucus from molestation in the country about Samaria; the King himself returned to winter in Ptolemais.

It would seem that during the winter the Seleucid conquest of Palestine went forward, as the frontier cities of Gaza and Raphia are found to be in the hands of Antiochus at the opening of the campaign of 217. By the spring of that year the Egyptian court considered its preparations complete. It soon became evident that the

decisive encounter was at hand. Ptolemy himself took the field, accompanied by his sister-wife, Arsinoe. The Egyptian army halted for its final marshalling in Pelusium, and then advanced across the desert. Antiochus on his part was equally soon on the move. His final dispositions for the march across the desert were made at Gaza. Ptolemy on the fifth evening after leaving Pelusium encamped about five miles short of Raphia, the first town in Palestine. When morning dawned, the Seleucid army was seen in position only a little more than a mile away, with Raphia in its rear. For some days the hosts remained stationary, face to face. Then Antiochus moved still nearer, so that only about five stadia separated the stockades of the two camps. Five more days went by without a movement. It was during these that Ptolemy narrowly escaped assassination at the hand of Theodotus the Aetolian, who stole into the Egyptian camp in the dark, and even broke into the state tent—to discover that Ptolemy slept elsewhere!

The Ptolemaic army began to be pinched by the inconveniences of its position; it had the desert behind it, while Antiochus had cultivated land to draw upon. On the sixth day it deployed in battle formation. A picture is drawn for us in a Jewish writing of the queen Arsinoe proceeding along the Egyptian lines, “with lamentation and tears and her hair loosed”, to fire the troops in her cause; that she addressed them is stated by Polybius, but it was probably rather in the bold spirit of a Macedonian princess.

Antiochus accepted the challenge, and the armies closed. The first phase of the battle was an engagement of the cavalry and light-armed troops on both wings, either phalanx waiting its turn in the centre without movement. The issue of this part of the fight was evenly balanced. On the Seleucid right and Ptolemaic left, where the two kings commanded in person, the lines of Ptolemy were disordered by the recoil of the African elephants from the Indian ones of Antiochus. Taking advantage of this, the household cavalry and light-armed Greek mercenaries of Antiochus broke the Ptolemaic left. In the excitement of victory the young King pressed the pursuit to a dangerous distance from his phalanx. On the other wing the fortunes had been reversed; there the Seleucid horse and the light-armed contingents of Asiatics—Lydians, Arabs and Medes—had been routed by the squadrons of the Thessalian Echebrates and the infantry composed of Greek mercenaries, Thracians and Gauls.

It was now time for the phalanxes to decide the day. Lowering their *sarissas*, the great masses rolled forward and closed. The fruits of the long preparation of the Egyptian court were now reaped. At the first shock the main part of the Seleucid phalanx broke and fled; only the select corps of 10,000, the flower and choice of all the provinces, endured the tussle for a while, and was then forced to follow the flight of the rest. At the moment when Antiochus on the right was already tasting the joy of victory, more experienced eyes observed that the clouds of dust in the centre of the field were moving towards the Seleucid camp. Antiochus wheeled in desperate haste, but it was too late. The whole army was making in full retreat for Raphia. It was a bitter mortification for the young king. He was persuaded “that as far as his part in the battle went, it had been a victory, but that through the base spirit and cowardice of others the enterprise as a whole had foundered”.

The defeated army took refuge for the following night at Raphia. But Antiochus was anxious to put a greater distance between himself and Ptolemy, and next day continued his retreat to Gaza. It was from this town that he sent the request which, with the Greeks, was the formal acknowledgment of defeat—the request for permission to bury his dead. Then he set his face homewards, abandoning the conquests of two campaigns. Ptolemy for his part was not disposed to press the pursuit, and rested completely satisfied with the restoration of the status quo, the withdrawal of the Seleucid power behind the Lebanon. He simply made a progress through Palestine, where the communities vied with each other in the effusion with which they returned to allegiance. “Perhaps”, the historian comments, “it is the usual way of men to adapt their conduct to the occasion; but in an especial degree the people of those parts are born timeservers”.

Antiochus had other reasons besides the fear of his retreat being harassed to quicken his steps. He did not know what alarming effects the defeat might have on the popular temper. What if Achaeus, to whom the diadem had once been proffered, should now appear in Syria, with all the credit of his successes in Asia Minor, and call upon the populace, Macedonian and native, to desert a prince who was discredited and lamed? Antiochus was concerned, as soon as he reached Antioch, to agree with his southern adversary quickly. He dispatched an embassy, headed by his nephew Antipater. Fortunately, the Ptolemy who now ruled Egypt cared for little except bestiality and *belles lettres*, and Antiochus found him unexpectedly accommodating. He agreed to a year's truce, and Sosibius, the vizier of Egypt, was sent to the Syrian court to conclude it. The truce seems to have led almost at once to a definite treaty of peace. Seleucia at any rate Antiochus had won back from Egypt. But in Coele-Syria, after all his efforts, he was obliged to see the old state of things restored. All his energies were now devoted to the crushing of Achaeus. The winter of 217-216 he spent in renewing his military organization, and preparing on a grand scale for the advance across the Taurus with the coming of spring.

CHAPTER XVI

ACHAEUS

Of all the potentates who bore the name of king in Asia Minor, Achaeus was now the most powerful. He had recovered from Attalus the territory which had belonged to the Seleucid house before its unhappy divisions. His wife, Laodicea, was a daughter of King Mithridates, sister therefore to the Laodicea who was the queen of Antiochus. She was the princess who had been placed in the hands of Antiochus Hierax, and had by him been confided to the care of Logbasis the Selgian. Once more there was a king who could invite the cities to look to Sardis, rather than to Pergamum, for the strong rule which should curb the forces of disorder.

But Attalus, though overborne, was not crushed. His armies had been driven out of the regions they had lately commanded. Except Pergamum nothing was left him. But in Pergamum he maintained himself. And the glamor of his glorious Gallic wars still invested him in the eyes of the Greeks; his influence was too well grounded to disappear even now. When Byzantium was on the point of a war with Rhodes it solicited the help of both princes. It was, however, really Achaeus in these days who counted; and the idea of his supporting the Byzantines was so alarming to the Rhodians that they stretched their influence at the Ptolemaic court to the utmost point in order to procure the release of his father, Andromachus, who had been taken prisoner in one of the late wars. By this move they purchased Achaeus neutrality.

Attalus, so long as he retained the nucleus of his power, continued to be a menace to Achaeus. Nor did Achaeus find an ally in the Bithynian king. Zaelas, whose daughter Antiochus Hierax had married, had been murdered at the time of the Gallic wars by some Galatians in his service; the present King, his son Prusias, was little friendly either to Achaeus or Attalus. The complete victory of either would, he knew, leave him face to face with a strong Hellenic king who would be a most inconvenient neighbor. Meantime, he was extremely glad to see the two Hellenic kings pitted against each other. He was furious with the Byzantines because they had tried to reconcile them. And what Prusias felt was also felt by every petty dynast who ruled in this or that corner of the hills; should Achaeus succeed in framing a strong kingdom in Asia Minor, it would be an evil day for the smaller powers. The Greek cities were devoted to Attalus. Lampsacus, Alexandria Troas and Ilion openly maintained his cause. Smyrna, so faithful in former days to the house of Seleucus, now showed the same fidelity to the Pergamene king, and only yielded to the overwhelming power of Achaeus. Among the other cities which had been constrained to submit to Achaeus, but longed for Attalus, mention is made of Cyeme, Phocaea, Teos and Colophon. These circumstances may help

to explain why Achaeus did not venture to leave Asia Minor even when the situation in Syria seemed to give him so excellent an opportunity.

In the summer of 218, whilst Antiochus was campaigning in Palestine, Achaeus extended his power in a new direction. He was perhaps determined to be king of Asia Minor indeed, and to deal resolutely with those problems which the disturbed Macedonian rule, no less than the old slipshod Oriental, had hitherto neglected. A serious attempt to subjugate the southern hills was at last made. The opportunity to intervene was given Achaeus by a petty war between Selge and Pednelissus. Selge was the most powerful of those Pisidian mountain-states who waged perpetual war not only with the kings of Asia, but with each other. Pednelissus, finding itself straitly besieged, appealed to King Achaeus. His general, Garsyeris, was at once sent to its relief, and was joined on his appearance by the other communities which were of the anti-Selgian faction in Pisidia, such as the Greek city of Aspendus. Side, on the other hand, held aloof, "partly in order to gain favor with Antiochus, but chiefly because of their enmity with Aspendus". After a chequered struggle among the hills Garsyeris succeeded in driving the Selgian bands from Pednelissus, and presently laid siege to Selge itself.

There was still living in Selge at this time the man who had been the friend of Antiochus Hierax, and under whose roof the queen of Achaeus had grown up, Logbasis. He was now chosen by his fellow-citizens to open negotiations with the besiegers. In supposing him to be a *persona grata* with the people of Achaeus they were not wrong; they had, however, mistaken his own inclinations. So soon as he was closeted with Garsyeris he offered to betray the city into the hands of Achaeus.

Garsyeris immediately sent swift messages to bring Achaeus to the spot. And meanwhile he amused the city with deceptive negotiations. Achaeus arrived, and the attempt was made to seize the city by a sudden attack, in which Logbasis and his accomplices had been instructed to co-operate from within. But at a moment as critical as this, the splendid promptitude of the Selgians foiled the plot. The escape nevertheless had been so narrow that they felt the wisdom of coming to terms. They consented to buy peace with a heavy fine and release the Pednelissian prisoners.

It was now that Achaeus spread the terror of his arms through the mountain region between Lycia and Cilicia, breaking the immemorial independence of the warlike tribes. He established his authority over Milyas and the greater part of Pamphylia. But the campaign which extended his power in one direction also showed on what insecure foundations it rested, how ill he could afford to be absent for a moment from his seat of government. His back had hardly been turned when Attalus issued out of Pergamum with a new-come band of Gauls, and was received by the Greek cities generally with open arms. Cyme, Smyrna and Phocaea were the first to join him. Aegae and Temnus did not dare to resist. Teos and Colophon sent their envoys. Attalus made a triumphant promenade through the kingdom of Achaeus, taking on his way the fortress of Didyma-Teiche, which Themistocles, the commander put there by Achaeus, delivered into his hand. He was encamped on the afternoon of September 1, 218 BC (as we should reckon) near the river Megistus (probably the same as the Macestus), when the moon was darkened by an eclipse which, as the shades of evening deepened, became total.

The Gallic bands, who had already been grumbling at the labor of a march which involved lugging their women and children along with them in wagons, were terrified. They clamored to be allowed to return to Europe, and Attalus was obliged to promise that they should be conducted to the Hellespont. If he had had any design of proceeding farther, it had to be abandoned. He returned to Pergamum. His expedition had at any rate dealt a blow to the power and prestige of Achaeus in the north-west.

When Achaeus returned with fresh laurels from the Pisidian hills the war between Sardis and Pergamum was resumed, and went on without a break till the Seleucid King at last appeared in the land to claim his own.

In the summer of 216 Antiochus led across the Taurus the army he had spent the last year in preparing. It was the first time that he stood as king in this land which his house had striven so long to possess, but which, as he found it now, was parceled out among five kings, a number of smaller dynasts, the house of Ptolemy, the free Greek cities, and the mountain tribes. *In the person of Antiochus III the house of Seleucus makes its crowning attempt to master Asia Minor.* It was at Achaeus alone that for the present his attack was directed. And in making it he had two things mainly in his favor. One was the hold which the Seleucid name had upon the Macedonian soldiery. The other was the mutual hostility of those powers which had divided the Seleucid inheritance amongst them. When the last Seleucid king, Antiochus' brother, had crossed the Taurus, Attalus was the enemy; today Attalus and Antiochus were ready to combine against Achaeus. Achaeus apparently had no friend but Egypt, and Egypt under Ptolemy IV was more the broken reed than ever. "Their strength is to sit still".

Of the course of the war no record is preserved. When the darkness breaks Achaeus has been driven from the field. Sardis alone remains to him. To this almost impregnable city Antiochus is laying siege (214). Then the story acquires for a moment peculiar vividness.

An incessant series of skirmishes, assaults and stratagems had led to no result. The besiegers were resigning themselves to the distant prospect of reducing the city by starvation. But the general discouragement was not shared by Lagoras the Cretan. He was convinced that a way could be found of entering the city. Its very strength would put the defenders off their guard, and its most precipitous points be the most remissly guarded. With this fixed idea his eyes day by day studied the ramparts. There was at one place a ravine, into which the besieged shot their refuse, and the Cretan observed that when the birds rose from it they habitually settled upon the rocks and masonry above; there then was no neighborhood of men. At night he would clamber about those rocks, scrutinizing every spot where foot or ladder could hold. At last his scheme was complete, and he carried it to the King. Antiochus approved the enterprise, and allowed him to take as his associates in command Theodotus the Aetolian and Dionysius, the commander of the *hypaspistai*. A night was chosen when there would be no moon in the hours before dawn. Fifteen men had been picked in the evening from the whole army to go up with the three and set the ladders. Another thirty had been chosen to wait a little way below. As soon as the fifteen had cleared the wall they were to beset a certain door from within; the thirty were to rush up and hack at the hinges and lintel without. A third

body of 2000 men were to hold themselves in readiness still further in the rear to dash through the door as soon as it was opened, and occupy the theatre. In order that these dispositions might not set the camp talking it was given out that, according to intelligence received, a reinforcing body of Aetolians would shortly attempt to enter the city by one of the ravines, and it was necessary to have special pickets on the alert.

By night, as soon as the moon was down, the several parties took their stations under the cliffs. When morning broke, the camp observed no change in the ordinary routine : the outposts were relieved as usual and the army assembled for parade in the hippodrome outside the city. But as Lagoras and Dionysius mounted their ladders they came into view of those below, although not of those above, and soon the figures on the dizzy cliff attracted general attention. The excitement in the camp, the upward stare, were observed by the watchers in the city, but Achaeus was only mystified and uneasy. He nevertheless detailed a body of soldiers to reinforce the wall at the part pointed at, but the passage thither being steep and narrow, it took a long time to reach it.

Meanwhile Antiochus, apprehensive that the stir among the troops might betray the design, made a diversion by attacking the "Persian Gate" on the opposite side of the city. And the movement succeeded. Aribazus, the governor of the city, drew his garrison thither to meet it, manned the wall, and made a sortie to engage the attacking columns. Then the door on the cliff was forced; the two thousand occupied the theatre. Aribazus was taken between two enemies; in his haste to re-enter the city he could not prevent the body which he had engaged entering with him. The Persian Gate was captured, and soon through the neighboring gates as well the besiegers were pouring in. There was, of course, no hope now of saving the town; Aribazus and his troops withdrew, after a short struggle, into the citadel. Once more in its history Sardis was given up to massacre, pillage and devastation.

Achaeus still held out with a handful of troops in the citadel. But he was in a trap. His only hope lay now in the chance of getting through the lines of the besiegers by surprise or stealth, and making good his escape to the hills or to Egyptian territory. Egypt, though it would not take overt action to save him, was still not indifferent to his fate.

A little while after the capture of the lower city of Sardis two men were closeted in a chamber in Alexandria. One was the prime minister of Egypt, Sosibius; the other was a Cretan *condottiere* in the service of King Ptolemy, called Bolis. Sosibius had for some time been narrowly observing his man. His examination had satisfied him; now he spoke. "My friend, your fortune with the King is made if you can get Achaeus out of his predicament. The means would be left to your own contrivance. Will you undertake it?" When Bolis answered, it was to ask for time to turn it over. Then the two men separated.

In two or three days they were again together. Bolis undertook the adventure. He then went on to tell Sosibius of a promising circumstance. Cambylus, who commanded the Cretan corps in the army of Antiochus, was not only the countryman of Bolis, but his intimate friend. The prime minister caught eagerly at the possibilities conveyed. He

congratulated himself on his choice of an instrument “If there is any one”, he exclaimed, “who can extricate Achaeus, I have him here!”.

It remained only to arrange certain details. For money, Bolis must understand the Egyptian court would see to that; here were ten talents out of hand, and unlimited sums to follow. Certain letters he would have to carry with him. Sosibius held in his hand the thread of old negotiations between Sardis and Alexandria. The letters would put Bolis into connection with one Nicomachus in Rhodes, and with Melancomas in Ephesus. These men had been the confidential agents of Achaeus in former days. Nicomachus was believed to love him as a son. All was soon settled. With an assured heart Sosibius saw his instrument launched upon his dark errand.

Bolis disembarked at Rhodes, concerted plans with Nicomachus, and proceeded to Ephesus. Here he duly came into touch with Melancomas. The next step was to communicate with Cambylus, the commander of Antiochus’ Cretans. Bolis wished to meet him in absolute secrecy. A subordinate therefore whom he had with him, called Arianus, was dispatched to the camp before Sardis. He was to tell Cambylus that his friend Bolis had just landed at Ephesus on a recruiting commission for King Ptolemy, and that there were one or two matters he should like to discuss with Cambylus privately. Arianus reached Sardis to find that Cambylus and the Cretan corps, by what seemed an extraordinary piece of luck, had been detached to guard one of the approaches of the citadel where the ground did not admit the regular barricades. He delivered his message. Cambylus lent a ready ear. Certainly, if Bolis would come to such and such a place at such an hour of a night he named, Cambylus would be there to moot him. This Arianus carried back.

The night came, and two Cretan captains talked in secret together under the citadel of Sardis. One was the agent of Ptolemy, the other in the employ of Antiochus, but in solitude together they made light of such transitory engagements, and remembered only that they were Cretans, whose business in life was simply to do the best for themselves. Bolis revealed the whole lie of the business to his friend, showed him the letter he bore from the Egyptian court, and put it plainly to him to consider how they could best turn the immense issues which lay in their hands to their own profit. They would act together—that was understood. The only question was, should Bolis betray Ptolemy and Achaeus, or should Cambylus betray Antiochus? The fate of kings and the destiny of nations was being decided that night by the whispers of the two *condottieri* under the stars.

It was decided that the richest harvest could be reaped by immediately sharing the ten talents given by Sosibius, and then making Antiochus the offer to possess him of the person of Achaeus. Cambylus was to explain things to Antiochus; Bolis was to open communications with Achaeus. The way in which Bolis intended to proceed was, first to send his subordinate Arianus into the citadel to carry to Achaeus letters in cypher from Nicomachus and Melancomas. Cambylus, of course, was to see to it that Arianus passed safely to and fro through the Seleucid lines. If Achaeus put faith in these letters he would reply, and then Bolis would tender his services and lure him into the snare. Such was the arrangement.

Each of the Cretans now set about his part. Cambylus obtained an interview with Antiochus and told him what was on foot. To Antiochus it seemed too good to be true. Of course, if they captured Achaeus, no reward would be too great, but he suspected something tricky in the business and probed every detail of their designs. It all held together. At last Antiochus doubted no more, and was simply beside himself with impatience to see the astonishing plan carried through.

Meantime Bolis had gone back to Melancomas at Ephesus, radiant. He and Nicomachus would be delighted to hear that Cambylus was quite willing to join them. Bolis proposed to send Arianus at once into the citadel to apprise Achaeus that his deliverance was at hand. Only he must carry credentials from the men whom Achaeus trusted. Nicomachus and Melancomas made no difficulty about that. Letters were drawn up in cypher which informed Achaeus who the bearer was, and told him that he might have complete faith in Bolis and Cambylus.

These letters Arianus carried through, Cambylus conveying him. It had been thought prudent not to tell Arianus the real plot, but allow him to suppose that he was being employed in the original design of rescuing Achaeus. He was shown into the presence of Achaeus and delivered his letters. Achaeus read them through. This man who brought them was strange to him; the men to whom he was asked to commit his person and life were no friends of his; one of them was actually in the service of his enemy; but here beyond doubt were the hands of Nicomachus and Melancomas. Achaeus cross-questioned Arianus narrowly. And having been employed by Bolis from the beginning, and being himself innocent of treachery, Arianus was able to face Achaeus with self-possession and give a full and satisfactory answer to all his interrogations. The issues were too tremendous for rashness, and Achaeus was not new to the world, but the unexpected door of hope seemed worth trying further. Achaeus would correspond with his friends without. So Arianus carried back an answer. This was replied to, and Achaeus wrote again, Arianus being still the intermediary. At last Achaeus came to a decision. He would put himself into the hands of these men. It was, at any rate, his only chance left. His idea, if he could once escape from the toils, was to make a dash upon Syria and call the Greek and Macedonian colonies to revolt. He conceived that in Phoenicia, Coele-Syria and in Antioch itself there would be many to welcome his appearance.

Achaeus wrote finally to Melancomas. Let Bolis and Arianus present themselves on a certain night be named, when there would be no moon, and he would commit himself to them. Before that night came Bolis was again with Cambylus under the stars at some lonely spot near the Seleucid camp. They had now to arrange every detail of the capture. Their plan was as follows. If Achaeus came out of the citadel alone, or with a single attendant, it would be simple; he would fall an easy prey. But if he came with a retinue—there was the problem. Antiochus made a great point of his being captured alive. It was therefore arranged that in descending the path from the citadel Arianus should go first, since he had been over the ground so often, Achaeus next, and Bolis immediately behind him. Then, when the spot was reached where Cambylus would be waiting with an ambush, Bolis would leap upon Achaeus and hold him fast, so that he

should not dive into the scrub and slip away, or, supposing he were desperate, throw himself down the cliff.

It was still dark when Cambylus returned to the tents, bringing Bolis with him. He was now to be presented to the King. They went together, and no fourth person was admitted to the interview. When they came out of the royal tent it was not the fault of Antiochus if Bolis had failed to conceive the immensity of the rewards which awaited him. As it grew near dawn Bolis went up with Arianus and entered into the citadel.

Achaeus at last saw his deliverer, and he gave him a suitable welcome. A little converse left him no doubt as to the caliber of this Cretan captain as a man of action. And his hopes rose wildly as the time approached. Then again there were moments when the horrible magnitude of his hazard swept over him. If Bolis were false? Two strong wits were indeed matched, and Achaeus had yet to make a move on which Bolis had not calculated. Bolis was suddenly informed that Achaeus found it after all impossible for him to leave at the time arranged; he wished, however, to send certain of his friends, some three or four men, with Bolis, in order that they might communicate with Melancomas. After that Achaeus would prepare to come himself. In this way did Achaeus strive, as Polybius says, to “out-Cretan a Cretan”.

The night came. Achaeus ordered Bolis and Arianus to go on ahead and wait outside the door from which the precipitous path ran down; the friends he was dispatching would duly present themselves. All this time Achaeus had kept his intended venture from his wife Laodicea. He had now to break it to her and take his leave. His last moments in the citadel were spent in the terrible farewell, in his endeavors to soothe and encourage the queen, who was naturally beside herself with the shock. Then he started for the gate with four companions.

After Bolis and Arianus had waited some time outside, five men issued from the gate. They were all in common garments. One spoke for the rest and explained that his four attendants were barbarians and did not understand Greek. Then they all began the descent, Arianus leading and Bolis bringing up the rear.

For this Bolis had not been prepared. Was Achaeus of the party or not? He had scrutinized the faces of the five, but it was too dark to distinguish any features. The whole success of Achaeus' plan now hung upon his keeping Bolis mystified till they had reached safety. The fault of his companions betrayed him. When they came to very steep and breakneck places in the descent, some of the men instinctively gave their king a hand or grasped him from behind. These momentary movements did not escape the lynx eyes which watched from the rear. Suddenly Bolis whistled. Cambylus and his party leapt from their ambush. Bolis threw his arms about Achaeus, clothes and all, so that he could not free his hands from his cloak. He had indeed a knife girt upon him, ready in case of capture. Even this Bolis had guessed.

Antiochus had spent an evening of impatient suspense. His suite had been at last dismissed and he sat alone in his tent, only two or three of the bodyguard in attendance.

Suddenly the party of Cambylus came softly in out of the darkness and set a man upon the ground, tied hand and foot.

“The suddenness and strangeness of it so overwhelmed Antiochus that for a long time no voice came. At last, touched in some human fiber, he broke into tears. And his emotion, I take it, was inspired by seeing how impossible to guard against, how incalculable, are the surprises of destiny. This Achaeus was the son of Andromachus, who was brother to Laodicea, Seleucus’ queen; he was the husband of Laodicea, the daughter of Mithridates the King, and he had held in his hand the whole country this side of the Taurus. And now at a time when all his forces and the forces of his enemy believed him to be lodged in the strongest place of the world, he sat bound upon the earth, the sport of his foes, whilst no single creature as yet knew the truth, except those who had had a hand in the deed”-*Polybius*.

When the “Friends” assembled at daybreak, according to custom, in the royal tent, they were no less overwhelmed than the King had been at the sight that met them—the bound man upon the ground. Antiochus held a council on the doom of the rebel. His first generous emotion did not hold, or he was overborne by his advisers. Achaeus, in accordance with the Council's vote, was first mutilated, then beheaded. The head was sewn up in the skin of an ass, the trunk hung upon a cross. In the punishment of rebels the Seleucid King kept, as in the case of Molon, to the Oriental tradition.

In the citadel no one but Laodicea knew of Achaeus’ going forth. Next day the tumult and signs of rejoicing descried in the enemy's camp told her that the venture had failed. Presently a herald presented himself, announced her husband’s fate, and ordered her to make immediate dispositions to evacuate the citadel. It was the first intimation that the defenders of the citadel had that their king was gone. A great cry ran through the place, a cry less of grief than horror at the terrible unexpectedness of the blow. But the demand for surrender was repelled. Laodicea held desperately on. It was, of course, only a question of a short time. Factions broke out among the defenders. A party headed by Aribazus, the old governor of the city, refused to obey the queen. Then each party surrendered, lest the other should be beforehand in doing so (213). The Seleucid King held the western capital of his ancestors.

The ancient historian cannot avoid moralizing on the fate of Achaeus. “In two ways he is a not unprofitable lesson for times to come; we are taught first to be slow to put our trust in any one; secondly, not to glory in prosperity, but to be ready for all chances, remembering we are but men”- *Polybius*.

CHAPTER XVII

THE RECONQUEST OF THE EAST

With the end of Achaeus a great cloud falls upon Seleucid history. Antiochus has regained Asia Minor, or at any rate that strip through the middle of it which the Seleucid court considered it of first importance to control. But the Pergamene king remains to be dealt with. He was the original enemy whom Seleucus III and Achaeus set out to subdue. Circumstances had made him since then, it is true, the ally of Antiochus III, and his services in that capacity were entitled to recognition. Some arrangement must, of course, have been come to between the two kings after the fall of Achaeus, but what frontier was agreed upon between the Pergamene and Seleucid realms we cannot say. Whatever the arrangement was, it could not be more than a temporary one. Inevitably with the removal of Achaeus the old antagonism between Pergamos and the Seleucid house revived. It was impossible for the latter to forget that Attalus had once supplanted it in all its territory beyond the Taurus, or, remembering it, to regard him as inoffensive. The situation in Asia Minor remained one of uneasy balance.

The destruction of Achaeus marks a period in the restoration of the Seleucid Empire by Antiochus III. Its extent at the present moment was roughly what it had been in the latter years of Antiochus II. Since the fearful shock given by Ptolemy Euergetes to the Empire, the Seleucid strip of Asia Minor, the provinces of the Euphrates and Tigris, and Nearer Iran had never till now been firmly reunited with Syria under a single hand. And this extent of territory is just that which the house of Seleucus was resolved to govern directly, to treat as the essential body of the Empire. The countries beyond this limit, which the Macedonians had never really conquered, or which had fallen away from the Seleucids before the death of Antiochus II, were put (for the present at all events) in a different category. It was recognized that to attempt to hold them in the same way as Lydia or Media would overtax the strength of the central government. In these countries the Seleucids were content to see subordinate dynasties, Greek or Asiatic, bearing rule. Their policy took the line of binding these other houses to themselves by alliances and royal marriages, and, where they had at any moment sufficient power, compelling an acknowledgment of their overlordship. In a sense, then, these countries form an outside sphere of the Seleucid Empire, although from the nature of the case the relations fluctuate with the momentary distribution of actual strength. In the treatment allotted to the vanquished we see this distinction of the outer and inner sphere marked. Molon and Achaeus are treated with the extreme rigor shown by the Oriental tradition towards rebels. In the outer sphere we see the vanquished admitted to terms, and peace, if possible, sealed by a royal marriage.

Antiochus, having achieved the restoration of the inner sphere, went on to restore the outer. Unfortunately the cloud covers the whole of this process, except for a few

rifts. And yet it was his exploits in this direction which were his chief glory in contemporary eyes, and won him the title of "Great King".

In Asia Minor the situation as regards the subordinate dynasties did not call for any immediate readjustment. A *modus vivendi* had been found with Attalus, the two Persian houses of Pontic and Southern Cappadocia were friendly and allied; the Bithynian king would be drawn to the house of Seleucus by the fear of Attalus. It was in Armenia, where Xerxes of Arsamosata had ceased to pay tribute, it was in Further Iran, that the Seleucid authority most needed reassertion.

It seems to be in the year 212 that we get the first rift in the cloud. Antiochus has penetrated into the mountain region of Armenia. Xerxes has shut himself up in his capital Arsamosata, and Antiochus, sitting down before it, makes preparations for a siege. At an early stage of the operations Xerxes escapes to some corner of the hills; then, as the siege goes on, he begins to fear that the fall of Arsamosata will entail the loss of his whole kingdom. He therefore sends messengers to Antiochus begging for a personal interview. Some of the royal council urge Antiochus to seize the occasion in order to make Xerxes a prisoner, and advise that as soon as the town has fallen, Mithridates, the son of Antiochus' sister, should be put in Xerxes' place. Antiochus, however, prefers to follow the policy of attaching Xerxes to his house by friendly alliance. He grants the interview, and remits a large proportion of the arrears of tribute due from Xerxes and his father. The demand which Xerxes is obliged to meet is for 300 talents, 1000 horses and 1000 mules. The affairs of the kingdom are regulated in the Seleucid interest, and Xerxes, who is still young, is given Antiochis, the sister of Antiochus, to wife. The generosity of this treatment wins Antiochus the hearts of the Armenians. So far Polybius; the sequel to the story puts the Seleucid policy in a somewhat different light. Xerxes gave fresh dissatisfaction to his overlord, and his wife Antiochis was employed to make away with him.

The expedition into Armenia seems to have immediately followed the reduction of the trans-Tauric provinces. How long an interval separated it from the great expedition into Further Iran it is impossible to say. The appearance of fresh cuneiform tablets might decide the question. Antiochus III seems at the time of his leaving Syria to have associated his son Antiochus, a child of about ten years, with himself on the throne. This was obviously, as in the case of Antiochus IV and Antiochus Eupator under similar circumstances, a measure to prevent a dangerous vacancy, should the reigning king meet with any fatal mischance at a distance from the seat of government. We may therefore conclude that so long as Antiochus III is given as sole king in legal documents the expedition is still future. Unfortunately, no documents have been found of the years between 100 *aer.* Sel. (October 212-October 211 BC) and 104 *aer.* Sel. (208-207 BC); in the former Antiochus III is sole king, in the latter his son is already associated with him.

The two chief independent powers which had sprung up in the East were, of course, the Arsacid dynasty in Parthia and the Greek kingdom in Bactria. It is convenient that the openings in the cloud are so arranged that we have a glimpse of each of the struggles thus entailed upon Antiochus in asserting the Seleucid supremacy. In

210 the army of Antiochus descends the Euphrates by boat. By the summer of 209 Antiochus has pushed as far as Media. That province, still governed apparently by the Diogenes who had replaced Melon, was the outpost of Seleucid power towards the East. Beyond it was the waterless plateau of central Iran and Parthia.

The visit of Antiochus III to the Median capital was marked by the first known instance of a practice to which the house of Seleucus was afterwards repeatedly pushed by its financial necessities with disastrous consequences—the spoliation of temples. That Antiochus resorted to it now is an indication how severe a strain the maintenance of its outlying dominion put upon the Seleucid court, or rather, considering what vast resources it had, in Babylonia for instance, how ill-regulated, in view of the demands put upon it, the financial administration of the Empire had already become. Ecbatana, though still offering a majestic spectacle, had lost much of its ancient splendor. The immense palace, with its colonnades of cedar and cypress wood, was still to be seen, a memorial of vanished empire, but the gold and silver plates which had once covered them had been stripped off and turned into coin during the stormy times which passed over Asia after Alexander's death. Its treasuries had, of course, long been empty. Only on the temple of the goddess Aine (Anaitis?) had the Macedonian chiefs feared to lay sacrilegious hands; they had spared the gold plating of its columns, its silver bricks and tiles. Antiochus III now appropriated all this precious metal, and realized in coin the sum of nearly 4000 talents. The action was calculated to embitter native opinion against the house of Seleucus as nothing else could have done, and it may be questioned whether this consequence in a province bordering on the Parthian sphere, did not more than outweigh the momentary advantage which the sacrilege procured.

By this time the third Arsaces had succeeded to the throne. He was naturally watching the eastward advance of Antiochus with anxiety. He did not, however, believe that the expedition would proceed farther than Media. The waterless tract would oppose an effectual obstacle to so large a force. To his dismay, however, he learned that Antiochus was really about to cross it, relying on the numerous wells which were supplied artificially from the Median hills by underground conduits. Arsaces knew that against the gathered strength of the house of Seleucus his own kingdom could not yet make head. He sent some horsemen in haste to block the wells in the enemy's line of march, and himself evacuated his capital, Hecatompylus, and fell back upon Hyrcania. Antiochus detached a body of horse under Nicomedes of Cos, who dispersed the Parthians at the wells and secured the road. The Seleucid army advanced without hindrance across the wilderness and quietly took possession of Hecatompylus.

After halting to rest the army in the Parthian capital, Antiochus determined to follow up the retreating foe into Hyrcania itself. He first moved to Tagae. There he learnt from the natives the enormous difficulties of a march through the mountains. But his resolution held. In the force he had at his disposal were Cretans and Aetolians, accustomed from childhood to mountain warfare. He knew that among the narrow gorges and defiles the valuable arm would be, not the heavy phalanx, but the light troops, archers, javelineers, slingers, who could scale precipices inaccessible to the heavily armed soldier, and by irregular attacks dislodge the enemy from the posts which commanded the passage. These troops he formed into an advanced guard under

Diogenes, the satrap of Media. They were to be supported by 2000 Cretans, whose armament was something between that of the light skirmishers and the phalanx (they carried small shields), under the command of a Rhodian exile, Polyxenidas, of whom more is heard by and by. Last of all were to come the heavy troops under Nicomedes of Cos and an Aetolian Nicolaus.

The difficulties of the road proved even greater than the King had expected. It wound for the most part through deep gorges, into which many boulders and trees had fallen, making the passage painful.

Up on the rocks above, too, were perched the barbarians, with piles of stones and trunks at all convenient places to roll down upon the labouring train below. Their calculations were, however, disconcerted by the tactics of the light skirmishers. The troops of Diogenes could scale the “white face of the cliff” itself, and the barbarians in their ambush suddenly found themselves exposed from unexpected quarters to a hail of stones and darts. As soon as a post had been occupied by the light troops it was a short matter for the engineers to make the road for the heavy troops below. In this way the ascent was successfully, though slowly, accomplished. Post after post of the barbarians was driven back. At the pass of Labus, which marked the summit of the mountain barrier, they determined to make a stand. In eight days from beginning the ascent the army reached the pass, and here the phalanx came for the first time into action. In a pitched battle, however, the barbarian mountaineers could do it little harm, and the light troops had secretly before dawn crept round and occupied strong posts in the enemy's rear. At the discovery of this the barbarians broke and fled. The King was concerned to prevent an incautious pursuit, and soon sounded a halt. With closed ranks and imposing order the Seleucid army descended into Hyrcania.

Tambraca was first occupied, a city considerable enough to contain one of the residences of the Parthian king. It was unfortified, and the inhabitants, after Antiochus' victory on the pass, had mostly taken refuge in the neighboring Syrinca, “the royal city as it were” of Hyrcania. Unlike Tambraca, Syrinca was a place of exceptional strength and included a Greek population. Antiochus proceeded to invest it, and against the highly developed siege tactics of the western race the defenders could not maintain themselves. As soon as a breach was made, there was a massacre of the resident Greeks and a stampede. They were, however, driven back again by the mercenaries under Hyperbasas, and, giving up all hope, surrendered.

And now the cloud falls again. Of the subsequent course of the war we know nothing. The end was probably a victory of the Seleucid arms, after which Antiochus, following the same policy as in Atropatene (Lesser Media) and Armenia, demanded only a recognition of his supremacy and a payment of tribute, and received Arsaces into favor. So much at least may be gathered from the loose statement of Justin that Arsaces fought with extraordinary valor against the overwhelming numbers of Antiochus, and was finally admitted to an alliance.

In the year following the invasion of Hyrcania (209-208) Antiochus moved upon Bactria. Diodotus, the son of the original rebel, no longer reigned there. His house had

been overthrown by another upstart, Euthydemus, a man from one of the Magnesias. It was he who now bore the name of king. The high-road to Bactria crossed the river Arius (*mod.* Hare-Rud), and Euthydemus encamped at some place on his own side of the river and detached a large body of his excellent Bactrian cavalry, 10,000 strong, to defend the fords. The intelligence of his position was carried to Antiochus whilst he was still three days' march from the river. He at once pressed forward, and with a select body of cavalry, light-armed troops and peltasts, reached the river before the third day dawned. The main part of the enemy's cavalry had retired from the bank during the night, as their habit was, leaving only a few patrols. Antiochus was thus able to throw the majority of his detachment across before he was discovered. Of course, daybreak brought the enemy's cavalry to the attack, and an engagement ensued. This battle on the Arius did more than anything else to make the reputation of Antiochus III for personal courage. The King himself headed the troop of horse which received the brunt of the leading Bactrian squadron, and fought in the thick of it till relieved by Panaetolus. After a hot action the Bactrian cavalry was beaten off with severe loss, and only a remnant of the force made its way back to the camp of Euthydemus. A large number remained as prisoners in the hands of the victor. The King himself had had his horse killed under him, and received a blow in the face which knocked out several teeth. His detachment bivouacked the following night on the field, awaiting the arrival of the main body. Euthydemus, without risking a second encounter, withdrew upon his capital Zariaspa.

Of the further course of the war we know only that the siege laid to Zariaspa or Bactra (Balkh) by Antiochus was a famous episode which popular historians loved to embroider. Before the summer of 206 was out, both belligerents were anxious for peace. To the Bactrian Greeks indeed the war must have seemed something like a civil war in the face of the alien foe. Surrounded as they were by barbarians, the outposts of Hellenic civilization against the hordes of the great wilderness, they realized intensely their solidarity with the Hellenism of the West. The man who was king in Central Asia still felt himself a Magnesian, still thought of some city 2000 miles away as his home. A fellow-countryman of his, the Magnesian Teleas, was among the persons of influence about Antiochus. Euthydemus besought his good offices to effect a reconciliation. What indeed, he urged, was his offence? It could not be rebellion. The Seleucid power had already ceased to be effective in Further Iran when he made himself a kingdom. It was the rebellious house of Diodotus, not the ministers of the Great King, whom he had replaced. Or was it his crime to have assumed the royal name? For justification he had but to point eastwards, to the innumerable shifting peoples of the wilderness, who loomed like an ominous cloud over Iranian Hellenism. There could be no vacancy in Hellenic sovereignty here without hazarding such an irruption from that quarter as would without question submerge the country in barbarism. The Bactrian kingdom was a dam, which the interests of Antiochus should impel him, not to weaken, but to make as strong as possible. These representations, conveyed by Teleas to the ears of Antiochus, were not without weight. He had long desired to be rid of the Bactrian entanglement, protracting as it did his absence from the West to a dangerous duration. Teleas was now entrusted with the conduct of the negotiations, and a satisfactory settlement was reached. Euthydemus, no doubt, recognized the Seleucid suzerainty; he ceded at any rate to Antiochus his elephants of war and furnished supplies for the army.

Antiochus, on the other hand, authorized Euthydemus to bear the title of king. The other points at issue were determined in detail by a written treaty, and a formal alliance was concluded. This happy result was greatly facilitated by the favorable impression made upon Antiochus by the person and bearing of Demetrius, the son of Euthydemus. Antiochus promised him the hand of one of his own daughters. This was the Demetrius who was to be known one day as the conqueror of western India.

From Bactria the imperial army moved south. Antiochus crossed the Hindu-Kush and descended the Kabul valley. Once more a Macedonian king at the head of his army stood at the door of India. The great Asoka was no longer alive, and his death had been followed by the break-up of the realm. No certain knowledge of the period of confusion can be got from Indian sources, nor do we know with which of the kings they mention, if with any, the Sophagasenus spoken of by Polybius is to be identified, or whether he belonged to the house of Asoka. With this Indian ruler, whoever he was, Antiochus III had to do. Sophagasenus recognized the superior power of the Seleucid. He gave Antiochus more elephants and provisions for his army. He also promised a large quantity of treasure. Antiochus now turned homewards. Androsthenes of Cyzicus was left to convey the treasure when Sophagasenus had collected the required amount. The King went by way of Arachosia, across the Erymanthus (*mod.* Hilmend), and thence through Drangiana (*mod.* Seistan) to Carmania, where he encamped for the winter (206-205). He thus passed south of the great Iranian desert, not by the ordinary trade-route, which went north of it, and by which he had come.

In the following year he was once more in the eastern capital on the Tigris.

Like Alexander when he had completed the circuit of his Empire, Antiochus III, as soon as he had returned to Babylonia, turned his thoughts to the still unattempted Arab country to the south. The principal commercial centre of the nearer part of Arabia was the town of Gerrha, a point in the great caravan route from the spice regions beyond, from which tracks branched off to Mecca, Medinah and Petra, and which was in close connection with the harbors of the Persian Gulf. The Gerrhaeans were the great merchantmen of that part of the world. By caravan through the desert or boats along the coast, they went to and fro between Babylonia and the Arabian interior, and were to be met in the market-places of the cities on the Euphrates and Tigris, carrying frankincense and myrrh. Antiochus went with a fleet from the Tigris along the Arabian coast, and made as if he would bring this place of merchandise under his hand. But a view of the country made him abandon the idea of a permanent occupation. When therefore a letter from the Gerrhaean chiefs was brought him, which, being interpreted, ran, "Destroy not, King, those two things which have been given us of the gods—perpetual peace and freedom", he contented himself with receiving a large present, part in silver and part in precious gums, and sailed away, first toward the island of Tylos, and then back again to Seleucia-on-the-Tigris (206-204).

The eastern expedition of Antiochus III, blurred as it now is by the mists of time, took a large place in the field of his contemporaries' vision. After all the years of ruin and humiliation, the house of Seleucus had renewed its youth. Antiochus had resumed the glorious tradition of Alexander and Seleucus Nicator. He had vindicated his right to

bear the same titles as they; it was as the *Great King* that he was henceforth known in the west, as Antiochus Nicator in the East. If already in the western Mediterranean a power was growing up which vexed Greek statesmen with a new problem and peril, there seemed at any rate to be still a counterpoise in the Macedonian Great King. It was not only the kingdom, the office, the resources of Antiochus which had been magnified, but his personal character—his military ability, his courage, resolution and energy, his magnanimity to the vanquished.

Men recollected how the Seleucid Empire at his accession had touched the nadir of its decline, whilst now by nearly twenty years of incessant fighting Antiochus had won back well-nigh all that his grandfather and father had lost. The figure of the young King, in the glamour of his success, imposed itself upon the imagination of the Greek world; he became a hero of the market-place. And in this way events in one half of the Empire reacted, as they always did, upon the other. Just as the blows received by Antiochus II and Seleucus III in the West destroyed their authority in the East, just as the defeat of Antiochus III himself later on at Magnesia undid the work of his great eastern expedition, so now the success of that expedition made the position of Antiochus for the time stronger than ever in the West. The accession of resources, and still more of prestige, put a new complexion upon Seleucid rule in Asia Minor. The vassal princes became unusually submissive and well-disposed. The somewhat indefinite sovereignty of the Seleucid house over the Greek cities of the coast became more stringent. And beyond the limits of the Empire altogether, that influence in Greece itself upon which the Macedonian houses set such store was secured in a new degree. It was whispered in some circles that the ideal of Alexander, the whole Greek world united under a single sceptre, might yet be realized.

Regarded from the sober standpoint of history, what had Antiochus achieved? He had not, of course, established Seleucid rule on any permanent basis in the outer sphere of the Empire, in the principalities, that is, of Pergamos, the two Cappadocias, Armenia, Atropatene, Parthia and Bactria. It is obvious that wherever the subordinate dynasties had been left in possession, at the first opportunity, the first shortening of the suzerain's arm or the ability to do without him, those dynasties would forget their allegiance. The Seleucid rule only existed so long as the Great King was prepared to enforce it by a fresh military expedition from the seat of government. And yet Antiochus was wise in stopping short where he did; it was no generous folly. For the time no better plan was possible. He might, of course, have fought till he had dethroned the princes in possession and substituted for each of them a satrap appointed by himself. But he would not have gained much by so doing. The new satrap would be just as likely as the old dynast to improve the occasion to revolt. By using his victory magnanimously, by uniting the dynasts by ties of marriage with his own house, Antiochus really did secure their loyalty—for a time. He might have quartered troops in the outlying provinces. But even supposing such garrisons remained loyal, they would be locked up in distant places when he wanted them badly elsewhere, and the difficulty of relieving them, should they be exposed to attack in detail, might be enormous.

The fundamental obstacles to a permanent settlement—the dependence of the central government upon mercenaries, the difficulty of communication between

different parts of the Empire, the financial embarrassment—all these could be overcome only by time, by the development of the richer provinces, a sound administration, a thorough reorganization of the government machinery, and a wise expenditure on public works. For all these things were prerequisites of the only efficient contrivance for holding together such an Empire, in its essence artificial, without basis in nationality—a system of extensive and centralized military occupation. A statesman, regarding the problem from the Seleucid point of view, would necessarily have put such a system before himself as the ultimate end, but some temporary expedient would be required to maintain the authority of the Great King till that was possible. And as such an expedient the dispositions made by Antiochus were unexceptionable.

Looked at in this light, the achievements of Antiochus, which won him so much glory, did not amount to a conquest of Iran, but were only a step in the process of conquest, the necessary first step. Whether they remained a splendid but idle *tour de force*, or whether the process was carried on to a practical conclusion, depended largely on the character and political talent of Antiochus. Antiochus came to be something of a puzzle even to his contemporaries; there seemed such discrepancy between his character as it appeared in his early struggles and his character as it appeared in the latter part of his reign, when he strove with Rome. A difficulty of this kind, felt by those who knew far more of the circumstances than we do, it would be vain to try to smooth away.

But we may legitimately examine closely the record of either period and let the earlier Antiochus and the later each throw what light he can upon the other. The qualities displayed by the Antiochus of the earlier period are described by Polybius as “daring and indefatigableness”. Now as to physical courage, the courage of the soldier, that was inherent in the stock from which Antiochus sprang, and there is no reason to suppose that he was ever unwilling to adventure his person on the field. It was rather his political nerve which seemed to fail; it was the contrast between the energy with which his earlier political plans and campaigns were carried through and the hesitation, rashness, and puerile trifling of his war with Rome. We are thus brought to look more closely into the sort of energy displayed by Antiochus in his earlier period, and see whether there are no signs of those failings which were afterwards set in so damning a light. That Antiochus did on occasion show pertinacity and vigor is undeniable, in his repeated forcing of the gates of Coele-Syria, for instance, or in his passage of the Hyrcanian hills : a considerable degree of indefatigableness is implied in the mere fact that from the time of his accession in 223 he was almost continuously engaged in the personal conduct of war. But there appears at times a singular lack of thoroughness in his operations—his allowing the Ptolemaic army to reoccupy the passes into Coele-Syria when he had already once forced them and established posts on the farther side, his remissness in preparing for the encounter with Ptolemy, which lost him the battle of Raphia and undid the work of two campaigns. We observe that his is that energy which shows itself rather in bursts, when confronted by an obstacle, than in the deliberate and resolute provision of the means toward the end in view, which marks the true practical genius. It is displayed (to judge by the war with Ptolemy Philopator) rather in the beginnings of an enterprise, when the difficulties and dangers appear most formidable, and languishes with success. It is the energy of impulse, not of reason. It is evoked by

the prospect of a showy triumph rather than by the more prosaic but more solid labour of organization. We are well able to understand that energy of this kind might show increasingly conspicuous cessations, as the man passed into middle age, in an environment of ease and flattery, his vanity and self-confidence fostered by all the artifices of a court. And if this is a right view of the character of Antiochus, we may question whether his eastern expedition formed part of any large and statesmanlike design for the reconstruction of the Empire on a firm basis, whether, in fact, the puerility which appeared in his conflict with Rome was not already patent in the gratification he found in romantic but elusive triumphs.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE CONQUEST OF PALESTINE

Antiochus had extorted a formal recognition of his sovereignty in all those countries which had fallen away under separate rulers from the Empire. To make that formal recognition something solid and durable would be in itself a work demanding all his energies and resources. But he was hurried on by his ambition to grasp at the other territories which the house of Seleucus regarded as its rightful property—those which were held, not by rebellious satraps or insurgent chiefs, but by a foreign power. They included that region in which, from its geographical union with the Empire's base, the Seleucids felt a special interest—Coele-Syria, a region which the ancestors of Antiochus III had never indeed possessed, but only consistently coveted. Antiochus had not ceased since his repulse at Raphia to burn for a renewal of the contest with the house of Ptolemy. The enterprise, in which he had first drawn his sword, in which he had twice met with a mortifying repulse, might be renewed with better prospects by the conqueror of Asia.

The Egyptian Empire in the eastern Mediterranean had suffered little diminution even under Ptolemy Philopator. Seleucia-in-Pieria had been won back by the Seleucid, but the harbor-cities of southern Phoenicia, Tyre and Sidon, as well as Cyprus, gave Ptolemy a maritime base in Syrian waters. Thence the Egyptian stations extended all along the coasts of Asia Minor as far as Ephesus. They dotted the Aegean and dominated the Hellespont and Thracian coast.

It could hardly be expected that Antiochus the Great King should permanently acquiesce in such power being concentrated to his own prejudice in the feeble hands of the King of Egypt. And he was not the only one whose desires were excited by the Egyptian possessions. The house of Antigonus in Macedonia was now represented by a man as ambitious and energetic as Antiochus, Philip the son of Demetrius. What Coele-Syria was to the house of Seleucus, Thrace and the Hellespont were to the Antigonids. Philip was no more likely to rest than Antiochus so long as a valuable province geographically united with his own territory was in the hands of a Ptolemy.

It was therefore inevitable from the nature of the case that the Egyptian Empire should before long be assailed. During the reign of Ptolemy Philopator indeed relations between Egypt and the two rival powers continued formally friendly. Antiochus and Philip both tendered their aid to Ptolemy, on the occasion, probably, of a native rising. Negotiations were begun for a marriage between the royal houses of Egypt and Macedonia. But in 205-204 Ptolemy Philopator died. The succession devolved on a child of four years, Ptolemy V Epiphanes. The favourites who held the reins of power at the King's death now tried to avert the catastrophe by sending an embassy to Antiochus to remind him of his treaty engagements, and an embassy to Philip to clinch the

marriage project and to enlist his support, in case Antiochus attacked. Scopas, the ex-president of the Aetolians, who after his fall had taken service under Ptolemy, was at the same time sent to raise a new mercenary army in Greece. The favorites, however, were soon hurled from power by a popular rising in Alexandria. An understanding was come to between the courts of Antioch and Pella with a view to the partition of the Ptolemaic Empire (202).

As to the terms of this pact we have, as is not surprising in the case of a transaction by its nature secret, no exact information. Appian gives it as a popular story that, according to its stipulations, Antiochus was to get Cyprus and Egypt itself (including, of course, Coele-Syria), and Philip Cyrene, the Ptolemaic possessions in the Aegean, and the Ionian sea-board. But it is extremely unlikely that there was any intention to interfere with the African dominions of the Ptolemies. On the other hand it is true that the western sea-board of Asia Minor (or part of it) was made over to Philip. This is proved, not by Philip's invading it—since Polybius distinctly states that the two kings did not keep to their compact—but by the fact that *Philip's claim to be supported in that invasion by the Seleucid power was admitted.*

What is the meaning of this strange abandonment to the house of Antigonos of regions in which the house of Seleucus was itself interested? To explain it one has first to recognize that neither party to the agreement meant it honestly. It was only meant to last till the Ptolemaic power was swept from the field. The conquest of Coele-Syria was the most important part of the whole to Antiochus, and to secure that he was willing to see Philip make a diversion in Asia Minor. As a matter of fact, he did not intend to give him serious support. Secondly, one must take account of the actual situation in Asia Minor. The alliance of the two kings was levelled not at Egypt only. Seleucid rule was threatened in Asia Minor by a more dangerous foe than Philip would prove, by the Pergamene king. Egypt and Pergamos both belonged to a group of powers which was more or less closely united by common sympathies and aims, and embraced beside themselves Rhodes, the Aetolian League, and, looming in the background, Rome. Three of the powers—Pergamos, Egypt and Rhodes—were established in Asia Minor, and their mutual friendship corroborated the bar to Seleucid ambitions. We see then why it might seem desirable that a power antagonistic to the group should take the place of Egypt in Asia Minor. The inevitable conflict between Philip and Attalus would wear down both powers, and the house of Seleucus would reap the benefit.

The compact concluded, Antiochus attacked Coele-Syria once more. And here again it is brought home to us how capriciously time has dealt with the ancient authorities. Whilst we have comparatively full information as to the campaigns of 219-217, we are left almost entirely in the dark as to the campaigns which really did lead to the transference of Coele-Syria from Ptolemy to the Seleucid.

The state of affairs in Egypt during the minority of Epiphanes—the court torn into rival factions, the natives rebelling—contributed largely to the success of Antiochus. How soon the conquest followed 202 we do not know. As to its completeness it extended at any rate to Judaea. By 199 Antiochus seems to have considered the conquest achieved and to have turned his attention to Asia Minor.

In that quarter the compact had meanwhile led to startling results.

Philip had flung himself immediately after its conclusion upon the Ptolemaic possessions in Thrace and the Asiatic shores of the Hellespont. In a few months his garrisons were in Lysimachia, Sestos and Perinthus, and Chios had been razed to the ground. In the following year (201) he appeared with a strong fleet in the Aegean and turned the people of Ptolemy out of Samos. Then Rhodes and Attalus allied themselves to stop him, for in Egypt there was no power to resist. Philip landed on the Pergamene coast, and, while the forces of Attalus retired behind the walls of the cities, wasted the open country with barbaric recklessness. Zeuxis, the Seleucid satrap of Lydia, gave him lukewarm support.

When Philip was got to sea again and making for Samos, a combined Rhodian and Pergamene fleet overtook him between Chios and the mainland. Attalus himself was on board. A battle of doubtful event followed—on the whole adverse to Philip. But a second sea-fight off Miletus between Philip and the Rhodians went in his favor. And the result was that Caria was left exposed to invasion. Miletus made haste to seek Philip's friendship. Myus, Prinassus, Pedasa, Bargylia, Euromus and Stratonicia fell into his hands. The last was one of the possessions of Ptolemy. Presently, however, Rhodes and Attalus recovered the mastery of the sea and cut Philip's communications with Macedonia. He was now hard put to it to provision his army in Caria. The supplies furnished by Zeuxis were found to be very short. He was reduced to such expedients as purchasing food with the territory he had won. Myus he made over to Magnesia-on-the-Meander in exchange for a consignment of figs. To extend his conquests in Caria was out of the question. He left garrisons here and there, and slipped through the enemy's fleets home to Macedonia.

Next year (200) Philip rounded off his conquest of the Thracian coast. Aenus and Maronea were still held by Ptolemaic garrisons, but these now fell before Philip's attack, beside a number of smaller towns. Then he crossed over and laid siege to Abydos.

But now the eyes of men were turning to the West. Within the lifetime of men living, the Greek world had watched the rise in the Italian peninsula of one of the "barbarian" states to a position of world-wide importance. Rome had come out of its war with Pyrrhus, seventy-five years before, the leading state of the peninsula, and the other Italian communities south of the country of the Gauls were soon in more or less direct subjection to the city on the Tiber. Since then its wars with Carthage had enormously raised its prestige and spread its influence. To Hellenism the new power was no less earnest to show its devotion than the Macedonian had been. On the first appearance of Roman armies east of the Adriatic in 229-228 the barbarian stigma had been to Rome extent removed from the Romans when they were allowed to participate in the Pan-Hellenic games of the Isthmus. Like the Macedonian houses, Rome rendered its homage to the Greek culture, and professed its adherence to the sacred principle of Hellenic autonomy. And to those among the Greeks who regarded the cause of freedom as having been under a cloud since the rise of Macedonia there seemed a promise of better days in the appearance of a great state in the West, which, whatever its nationality, was piously phil-Hellenic and a republic.

Now therefore that the Macedonian king was displaying a new activity, it was the voices of those powers whose Hellenism was the purest—of Athens, of Rhodes, and of Attalus—which called upon Rome to intervene in Greece. Philip was still besieging Abydos when he received the Roman ultimatum. Soon after that the strained relations reached breaking point. Rome declared war and two legions crossed the Adriatic.

In this way Rome was drawn into all the quarrels which Philip had with his neighbors, and these included the question in which the house of Seleucus was so nearly concerned of the Ptolemaic possessions in the Levant. Antiochus could not look with indifference upon a struggle which brought a collision between Rome and himself within measurable distance.

What dealings there had hitherto been between the house of Seleucus and the Republic of the West is a matter of question. There is a statement in a late writer that after the first Punic war, in 240, Rome offered help to Ptolemy against “Antiochus (sic) king of Syria”. It was the moment when Seleucus II was recovering Syria from Ptolemy III. That the statement in its present form is erroneous is obvious; that it has no historical basis it appears to me that we are not justified in asserting. Again we are told that the Emperor Claudius in writing to the Ilians cited an old Greek letter of the Roman Senate and People to “King Seleucus” promising him the friendship and alliance of Rome, on condition that he granted the Ilians immunity from tribute. There is no improbability, as it seems to me, in the statement; on the other hand, the authority for it is certainly bad.

It is in this year (200) that we hear of the first certain communication between Rome and the Seleucid kingdom. The embassy which left Rome for the East to carry the ultimatum to Philip was also charged to visit the Ptolemaic and Seleucid courts in order to make peace between Antiochus and Ptolemy. This is probably the embassy meant by Justin. It is represented as warning Antiochus after his conquest of Phoenicia and Coele-Syria to hold his hands from the Ptolemaic realm, which had been specially placed by the dying appeal of Ptolemy Philopator under the protection of Rome. Antiochus naturally disregarded an injunction which Rome was not in a position to back up by force, in view of the Macedonian complication. What attitude would he maintain in regard to that struggle?

He might throw Philip over and come to a frank understanding with Rome and Attalus. Or he might move to the assistance of his ally. Or, thirdly, he might observe a careful neutrality. The most essential thing was that he should clearly make up his mind what line to take and concentrate his powers on pursuing it. Destiny was putting the statesmanship of Antiochus III to the test by bringing him face to face with a situation which demanded the venture of a decision, but Antiochus had not the courage and grasp of mind which could steadily confront a problem of such large elements and on which such enormous issues hung. It was easier, as it was fatal, to waver, to try half-measures, to catch the suggestions of the moment, without looking ahead. His hopes were with Philip, but he was not prepared to provoke the hostility of Rome, his relations with the Republic being still (in the diplomatic sense) “friendly”. And yet he could not bring himself to preserve correct neutrality.

The conquest of Coele-Syria set him free to resume the Seleucid ambitions in Asia Minor. And a time when Attalus, the great rival of his house in that region, was away in Greece with the forces of the Pergamene kingdom offered too tempting an opportunity to be neglected. In the winter (199-198) Antiochus invaded the undefended territory of Pergamos. Even if the movement was not made on an understanding with Philip, it was obviously a breach of neutrality at a moment when Attalus was actually co-operating with the Roman and Aetolian forces against Philip. As a diversion in Philip's favor nothing could be more effectually contrived. But yet so little resolution had Antiochus to strike a bold blow for Philip, that when Rome, at the instance of Attalus, protested, as Antiochus must have known it would, he immediately withdrew.

The Roman protests, however, were not the only cause of this retreat. News of a disconcerting kind reached the King from Coele-Syria. Antiochus seemed at one moment to be about to go through the experience of 217 again, to conquer the province only to see it wrested from his grasp. The man who was able to retrieve so signally for a time the Egyptian fortunes was the Aetolian Scopas, one of the prominent figures of his time. He had been *strategos* of the Aetolian League, the chief magistrate of the most powerful state in Greece, but, being thrown from power, had left his country and entered the Ptolemaic service. Such a man could hold no inferior position; he had been appointed commander-in-chief of the Egyptian forces, drawing pay at the rate of ten *minas* a day. He had recently levied a force of 6000 foot and 600 horse in Greece, and almost cleared his native state of men in doing so. He now invaded Coele-Syria, drove out the Seleucid garrisons, and recovered the province for King Ptolemy.

But Antiochus was soon on the march to reassert his authority in the contested region. He passed the defiles between the Lebanon and Anti-Libanus, and at the entry of the land, where the sources of the Jordan were marked by the precinct of a deity, in whom the Greeks recognized Pan,—the *Panion* he came into collision with Scopas. From the criticisms made by Polybius upon Zeno's fanciful account of the battle we can gather only the two facts—that a son of Antiochus, bearing the same name, was present, and that the elephants (of which Antiochus had brought back a fresh supply from India) figured conspicuously. The result at any rate was a complete and decisive victory for Antiochus. *The battle is the landmark denoting the final and definite substitution of Seleucid for Ptolemaic rule in Palestine.* Scopas shut himself up with the remainder of his force, 10,000 men, in Sidon, which Antiochus proceeded to invest. Egypt made an effort to relieve it, but without effect Sidon was obliged by famine to capitulate, Scopas being permitted to withdraw unhurt. Antiochus took formal possession of the land. The region of Greek cities east of the Jordan (Batanea, Abila, Gadara), as well as Samaria and Judaea, became incorporate with the Seleucid empire.

Jerusalem, or the bulk of its population, as we shall see when we come to speak of the Jews, received Antiochus with open arms. The Philistines were found, as usual, on the opposite side to the Jews. The great city of Gaza held, even in this day of disaster, by the house of Ptolemy. Their fidelity to the old allegiance provoked the admiration of the contemporary Greek. The siege which the city underwent till it was at last stormed by Antiochus was reckoned one of the great episodes in the military history of the time. It furnished an appropriate theme for the rhetorical historian. But of all the

writing which it created nothing is preserved. Antiochus retired at the end of the summer of 198, the reduction of Palestine complete, to winter at Antioch and make preparation for the much more formidable business which awaited him in the West. But he was still careful to preserve the forms of amity with Rome, and sent a complimentary embassy during the winter. The Senate, whose diplomacy likewise aimed at keeping on good terms with Antiochus whilst there was a danger of his uniting with Philip, received the embassy with studied courtesy, and passed resolutions in honor of Antiochus which left nothing to be desired in the matter of fair words.

With Egypt after the conquest of Coele-Syria the relations of Antiochus are difficult to define. There was no longer technically a state of war between the two powers. Cleopatra, in fact, the daughter of Antiochus, was now betrothed to the young Ptolemy. No doubt the betrothal was one of the articles in the treaty of peace which Antiochus imposed. At the same time Antiochus pursued next summer his conquest of the Ptolemaic possessions. It was this ambiguous state of things which made it possible for the Roman embassy in 196 to demand a cessation of hostilities against Ptolemy and for Antiochus to reply that peace already existed.

CHAPTER XIX

THE ADVANCE IN THE WEST

In the spring of 197 Antiochus launched his forces upon Asia Minor. The land forces were sent by the direct road over the Taurus under the command of the King's sons, Ardys and Mithridates, to Sardis, where they had orders to await his arrival. Antiochus himself went with the fleet along the coast. The immediate object indeed of the expedition was to seize the possessions of the house of Ptolemy, and these were all on the coast. Was there an ulterior design? Had Antiochus at last made up his mind to intervene openly in the struggle going on in Greece? On the rumor of his advance this was believed—with what ground can never be known. As he passed along the coast of Rugged Cilicia he summoned all the towns and fortresses subject either to local dynasts or to Ptolemy to surrender. And one after another—Soli, Corycus, Zephyrium, Aphrodisias, Anemurium, Selinus—they obeyed the summons without resistance. Antiochus met with no check till he reached Coracesium, the strongest place along that rugged coast. The steep isolated hill of Alaya, which reminds modern travellers of the Rock of Gibraltar, still shows the masonry, of every date, by which the successive masters of the place, down to the Middle Ages, have labored to make it impregnable. The determination to reduce it brought the King to a halt, and he was still lying before it when the situation was modified in a disagreeable way.

First an embassy from the Rhodian Republic presented itself. It brought him the astonishing declaration that should he attempt to pass the Chelidonian promontory—the point assigned in the old days of Athenian supremacy as the bound for the Great King's ships—the Rhodians would oppose his advance with an armed squadron. They justified this action by accusing Antiochus of a design to join Philip. Antiochus had the self-command to return a polite answer; he assured them that their imputation was quite groundless, and promised an embassy which should dissipate the suspicions entertained of him in Rhodes. The embassy went, and by a strange chance, at the very moment when its spokesman was addressing the Rhodian Assembly, a post arrived with the disconcerting intelligence that the war was over. Philip had met with a final defeat at Cynoscephalae in the Thessalian plains.

The hesitating policy of Antiochus had thus let the opportunity of joining his forces with the Macedonian power, before it was crushed, go by, whilst it had at the same time awaked the suspicions of Rome. But the overthrow of Philip was not altogether unwelcome to Antiochus. All the time that Philip had been an ally, his other character, the rival, had peered through. It was plain that the king of Macedonia would now have to relinquish that share in the spoils of Ptolemy made over to him by the late compact, and Antiochus would stretch his hand over the whole.

But the imaginations kindled in the Seleucid court by the humiliation of the Antigonid reached farther than Asia Minor and Thrace. Those unfortunate memories of the first Seleucus could never be charmed to sleep; his successors had acquiesced perforce in seeing the European part of Alexander's heritage occupied by the houses of Ptolemy and Antigonus, but now a moment was come when the house of Ptolemy had sunk into the extreme of impotence and the house of Antigonus had been bruised in the conflict with a remote power. Alone of the three, the house of Seleucus seemed to have renewed its youth and still to possess the secret of conquest. Wild hopes and heated language grew rife in the congenial atmosphere of a court; it was soon no secret that Antiochus meditated appearing in Greece as the heir of Alexander and Seleucus Nicator.

It was natural under these circumstances that Philip should not on his part feel any good will towards his late ally, who had not only left him to go down unaided, but who was preparing to seize the prizes in Asia Minor and Thrace which he himself was compelled to drop, and even dreamed of supplanting him in the domain where the house of Antigonus had been predominant for four generations. From the time of Philip's defeat the alliance between the two kings was replaced by complete estrangement.

The Rhodians, after the news of Philip's defeat reached them, had no further ground for opposing the advance of Antiochus. But they did their best to prevent his obtaining possession of the cities of Caria and the neighboring islands. After more than a century of Macedonian domination, during which the Greek ideal of separate independence for every Greek state, whether city or league, had suffered violence, it seemed as if that ideal were now at last to be realized. The great Italian republic had stood forward as its champion. In breaking the Macedonian power Rome had inscribed the liberty of Greece upon its banners. The victor of Cynoscephalae, Titus Quinctius Flamininus, was a phil-Hellene of the most enthusiastic type, and the circle of choice spirits among the Roman aristocracy whom he represented were as genuinely eager to create a free Greece as the phil-Hellenes at the banning of the nineteenth century. It was not the duplicity of Roman statecraft but the hard facts of the world which made these visions futile. After Cynoscephalae, however, liberty was in the air. Rhodes had borne a part in the struggle and was in a high degree animated by the ideal. But from the practical point of view Rhodes was more nearly concerned in the cessation of Macedonian rule over the cities of the neighboring coast and islands than in the emancipation of Greece itself. The Ptolemaic rule here was ready to vanish away; Rhodes was anxious that the Seleucid should not take its place.

Antiochus addressed himself to the conquest of the coast of Asia Minor from Cilicia to the Troad. Of his operations we know very little. We are not told whether he ended by reducing Coracesium or what were the remaining events of that year. Some of the states succeeded, with the help of Rhodes, in throwing off their present yoke and defying the efforts of Antiochus to impose another. Caunus, Halicarnassus, Myndus and Samos are mentioned as recovering their liberty at this moment. In the case of Caunus the Rhodians seem to have understood "liberty" in the sense most congenial to their

own ambitions; the transaction consisted apparently in their paying down a sum of 200 talents to the Ptolemaic commanders as the price of their withdrawal and then annexing the city to their own dominions. In the Cyclades also a Rhodian supremacy seems to have now superseded the Ptolemaic or Antigonid.

Beyond Coracesium westwards Antiochus would come to the coast of Pamphylia. The interior had mostly been conquered by Achaeus, and perhaps the coast as well. If so it would have already passed in 216 under the sway of Antiochus. It is at any rate occupied by his forces seven years later, when we find him maintaining a garrison in Perga.

Lycia, the next country along the Asiatic coast, yielded at once to the summons of Antiochus. Jerome speaks of the capture of Andriace (the harbor of Myra), Limyra, Patara and Xanthus. Antiochus certainly had a garrison in Patara in 190. The Seleucid cause, in fact, seems to have been popular with the Lycians, probably because it was antagonistic to Rhodes.

In Caria Antiochus already touched the sphere which had been by the compact assigned to Philip. The political situation which Philip left there on his retirement in 201 had been a confused one. Some of the cities still obeyed Ptolemy; in Caunus at any rate we saw that there remained a Ptolemaic garrison. Other cities had been annexed by Philip; the headquarters of his army of occupation were at Stratonicea, and he had garrisons in Pedasa, Euromus, Bargylia and Iasus. A third category is made by cities like Alabanda and Mylasa, which maintained their independence alike of Macedonia, Egypt and Rhodes. Shortly before Cynoscephalae the Rhodians had struck to recover their Peraea from Philip's forces, and Alabanda seems to have made common cause with them. A battle had taken place near Alabanda between the Macedonian troops under Dinocrates and the Rhodians. The result was a complete victory for Rhodes, which was followed up by their recovery of a number of small townships and fortresses, but the larger towns occupied by Philip they were unable to reduce. Dinocrates, who had in the first instance fled to Bargylia, succeeded in entering Stratonicea, and the city defied all the efforts of the Rhodians to capture it.

Except, however, for the cities who asserted their freedom or were annexed by Rhodes, Antiochus appears to have brought Caria under his dominion without difficulty. From Ptolemy, even if his garrisons had not already all disappeared before the invasion of Philip and the active diplomacy of Rhodes, no opposition was possible. Philip was certain to be compelled, when Rome dictated the definite terms of peace, to evacuate everything he had occupied in Asia. The field was left empty for Antiochus. Only for a time in Bargylia, and perhaps in some other places, Philip's garrison was left in possession. At Iasus the garrison of Philip was soon replaced by that of Antiochus, and the anti-Seleucid party driven into exile. Towards Rhodes the King adopted a most conciliatory attitude. He acquiesced apparently in the occupation of the mainland, and not only so, but after taking over Stratonicea, either by the expulsion of Philip's garrison or its withdrawal, he placed the city at the disposal of Rhodes.

In Ionia we find the Greek cities at this time in the possession of a high degree of freedom. Twenty years before, when Achaëus and Attalus had fought for mastery over them, the cities had not been merely passive. And since then the wars between Achaëus and Antiochus, and the diversion of the Seleucid strength to other quarters, while it was represented in this region since 216 by the comparatively inoffensive satrap of Lydia, had allowed the independence of the cities to grow more substantial. Philip, although he had subjugated the Ionian Samos, had left the Ionians of the mainland undisturbed. The greatest indeed of all these cities was an exception. In Ephesus there still remained a body of armed men which took its orders from King Ptolemy. This was the splendid prize towards which the thoughts of Antiochus were directed. It was the 'citadel which commanded, both by land and sea, Ionia and the cities of the Hellespont, the most convenient base from which the master of Asia could direct operations against Europe. Before the close of 197 the capture of Ephesus had crowned the work of the year. It was in Ephesus that Antiochus took up his quarters for the ensuing winter. Now that his attention is directed to the West, Ephesus, on the coast, seems to replace inland Sardis as the capital of the Seleucid King.

From Ephesus Antiochus undertook during the winter the restoration of Seleucid rule over the cities of northern Ionia and the Hellespont. A detachment had already gone north to occupy Abydos on Philip's withdrawal, with a view to the passage of Antiochus the following year into Thrace. In both the Ionian and the Hellespontine group of free cities there was one pre-eminent in power and influence, Smyrna in Ionia, Lampsacus on the Hellespont. Their example would be of immense consequence in determining the action of the rest. Unfortunately for Antiochus, this very position of dignity made them less willing to accept a yoke, however much disguised in phrases. Not only so, both had ranged themselves heartily with the Pergamene power, which seemed to embody the purest Hellenic tradition. Antiochus tried to bring force and persuasion simultaneously to bear. While it was still winter a royal force appeared under the walls of Smyrna, and the main part of the garrison of Abydos was moved upon Lampsacus. At the same time within the walls his envoys stood before the citizens and spoke at large of the handsome treatment which awaited them, even the complete bestowal of liberty, if they would return to allegiance. But the citizens persisted in thinking their strong walls a better guarantee of freedom than the King's promises. Under pressure from Antiochus, Lampsacus took a step which holds a definite place in the series of events which brought about the collision we are soon to see. It appealed to Rome.

The history of this embassy, headed by Hegesias the Lampeacene, of which the historians say nothing, is preserved for us by an inscription. It throws many interesting lights upon the relations of that time. In the first place, it was not easy for Lampsacus to find among its citizens those who would face the inconvenience of the immense journey and its serious dangers, for it was intended that the envoys should go as far as Massalia (*mod.* Marseilles). Lampsacus and Massalia were both colonies of Phocæa, and the sentiment begotten by a common origin was in those days a really operative factor in politics. Lampsacus could now appeal to it in order to enlist the advocacy of the Massaliots, which was known to have weight with Rome. Even the mythical origin of

Rome from a Trojan stock could be made seriously the ground for Lampsacus to urge the claims of kinship. Many of the citizens elected for this task excused themselves; Hegesias undertook it. He first proceeded with his fellow-envoys to Greece and had an interview with the commander of the Roman fleet, Lucius Quinctius Flamininus.

Arrived at last in Massalia, the Lampsacene envoys came before the Assembly of Six Thousand and put before them the predicament of the sister-state in Asia. The Massalians at once sent an embassy of their own to support the Lampsacenes before the Roman Senate. What is still more curious, they delivered to Hegesias, in virtue of their relations with the Gauls of the Rhone valley, a letter to the *demos* of the Tolistoagioi Galatai of Asia Minor, recommending to them the cause of Lampsacus. The Senate received the double embassy favorably, promised to include a declaration of the freedom of Lampsacus in the treaty of peace with Philip, and for the rest referred Hegesias to Titus Flamininus and the ten commissioners who were gone to settle the affairs of Greece. Hegesias proceeded to Corinth and once more pleaded the cause of Lampsacus before the ten commissioners. From them he obtained letters to the kings of Asia expressing the desire of Rome to see the freedom of Lampsacus respected. The result of the mission lay so far only on paper; its value was exactly according as Rome was prepared to follow up words by deeds.

But the other cities of Asia Minor seem to have been too weak, with the exception of Alexandria Troas, to follow the example of Smyrna and Lampsacus. They yielded with little difficulty to Antiochus.

A restoration of the condition of things under the first kings of his house was the formula of Antiochus' policy of the old order, as we have seen it, with the cities on the one hand subservient to the kings, and the kings on the other hand liberal patrons of the cities. As of old, it was as the champion of liberty and autonomy that the King lent his arm to elevate in each city the party favorable to himself to power, and crush the party opposed to him. An inscription of Iasus gives us the official view of things. Antiochus has written repeatedly to the *demos*, declaring his devotion to the great principles of democracy and autonomy. In this he is following the example of his house, which has shown itself zealous to do good to the Hellenes. The city has been vexed by factions; Antiochus has addressed to it paternal admonitions on the excellence of concord. He has been reinforced by the voice of the god of Branchidae—the "divine ancestor of his family". Concord restored, the *demos* are filled with gratitude, and so on in the usual strain. That the admonitions of Antiochus were also reinforced by his setting a garrison in the citadel and driving the faction opposed to him into exile the inscription does not betray.

We have evidence dating some years before of the favor shown by Antiochus to Magnesia-on-the-Meander. It was when that city was sending round to all the Greek kings and cities asking to have its festival of Artemis recognized as of Panhellenic standing. Its envoys found Antiochus in Persis on his return from the East (in 205), and his letter in answer promises to do all he can in the matter, and states that he is ordering the provincial governors to see to it that the cities under Seleucid influence give the required recognition to the Magnesian festival.

In the cases of the Carian Antioch and Teos we see again how opportunities to gratify the cities in ways which did not affect his supremacy were seized by the King. They are cases precisely parallel to that of Smyrna under Seleucus II—cities desiring to obtain a recognition of their sanctity from foreign powers. Antiochus instructed his own ambassador to Rome to undertake the cause of Teos with the Senate, and backed the envoys of the Teians in other places (Rhauca and Eleutherna in Crete) by an envoy, whom he himself sent on a peace mission in one of the eternal Cretan wars. The presence of an envoy of Antiochus in Crete shows that even lands altogether outside the Seleucid sphere came to know Antiochus as a good friend of the Hellenes.

At the very moment when Seleucid rule was being restored in the coast regions of Asia Minor a notable figure passed from the scene. Attalus of Pergamos, whilst addressing the assembly of the Boeotian League in the interests of Rome, had suddenly fallen under a paralytic seizure. He had been carried home to Pergamos, and had there died, an old man of seventy-two, on the threshold of a new time (197). He was succeeded by Eumenes, the eldest of his four sons; the other three, Attalus, Philetaerus and Athenaeus, remained, as Strabo says, “private persons”. The family concord continued undisturbed; the brothers of Eumenes, without share in the royal title, were ready to serve under him as ambassadors and commanders. They had some power and wealth of their own, which they used as benefactors of the Greek cities.

During this first winter that he spent in Ephesus (197-196) Antiochus sent another embassy to remove the suspicions of Rome. His ambassadors, Hegesianax and Lysias, went this time, not to Rome itself, but to Titus Flamininus and the ten commissioners, who had come to Greece to settle finally the conditions of peace with Philip and declare the will of Rome in the East. They were present at the historic Isthmian games, at which Flamininus proclaimed the freedom of the Hellenes, and they witnessed the scenes of wild enthusiasm, laughter and tears, which followed the proclamation. It was not a moment which made their task of justifying the conquests of Antiochus easy. Flamininus and the Ten gave them audience as soon as the festival was over. Full of the glow of disinterested benevolence, the Romans condemned with zest the aggressions of Antiochus. They required him to abstain from hostilities against any free city of Asia, and to evacuate those which had been before in the possession of Philip or Ptolemy. A declaration of the freedom of the Hellenes of Asia, as well as those of Europe, had indeed been included in the terms of the peace. Further, they cautioned Antiochus against crossing into Europe to disturb that reign of tranquillity and freedom which they had established, and announced their intention of deputing some of their own body to carry the King their mandate.

But before that deputation, or even his own returning ambassadors, could reach Antiochus he was on European soil. At the beginning of spring (196) he had sailed with the fleet to Thrace. The land forces were directed to move from Sardis to Abydos, and thence pass the straits into Europe, meeting the fleet at Madytus. This was effected, and Madytus itself—one of those towns which had thought to regain its liberty on the defeat of Philip—was brought to surrender. The submission of the other towns of the Chersonese followed.

Thrace was one of those regions where Hellenic civilization was continually menaced by the neighborhood of barbarism, whilst its position between East and West made it of peculiar importance for the traffic of the Greek world. As the country passed from one to the other of the great Macedonian houses, barbarism pressed forward upon the Hellenic frontiers. The capital of Lysimachus, once the centre of a strong kingdom which had been a dam against the Thracian onsets, had at last itself succumbed to the encroaching flood. Abandoned by Philip after his defeat, it had been seized by the Thracians and given to the flames. Lysimachia stood an abandoned ruin. In these regions Antiochus was able to present himself with some reason as the saviour of Hellenism. He designed to restore the kingdom of Lysimachus as an appendage of the Seleucid crown, and make his second son, Seleucus, king or viceroy. Without delay he set about the rebuilding of Lysimachia. The old inhabitants were in slavery, or scattered through the neighboring country. These he took pains to find and restore to their homes; at the same time he sought for new settlers. Half his land force and all the fleet was told off for the work of construction; with the remaining troops he made a foray into the country of the Thracians.

These magnificent designs were calculated to give offence in two quarters. The king of Macedonia could not but feel that geographical position and the traditions of his kingdom alike entitled him to be the protector of Hellenism on the Thracian marches; the revival of the kingdom of Lysimachus was probably the last thing that he desired. Secondly, Rome regarded with settled hostility the progress of Antiochus westward.

Antiochus was still in the field against the Thracians when Hegesianax and Lysias reached Lysimachia. About the same time a mission under Lucius Cornelius, which had been dispatched from Rome to make peace between Antiochus and Ptolemy, landed at Selymbria, and with its arrival coincided the appearance in Thrace of Publius Lentulus, who had come from Bargylia, where his business had been to expel the garrison left by Philip, and of the two deputed out of their number by the ten commissioners, Lucius Terentius and Publius Villius. All these Antiochus found waiting for him at Lysimachia on his return, as well as envoys from Lampsacus and Smyrna.

The distinguished Romans found the Seleucid King a charming host till they proceeded to business. It was then apparent how little the situation admitted a peaceful issue. Rome had now two grounds of quarrel with Antiochus—first, the subjugation of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, which had already been the subject of protest to his ambassadors in the Isthmus; and, secondly, the step he had since taken of entering Europe. The grounds on which objection was taken to his subjugation of the Greek cities varied, as the different cities in question had been, before his attack, in the possession of Ptolemy, or in that of Philip, or free; in the case of the first, Lucius Cornelius, who acted as spokesman, based the objection of Rome on its benevolent interest in the Ptolemaic kingdom; in the case of the second, on the right of conquest which gave the spoils of Philip to Rome; in the case of the third, the Romans assumed the rôle of the champions of Hellenic freedom. The inconsistency between these several positions is sufficiently obvious. Then as to the King's passage into Europe, Cornelius asserted that it could have no meaning except a hostile design against Rome.

The audacity of these representations is difficult to realize when later history has invested Rome, to our thinking, with the birthright of indefinite empire. It was then only the most powerful state of the western Mediterranean—and that pre-eminence was but of yesterday—whose dealings with Asia had, up to the war with Philip, been limited to an embassy sent in a matter of religion to the king of Pergamos, and perhaps a few other transactions of a like kind. The fact that Philip had been not only a European but an Asiatic power as well, now indeed gave them an opening in that region, and the compact which had made him such was now bearing bitter fruit for the other party to the bargain.

When the Roman envoy had wound up his indictment, the demeanour of Antiochus expressed the liveliest astonishment. What possible *locus standi*, he asked, had Rome in these matters? How did the conduct of the king of Asia in regard to purely Asiatic questions concern them? He might as well, he exclaimed, meddle in the affairs of Italy! In answer to their sinister construction of his presence in Thrace he had but to indicate his hereditary title to that country, based on the conquest of Lysimachus by Seleucus Nicator. How did any menace to Rome lie in his restoration of Lysimachia, after its unfortunate destruction, to be his son's residence? As to the free cities of Asia, if the Romans were the champions of Hellenic liberty in Greece, it was for him, not for them, to assume that part in Asia, and by the concession of freedom to those cities reap their gratitude. As to Ptolemy, the solicitude of the Romans was quite superfluous; relations between the two courts were already friendly, and Antiochus was even about to cement that friendship by a marriage alliance.

At the instance of the Romans, the envoys from Lampsacus and Smyrna were called in. Emboldened by the countenance of the Romans, they arraigned the proceedings of Antiochus with great freedom. This was too much for the King. He cut short Parmenio, the Lampsacene envoy, with an angry command to be silent, adding that when he chose to submit the differences between himself and cities to the arbitration of an outside power, it was not to the Romans but to the Rhodians that the appeal should lie. With this stormy close the sitting broke up.

Before the conference could be brought to the shaping of any *modus vivendi* it became abortive by an unexpected change in the situation. The rumor ran through Lysimachia that the young king of Egypt was dead. In that case a great estate in which both parties to the conference were closely interested lay vacant. Neither thought it safe to avow a knowledge of the report, but Lucius Cornelius suddenly discovered that the duties of his mission required his immediate departure for Egypt, and Antiochus, leaving the land-forces with Seleucus in Lysimachia, sailed south with all possible expedition. From Ephesus he sent another embassy to Flamininus to assure the Romans of his pacific intentions, and continued his voyage along the coast. At Patara in Lycia the intelligence encountered him that the report of Ptolemy's death was false. This suspended the race for Egypt, but Antiochus, baffled in one ambition, only bethought him how he could use the strong naval force at his disposal to realize another. Of the Ptolemaic possessions over-seas Cyprus only was left, in such tempting proximity to the Asiatic mainland as even to be visible in clear weather from the hills of Rugged Cilicia. Antiochus resolved at once to strike for Cyprus, and with this end in view pursued his

precipitate course along the coast. But he had barely rounded the Chelidonian promontory and reached the plain about the mouth of the river Eurymedon when the rowers, exasperated doubtless by the unrelaxed speed of these many days, mutinied. A vexatious delay was the consequence. But worse was to follow. Off the beach, where the river Sarus runs through the Cilician plain to the sea, the Seleucid armada was shattered by a storm. The loss of life and vessels was enormous, some of the great persons of the realm being among those who perished. After this all possibility of attacking Cyprus was gone; the King brought the remnants of his fleet home to Seleucia.

It was now past the season for active operations. During this winter (196-196) the King resided in Antioch. Since he had set out thence a year and a half before he had accomplished much; his rule had superseded that of Ptolemy on the Asiatic sea-board and in Thrace; but, on the other hand, Smyrna and Lampsacus were still contumacious, and the kingdom of Pergamos, touching the sea at Elaea, was driven through his empire like a wedge. More than this, the reconquest of his ancestral dominion in the West had brought him into collision with the advancing power of Rome. The winter was marked by a family event of importance in the Seleucid house. The King celebrated the marriage of his son, Antiochus, with his daughter, Laodice. This is the first instance to our knowledge of the marriage of full brother and sister in the house of Seleucus. It was, of course, in accordance with the practice both of the old Persian and of the old Egyptian kings, and had become the rule in the house of Ptolemy.

It was either in this year or the year before that the world was thrilled by the news that the eastern King had been joined by no less a person than Hannibal. The great Phoenician, since the end of the war with Rome, had taken an active part in the internal politics of Carthage. He had endeavored to correct some of those abuses in its constitution which sapped its strength, and had so come into conflict with the persons whom those abuses nourished. They accused him to their Roman friends of being in correspondence with Antiochus. When Rome sent a mission of inspection he was obliged to fly, and made his way, not without narrow escapes, to Tyre. The mother-city of Carthage received him as became one of the greatest of her children. A few days after his landing he took the occasion of one of the festivals celebrated by the court of Antioch at Daphne to present himself to the young Antiochus. Then he proceeded to Ephesus, and placed his genius and experience at the service of the Seleucid King. The conjunction of the conqueror of Spain and Italy with the conqueror of the East seemed of portentous significance.

There was a general feeling in the summer of 196 that a great war was brewing. But Antiochus himself, for all his victories and his empire, still faltered before its possibilities. If he held his hand at the point he had now reached, it might be avoided or indefinitely postponed. Rome was not likely to force a quarrel on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks, or even of Thrace, in itself; the interests there were too remote. But Rome was determined to maintain its ascendancy in Greece, or, at any rate, safeguard the neutralization of that country. It would be a *casus belli* if the Seleucid King set foot there; even if he gave Rome ground for believing he contemplated doing so, he might be attacked. Antiochus might perhaps avoid war by a frank acceptance of the existing

position. But to this the heir of Seleucus could not reconcile himself. Greece had been a century before the prize for which the rival Macedonian houses fought; for a moment Seleucus Nicator had thought himself its master. And now the house of Seleucus saw its old rivals reduced to impotence, but Rome coming as an interloper among their family quarrels to take the coveted possession to herself. She could hardly do so unchallenged.

At Rome itself the report which the ten commissioners delivered that spring (195) represented the prospects of peace as gloomy. They averred their belief that had not Antiochus been turned aside the preceding year by the report of Ptolemy's death, Greece would have been already ablaze. They called attention to the combustible material which existed in that country, where the most powerful of the Greek states, the Aetolian League, whose mountains the Macedonian conquerors had never been able to subdue, and whose alliance in the late war had been of substantial service to Rome, was profoundly dissatisfied with the terms of peace and in a dangerous frame of irritation.

About the same time that the ten commissioners were delivering their pessimistic report in Rome, the ambassadors of Antiochus those presumably whom he had sent the previous autumn from Ephesus—had audience of Flamininus at Corinth. A great conference, to which all the Greek states in alliance with Rome sent delegates, had just been held in that city, under the presidency of the Roman proconsul, and had served to make plain the angry mood of the Aetolians. Their suspicions were roused by the Roman garrisons which continued to occupy Demetrias, Chalcis and the Corinthian citadel—the “fettters of Greece”—a measure which was in fact inspired by the apprehension of an attack on Greece by Antiochus. To the ambassadors Flamininus declared himself unable to say anything without the ten commissioners, and referred them to the Senate in Rome. Instead of proceeding thither the ambassadors seem to have returned to report the answer of Flamininus to the King.

A year passed, and the summer of 194 was employed by Antiochus in completing the conquest of Thrace. He broke the yoke of the barbarians from the neck of the Greek cities. Byzantium had suffered heavily from the “eternal and grievous war” with the Thracian tribes, and had been accustomed to see its richest harvests carried off under its eyes. It now found itself the object of the King's especial solicitude. He courted with lavish favors the good-will of a city in whose hands it was to open and shut the gate of the Black Sea. The Gallic tribes settled during the last century in the country he also tried to win by his largess, in order to enrol under his standards more of these large-limbed men of the North. The following winter (194-193) he was once more in Ephesus.

It was in 194 that the evacuation of Greece was actually carried out by the Romans. After another conference of the Greek states, held at Corinth in the spring of that year under Titus Flamininus, the Roman garrisons had been withdrawn from Demetrias, Chalcis and the Corinthian akra. The phil-Hellenic enthusiasts at Rome could now exult in the spectacle of a Greece really and absolutely free. Macedonian domination was a thing of the past; the days of Pericles would be restored. But Rome had yet to learn, as other nations with an imperial destiny have had to learn, that the process of expansion cannot be checked by creating a vacuum, that in such cases the

alternatives for a conquering state are to assume the dominion itself, or to see it assumed by others. It was, in fact, an absurdity to declare it worth a war to prevent any foreign power establishing itself in Greece and at the same time to withdraw from the defence of its coasts. If, indeed, the Romans in retiring had left a united nation, devoted to Rome, and resolved to act together in excluding any third power from Greek soil, it might have been a practical, if not a magnanimous, policy for Rome to maintain Greece as an independent “buffer-state” on its western frontier. But, as a matter of fact, the jealousies and hatreds between the various Greek states were as violent as ever; two of the most powerful, Aetolia and Sparta, were anything but well disposed towards Rome, the one her late ally smarting under a grievance, the other an enemy with whom she had just concluded an uneasy truce. So far from helping to defend the frontier, the Aetolians were ready to welcome Antiochus, or their old foe the king of Macedonia, as a deliverer. When, thanks to the hesitation of Antiochus and the prudence of Philip, the departure of the Roman legions was followed by no immediate breach of tranquillity, the Aetolians set to work of their own accord to stir up trouble. Their envoys incited Philip and Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, to break the peace; Dicaearchus, the brother of the Aetolian *strategos*, Thoas, was sent to Antiochus (end of 194).

The common object of all these envoys was to bring about a great anti-Roman alliance of the houses of Antigonos and Seleucus, Aetolia and Nabis. Dicaearchus endeavored to impress upon Antiochus in what fierce earnest the Aetolians would act by enlarging upon their grievances; he magnified the Aetolian power; it was they who held the western door of Greece; they to whom Rome owed her late triumphs; and he paraded the great alliance before the dazzled eyes of the King, glozing the fact that it existed so far only in the heated brain of Greek intriguers.

The influence of Hannibal at the Seleucid court was, of course, thrown into the scale of war. He saw a prospect of matching himself once more with the hated oppressor of his race, of renewing that struggle which had so nearly ended fatally for Rome. It is said that he began to urge upon Antiochus a plan of campaign, of which the outlines were that he should take himself 100 ships of war, 10,000 foot and 1000 horse, and with these effect a landing in Italy, while the King should simultaneously invade Greece, and Carthage should rise in rebellion. No telling blow—on this he insisted—could be dealt Rome so long as her base was secure; only when the adversary wrested to himself those resources which Italy yielded her could Rome be really straitened. And who was there that knew the ground in Italy so well as the framer of this plan?

In pursuance, at any rate, of some such schemes, the secret agent of Hannibal, a Tyrian named Ariston, was dispatched from Ephesus to Carthage in the course of 194 to concert plans with the popular faction, whose leader Hannibal had been. But Antiochus had not yet brought his resolution or preparations to the point of an open rupture—not even when the suggestions of Hannibal were reinforced by the envoy of the Aetolians.

In the winter of 193-192 Antiochus was in Syria, and the marriage which he had announced in 196 to the Roman envoys at Lysimachia between his daughter Cleopatra and the young Ptolemy Epiphanes now took place. Antiochus escorted Cleopatra in person to the frontier. At Raphia they were met by the bridegroom, and the nuptial

ceremonies were performed. Antiochus returned to Antioch, and Egypt knew the first of the famous Cleopatras. That name henceforward supersedes Arsinoe and Berenice as the characteristic name of a Ptolemaic queen.

Spring (192) was hardly yet come when Antiochus was on the move to Ephesus. He went this time by land across the Taurus, accompanied by the younger Antiochus, who, however, was sent back almost immediately to Syria to hold, as before, the place of king in that country. The elder Antiochus, with a view of consolidating his authority in the trans-Tauric country and securing the communications between Syria and Ionia, turned upon the immemorial foes of Asiatic empires, the Pisidians.

In the spring of the preceding year (193) ambassadors from Antiochus had been given a hearing in Rome. They were among the embassies from all parts of Greece and the East who thronged to Rome for the moment when Titus Flamininus should submit to the Senate for ratification the measures he had framed in concert with the ten commissioners. The Senate did not feel itself possessed of enough special knowledge, as a body, to engage the King's envoys in debate, and therefore deputed Flamininus and the original ten commissioners to hear them separately and to speak for Rome.

It was ostensibly the object of the embassy to obtain a renewal of those friendly relations between the Seleucid court and the Republic which had been broken since the conference of Lysimachia, when Antiochus had repelled the Roman demands for the evacuation of Thrace and the liberation of the Greek cities of Asia. The real object of the mission was to ascertain how far Rome was prepared to go in sustaining these conditions. From the answer which Flamininus returned to the representations of Menippus it was plain that whilst only a sentimental interest was felt in the Asiatic cities, Rome was seriously concerned in dislodging Antiochus from Thrace. Flamininus intimated that if Antiochus evacuated Thrace, the other question would be suffered to drop. "The King contends that we have no right of interference in Asia; then let him keep his hands off Europe". It was not difficult for the King's envoy to point out the logical flaw in such an argument; the cases were not parallel; Antiochus had claims to Thrace, based both upon hereditary right and the sacrifices he had made to recover it from barbarism; the Romans had no such claims in Asia. Only it happens that such questions are not determined by formal logic. The newly-acquired ascendancy of Rome in Greece was threatened by the occupation of Thrace; in the face of this fact the legal reasonings of the Seleucid envoys missed the point. So long as the Seleucid court was obstinate on the Thracian question, Rome found it convenient to champion the liberty of the Asiatic cities. The orators of the Senate paraded this attitude to the assembled ambassadors from Greece and the East, contrasting the liberating policy of Rome with the tyrannic aggressions of the Seleucid King. Menippus lifted a voice of protest. He entreated the Romans, in the name of the peace of the world, to pause, and reiterated the pacific disposition of his master; diplomacy might still find a solution of the deadlock. The Senate on its side was not anxious to precipitate the conflict, and resolved to send an embassy to the King. For this office the persons chosen were Publius Sulpicius, Publius Villius (who had confronted Antiochus at Lysimachia) and Publius Aelius.

These emissaries were instructed first to visit the court of Pergamos and ascertain the leanings of Eumenes. Antiochus had indeed been doing his utmost to induce the powers of Asia Minor to oppose a solid front to the Roman aggression. On Prusias of Bithynia he could count, Prusias, the foe of Pergamos, and the ally of Philip before he had been humbled. Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia Antiochus essayed to bind to himself in the same way as he had bound Ptolemy; he had other daughters to give.

We last heard of the Cappadocian court when Antiochus Hierax took refuge with Ariamnes about 230. Since then it had continued its tranquil existence aloof from the broils of the world. Ariamnes, celebrated for the warmth of his domestic affections, had died after an uneventful reign of about forty years at a date probably not far removed from the visit of Hierax. His son, Ariarathes III, who had already borne the name of king during his father's lifetime, then reigned alone. It was this Ariarathes whose wife was a Seleucid princess, Stratonice, the daughter of Antiochus Theos, and aunt therefore of Antiochus III. The reign of Ariarathes III, like that of his father, is wrapped in complete obscurity. Only his coins bear witness to the Hellenic influence at work in his court. It is no Oriental potentate, with beard and tiara, that here is shown, but a king of the regular Hellenistic type, clean-shaven, with short hair and the simple diadem. On the reverse of his coins the barbarian goddess of Cappadocia is replaced by a classical Athena copied from the money of Lysimachus. Already under Ariamnes, it will be remembered, Greek had superseded Aramaic for the legend. Ariarathes III had died about 220, and the son who succeeded him, Ariarathes IV, was at that time quite an infant. He inherited the family characteristics of simplicity and affection, so far as we can judge by the little told us. He is the first of the dynasty for whom a surname appears, the modest one of *Eusebes*, the Pious. In an evil day for himself he received the Great King's daughter Antiochis to wife. He was no mate for one of those tigress princesses whom the old Macedonian blood continued to produce.

Antiochus had yet a third daughter, and by means of her he did not despair of even overcoming the hostility of Eumenes, of bringing Pergamos into line with the other Asiatic courts. Together with her hand he offered the restoration of the cities which had once obeyed Pergamos and indefinite services in the future. But Eumenes was shrewd enough to refuse the splendid bribe. It was the policy of his house to ally itself with the more distant against the nearer power, and the wars, in which Attalus had fought side by side with the Romans, had led the Pergamene court to form a true estimate of the strength and persistency of the Republic; so that now, when their old confederates, the Aetolians, were estranged, Pergamos stood stoutly by the Roman alliance as the soundest speculation.

Sulpicius and his colleagues touched in 192 at Elaea, the harbour-town of Pergamos, and thence went up to the capital. They found Eumenes a strong advocate of war; he knew that a decisive conflict must come sooner or later between Pergamos and the Seleucid power, and grasped at the chance of entering into it side by side with Rome. In such a contingency he saw the prospect, not only of safety, but of aggrandizement, of recovering that dominion in Asia Minor which his father had held for a moment amid the broils of the Seleucid princes. He now used all his influence, as Hannibal was doing on the other side, to force on hostilities.

The Romans contrived to awake in the mind of Antiochus the suspicion that his great ally, Hannibal, was playing a double game.

Antiochus, as soon as he learnt the arrival of Villius at Ephesus, suspended operations against the hill folk and came down to Apamea, the Phrygian capital. The ambassador proceeded from the coast to the same city. The old arguments were gone through on either side once more, with as little result as ever. Then the conference, like the previous one at Lysimachia, was brought to a premature close by sudden tidings. The young Antiochus, the heir-apparent to the Seleucid throne, who had now shared the royal title for about seventeen years, was unexpectedly deceased in Syria. Whispers of foul play, how far justified we cannot know, ran abroad; it was the jealousy of the King at his son's popularity, or his preference for the younger Seleucus. At any rate, the court at Apamea abandoned itself to mourning, and diplomatic propriety made Villius take his leave and return to Pergamos. Antiochus, without resuming the subjugation of the Pisidians, moved to Ephesus. At Ephesus the King continued to hold himself withdrawn from public intercourse. He was continually closeted with Minnio, the chief of the "Friends", whose chauvinistic proclivities were known—an indication of the drift of the royal policy. Presently the Roman ambassadors were invited from Pergamos to a discussion with Minnio of the questions at issue. The King himself did not appear. Again the barren controversy as to Smyrna and Lampsacus, which did not really touch the ground of quarrel, was agitated. Minnio pressed the point that the Romans, who set up to be the champions of Hellenic liberty in Asia, themselves held the Greek cities of Italy and Sicily—Naples, Tarentum and Syracuse—in subjection. This the Roman envoys evaded by a new distinction; their sovereignty over the Greek cities of the West had been uniform and continuous; the Greek cities of Asia in question had passed long ago from Seleucid rule to Ptolemy or Philip, or had in some cases acquired *de facto* independence. The distinction hardly removed the inconsistency; if it was lawful to keep Greek cities in subjection, it could hardly be outrageous to reconquer them. Then, as before at Lysimachia, the ambassadors of Smyrna and Lampsacus were called in. They had been drilled for their part by Eumenes, and with the encouragement of the Romans talked somewhat wildly. The conference ended in noisy words, and the Roman ambassadors, without having accomplished anything, returned home.

This diplomatic trifling served, at any rate, to convince either side that war was now inevitable. It was spoken of at Rome as an ultimate, if not an immediate, certainty. At Ephesus the more fiery spirits began to clamor for it in the council of the King. Adventurers from Greece, like Alexander the Acarnanian, talked excitedly of what would happen when Antiochus appeared on the other side of the Aegean, of the simultaneous rising of the Aetolians, Nabis the tyrant of Sparta, and, above all, Philip. Alexander had once been a familiar of that king's, and recounted how he had heard him again and again pray the gods during his war with Rome for the co-operation of his Seleucid ally. Did it occur to any one to reflect that, if this was true, the discovery that his Seleucid ally left him after all in the lurch might have had some effect upon the sentiments of Philip?

It is indeed hard to see what issue the situation could have had but war. And that, although war was by no means desired by either of the principals : Rome had hoped

against hope to avert it by diplomacy. Flushed as the Romans were with the victories over Carthage and Macedonia, a contest with the Seleucid King would involve them with the unfamiliar East, with an adversary seen in the glamor of illimitable dominion and exhaustless treasuries. Before the unknown entanglements of such a struggle the homely sense of the Roman fathers recoiled. They were, nevertheless, resolved to maintain the Roman influence in Greece even at the cost of war. Antiochus on his part felt his nerve fail, as is shown by his long hesitation, at the prospect of trying issues with the legions; he was not disposed to declare war; at the same time he was informed that measures, which presented themselves to him as steps in the resumption of his legitimate inheritance, were regarded by Rome as hostile acts. Neither party in fact, desirous as they were of peace, could renounce its colliding ambitions. It may, however, be that had Rome and the house of Seleucus been the only agents in the matter, the caution of either side might have led to such an adjournment of the crisis as ultimately to make a *modus vivendi* possible; Antiochus might have relinquished Greece and Rome acquiesced in the occupation of Thrace. But there were those among the subordinate agents who exerted all their force to push the two great powers to a conflict. Hannibal saw in war a chance of avenging his country upon the oppressor; Eumenes of Pergamos a chance of aggrandizing his kingdom; above all, the mass of the Aetolians were eager to stir up trouble. A situation so delicately balanced was at the mercy of the subordinate agents.

The antagonism between Rome and the Seleucid King was a cleft which extended to the whole family of Greek states. The cleft was not so much between state and state as between the two factions of oligarchs and democrats, rich and poor, into which every Greek state was divided. The Roman party coincided in most cases with the oligarchical, the party favorable to Antiochus with the democratic. Even among the Aetolians many persons of influence were opposed to a rupture with Rome. The reason of this connection lay deeper than the mere policy of the Roman aristocracy to foster oligarchical institutions in the states to which its influence extended. That policy itself was based upon a natural alliance between the well-to-do classes everywhere and Rome. The Roman ascendancy on the one hand violated the imaginative ideal of the Greeks—Hellas completely free from barbarian control; on the other hand it gave, when once established, a novel guarantee for social stability. Now the propertied classes would at once be far less affected by sentimental considerations than the people, and would lose instead of gaining by disturbances of the *status quo*. To impose upon sentiment and imagination, the Seleucid King was more favorably situated than Rome. All that the name of Great King had evoked for generations, to the inhabitants of the Greek lands, of splendor and riches belonged to him, all the memories of the Greek conquest of the Persian Empire illuminated his diadem; upon him the glories of Xerxes and of Alexander converged. He could appear too to the Greeks, as the Romans could not, in the light of a compatriot. Whatever taint of barbarism had attached before Alexander to the Macedonian princes, the courts of his successors were Greek in their language and intellectual atmosphere, Greek to a large extent in blood and manners. One must add to this the personal lustre which had invested Antiochus III since his eastern expedition, the vision of the Indian elephants, of the mountains of gold, of the innumerable chivalry of the East which were conjured up by those who came from his court. The democracy

of the Greek cities was ready, so soon after it had sobbed with emotion at the grant of freedom by phil-Hellenic Rome, to welcome Antiochus as the saviour of Hellenism. In the struggle of the two factions within the various states the war between Antiochus and Rome was already in a sense begun.

The ambassadors returned to Rome in 192 soon after the consuls for that year had entered upon their office. Their report showed the senate that no *casus belli* had as yet arisen, but the presentiment of war grew daily stronger. The air was thick with rumors. Attalus himself, the brother of the reigning Eumenes of Pergamos, brought the assurance that Antiochus had already crossed the Hellespont with an army, and that the Aetolians were ready to spring to arms at his arrival in Greece. The Senate took vigorous defensive measures. One Roman squadron had already early in the year sailed for Greek waters under the praetor Atilius to overawe Nabis; under the impulse of fresh alarms some legions were stationed under another praetor, Marcus Baebius, at Tarentum and Brundisium, ready to cross at a moment's notice to Greece; a squadron of twenty ships was set to cruise off Sicily, where an attack of the Seleucid fleet was apprehended; and the governor of Sicily was instructed to levy fresh forces and maintain a strict watch along the eastern shores of the island. The force under Baebius was before long moved across the Adriatic and concentrated at Apollonia. The construction of fresh ships of war was pushed busily forward.

But the preparations on either side during the earlier part of 192 were not only military and naval. Diplomacy had still a work to do. That work, however, was now no longer to obviate a collision between Antiochus and Rome; it was to secure the adherence to the one side or the other of that country where the first encounter would take place, to prepare the ground in Greece. The connections of Antiochus were naturally closest with the Aetolians. No less responsible a person than Thoas, the strategos of the Aetolian Confederation, had been deputed as the intermediary in these transactions at the Seleucid court. In the course of 192 he returned to Greece, bringing Menippus, the late ambassador to Rome, with him. There was still a party among the Aetolians who advocated peace, and it was thought that the representations of Menippus would be useful in confirming the warlike temper of the majority. The Romans on their side were equally busy in bringing diplomatic pressure to bear upon the mobile Greeks. Titus Flamininus himself, the great phil-Hellene whose influence in Greece was paternal, was sent in 192, with Villius and other colleagues, to remind the Greek states of their engagements. Nabis had already taken up arms and was involved in a war with the Achaean League, which the Romans left to take its natural course, seeing in it a guarantee of Achaean fidelity. Chalcis and Demetrias, the two "fetters" of Greece, were visited. At both the authority of Flamininus sufficed to drive the head of the anti-Roman party into exile. In Aetolia, on the other hand, Flamininus failed to make any impression upon the excited people, now more than ever inflamed by the gorgeous descriptions of Menippus. The Great King was bringing enough gold with him to buy up Rome. Amid great popular effervescence the Federal Assembly passed a decree which called on Antiochus to liberate Greece and decide the controversy between the Confederation and Rome. Flamininus himself was not present on the occasion, and when he asked Damocritus, who was now *strategos*, to give him a copy of the decree, the hot-headed

Greek bade him wait for his answer *till the Aetolians were encamped on the banks of the Tiber.*

The rupture between the Aetolians and Rome was thus complete. It now became a matter of immediate necessity to the Aetolians to occupy the points of vantage against the coming of the Great King. Thoas was commissioned to secure Chalcis with the help of the anti-Roman party in the city and a merchant-prince of Chios, Herodorus, whose connections there were considerable. Another Aetolian, Diodes, was sent on a similar errand to Demetrias. A third was to seize Sparta, where Nabis was now hemmed in by the victorious Achaeans. Of these enterprises that of Diocles alone met with success. An Aetolian garrison occupied Demetrias, and the friends of Rome were put to the sword. At Chalcis the attempt of Thoas was repulsed by the Roman party, thanks to the help of Eretria and Carystus. In Sparta the Aetolian force, after they had treacherously assassinated Nabis, was cut to pieces by the indignant Lacedaemonians. Demetrias, however, was securely held, and the anti-Roman magistrates refused to admit Villius when Flamininus sent him to recover the city, if it might be, by his earnest representations. The main door of Greece, which the Romans had evacuated two years before, was now held open for Antiochus. Thoas hastened to Asia to carry him the tidings.

Whilst his agents had been working against the Roman cause in Greece, Antiochus himself had not been idle. Now that all attempts to compose by diplomacy the differences between himself and Rome had been dropped, Antiochus had with the campaigning season of 192 resumed his efforts to subjugate, as a preliminary to his invasion of Greece, the independent cities of Asia by force of arms. Smyrna and Lampsacus, however, to which we now find the name of Alexandria Troas added, were still unsubdued when Thoas arrived with the news that Demetrias was secured. He found Antiochus still full of hesitations. The King was not only unwilling to start for Greece till the reduction of the cities had secured his base, but he could not make up his mind what to do with Hannibal. A fleet of open vessels, with which the exile was to make a diversion in Africa, was, after long Oriental delays, at last ready. But Antiochus had developed by then a reluctance to entrust the great Carthaginian with an independent commission. Hannibal had been able in some degree to reassure him as to his sincerity after the doubts aroused by the attentions of Villius early in the year. But his great abilities still showed to the masterful and jealous King in the light of a disqualification for service. Upon this posture of affairs Thoas supervened, and prevailed upon the irresolution of the court by his decision, assurance and boundless mendacity. The highly-colored picture he gave Antiochus of the situation in Greece was as false as the picture which he and his friends had given his wavering countrymen of the apparition of the Great King. His counsels were at the same time determined by the separate interests which the war-party in Aetolia intended a conflict between the two great powers of East and West to promote, and pointed therefore to the concentration of the King's forces upon Greece. Thoas thus found himself opposed to Hannibal, whose outlook upon the war was of wider reach, and who saw in the invasion of Greece only a detail in a large scheme of attack, of which the telling stroke was the invasion of Italy. Thoas, much more than Hannibal, had the King's ear, and under his influence the well-

considered plan of action in the western Mediterranean was dropped and Hannibal reduced to the inoffensive rôle of unheeded adviser.

The invasion of Greece—this now occupied all the thoughts of Antiochus. The favorable opening given by the capture of Demetrias must not be let slip. The great project, so long the theme of courtiers, was at last come near accomplishment. As a solemn inauguration of the enterprise, Antiochus made the short voyage to Ilion, and sacrificed to the ancient Athena, as Xerxes had done before he invaded Europe, and Alexander when he invaded Asia. On his return to Ephesus, although the year was advanced, the forces destined for the invasion of Greece put out to sea—40 decked ships, 60 open, and 200 transports.

Passing by Imbros and Sciathos, the armada touched the Greek mainland at Pteleum, on the left side of the entrance of the Pagasaeon Gulf. Here the King was received by Eurylochus and others of the party now dominant among the Magnesians and escorted the following day to Demetrias.

Antiochus was really on Greek soil at last! It was, however, characteristic of his procedure that, in spite of the years during which his hand had hovered to strike, the blow in the end was hurried and feeble. No adequate force was ready for the enterprise; instead of the looked-for myriads, the ruler of Asia had brought with him only 10,000 foot, 600 horse, and 6 elephants—a force hardly large enough for the bare occupation of Greece, to say nothing of the strain of a war with Rome. He had crossed incontinently, when the winter gales were already beginning, and although he had escaped with a buffeting, his little army was cut off from reinforcements till the following spring. In such a position he depended entirely upon the energy of the Aetolians, as indeed it had been in reliance upon the assurances of Thoas that he had taken his resolve.

On the news that the Great King was landed, a wave of excitement swept over Greece, not unmixed with disappointment at the meanness of his following. The political situation his presence created was to some extent ambiguous. He still professed innocence of any purpose hostile to Rome. He had not come to conquer Roman territory, but to achieve the very thing which the Romans declared to be their object—to emancipate Hellas from foreign control. If the Romans were sincere in recognizing Greek independence, what objection could they raise to the presence of a friendly king on these shores? If the Greeks were free, why might they not be friends with Rome and Antiochus alike? It cannot be denied that the glowing language of the phil-Hellenic party in Rome gave some hold to such contentions.

But the phrases of neither side could now conceal from anybody the real fact that what each power meant by the freedom of Greece was the predominance in every state of the faction subservient to itself—in fine, its own supremacy.

Immediately after the arrival of Antiochus at Demetrias a meeting of the Aetolian Federal Assembly was held at Lamia (in Aetolian possession for the last century), confirming the previous invitation to Antiochus. The King appeared in person. He was received with a storm of applause. Under the circumstances his speech was

necessarily somewhat apologetic, but he promised that the spring should really show Greece those colossal armies and fleets of which they had heard so much; and meanwhile—well, he would thank the Aetolians to provide supplies for the troops which accompanied him. The Roman party among the Aetolians, reduced to futilities, were for an impossible compromise, by which, instead of war being declared with Rome, the services of Antiochus should be requested, as arbitrator only. It happened that the president of the year belonged to this party, but even his influence was overwhelmed by the popular feeling. Antiochus was elected Commander-in-Chief of the Confederation, and a body of thirty, chosen from among the Inner Council, the *Apokletoi*, was appointed to assist him with its advice.

CHAPTER XX

THE WAR IN GREECE

The Great King was in Greece. He and his Aetolian allies were confronted by a twofold problem—how to make themselves masters of the country, and how to parry the consequent attack of Rome. They must proceed at once to the accomplishment of the first part of their task if there was to be any chance of their succeeding in the second. Greece lay before them derelict, left by the expulsion of the Macedonians and the retirement of Rome to its own caprices and powers of defense. The sudden move of Antiochus in entering Greece at that late season of the year, with many drawbacks, had one advantage. It had taken Rome by surprise. Rome had absolutely no troops on the east of the Adriatic except the force of Baebius at Apollonia—two legions with auxiliary contingents—which could not cross the mountains of Epirus till the spring, and the 3000 Roman and Italian infantry on the vessels of the praetor Atilius. Titus Flamininus and his fellow-commissioners had to depend almost entirely for stopping the progress of Antiochus upon the levies of the Greek states themselves, the states friendly to Rome. Upon these, however, they could count only so long as the states themselves did not veer, and there was, we have seen, in all or most of them, a party favorable to Antiochus. A series of not unlikely changes of government, if one may use the modern phrase, might put Antiochus *ipso facto* in possession of Greece. The only body of troops not drawn from the country itself which the Romans had at their disposal, beside the 3000 with Atilius, was the Pergamene force brought up at a fortunate moment by King Eumenes. His squadron had appeared in the Euripus just after the attempt of the Aetolians upon Chalcis had failed, and whilst Eumenes proceeded himself to Athens he had dropped in Chalcis, by the request of Flamininus, a garrison of five hundred. Only two years before the great Liberator had drawn the Roman garrison from that critical post with every circumstance of disinterestedness and magnanimity.

Antiochus and the Aetolians immediately put forth all they commanded of material force or diplomatic address to win over the cities and states of Greece. The Roman envoys, on the other hand, brought their moral weight to bear to keep the states faithful. There ensued everywhere simultaneously an intense trial of strength between the two parties. The Boeotian League soon began to trim. Even the favored Athens showed signs of unrest, and Flamininus was called in by the Roman party to drive the popular leader Apollodorus into exile, whilst an Achaean garrison of 500 was lodged in the Piraeus.

At Aegium, before the Achaean Assembly, the envoys of Antiochus and Flamininus met face to face. In answer to the royal envoy's imposing catalogue of the nations which his master would bring into the field—Kurds, Parthians, Medes and

Elamites—the Roman propounded a homely parable. It reminded him, he said, of a friend of his who set what seemed every variety of flesh and game before his guests, and in the end it turned out to be all culinary disguises of the common pig! All these formidable names clocked the same miserable breed of Syrians!—a statement of a fine free boldness in ethnology. Of the Achaeans Antiochus had thought it unwise to ask more than neutrality; but here the Roman influence was so strong that even this proposition was rejected and the Achaean militia placed at Flamininus' disposal.

Chalcis, of course, was the point of the most immediate consequence to Antiochus. His first attempt to seize it had been conducted in person, as the initial step in that plan of campaign which he had concerted with the Aetolians. But the Roman party in power, led by the magistrate Micythion, resisted his overtures, encouraged, no doubt, by the Pergamene force within their walls. It could not fail to come now to an exertion of force, on the one side to capture, on the other to retain, the important city.

Antiochus, after his rebuff, had withdrawn to Demetrias to gather troops, and an advanced detachment under Menippus of 3000 was soon on its way, supported by the Seleucid fleet under Polyxenidas. This man, the King's admiral, is the same Rhodian exile of whom we heard seventeen years ago as the commander of a Cretan corps in Parthia. Antiochus himself followed with the main body—6000 of his own troops and a hastily levied body of Aetolians whom he picked up at Lamia. The opposite side, on their part, hurried up reinforcements. Eumenes sent on an addition to the Pergamene garrison under Xenoclides, one of the chiefs of the Roman party in Chalcis; the Achaeans, at Flamininus' suggestion, a body of 500 men, and a third body of 500 Romans (drawn doubtless from the ships of Atilius) followed at an interval. All these bodies were racing for the Euboean Straits. The Achaeans and the men of Eumenes arrived first and threw themselves into the city. Next came Menippus, and by occupying Hermaeum, the embarking-place near Salganeus, cut off the Roman force from the passage. The latter, on finding this, moved to Delium, twelve miles along the coast, in order to cross thence. War, in spite of all the diplomatic contention and the maneuvering of troops, had not been declared, but Menippus could now only preserve the forms of peace by allowing the Roman force to proceed. With this alternative he fell upon them suddenly, in the very sanctuary of Apollo, cut down the majority, and took fifty prisoners; only a handful escaped. The first blood was drawn in the quarrel. For the moment the sudden stroke was brilliantly successful. When the King moved up to Aulis the Roman party in Chalcis were cowed and the city opened its gates. Micythion, Xenoclides and their partisans fled. The Achaean and Pergamene forces, as well as the survivors of the Romans, entrenched themselves in the little towns on the mainland opposite, but were compelled to evacuate them on the King's promising to let them depart unmolested. The fall of Chalcis was immediately followed by the submission of the whole of Euboea.

The Roman commissioners were now unable to prevent the movement in Antiochus' favor spreading like fire throughout Greece. Elis, by tradition associated with Aetolia and hostile to the Achaeans, notified him of its adherence. The Epirots thought it prudent to secure themselves on both sides by offering their alliance, but offering it on condition that Antiochus should move into their country. Boeotia ranged

itself definitely at last on his side and received him at Thebes with popular acclamations. His statue was erected by the League in the temple of Pallas Itonia at Coronea.

A more useful ally than any of these Greek states Antiochus had in Amynder, the king of the Athamanians, one of the semi-barbarous peoples, akin to the Hellenes, who inhabited the mountain regions on the confines of Aetolia and Thessaly. Amynder was now to a large extent under the influence of an adventurer, who played a somewhat conspicuous part in the events of that time, a certain Philip of Megalopolis. This man was of a Macedonian family settled in Arcadia, and he made no less a claim than to be descended from Alexander himself. His sister, who bore the royal name of Apama, was married to Amynder, and Philip accompanied her to the Athamanian court as a convenient place whence he could blazon his pretensions to the Macedonian throne. Even if he was not taken altogether seriously by the world at large, Antiochus and the Aetolians thought it worthwhile, in order to secure the co-operation of Amynder, to encourage Philip's ambitions. If they still had any hopes of the real King Philip's help, this was hardly the way to make him their friend.

The King's heart was lifted high by these successes. He was of too unsteady a judgment to feel how unsubstantial they were. He had seized the object of his ambition in the absence of the competitor; the real bout would not begin till Rome turned to recover what it had lost. The adhesion of Eleans and Boeotians, in the moment that he possessed the field, meant little. Their co-operation was a feeble quantity, even if it were assured, and it would be assured only so long as it seemed to pay. To achieve the first part of the task, to occupy Greece (and even that Antiochus had done so far very imperfectly), was futile in the extreme, unless the second part of it, the repulse of Rome, was to be achieved in its turn. A commander of any sense in the position of Antiochus would have subordinated every consideration to that of checking the Roman attack which must come with the opening spring.

The natural barriers which defended Greece on the side of Rome were, first the sea, and secondly the mountains of Epirus, in conjunction with the dominions of Philip. Instead of using every effort to gain command of these, Antiochus called a council of his allies at Demetrias to form plans for the occupation of Thessaly. Hannibal, since the influence of Thoas had been in the ascendant with Antiochus, had been relegated to the background. On this occasion, however, our account says, the King asked his opinion. Then amidst the extravagances of courtiers a sane voice made itself heard. Hannibal tried to open the King's eyes; it was with Rome he had to do. The plan he proposed included the establishment of a naval base at Corcyra, to command the sea on the west; the occupation in strength by the King himself of the valley of the Aous, to prevent the Romans throwing troops across the mountains of Epirus from Apollonia, and, above all, an alliance with Philip, without which the Romans could move troops from Apollonia into Greece by way of western Macedonia. The alliance of Philip would be the greatest weight in the scales; and if it could not be procured, Philip must at least be rendered harmless by the King's son, Seleucus, making a diversion on his Thracian frontier. Besides this, since Antiochus had, against Hannibal's advice, chosen as the battleground between himself and Rome a country such as Greece, which could furnish him but

poorly with provisions or troops, he must remedy these disadvantages by importing men, material and food on a large scale from Asia, and use all the naval force available for keeping the army in Greece in touch with its source of supplies. The only part of this scheme which the Seleucid council thought fit to adopt was the dispatch of Polyxenidas to bring up reinforcements from Asia.

Whether an alliance with Philip, as Hannibal advised, was really a practicable policy may be questioned. Hannibal, looking at the situation solely in reference to a conflict with Rome, was, of course, perfectly right from his point of view—the strategical. But the political difficulties of such a course were probably insuperable—that is, if Antiochus intended to retain an ascendancy in Greece. The house of Antigonos could never do anything to help the house of Seleucus to that. It seems that Philip afterwards asserted that Antiochus had at one time offered him as the price of his alliance 3000 talents, 50 decked ships, and *all the Greek states* which he had formerly dominated. If this was true it was certainly not disinterested attachment to Rome which made Philip refuse the offer. But whilst Antiochus was debarred from an alliance, to induce Philip to remain a passive spectator was probably possible by careful management. A difficulty was, no doubt, constituted by Philip of Megalopolis. To countenance him perhaps appeared necessary in order to retain the Athamanian alliance; but he could not be countenanced without serious offence to King Philip. It may have been that Antiochus felt he had to choose between the active co-operation of the Athamanians and the neutrality of Macedonia, and preferred to sacrifice the latter. Prudence, at any rate, directed that, if the claims of Philip of Megalopolis were supported, he should be dissuaded, as far as possible, from flaunting them in such a way as to goad King Philip into active hostility. This Antiochus failed to do. The pretender was allowed to inter with ostentatious ceremony the bones of the Macedonian soldiers, which King Philip had been obliged to leave whitening the field of Cynoscephalae. It was an outrageous blunder. Before Antiochus had been many months on Greek soil, the King of Macedonia was offering himself, heart and soul, to the Roman praetor, Marcus Baebius, at Apollonia.

When the funeral of the fallen Macedonians was celebrated, the army of Antiochus was already encamped by the Thessalian city of Pherae. Thessaly, surrounded on all sides by mountains, is again divided by a line of hills which run through it north and south into an eastern and a western plain. It was in the former that the three great cities of Thessaly, Larissa, Crannon and Pherae, were placed. The Romans, after wresting this country from the dominion of Macedonia, had formed the Thessalians into a distinct confederation, setting the seat of the federal government at Larissa.

Antiochus, moving from Demetrias and crossing the rim of hills which surrounds Thessaly by the pass now called Pilav-Tepé, would descend immediately upon Pherae. The whole distance between Demetrias and this town is not more than twelve miles. As soon as he had been joined by the Aetolians and Athamanians, the work of capturing the Thessalian towns began. The government friendly to herself, which Rome had installed at Larissa, sent reinforcements in vain. First Pherae was summoned to embrace the cause of Antiochus, and when the authorities within refused, it was reduced by force.

The surrender of Scotussa, across the jagged hills which here divide the two plains, immediately followed. Then Crannon fell — all within ten days of the King's appearance in Thessaly. At Crannon Antiochus was only ten miles from Larissa. But before approaching the capital of the League the allied forces turned back to subjugate the western plain, and received the submission of Cierium and Metropolis (near mod. Karditsa). We can perhaps trace the impatience of the Aetolians and Athamanians to possess themselves of this region neighboring their own mountains. The northern parts of the plain were, at any rate, after conquest made over especially to the Athamanians: Aeginium (*mod.* Kalabáka), commanding the pass through the mountains to the north-west where the Peneus breaks through into the Thessalian plains; Gomphi, commanding another pass farther south; Tricca (*mod.* Tríkkala, the principal town of western Thessaly), on a spur of the northern wall above the Peneus —all these and other places of less importance are found the following year in Athamanian hands. When Antiochus sat down before Larissa the rest of Thessaly was already conquered. There were some exceptions—Pharsalus in the south, Atrax, the stronghold which commanded the road along the Peneus from Larissa to the western plain, and Gyrton. Pharsalus, however, before the winter closed in voluntarily espoused the King's cause, and whilst Antiochus paraded his phalanx and elephants before Larissa, the Athamanians and Menippus with an Aetolian force were operating separately in Perrhaebia and the hills on the north-western corner of Thessaly. Pellinaeum, about ten miles above Atrax on a tributary of the Peneus, received a strong Athamanian garrison.

Antiochus, before threatening force against Larissa, had exhausted every means of conciliation. He had argued with the city's envoys and dismissed unhurt the contingent of Larissaeans captured in Scotussa. Neither persuasion nor intimidation had availed; it was late in the season to begin a siege. Now, however, Antiochus began to taste the fruits of his alienation of Philip. The cordial *entente* between Philip and the Romans opened the way from Apollonia into Greece through Macedonia. In the country of the Dassaretae above Apollonia, Philip had a personal conference with Baebius, and while Antiochus was winning his easy laurels in Thessaly a Roman detachment under Appius Claudius was making its way through the defiles of Macedonia, and one night the army at Larissa descried its watch-fires on the crest of the hills to the north near Gonni. Appius disposed his little force so as to give it the appearance of a large army. Antiochus still shrank, in spite of the unfortunate incident of Delium, from overt hostilities with Rome. He immediately abandoned the idea of a siege and retired to Demetrias, alleging the advance of winter as a reason for suspending the campaign. Garrisons, Seleucid or Athamanian, were left in the conquered towns. Larissa was saved to the Romans. They retained, thanks to Philip, the northern gate of Greece.

In the early winter months of 191, as soon as the new consuls, Publius Scipio and Manius Acilius Glabrio, had assumed office, the Roman Republic, with all religious and formal circumstance, declared war on King Antiochus. For his part, the King employed the winter in contracting a new marriage. He had been seized with a passion for the daughter of a citizen of Chalcis, Cleoptolemus, and insisted on making her his queen, styling her Euboea, as if she were the patron goddess of the island. The display and indulgence with which it is the fashion of Asiatic courts to celebrate a royal marriage

were strange to Greece, and the spectacle, combined with the inequality of rank and age between the King and his bride, and the grave circumstances of the hour, caused wide scandal. Discipline was relaxed, and the taverns of the Euboean towns were filled with the King's soldiery. As soon, however, as the season allowed, the King took the field. The allied forces met at Chaeronea. It was determined as the first step of the campaign to conquer Acamania. That this movement had a place in any rational scheme of strategy is improbable. Acamania adjoined the country of the Aetolians; for ages it had eluded their grasp; it was the only country in northern Greece which had not made its submission to Antiochus and his allies. This was probably all; and meanwhile Greece lay open on the north, and no attempt was made to reduce Larissa or shut that door against the advance of the legions.

Antiochus inaugurated the campaign, as he had done that of the previous year, by sacrificing at a historic shrine. He had now access to the central shrine of the Greek race, to Delphi itself, and there he endeavored to win the favor of the patron god of his house, and display himself to the world as the consecrated champion of Hellenism. The expedition into Acamania brought, after all, little credit. Antiochus did indeed occupy Medeon, but this was only through the treachery of an Acamanian notable, Mnasilochus, and Clytus, the strategos of the Acarnanian Confederation. The island of Leucas, the seat of the federal government, was held in awe by the fleet of Atilius, a section of which watched events from Cephallenia close by. A few other petty towns beside Medeon were occupied, but Antiochus was still defied by Thyreum when tidings came which rudely disturbed his dreams of conquest.

The Romans after declaring war had taken energetic measures. They did not, like Antiochus, leave to hazard the vital question of supplies. The praetor of the past year in Sicily was ordered to stay on in the island with his successor and be responsible for the transport of corn from that great granary to the army in Greece. A commission was sent to Carthage to supervise the shipment of African corn to the same destination. Meanwhile the other states of the Mediterranean were offering their services—Carthage, Masinissa, and even Antiochus' own son-in-law, Ptolemy Epiphanes. Most momentous of all was the intimation that the King of Macedonia was at their command. Antiochus found no independent support outside Asia and Greece—an indication how his chances, after the flourish of his campaign in northern Greece, seemed to stand. Rome on her part would not let even that admission of weakness escape her which might seem implied in her accepting help from without. She would take nothing from the African powers but the grain of Carthage and Numidia, and that for a just price. Of Philip she only required that he should second the Roman commander.

On the 3rd of May 191 the consul, Manius Acilius, left the city in the garb of war. An army of 20,000 foot, Roman and Italian, and 2000 horse was concentrated at Brundisium by the 15th of the same month. But Baebius and his two legions had taken the offensive before the arrival of the consular army upon the scene. Baebius had been content the previous year, and justly so, with the relief of Larissa; as soon as the spring came he took advantage of its possession. In conjunction with King Philip and a Macedonian army, the propraetor descended upon Thessaly. The rumor of this advance,

carried by Octavius, one of the subordinates of Flamininus, to Leucas, caused Antiochus to throw up the conquest of Acarnania and retire in trepidation to Chalcis.

On entering Thessaly, Baebius and the Macedonians turned in the first instance westwards. Their object was, no doubt, to free the passes so important for Roman communications. The Perrhaebian towns which Menippus had taken the preceding year were speedily recaptured, and the Athamanian garrisons ejected from the places which they held. Pellinaeum, held by the flower of the Athamanian soldiery under Philip of Megalopolis, offered a more stubborn resistance. Baebius was sitting before it, and King Philip before the neighboring Limnaeum, when the consul Acilius appeared in the Macedonian camp. His legions had still to enter Greece by way of Macedonia and Larissa; the consul had pressed on in advance with the mounted troops, either by the same route or more directly across the hills. Limnaeum, with its garrison of Seleucid and Athamanian troops, at once surrendered; Pellinaeum soon after. The Roman and Macedonian forces then separated; Philip carried the war into Athamania itself and annexed the country, Amynder flying over the borders. The consul moved to Larissa to concentrate the Roman troops, and thence, after the men were reposed, began the march south.

The flimsy fabric of Seleucid rule in Thessaly instantly collapsed. Antiochus, still short of troops, could give his garrisons there no hope of relief. Even before Acilius had reached Larissa, Cierium and Metropolis had advised him of their return to allegiance; Crannon, Scotussa, Pherae, Pharsalus delivered up their garrisons on his approach. These garrisons, composed, of course, largely of mercenaries, were, to the number of one thousand men, willing to exchange the service of Antiochus for that of Philip.

Without turning aside to attack Demetrias, the Roman commander struck straight for the ridges of Othrys, which separate Thessaly from the valley of the Spercheus. It was in that valley that Lamia, the capital of the Aetolian League, lay; through it ran the road to central Greece. The Othrys range was another defensible barrier between Antiochus and the Romans. But as the Romans advanced they met no force of the King's. The road over Othrys, about six miles from Pharsalus, passes close under the fastness of Proema. This yielded to Acilius. Another six miles farther on, where the road begins to climb, was the strong town of Thaumaci. Its inhabitants tried to harass the Roman advance by guerilla tactics, but got severe punishment. The next day the Romans descended the southern slope of Othrys. They began wasting the fields of Hypata in the Spercheus valley, about twelve miles above Lamia.

It was not cowardice which restrained a king of the Seleucid stock from confronting the enemy; it was the hopeless slipshod of his military organization. Antiochus had placed no troops upon Othrys because he had none to place. The great hosts from Asia, upon which everything hung, had never arrived. As soon as the Romans entered Thessaly he gave up that country for lost, and removed his base from Demetrias to the safer distance of Chalcis. He had indeed at one moment hoped to arrest the Romans on Othrys; some scanty reinforcements which had at last straggled across the Aegean kept the force at his disposal at its original figure of 10,000 foot and 500

horse, in spite of the loss of his garrisons in Thessaly. He summoned the Aetolians to muster at Lamia; their levy, added to his own force, would make, if Thoas had spoken the truth, a respectable total. At Lamia disillusionment awaited Antiochus; some Aetolian notables presented their insignificant bands; these were all, they assured him, their utmost endeavors had succeeded in raising. The young men nowadays, they added lamely, were not what they used to be. Antiochus now understood the real character of the high-flown Greek patriotism on which he had counted. He finally abandoned Thessaly, Othrys, the Spercheus valley; his only hope lay in checking the Romans at the next harrier, the Oeta range, which narrows the entrance into Central Greece to the road between mountain and sea at Thermopylae. If he could hold up the Romans at that historic passage till the expected reinforcements came!

Antiochus took up a position on the inner (east) side of the pass, and labored to supplement its natural difficulties with barricade and trench and wall. Time had brought about strange revenges when the post of Leonidas was occupied by a Hellenic Xerxes, professing to fight in the cause of Greek freedom. Aetolian bands to the number of four thousand by this time joined him. These Antiochus told off to hinder the advance of the Romans by protecting the territory of Hypata from their ravages and occupying Heraclea. That city was conveniently placed to command the tracks which led across the back of Oeta. When, however, the consular army advanced steadily, and took up a position at the west end of the pass, Antiochus grew uneasy. History furnished him with both an encouragement and a warning. It had not been found possible to break through the pass if it was resolutely held, but over and over again the position of the defenders had been turned by the mountain tracks. Antiochus sent a message to the Aetolian force in Heraclea to occupy the heights. Only half their number thought good to obey this order of their Commander-in-Chief.

When the main body of the Romans assaulted the pass they were unable to make any impression. Antiochus had posted his phalanx, with its huge Macedonian spears, across the way, protected on its right, where the beach formed a sort of morass, by the elephants, while the heights on its left were lined with archers, slingers, and javelineers, who enfiladed the Roman column with a galling rain of missiles from the unshielded side. Even when the stubborn fury of their attack made the phalanx give ground they were brought to a stand by the fortifications behind which it retired to renew the fight at an incontestable advantage. Then history repeated the old drama of Thermopylae. The attention of the Seleucid troops was caught by a body of men moving far up on the heights above them. It must be a reinforcing party of Aetolians. As they descended nearer, as their standards and equipment became distinguishable, they were known for Romans. The consul had detailed a part of his infantry under the consulars, Lucius Flaccus and Marcus Cato, to force the mountain tracks. Two of the Aetolian stations had been unsuccessfully attempted by Flaccus, a third had been surprised sleeping off its guard by Cato and overpowered. It was his force which the defenders of Thermopylae now saw taking them in the rear. All that was left was flight. In a moment the pass which had bristled with sarissae was choked with a stampede—men, horses, elephants flying *pêle-mêle*, The King, wounded in the mouth, did not draw rein till he reached Elatea. The Romans followed, hacking at the confused mass which blocked

their way, as far as Scarphea, and would have carried the pursuit farther had there not been the royal camp to pillage. But the respite was short. Next morning before dawn the Roman cavalry was again scouring the roads, cutting down the bewildered fugitives right and left. The King himself eluded capture. When the pursuers reached Elatea he had made off with 500 men, the relics of his 10,000, to Chalcis.

The Greek expedition of Antiochus would have failed even had the Aetolians on Callidromus not slept at their post. No tactical skill on the field of battle could have compensated for the insecurity of his communications with Asia, an insecurity which could only be remedied by a far more systematic organization of transport and convoys than it was in the nature of an Oriental court to provide. About the time of the battle of Thermopylae a large fleet of transport vessels had been caught by the Roman admiral Atilius off Andros, and the corn destined for the invaders carried in triumph to the Piraeus and distributed to the Athenian people.

Antiochus did not stay long at Chalcis. He made haste to set the breadth of the Aegean between himself and the Romans, and, together with his queen Euboea, regained Ephesus in safety. The return of the King did not of course necessarily mean the end of the conflict. The Seleucid army in Greece, it is true, was annihilated, but the Aetolians were still in arms, and to their envoys, who followed him to Ephesus, Antiochus dispensed money and showed his arsenals humming with the preparations for a gigantic war. There were still Seleucid garrisons dispersed among various towns—at Elis, for example, and Demetrias. A royal squadron of ten vessels was in the harbor of the latter town; it had touched at Thronium whilst the battle in the pass was going on, and when Alexander the Acamanian had come aboard mortally wounded, bringing the tidings of disaster, it had sailed to Demetrias seeking the King.

But any plans Antiochus may have formed for maintaining the struggle in Greece by his subsidies till he could throw a fresh army into the country were futile. All the Greek states which had joined him, Boeotia, Euboea, Elis, hurriedly made their peace with the Romans. His garrisons in Chalcis and Elis had, of course, to be withdrawn. Demetrias threw open its gates to Philip and the leader of the anti-Roman party committed suicide. By the terms of surrender the Seleucid troops there returned under Macedonian escort to Lysimachia, and the ships in the harbor were allowed to depart unharmed. The Aetolians, left to themselves, rapidly succumbed to the combined attack of the Romans and Philip. The siege of Naupactus brought them to extremities, and they secured, by the good offices of Flamininus, an armistice in which to negotiate for peace at Rome.

Thus ended the crowning effort of the house of Seleucus to seize the Macedonian inheritance in Greece. One by one, after what seemed dissolution, had Antiochus III, during thirty years of fighting, restored (in appearance at least) the severed limbs to the body of the Empire. He had annexed the long-coveted Coele-Syria. At the end of the previous year he had, in addition to his dignity as Great King, made good to a large extent his title to be, as Alexander had been, the Captain-General of the states of Greece. At his accession the Empire had touched the lowest point of decline; last year it had touched its zenith. But Antiochus seemed born too late, when already a new

competitor had entered the field. In the moment of its apparent triumph the house of Seleucus had received a terrific blow. So far, it is true, the King's recoil left the situation externally what it had been before his last venture, but he was confronted by an antagonist, victorious, resentful, and hard to turn from his slowly made resolves.

CHAPTER XXI

THE WAR IN ASIA

Antiochus, we are told, did not at first understand the import of what had happened. He had struck a blow for Greece; the blow had failed; that was all; the *status quo*, which the Romans had wished to preserve, was restored. It was mortifying, but he must wait for another occasion. Our account goes on to say that it was Hannibal, now once more listened to with respect, who enlightened him as to the true position. Thoas also and the Aetolian envoys, instead of thwarting Hannibal as before, spoke to a similar effect. Antiochus felt himself to have retired to Asia Minor only as to a vantage ground, from which to spring again on Greece. But the Romans were not the people to submit to such a menace; Antiochus must expect to be struck at nearer home. Last year the problem before him had been to make sure the defences of Greece; now the problem was to make sure those of Asia.

It must be recognized that the position of Antiochus for defense, in spite of the catastrophe in Europe, was a strong one. The circumstances to which his defeat in Greece had been due, the difficulty of procuring reinforcements and supplies, did not exist on the eastern side of the Aegean. If the Romans had beaten him, it had been so far with the superiority of numbers on their side. It would be the Romans who would feel the difficulty of transport in undertaking a war in Asia. They had never yet sent an army so far from home, and, as a matter of fact, regarded the necessity of doing so with considerable apprehension. Even if their soldiers were better than the levies of Asia, they were confronted with the initial difficulty of getting them to Asia at all. The Asiatic dominions of Antiochus could be approached by water only; it was obvious that the first question to settle was the command of the sea. At one point indeed—the Hellespont—Asia almost touched Europe, but both shores of the Hellespont were in Seleucid occupation. The passage of an army through Thrace was under no circumstances easy; Antiochus by a prudent defence could make it almost impossible. The possession of Thrace was a great addition to his strength.

As soon as Antiochus realized the imminence of a Roman attack he took measures to secure both the sea and the Thracian Chersonese. To the latter he himself repaired with the ships in readiness, in order to superintend with his own eyes the dispositions for defense. Sestos and Abydos were strengthened; Lysimachia was made a great depôt. The guard of the sea was committed to the royal admiral, Polyxenidas of Rhodes, who was ordered to mobilize the rest of the fleet and actively patrol the islands (latter part of 191).

A dispatch from Polyxenidas soon called the King back to Ephesus; it announced that a Roman fleet was at anchor in the harbor of Delos.

The Romans were already about to take the offensive at sea. To do this was not only a prerequisite to an eventual invasion of Asia; so long as Antiochus threatened another descent on Greece it was an urgent measure of precaution. They needed to be masters of the sea, not only in order that they might reach Antiochus, but that Antiochus might not reach them. It must be remembered that when Gaius Livius arrived in Greek waters in the summer of 191 to supersede Atilius in command of the Roman fleet, the war in Greece was still going on. The Aetolians were making their stand at Naupactus, and rumours were flying of the King's preparations. Livius set out from the Piraeus to operate on the coasts of Asia.

For a naval war in that region the attitude of the islands and coast cities would be an important consideration. Even that part of Asia Minor which the house of Seleucus called its own was imperfectly subjugated. The coast had been conquered by the present King, after nearly half a century of separation, within the last twenty-five years, some of it within the last four. It was not a region where a long unbroken period of Seleucid rule had made its roots deep and its authority venerable. It did not confront an assailant as a compact whole. The cities, of course, differed in their actual status. Some, like Smyrna and Lampsacus, or the cities which had been freed by Rhodes since 197—Caurus, Myndus, and Halicarnassus—openly asserted their independence. Some, on the other hand, like Ephesus and Abydos, were completely at the King's disposal and filled with his troops. Between these two extremes were perhaps various grades of dependence. The majority of cities seem to have had no Seleucid garrison, but from prudence or inclination to have bowed to the King's control. With the appearance of a Roman fleet in this quarter we shall see a new situation created. The cleft of sympathies between the well-to-do classes and the populace, which had been so marked in Greece, then shows itself in the Greek cities of Asia Minor. The cities sway between the two opposing forces. Some espouse the Roman cause with zeal; others change according to the circumstances of the hour. We hear of none, except those with royal garrisons, which dare to refuse their harbours to the Roman ships when these come near to demand them.

The case of the island states was different. To these the conquests of Antiochus had not yet extended. But they had, no doubt, felt themselves threatened, and they embraced the Roman alliance as an opportune protection. Among these states Rhodes had the pre-eminence. The policy of Rhodes had showed some uncertainty in the last few years. It had offered bold defiance to Antiochus in 197 as an ally of Rome. Since then Antiochus had courted its friendship not altogether in vain. When the Roman ships first appeared in the East, the Rhodian statesmen, conscious perhaps of the dangers to Greek liberty from either quarter, hesitated for a space to commit themselves. But they soon made up their minds to give the Roman admiral their co-operation, and, once ranged on that side, left no room for reproach in the matter of zeal. Samos, one of the states which had recovered its independence by means of Rhodes in 197, Chios and Mitylene were also ready to throw in their lot with Rome. Delos, whose harbor had received the fleets of Livius, followed, as far as it could, a policy of neutrality, or rather of friendship with all the powers. It drew honors and presents from all parts of the

Hellenic world, and would have been glad to alienate none of its benefactors. The gift of a chalice from King Antiochus is recorded in the registers of the Temple. But with the advent of the Roman forces it receives gifts year by year from their commanders.

It need not be pointed out how great an advantage it was to the Roman fleet to have these islands as points of support in operating on the coast of Asia. It gave them both protection and posts of observation close to the enemy's positions. Chios became the main depot for the grain and other stores on which the Roman army depended.

But it was the Pergamene kingdom upon which the Romans counted above all else. Eumenes was, of course, an energetic ally. He was to Asia what the traitor within the walls is to a beleaguered city. His local knowledge, his influence in the Greek cities, would be invaluable to an invader. His harbour-town, Elaea, would give them a foothold upon the mainland. His dominion cut off Antiochus from direct communication by land with the region of the Hellespont. Even for maintaining his position in Asia Antiochus depended upon his command of the sea.

The fleet of Livius counted eighty-one decked vessels, including the twenty-five taken over from his predecessor, and a large number of smaller craft. Carthage had sent a contingent of six ships; King Eumenes, voyaging home, accompanied the fleet with three. Livius was being detained at Delos by contrary winds when the patrolling ships of Polyxenidas got tidings of him. Antiochus, as soon as the news reached him, hurried back to Ephesus. At a council of war it was decided, on the advice of Polyxenidas, to engage the enemy before he was joined by the allied fleets of Pergamos and Rhodes. The Romans, it was anticipated, would make for Pergamos, and to intercept them the Seleucid fleet, with King Antiochus on board, sailed northward. This fleet was less numerous than the Roman, comprising only seventy decked vessels, and the ships were smaller, but Polyxenidas put great confidence in their handier build and greater mobility and in the local knowledge of his seamen. The enemy's vessels were known to be carrying large cargoes of food, and so to be heavier in the draught. On reaching Phocaea the king's fleet got intelligence that the enemy was somewhere in the neighborhood. Antiochus had no desire for personal experience of a fight at sea, and was put ashore. Polyxenidas then moved south again to Cissus, near Erythrae, hoping to catch the enemy, but his maneuvering completely failed of its end. The Roman commander slipped past on the outside of Chios and got to Phocaea unchallenged. Phocaea was the first Greek town in the King's country which the Romans touched. It did not dare to offer them any opposition. It was then a short matter for Eumenes to proceed to Elaea and bring up the Pergamene fleet. The united strength of Romans and Pergamenes in decked vessels reached 105. Livius, having successfully effected the junction, was as eager for an engagement as Polyxenidas. The King's admiral waited for the enemy in battle order off Cissus, his right wing resting on the shore. The engagement opened with the capture of a Carthaginian ship by two of the King's. But it soon became apparent that the mobility to which Polyxenidas trusted availed little against the Roman tactics. An attacking ship found itself grappled by the iron claws of the ponderous Roman and the fight was transformed to a hand-to-hand encounter. The Seleucid left, where Livius directed the attack, was first broken, and the King of Pergamos, who was waiting in reserve, then flung his weight upon the right. The Seleucid fleet was soon in full rout.

Thanks to its lightness it escaped with the loss of only twenty-three vessels, thirteen of which were captured. The result aimed at by Livius was completely obtained; the Seleucid fleet, if not annihilated, was beaten off the sea. When the victors, now further strengthened by a Rhodian squadron of twenty decked ships under Pausistratus, made a demonstration off Ephesus, the King's admiral did not dare to go out to battle. Erythrae almost immediately after is found to have joined the Roman alliance. The season for active operations closed, leaving the Romans masters of the Aegean. The allied fleets separated. The Romans, after visiting Chios and leaving five vessels at Phocaea to secure its loyalty, beached their ships at Canae on the Pergamene coast and sat down to wish for the spring.

But although the operations of war were suspended, the leaven of disaffection probably worked strongly among the Greek cities of the Seleucid alliance. Cyme and the Aeolian cities generally, Colophon and Clazomenae had before long declared for the Romans. The ships of Cos came to fight alongside of the ships of Rhodes.

Antiochus saw that every nerve must be strained during the winter if the campaign of 190 was to stem the progress of the Roman arms. He directed his own energies to the massing of the land-forces of his kingdom. The point of concentration was fixed at Magnesia, about thirty-five miles up the Hermus valley, out of sight of the Roman fleet, but not so far inland as Sardis, which lay in the same valley another thirty miles farther up. Antiochus went himself for the winter to Phrygia, to supervise the movement of troops. All Asia felt the strain of effort. Every province from the Mediterranean to Central Asia sent its choice of fighting men. Along all the roads companies of horse and foot in every variety of habit were moving to a common centre; men of nations that had long ago ruled in Asia, Assyrians, Medes, Lydians; men of the Greek and Macedonian stock that ruled since yesterday; half-savage peoples of steppe, desert and mountain—nomads of the Caspian, Arabs from the south on their camels, yellow-haired Galatians, whose fathers had descended from the forests of central Europe. Once more Asia with its medley of nations was uniting to repel an invader from the West, as it had united a century and a half before to repel Alexander under the hand of the last Persian king.

But the great host gathering on land loomed still in the background. It would not feel the impact of the legions till the way was opened by the conquest of the sea. The war was still among the ships. The Romans had, it is true, the upper hand at sea already. They had driven the Seleucid fleet into its harbor. They had convenient naval bases in the friendly islands, like Chios and Samos, or in the coast cities, like Phocaea and Erythrae. They cut off the King's forces from the critical region of the Hellespont. But the King had not yet abandoned the contest. His fleet, if penned up, was not annihilated. The corsairs, who made common cause with him, might still prey upon the Roman corn-ships. And Antiochus was determined to make a supreme effort to recover the sea. Such an effort implied in the first place a great increase in the fleet. Hammers and axes were busy all that winter in the docks of Ephesus, old vessels being repaired and new bottoms laid down. This work was done under the eye of Polyxenidas. But it was still, as in old Achaemenian days, the Phoenician cities from which the Great King mainly drew his naval strength. And the task of bringing up reinforcements from that quarter

was appropriately confided to Hannibal. In the second place, it was important to dislodge the Romans from the footholds which they had on land, or at any rate prevent them from acquiring any more. The islands, whilst the Romans held the sea, were out of reach, but the cities of the mainland might be coerced, conciliated or overawed. The King's son Seleucus was stationed with a force in Aeolis, to wait for an opportunity to drive the Romans out of the places they had already won, and to counteract their solicitations in the case of cities which were still wavering.

Such were the preparations on the Seleucid side. The Romans improved the inactive season by a raid, made about mid-winter in concert with Eumenes, into the country about Thyatira—an expedition which proved lucrative enough in the matter of loot. When spring drew on, Livius thought himself already in a position to achieve the great object of all his naval operations, to secure the Hellespont for the passage of the legions. On his way north he landed in the Troad, and, like Antiochus, went up to sacrifice to the Athena of Ilion. The petty towns of the Troad—Elaeus, Dardanum and Rhoeteum—put themselves into his hand. When the Roman squadron moved to the place where the transit of a bare mile of sea separated Sestos on the European, from Abydos on the Asiatic, shore, he proposed to reduce both towns. The Seleucid government depended for its hold in this quarter upon the strong garrison in Abydos. Sestos seems to have been undefended, and now, cut off as it was from the garrison opposite by the Roman ships, it first deputed the eunuch-priests of the Great Mother, the *galloi*, to deprecate an attack, and then formally capitulated. The reduction of Abydos was naturally a much more difficult affair. It was, even so, pressed by the Roman commander to a point when the King's officer allowed the city to treat. But the siege was suddenly raised; tidings reached Livius of a grave sort.

He had not in moving north left the rest of the Aegean denuded. The main part of his fleet was still at Canae. The Rhodians, when Livius launched his thirty ships, were already stirring. A squadron of thirty-six sail under Pausistratus, a bluff and ingenuous sailor, was put to sea. But now, in the absence of Livius, a great blow was struck on the side of the King. The hand was that of Polyxenidas, and the stroke did him little honour. He secretly conveyed to Pausistratus the intimation that he was ready as the price of his return to his native country (he was, it will be remembered, a banished Rhodian) to betray the King's fleet to the enemy. He was to neglect preparations and give Pausistratus the signal to attack. The crews indeed of the ships disappeared in a curious manner from Ephesus, and such a device as their being moved to the neighboring Magnesia was remote from the simple mind of Pausistratus. He slipped into an easy confidence, and only waited at Panormus on the Samian coast for the signal of Polyxenidas. There he was, one morning, taken in front and rear simultaneously by Polyxenidas, and only five of the Rhodian ships escaped destruction or capture. Pausistratus himself perished in the attempt to break away in his flag-ship to the open sea.

The success, however shabby in its method, was substantial in its result. It was not the only one. Phocaea had been made the previous winter the station of five ships of the Roman fleet. The place was of importance to Rome from its neighborhood to Magnesia-on-Sipyllus. It was also required to furnish its quota of corn to the Roman

forces and a tale of 500 gowns and 500 tunics. These burdens, coming at a time of scarcity, raised murmurs among the townsfolk, and gave an advantage to the popular party, which here, as elsewhere, was less inclined to Rome than the governing class. The withdrawal of the ships when the ferment was once at work, instead of allaying it, only removed restraint. The presence of Seleucus in the neighborhood gave the King's party, the *Antiochistai*, courage. In this predicament the city magistrates sent an urgent request to Seleucus to withdraw, declaring that the city's policy was to remain neutral and await the event. The message only made Seleucus hasten forward to use his opportunity. A gate was opened by the *Antiochistai* and Seleucus took possession of the city. It was at once secured by a strong garrison. Several of the Aeolian towns, including Cyme, transferred their allegiance to the King.

Polyxenidas could filch a victory by the arts of an intriguer, but he could not use it. The annihilation of the Rhodian fleet gave him an opportunity to fall upon the bulk of the Roman fleet at Canae before it could be got down to the sea or Livius come to its rescue. This, in fact, was what Livius feared he would do, and evacuated the Hellespont with all speed to hasten south. But he reached Canae, and Eumenes Elaea, without seeing the enemy. The beached ships had not been molested. The incident was nevertheless an awkward demonstration that the King's fleet, while it could hold itself out of reach, could keep the Romans and their allies to the strain of a close watch. Livius determined to remove his station to Samos, which was nearer Ephesus. There he was to meet a second Rhodian fleet of twenty sail, under Eudamus. On his way along the coast he made a descent upon Aeolis, and seized what he could of slaves or substance, in punishment of its desertion. He rallied his fleet, now joined by King Eumenes, in one of the harbours of Erythrae for the passage to Samos. Polyxenidas was on the watch. But again, although a storm separated the Roman ships, he allowed the scattered portions to slip through his maladroit hands and regain Corycus (the Erythraean harbor) in safety. After this fiasco he retired to Ephesus; the Romans crossed to Samos unopposed, and effected a junction in a few days with the Rhodians.

Things were now come to a deadlock. The allied fleets shut up Polyxenidas in Ephesus, but they themselves could not move away. And meanwhile the Hellespont was still in the King's hands, and a base for the cruisers which swooped down upon the Roman commissariat vessels. The Phoenician fleet was coming up from the east. Not to remain altogether inactive Livius landed a party of troops to pillage the country round Ephesus, but Andronicus, the commander of the garrison, drove them back by a successful sortie, with the loss of their plunder, to the ships. Livius now formed the naive project of imprisoning the royal fleet in the harbor of Ephesus by sinking hulks at the entrance. He had not time to make the experiment. Lucius Aemilius Begillus, one of the praetors of the new year (190) arrived in Samos to take over the command. The next bout in the struggle, opened by his arrival, is characterized by an unsuccessful attempt on either side. *The attempt of the Romans was to establish a post in Lycia.*

Such a move was prompted, so far as the Romans were concerned, by the necessity of intercepting the reinforcements from Phoenicia; but there was another motive at work. Just as the Aetolians had used the alliance of Antiochus to advance their own ambitions, so the allies of Rome sought to use her power for their separate

ends. The Rhodians cherished the hope of adding Lycia to their dependencies on the mainland and designed to engage the Roman forces in the conquest. It was a Rhodian captain who suggested the move. In the unprofitable situation the suggestion was accepted by the Roman admiral.

Patara the capital of the Lycian Confederation, was the place chosen. But Patara was held by a Seleucid garrison, and the townsfolk offered so fierce an opposition that Livius, who commanded the expedition, now as a subordinate of Aemilius, abandoned the enterprise and, sending his squadron to Rhodes, himself sailed away home. The expedition had incidentally the result of evoking a demonstration of zeal for the Roman cause on the part of the cities of Caria—Myndus, Halicamassus, Cos, Miletus and Cnidus—of which the first three certainly, and the last two probably, had been for some time independent. Alabanda mentions in an inscription the services it rendered to the Roman armies, and these probably went back to the time before Magnesia. Mylasa also declared against Antiochus while the event of the war still hung in the balance.

The crux, of course, in the position of the allies was, shortly put, that the fleet was wanted in three places at once—before Ephesus to watch Polyxenidas, in Lycia to arrest Hannibal, and in the Hellespont. It could not be separated without setting Polyxenidas at large to harass the friends of Rome and attack the divisions of the fleet in detail. Polyxenidas understood the position and abided his time. However, after the failure of Livius the new admiral must do something. He felt that anything was better than to sit still in Samos, especially when another attack he had made on Ephesus had broken down. Accordingly, even at the cost of letting Polyxenidas loose, he determined to move the united fleet on Patara. The gathering of ships glided away from Samos sailing south. But the liberation of Polyxenidas would tell more heavily upon the people whose land was exposed to his ravages than upon the Romans. And the move of the commander was widely criticized by the subordinate officers, who reflected on the importance of retaining the good-will and confidence of their Asiatic allies. Aemilius was shaken in his resolution by these murmurs. The fleet got no farther than Loryma in the Rhodian Peraea. Then it returned after a mere waste of time to Samos. *The Roman attempt to obtain a lodgment in Lycia had definitely failed.* There were seen to be no alternatives between dividing the fleet and lying idle in front of Ephesus.

The attempt on the part of Antiochus which corresponded in time with these events was *to crush the Pergamene kingdom*, Seleucus first made a dash with the force he had under him in Aeolis upon Elaea. Finding it prepared for defence, he at once moved, pillaging the country as he went, upon Pergamos itself. Simultaneously Antiochus left his winter quarters in Apamea and advanced upon the Pergamene territory by way of the Sardis-Thyatira road. The motley host which he had spent the winter in collecting was soon encamped about thirty miles from Pergamos near the sources of the Caicus. In the absence of Eumenes, the government and defence of the kingdom were in the hands of his brother Attalus. But before the attack of the two Seleucid armies he could do no more than shut himself up in the walls of the capital and abandon the country to devastation. This was the posture of things reported to Eumenes on his return with the Romans to Samos. He at once hurried home and slipped through the besiegers' lines into the city. A few days after, the fleet of the allies, still united,

made the port of Elaea. The danger of his chief ally had seemed to Aemilius a justification for again relaxing the blockade of Polyxenidas.

All this while the legions were drawing closer. The nominal command was held by the consul Lucius Cornelius Scipio, but the real direction was in the hands of his great brother Publius, the victor of Zama, who accompanied him with practically proconsular power. There were the two legions of Acilius which the Scipios had taken over in Greece, and they had brought with them from Italy two legions more—a force (Roman and Italian) of 13,000 foot and 500 horse. In Greece they had found the Aetolians, after a vain attempt to make terms at Rome, still in arms; but in order not to be diverted from their main object, the Scipios encouraged them to renew negotiations. An armistice was arranged for, which allowed the Roman army to press forward to Macedonia. And in this way the hopes which Antiochus had built upon the Aetolian resistance collapsed. The march through Macedonia and Thrace was made as easy as possible by the zeal of Philip, who had repaired the road, bridged the rivers, and laid up stores of provisions against the coming of the Romans. The Seleucid occupation of Thrace since 196 seems to have rested upon the garrisons in Aenus, Maronea, and Lysimachia. But these places remained apparently on the defensive; no opposition was offered to the Roman advance. The real difficulties, it was apprehended, would begin when the Hellespont was reached. A check there might threaten the Roman camp with famine.

The rumor of their approach, as well, no doubt, as the consciousness that his attack on Pergamos was a failure, made the King lose all stomach for the war. He came down from the hills to the low country about Elaea, and leaving his infantry upon a neighboring eminence, approached the city with his clouds of horse and asked to treat. The answer, inspired by Eumenes, was that there could be no negotiations before the arrival of the consul.

Behind the walls of Pergamos and Elaea the enemy was out of the king's reach. There was no time for a siege such as had given him Sardis, and Bactra, and Gaza in the glorious years of his reign. He could, of course, sweep the open fields, and his hordes in that spring of 190 made the gardens of the Pergamenes and Elaeans a desolation. Thence he passed to the plain of Thebe behind Adramyttium, the richest part of the kingdom of Eumenes, and gave it up to the will of his troops. Adramyttium itself he failed to take, Eumenes and Aemilius moving round into its harbor. Antiochus next went on to waste the territory belonging to the island city of Mitylene, which had joined the Romans—its possessions on the mainland—and having taken some obscure townships (Cotton, Corylenus, Aphrodisias, Prinne), returned the way he came to Sardis. Seleucus also withdrew from Pergamos to the Aeolian sea-board — a movement caused, says the account which emanates from the Achaean historian, by the damaging sorties made by a body of Achaeans whom the League in virtue of its alliance with Eumenes had sent under Diophanes, a disciple of Philopoemen. But if Antiochus failed to capture Pergamos, the Romans equally failed to regain possession of Phocaea. Reinforcements thrown into the city by Antiochus saved it. And the Romans resorted to as base a consolation as Antiochus—they wrought havoc among the shrines and works of art with which the neighbouring Bacchium was filled. In a word, neither side had

succeeded in materially modifying the situation, as it had been when Aemilius first arrived, except that Hannibal on the one side, and Scipio on the other were come nearer.

Aemilius was reduced at last to divide the fleet. Eumenes and the Pergamene contingent were first detached to convey from Elaea to the Hellespont the material necessary for the passage of the consular army. The Roman and Rhodian fleets returned south to Samos. There a further division took place. The Rhodian fleet was sent to encounter Hannibal, and the Roman was left alone confronting Polyxenidas.

Eudamus, the commander of the Rhodian fleet, departed from Samos with the thirteen Rhodian vessels, one Coan and one Cnidian. On reaching Rhodes he found that the authorities at home had already anticipated the order of the Roman admiral, and had sent out a squadron under Pamphilidas. Their action had no doubt been accelerated by the fact that the Seleucid forces in Lycia were becoming aggressive and had beset Daedala, the frontier fortress of the Rhodian Peraea, and others of their towns. Eudamus hastened to join his ships with those of Pamphilidas. When he came up with him, Pamphilidas was off the island of Megiste, twenty miles beyond Patara, having successfully relieved the frontier towns. Eudamus took command of the united squadrons and proceeded to Phaselis, where he intended to lie in wait for the Phoenician fleet. But the year being at its hottest and the place malarious, the sickness which broke out among the crews compelled him to move on. The mountains of Pamphylia, unlike those of Lycia and Rough Cilicia, on either side of them, retreat from the coast, leaving a crescent-shaped plain between their feet and the sea. Towards the western extremity of this plain were the two Greek towns of Aspendus and Side, the former some few miles up the river Eurymedon, the latter twenty miles to the west on the coast. Each was distinguished by its steadfast enmity towards the other. In the quarrels which affected that region they were sure to be found on opposite sides. In the present instance Side was strong for the Seleucid cause; it furnished a redoubtable contingent to the King's fleet, being ranked in naval prowess with the Phoenician towns; Aspendus, of course, held by Rhodes and Rome. When Eudamus reached the Eurymedon the Phoenician fleet was already in the harbor of Side. The Aspendiaus gave him the intelligence. On the following day the thirty-six Rhodian ships (thirty-two quadriremes and four triremes) moved along the coast in a long column, the flag-ship of Eudamus leading. As they rounded a headland before Side the anxiously-expected Phoenician fleet came into view. It lay before them in line of battle, forty-seven sail, among them three great ships of seven banks of oars, and four of six. Its right was commanded by a nobleman of the court, Apollonius, and on its left was Hannibal. Eudamus immediately accepted the challenge, and stood out from shore so that the ships in rear might form into line on his left. Before there was room for the Rhodian left to come up into line, the right was engaged by Hannibal. In spite of this initial disadvantage, the nimble seamanship of Rhodes gained the day. One of the towering giants of the King's fleet was disabled in a moment by the blow of a Rhodian vessel half its size. Where Hannibal was, indeed, the Phoenicians pressed Eudamus hard, but they were compelled to retire when their right was broken for fear of being cut off from the shore. Under some circumstances the Rhodian victory might not have been final; more than twenty ships of Hannibal's fleet were uninjured; the Rhodians, owing to the sickness which their rowers had contracted

at Phaselis, could not press the pursuit effectively; the Phoenicians had the friendly Side and the Cilician coast behind them as a refuge. But Hannibal could no longer hope to get his fleet in time past the victorious enemy, who henceforth lay to intercept him off Lycia. All that was necessary for the purposes of the war had been done; the Phoenician reinforcements on which the King counted were paralyzed.

The battle of Side spoilt the chance of Antiochus. Had fortune inclined the other way, the Phoenician fleet would have joined the fleet under Polyxenidas at Ephesus, and together they would have given battle to the Romans with an overwhelming superiority. And the command of the sea regained, the Hellespont would oppose an insuperable bar to the consular army, and place before it the alternatives of retreat or starvation. The land-forces of Rome, which could pierce to the interior of his kingdom, these were the enemy which exercised Antiochus; the naval war, wherever its battles might be fought, was in reality a struggle for the Hellespont. The King's defences at the critical point were further weakened about the time of the disaster at Side by a diplomatic defeat not less galling and not less momentous. Prusias of Bithynia, after being beset with the solicitations of either side, at last somewhat unexpectedly ranged himself with the enemy. The letters of the Scipios had labored to show him how enviable was the lot of those princes who were clients of the Republic. And their force had been carried home by Gaius Livius in person, who, after returning from the fleet to Rome, had been sent out again as special envoy to the Bithynian king.

There was now nothing for Antiochus to do but to make a supreme effort with the fleet of Polyxenidas. The enemy's forces at any rate were still divided, the Pergamenes in the north and a number of the Rhodian ships about Lycia. The King himself came down from Sardis to Ephesus that the encounter might take place under his own eyes. To draw the Romans from Samos, Polyxenidas moved out and attacked Notium, now a dependency of Colophon, and in fact its port. Colophon was the nearest to Ephesus of the cities which held by Rome. Antiochus brought up a force to Notium and threatened the town on the landward side. Aemilius had all this time been growing more and more impatient in Samos, and since Polyxenidas did not come out to engage him, had talked of going off to the Hellespont. When the cry of the Colophonians reached him he saw an opportunity for action at last. He did not, however, proceed straight to Notium, but northwards, intending to revictual at Chios and punish Teos on the way for promising the King's fleet 5000 jars of wine. The wine dispatched from Italy to his own fleet had, he heard, been delayed by bad weather, and it seemed a happy thought to extort from the Teians those jars which they had collected for the King. Teos, on the neck of a rocky foreland, had a harbor on its northern as well as on its southern side. The Roman fleet sailed into the northern one and addressed their demands to the city. Polyxenidas was informed of the enemy's movements. He knew the northern harbor of Teos to have a narrow entrance, and thought he had the Roman fleet in a trap. Immediately the King's fleet of eighty-nine sail, counting two ships of seven banks and three of six, made for Teos and concealed itself in a small island close by. Unfortunately the Romans had already removed to the other harbor, and instead of taking them in a trap, Polyxenidas found himself committed to another battle in the open. The Romans, on learning the neighborhood of the royal fleet, got to sea with some confusion,

Eudamus and the Rhodian contingent in the rear. Between the promontories of Myonnesus and Corycus the hostile fleets came within each other's view. Polyxenidas was advancing in a column in double file. The Romans and their allies counted nine ships less than the King's admiral, and he at once tried to turn this numerical superiority to account by deploying so as to outflank the Roman right. This device was foiled by Eudamus and the Rhodians, who came up with disconcerting speed to the threatened flank. The fleets after this were locked in a general grapple. Then the royal centre gave and broke; the victorious Romans passed through the enemy's line and attacked the rear of his left, with which the Rhodians were engaged in front. The royal right, seeing what had occurred and the flag-ship of Polyxenidas in flight, abandoned the hopeless contest and spread their sails for Ephesus. A naval fight in ancient times was made up entirely of ramming and boarding; in the art of maneuvering, necessary for the former, no seamen in the world could compare with those of Rhodes; in boarding, it was man against man, the Roman against the Asiatic, Greek or Syrian. The Rhodian fire-ships had also materially contributed to the victory. On the King's side the loss was thirteen ships taken and twenty-nine burnt or sunk; the loss of the allies was only three, two Roman and one Rhodian. The King himself, his elephants and cavalry displayed about him, had watched the action from the shore.

After this third and decisive battle *the naval war was ended in favor of Rome*. That war had been to Antiochus all along a struggle for the Hellespont; with his final defeat he gave up the Hellespont for lost. It must come at last, he saw, to a battle of the phalanx and the legion, and with his impulsive precipitancy he abandoned everything but preparations for that encounter. His instinct was to draw his forces about him; Lysimachia, in spite of the entreaties of the citizens, was evacuated and its garrison recalled to Asia; the siege of Colophon was raised. For a time the garrison in Abydos was retained; then that too was withdrawn. The King sat down in Sardis, and sent his messengers to bring up troops from Cappadocia and from wherever else they could be found. He could not even spare a force for the relief of Phocaea, which the Romans soon after their victory had proceeded to besiege. The city, on being promised good treatment, capitulated, and its harbor was chosen as the station of the Roman fleet for the winter, which was now close at hand.

The evacuation of Lysimachia was an agreeable surprise to the Scipios, since the city could have sustained a long siege and created a difficult delay. In his haste Antiochus had even omitted to remove or destroy the stores of which it was full, and they were a godsend to the Roman soldiers. No enemy appeared to trouble their passage of the Hellespont; all the necessary material had been prepared by Eumenes and was waiting for them. With unlooked-for ease the Romans found themselves encamped on Asiatic soil.

Antiochus at his former overtures for peace had been told to await the arrival of the consul. While the Romans were still, for reasons connected with the religious calendar, halted on the shores of the Hellespont, Heraclides, a Byzantine, appeared in their camp as envoy from the King. He was instructed to approach Publius Scipio especially, both because of his reputation for magnanimity, and because his son had at some time during the war been captured by Seleucus, and was being treated with every

sort of consideration at the royal court. Antiochus was prepared to make large concessions. The Thracian question, his envoy said, no longer existed, since Antiochus had already evacuated his European province; on the question of the Greek cities of Asia also he would give way, recognizing the independence of Smyrna, Lampsacus, Alexandria Troas, and all the cities which had allied themselves with Rome. That is to say, *Antiochus surrendered the whole original ground of quarrel*. But besides this he would pay an indemnity amounting to half the costs of the war. These overtures of the King were seconded by the city of Heraclea, which had been forward to confirm its friendly relations with Rome on the advance of the legions, and now endeavored to mediate between the belligerents. Possibly other of the Greek states acted in concert.

But at this stage the Romans could not be thus satisfied. “When the horse is bitted and the rider set, there is no easy parting”. They required not only to see the past aggressions of the Seleucid King cancelled, but to secure themselves against their repetition at any future conjuncture. Their demands were the whole costs of the war and the evacuation of all the country north of the Taurus. The attempts of the envoy to obtain a modification of these terms by an appeal to Publius Scipio’s private interests, whether by the offer to release his son or more vulgar forms of bribery, met with such an answer as showed that the ways of a Roman aristocrat were not yet those of an Oriental official.

On learning the answer to his proposals, Antiochus made up his mind to fight. The Roman army was soon in motion. It advanced along the shore of the Troad, whose towns had surrendered to Livius in the spring, and now received the western invader with profuse friendliness. At Ilium the Romans believed themselves to have come to the cradle of their race; it was a meeting of long-sundered kinsmen.

But the Romans were not come to Asia to indulge in sentiment; the season was advanced, and the Scipios were anxious to strike a decisive blow before winter should bring the war to a standstill. They marched straight for the upper Caicus, whence Sardis could be reached by the same road which Antiochus had used in his attack on Pergamos a few months before, the road which led up from the Caicus valley over the watershed between the Caicus and the tributaries of the Hermus to Thyatira, and thence to Sardis in thirty straight miles. In the Caicus valley the consul halted till the troops were fully provisioned. Eumenes, who had been left behind with his ships in the Hellespont and now overtook the Roman army, was sent to Pergamos to bring up the corn he had stored in readiness. The consul, Lucius Scipio, was at this moment deprived of his brother's direction; Publius had been stricken down with a sickness which compelled him to be carried to the sea, and he lay ill at Elaea. Antiochus, when he heard it, with a magnanimity that was showy rather than interested, sent him his captive son without ransom. From his arrival Scipio began to mend. His thanks to the King took the form of a piece of advice—not to risk a battle till he had returned to the camp.

This message caused Antiochus to retire to Magnesia in the southern part of the Hyrcanian plain. Near that city he took up a position on the left bank of the Phrygius, a tributary of the Hermus, and surrounded himself with such works as would defy attack till Publius Scipio returned to his brother's side. The consul, believing Antiochus to be

still at Thyatira, crossed from the Caicus to the northern extension of the Hyrcanian plain, and then finding he had moved, followed him along the opposite bank of the Phrygius, and pitched less than four miles away, the river between the two camps. A skirmish took place on his arrival between the Roman outposts and a body of light horse, Gallic and Central-Asian, which the King threw across. Then after two days of in-activity the consul transferred his camp to the left bank, bringing it to about a mile and a half from the King's. Antiochus did not defend the river, but harassed the enemy without much effect whilst the new camp was being made. After that each day, for four days, the two armies deployed under their ramparts, but neither attacked. On the fifth the Romans came to within 350 yards of the King's defences. Still Antiochus did not move. The consul, urged by the wish to bring matters to a decision before the winter, on the third day after again deployed his line in the plain. Antiochus was now obliged by the fear of demoralizing his troops to accept battle.

On the Roman side the four legions formed the bulk of the line, to the right of which were the Greek auxiliaries, Achaean and Pergamene, the Roman and Pergamene horse, and a body of missile-shooters, Cretan and Trallian (Illyrian). On the left, which was protected by the river, were only four squadrons of horse. A contingent of Macedonian and Thracian volunteers was detailed to guard the camp. The few African elephants were stationed in the rear of the legions. On the side of the King the phalanx, with its complement of elephants, occupied the centre, flanked on the right by Gallic, on the left by Cappadocian foot; beyond these were the various bodies of horse, covered on the left by the scythed chariots, and the missile-shooters, as usual, at the two extremities. The King himself commanded on the right, Seleucus and the King's nephew, Antipater, on the left, Minnio, Zeuxis and Philip the *elephantarchos* in the centre. The day opened in a wet mist, which had an ill effect on the Asiatic bows and thongs. When the armies engaged, Antiochus was once more betrayed by his characteristic impetuosity. The charge of the Iranian cavalry, which he commanded in person, drove in the weak body of horse on the Roman left, and Antiochus, just as he had done under similar circumstances twenty-six years before at Raphia, at once dashed forward in pursuit, taking no thought for the rest of the field. Whilst the King was following the routed squadrons up to the Roman entrenchments a fearful collapse was taking place on the other wing. Here the scythed chariots—a species of terrorism in which the armies of Asia found it hard not to believe—had been easily repelled by a shower of missiles under the direction of Eumenes. Their flight disordered the bodies of cavalry behind them, and, on the charge of the Roman and Pergamene horse, corps after corps broke and fled till the flank of the Cappadocian infantry was exposed. The Cappadocians fled. Then the shock of the Roman onset reached the phalanx. But the stampede of the left had already entangled the phalanx, and the Roman foot, when it came to close quarters, had little to do but butcher's work. On the right also the Romans rallied, and turned the victory of the royal wing into flight. For a while as much of the great army as succeeded in gaining the camp held it against the conquerors. Then the camp was stormed, and its storm followed by fresh carnage. The King's army was practically annihilated.

That night the King passed through Sardis, flying, his face toward the east. He had come only to take up Queen Euboea and his daughter, and before dawn he was on the road to Apamea. Seleucus and a number of principal men had fled to Apamea from the field. From Apamea, Antiochus on the following day pursued his course to Syria, leaving his generals to rally the fugitives. In the regions upon which the King turned his back his rule instantly ceased; the cities sought with all possible speed to make their peace with Rome. Magnesia-on-Sipylus and the neighboring Thyatira surrendered the day after the battle. Next a deputation came from Sardis itself, even the soldiers of the garrison advocating surrender, in spite of the new commandant and the new satrap of Lydia, whom Antiochus had installed in his passage through the city. When the news of the battle reached Ephesus, Polyxenidas immediately took the fleet to Patara—as far as he dared, because of the Rhodian squadron at Megiste—and there left it, himself making for Syria overland. Ephesus threw its gates open to the Romans.

To Antiochus after the battle of Magnesia there was no longer any course open except to accept whatever conditions the Romans determined to impose. As soon as the consul reached Sardis and was joined there by his brother Publius, now sufficiently recovered, Musaeus, the King's herald, presented himself and asked leave for his master to send ambassadors. This was granted, and in a few days the ambassadors came. They were Zeuxis, who had lately resided as satrap in the very place to which he now came as a suppliant, and Antipater, the King's nephew. The conditions announced by the Roman generals were no more than they had been before the battle: (1) the Taurus to be the frontier of the Seleucid Empire, and the King's hands to be held off Europe; (2) an indemnity covering the total costs of the war, estimated at 15,000 Euboic talents, of which 500 was to be paid at once, 2500 when peace was ratified, and the remainder in twelve annual instalments; (3) a supplementary indemnity to Eumenes of 400 talents, besides the arrears of a debt for corn supplied to the Seleucid government by the late King Attalus; (4) the delivery of twenty hostages, to be selected by Rome; (5) the extradition of Hannibal, Thoas and certain other obnoxious persons; (6) the regular supply to the Roman army of a fixed amount of corn till the conclusion of peace.

The instructions of the royal envoys were to secure peace on any terms that could be had. It was accordingly the next step to send an embassy to Rome to obtain the ratification of the consul's conditions. In the following winter (190-189) the embassy, headed by Antipater, came early to Ephesus, where the consul had fixed his headquarters, bringing with them the required hostages, and amongst them a younger son of the King's, called, like his dead brother, Antiochus. They were conducted to Rome under the escort of one of the consul's aides-de-camp.

The terms of peace, as outlined by Scipio, were ratified that winter by the Senate and the People, and a provisional treaty made with Antipater. The definitive peace was, of course, to be drawn up on the spot by the usual ten commissioners. The Taurus to be the frontier—that was the main principle. Beyond that Rome refused to interfere, even on behalf of the older Greek cities. When the Rhodian envoys raised the question of Soli in Cilicia, the Senate showed itself so disinclined to urge its emancipation upon Antiochus, that the Rhodians let the matter drop.

During the following year (189), the ten commissioners not having yet arrived in the East, we find the Seleucid court supplying corn, according to the compact made with Scipio, to the Roman army in Asia. Seleucus, the King's son, himself conveyed it to Antioch-on-the-Meander. Lucius Scipio had returned home, and had been rewarded for his victory by the surname of Asiaticus. His place was now taken by the consul Gnaeus Manlius, who, when Seleucus reached him, was just setting out on an expedition against the Galatians. Manlius insisted that the compact should be so interpreted as to include his Pergamene allies.

In the winter (189-188) Musaeus appears at Ephesus as the King's ambassador. Antiochus is ordered to send his tale of corn, as well as the 2500 talents now due, to Pamphylia in the spring. The position of Pamphylia was somewhat ambiguous, since the irregularity of the mountain formation made it doubtful on which side of the Taurus it should be held to be. Antiochus still maintained a garrison in Perga. When the spring came, Manlius moved across the mountains from Apamea into Pamphylia. The corn and the bullion were being brought from Syria overland in waggons and on oxen. After the consul had waited three days the long train wound into sight, having found more delays upon the journey than had been taken into account.

Manlius now required the garrison in Perga to surrender the city. The commander begged for a respite of thirty days, in order that he might ascertain the King's will. To this Manlius agreed, and within the given time an order had come from court for the surrender. And now the ten commissioners had landed at Ephesus and were proceeding up country. The consul returned with his army to meet them at Apamea.

The Peace of Apamea made the new basis on which the Seleucid house was to deal with the peoples of the West. Its main provisions were the abandonment by Antiochus of all the country beyond the Taurus and the payment of the war indemnity to Rome and Eumenes. How exactly the new frontier was drawn is obscure. The indemnity still due to Rome, 12,000 talents of silver, was to be paid, as arranged, in twelve annual instalments; and besides the money indemnity Antiochus was to supply 90,000 *medimni* of corn. There were important provisions intended to disable the Seleucid power utterly for offensive action in the West. The whole fleet was to be delivered up, and no more than ten decked ships of war to be kept in the future; these, moreover, were not to sail farther west than the promontory Sarpedonium, except when conveying instalments of the indemnity, ambassadors, or hostages. The war elephants of the Seleucids were to be all surrendered and no more to be kept. No recruiting officers were any more to set foot in the sphere of Roman dominion to raise mercenaries for the Seleucid service. Certain persons peculiarly obnoxious to Rome, such as Hannibal and the Aetolian Thoas, were specified for extradition, if they could be caught; but besides these, Antiochus bound himself to deliver up any subjects of Rome or Eumenes found in the ranks of his army. Other clauses regulated various minor matters, such as the protection of Rhodians trafficking in the Seleucid realm and their property. Twenty hostages were to be given by Antiochus, who could, with the exception of the young Antiochus, be changed every other year.

The consul swore to the Peace on behalf of Rome. His brother and *legatus* Lucius Manlius went with one of the ten commissioners to Syria to exact the King's oath and take security for the fulfillment of his obligations. The clause relating to the royal navy Manlius lost no time in carrying into effect. Polyxenidas, it will be remembered, had left his fleet at Patara. Quintus Fabius Labeo, by the consul's order, now sailed to that harbor and gave fifty ships of war to the flames.

The hundred years' struggle of the house of Seleucus for Asia Minor had come to an end.

CHAPTER XXII

THE INTERVAL OF PEACE

The history of the Seleucid dynasty up to the battle of Magnesia has been one of almost continuous war. “At the return of the year, at the time when kings go out to battle”, says the record of the old Hebrew monarchy, and in the Seleucid kingdom too it had come to be the normal thing for the King to march out at the end of every winter and spend his summer in the field. For the first time this activity is suspended after the stunning fall given Antiochus III by the adversary with whom he had rashly closed. For fourteen years after Magnesia there is a lull. Then new commotions begin, and cease only with the ceasing of the dynasty. It is the negative quality of these fourteen years which makes them remarkable.

It has hitherto been misleading to speak of the Seleucid kingdom as “Syrian”. Till the time of Seleucus II Kallinikos, Asia Minor, as we saw, was the land where the kings were most at home, and although by the division in the family itself the court of the elder king, Seleucus II, was fixed east of the Taurus, the Seleucid house was always straining towards the west, and in the last years before Magnesia we saw Antiochus residing as much in Ephesus as in Antioch. But now Asia Minor was barred against the house of Seleucus for ever; the empire, which had almost been the empire of Alexander, was become the kingdom of Syria. Let us see in what environment this kingdom found itself, with what neighbours it would have to do.

But in the first place we should observe that although the long wars of Antiochus III ended in the collapse of Magnesia, they were not altogether without fruit. Two provinces, which at his accession were politically separate from Syria, he left united with it—Cilicia and Coele-Syria (Palestine). The realm had thus to some degree gained in compactness what it had lost in extent. It embraced the whole country of Aramaic speech.

Asia Minor had passed from Seleucid rule, but the Seleucid kingdom must still be affected by its fortunes and maintain close relations with the powers that ruled there. For some time after Magnesia no one knew what the outcome of the battle would be. The Seleucid power had been thrust back across the Taurus; but Rome did not immediately intimate what she intended to do with the vacated territory. The following winter (190-189) was one of a great diplomatic scramble. From every part of Asia Minor envoys hastened to Rome. All the states interested were eager to put their particular views before the Senate.

After the Peace of Apamea (188) the ten commissioners who had fixed its conditions proceeded to make the great territorial settlement in Asia Minor, which lasted with slight modifications till the extinction of the Pergamene dynasty sixty years

later. Rome took nothing for herself; she trusted to influence rather than direct sovereignty. The net result of her arrangements was to put Eumenes of Pergamos in the place of the Seleucid King; almost the whole of the Seleucid domain fell to him as King of Asia.

It was not quite the whole of the Seleucid domain which Eumenes got. In the first place, Caria south of the Meander and Lycia were made subject to the other great ally of Rome, to Rhodes; the seaport of Telmessus only, on the confines of Lycia and Caria, was made over to Eumenes. In the second place, the Romans, having come to Asia with such high professions of freeing the Greeks, were bound to do something to make them good. They could hardly take away from Eumenes the cities which were his, and to satisfy at once his claims as an ally and the claims of the cities as Greek states was not a simple matter. The Romans found a practical way out of the difficulty by deciding that all those cities which formed part of the inherited domain of Eumenes should continue tributary to the Pergamene king. To these were to be added those cities which had held by Antiochus till after the battle of Magnesia. This “enslavement” of them could be justified as a punishment, although in many cases it must probably have been known that the city had had little choice in the matter, shaping its policy under the eyes of a garrison. All those states which had renounced their allegiance to Antiochus before the battle of Magnesia were to be free. Even so the new realm of Eumenes included some of the most illustrious cities of Asia Minor—Sardis, the old capital; Ephesus, the great harbor and commercial centre; Magnesia under Sipylus, Tralles, and Telmessus. Pamphylia, which the Seleucid court maintained to lie on the southern side of the Taurus, was ultimately assigned by the Senate to Eumenes.

There are now then four kingdoms in Asia Minor with whom the Macedonian houses of Seleucus and Antigonos have to treat on a footing of equality—the kingdom with its capital at Pergamos, the kingdom of Bithynia, the kingdom of Pontic Cappadocia, and the kingdom of southern Cappadocia. Besides the territories ruled by these four kings there are the continental domain of Rhodes, the territories of the independent Greek cities, certain petty principalities, and the lands held by barbarian tribes, such as the Pisidians and Gauls.

These last still constituted a danger for civilization. It was the Gauls who had furnished Antiochus with the most formidable part of his armies. In the year following Magnesia (189) the consul Gnaeus Manlius had made an expedition into Pisidia and the Galatian country, and inflicted upon the Gauls defeats so severe and sanguinary as must keep them quiet for some time to come. This was part of the necessary work of pacification which the Romans must do before they left Asia Minor to their allies.

Farther east also, the battle of Magnesia introduced a new state of things. We have seen before how events at one end of the Empire reacted upon another. And such a blow destroyed the prestige upon which the supremacy of the Seleucid house in all outlying lands rested. Already at the time of the repulse of Antiochus from Greece a great fear, according to the Ptolemaic envoys in Rome, had run through Asia Minor and reached even to Syria. And now to all the whispering multitudes under him the King was disgraced. “A commander had caused the reproach he offered” to the strong people

of the West “to cease; sevenfold had his reproach been required”. The Empire which Antiochus had spent his life in reforming instantly dissolved.

In Armenia at the time of the battle Artaxias or Artaxas was ruling over one part of the country and a certain Zariadris over another part. They ruled as the *strategoi* of Antiochus, and had evidently replaced the old Armenian dynasty, which had used the style of kings, and claimed, like the other royal houses of Iranian origin, to be descended from one of the Seven. Xerxes, to whom Antiochus had given his daughter in 212, had been afterwards assassinated at the instigation of the Seleucid court. The old line came to an end, according to Strabo, in an otherwise unknown Orontes. Kings were replaced by *strategoi*—a sign that Armenia had been brought into straiter subjection. Whether Artaxias and Zariadris were native Armenian chiefs or whether they had come in from elsewhere by the appointment of Antiochus, we do not know. Their names at any rate show them to have been Iranians by race or culture. *Magnesia made them renounce the Seleucid supremacy*. They declared themselves friends of Rome, and the *strategoi* in their turn became kings. Northern Armenia formed the kingdom of Artaxias, the southern region, called Sophene, that of Zariadris. Artaxias built a new city in the valley of the Araxes, calling it, after his own name, Artaxata, to be the capital of his realm. According to the general belief, the site had been chosen and the laying out of the city directed by the great Hannibal, who in his wanderings after the defeat of Antiochus had come as far as the court of the new Armenian king.

In Iran itself Magnesia probably at once undid the work of Antiochus twenty years before. About the same time that Antiochus was making his last stand in Asia Minor, the Parthian king upon whom he had imposed his suzerainty, Arsaces III, was succeeded by Arsaces IV Phriapatius. The change of ruler perhaps meant a fresh declaration of independence.

Antiochus, hurled back from Asia Minor, turned his thoughts once more to the field of his old glories, the East. It was thence he had drawn the riches and the renown which he had dissipated in the war with Rome. And now that his coffers were empty and his armies broken, was it impossible that from the East he might again renew his strength, as Antaeus did from repeated contact with the earth?

As soon as the peace with Rome had been finally concluded and sworn to (summer 188), Antiochus left Seleucus in Syria as joint-king and plunged into the East. The Mediterranean lands never saw him again. The tidings came back to Antioch that he had adventured himself with a body of troops in the Elymaean hills (mod. Luristan), where the temple of some native god promised great spoil of silver and gold, and had been overwhelmed by the fierce tribesmen. That was the generally received version of his end. “He shall turn his face toward the strongholds of his own land: but he shall stumble and fall, and shall not be found” (187).

Seleucus IV Philopator, who now reigned as sole king, was not without experience of affairs. He had borne an active part in the war with Rome. The rôle which he inherited could hardly be a dazzling one, but it might be not unhonorable—to preside over the slow recovery of the kingdom from the day of Magnesia. The most

serious consequence of that defeat was the empty coffers. It was an evil which could only be cured by time; and that it might be cured, a period of rest and the avoidance of all complications was absolutely necessary. The inaction of Seleucus Philopator's reign has led to his being regarded as a weak ruler; hardly justly, since an ambitious policy would have been madness just then.

Anxious eyes in Syria watched every turn in the politics of the Mediterranean states; the Seleucid court continued to catch all whispers from Asia Minor, from Macedonia, from the Greek republics. It was a time when the thoughts of men were agitated by a great transition. The paramount city of Italy had interfered with a strong hand in the eastern Mediterranean. Rome had come in as the ally of some states, as the enemy of others, as the champion of Hellenic autonomy, but not ostensibly as a conqueror. It had annexed no territory east of the Adriatic. But now in the lull after Magnesia men became aware of the real significance of the clash of arms that they had witnessed. The allies, as well as the enemies of Rome, began to feel the impalpable bands grip them faster than the acknowledged supremacy of Macedonian kings. And with the feeling a great revulsion swept through the Greek world, a nightmare agony to escape the thing that was closing upon them before all power of resistance was gone.

This feeling was common to both the allies and the enemies of Rome, but it was not enough to do away the old division. It was alloyed in the enemies of Rome by nothing but the fear of Rome's vengeance; in the allies of Rome it was alloyed by the desire for Rome's continued support. They could not refrain under the pressure of the moment from carrying their quarrels to the Senate and soliciting Rome's word on their behalf, although by so doing they wound themselves deeper and deeper in the toils.

Certainly at no previous moment could any one who stood forward as an antagonist of Rome have counted on such general sympathy in the eastern Mediterranean. And before long the eyes of men began to turn to the king of Macedonia. Philip was filled with resentment at the inadequate reward he had got for his help against Antiochus, and it became known that he was preparing on a vast scale for another fight. He died in 179, but his plans and preparations were carried on by his illegitimate son, Perseus, who succeeded to the Macedonian throne.

In such a time no one found himself in a more delicate position than King Eumenes. There was too much shrewdness at the Pergamene court for the inconveniences and dangers of the Roman patronage to be ignored. He could not, of course, do without it; he must not suffer his staunchness as the main ally of Rome to be clouded; but he saw the importance of giving Rome as little opportunity as possible to interfere in Asia.

On this principle Eumenes seems to have made his ideal *a state of family concord between the Asiatic kings*. Magnesia left him in a somewhat chill isolation. He alone among the kings was the friend of Rome. No sooner, therefore, was the house of Seleucus reduced to a position in which it ceased to threaten him, than Eumenes was ready with the hand of friendship. The envoys of Antiochus who came to the Roman camp after Magnesia were astonished to discover that the Pergamene king had

apparently blotted all trace of past soreness from his mind. But the great diplomatic success of Eumenes was in Cappadocia. Ariarathes IV, linked both by his mother and his wife to the Seleucid house, had not only sent his troops to fight with those of Antiochus at Magnesia, but had even in the following year supported the Galatians against Manlius. After the Roman victory he made his submission, and was amerced in 600 talents of silver. Now Eumenes saw his opportunity. He offered the Cappadocian king his friendship, and asked the hand of his daughter Stratonice. On condition that he complied, Eumenes undertook to use his influence to get the fine reduced. Ariarathes was probably glad enough to close with such terms. Eumenes married Stratonice. The fine was lowered to one-half of the original amount. Ariarathes and the Cappadocian people were received among the friends of Rome.

But the pacific policy of Eumenes was frustrated in other quarters. It was indeed almost a hopeless task to keep in with Rome and with the enemies of Rome at the same time. In proportion as the feeling against Rome in the Greek world grew stronger, more odium attached to the Pergamene house, which had served the alien with such zeal.

Presently it appeared that in Asia Minor also there was a power which might form the nucleus of an anti-Roman group. Since Antiochus III had fetched his bride from northern (Pontic) Cappadocia in 222 we have heard nothing of that kingdom. Its history during the rest of the reign of Antiochus III is for us a blank. Mithridates II, who appears to have died about the time of the battle of Magnesia, after a reign of some sixty years, is not mentioned as taking any part in the broils of his son-in-law, the Great king. But those unrecorded sixty years may have been years of steady internal consolidation. In 183, five years after the Peace of Apamea, the Greek world was horrified by the news that Sinope had been suddenly attacked and seized by Pharnaces, the son and successor of Mithridates. This was rapidly followed by fresh conquests along the northern coasts, till even Heraclea felt itself insecure. Pharnaces was thought to cherish large designs of aggression. He had found an ally in Mithridates, the satrap of Lesser Armenia. Asia Minor was at once divided into two camps. Eumenes, Ariarathes, and even Prusias II of Bithynia—the allies of Rome—took up arms in defence of the *status quo*.

All these developments on either side of the Aegean had been watched by the Seleucid court. An incidental notice shows us that Seleucus IV, if debarred from active interference in the west, was at any rate concerned to maintain close diplomatic relations with the states of Greece. Polybius describes a meeting of the Achaean Assembly held in the year following Seleucus' accession, at which his ambassadors presented themselves to renew the amity subsisting between the Achaeans and the Seleucid house, and to offer them a present of ten ships of war (in the year 187-186). The amity was renewed but the ships declined. It is only the deficiency of our records, no doubt, which prevents us from seeing similar embassies at work to sound their master's name in the ear of the other Greek states.

There could be no question that the sympathies of the house of Seleucus were with the antagonists of Rome. And as the anti-Roman movement defined itself more and more in the years following Magnesia, it was not an impossible contingency that Seleucus might compromise his neutrality. When the war between Pharnaces and the

other three kings broke out in Asia Minor (183-179), Seleucus seemed at one moment about to intervene on the anti-Roman side. He marched with a considerable force towards the passes of the Taurus, but his nerve failed before he had taken the decisive step. He suffered Pharnaces to go down unaided before Eumenes and his allies. It was about this time that Titus Flamininus came in the quality of ambassador to the Seleucid court, and we may connect his presence there with the abortive schemes of Seleucus.

The hopes of all in the Greek world who wished to be rid of the Roman incubus were fixed, as has just been said, upon Macedonia, and in Perseus, who succeeded his father Philip in 179, it may have seemed that the hour had brought the man. Macedonia had armed to the teeth, and Perseus worked unremittingly at amassing all the means of victory. There was, of course, no overt hostility to Rome, but everybody knew for what cause Perseus stood. It was therefore significant of the general temper in the eastern Mediterranean when Seleucus Philopator made haste, upon the accession of Perseus, to press upon him the hand of his daughter Laodice, and when the Rhodians escorted the new queen of Macedonia with a great display of their ships.

It was perhaps in consequence of the suspicions which were entertained of Seleucus in Rome that his brother Antiochus, who had been kept since 189 as a hostage, was exchanged before 175 for his son Demetrius. The name Demetrius, we may stop to notice, now appears for the first time alongside of Seleucus and Antiochus in the Seleucid family. It was, of course, a declaration of its consanguinity with the house of Antigonus through Stratonice, the daughter of the great Demetrius. The adoption of the name by the Seleucid house might have two objects. It might be intended as a mark of *friendship* to their cousin in Macedonia at an hour when the two houses must draw together against the foreigner; or it might be a notice to the world, when the reigning Antigonid king had only one legitimate son, that the kings who reigned in Antioch were the next heirs by blood.

Of the internal administration of Seleucus Philopator we know only that the necessities of the time made its first object *the replenishing of the empty treasuries*. The war indemnity paid by annual instalments to Rome was a continuous drain. The country had now to pay the bill for the grandiose enterprises of Antiochus III, and it was squeezed at a time when it had not even the imaginative compensation of seeing its king in the lustre of military glory. For the first time the inhabitants of Syria saw the Seleucid King sitting, year in, year out, at home. Such a king was not worth paying for, and yet he made them pay more heavily than they had ever paid before. "And there shall rise up in his (Antiochus III's) place an exactor, who shall cause the royal dignity to pass away, and in a few days he shall be broken, but not in battle array or in war".

The government appeared to be merely a vast machine for expressing money, and the working of it was in the hands of the chief minister Heliodorus the son of Aeschylus, a citizen of Antioch. An inscribed base declares that the statue once upon it was that of Heliodorus, put up in Delos by a mercantile association of Laodicea in gratitude for his benefits. This may show that the administration of Heliodorus was adroit in encouraging commerce; it may, of course, only mean that the merchants sought to win his favor by such honors. A Jewish work gives us a picture of him making a

progress through the cities of Palestine, accompanied by his bodyguards. His great position tempted Heliodorus to aspire still higher. He formed a conspiracy against the King, and in 176-175 Seleucus Philopator was suddenly murdered in the quiet of his kingdom. With Seleucus the quiet also came to an end.

CHAPTER XXIII

ANTIOCHUS IV AND THE CONQUEST OF EGYPT

It is probable that after assassinating Seleucus Philopator, Heliodorus proclaimed the infant son of Seleucus king. He intended, of course, to wield the whole royal power himself, and he would have lost more than he gained by assuming the diadem. The real heir was Demetrius, the elder son of Seleucus, now a boy of some nine years, growing up as a hostage in Rome. And there was yet another member of the royal house to be reckoned with. Antiochus, the brother of Seleucus Philopator, was in Athens when the news of the *coup d'état* in Syria reached him. He had betaken himself thither on being set at liberty, and had not only become an Athenian citizen, but had even been elected to the chief magistracy. Then whilst playing at being the successor of Pericles the prospect suddenly opened before him of being the successor of Seleucus Nicator. It was not from Syria only, but from Pergamos that the call came to him. The situation created by the murder of Seleucus jumped well with the policy of Eumenes. The action of Seleucus during the war with Pharnaces shows that the hopes of Eumenes to heal the quarrel with the Seleucid house had so far been vain. But the irreconcilable sovereign was now gone, and instantly Eumenes saw his chance of securing that the vacant throne should be held by a friend. He offered Antiochus the help of the Pergamene arms in seizing the inheritance.

Antiochus left Athens and crossed over to Asia Minor. He had probably at this moment no resources. But everything was provided. Eumenes and his brother Attalus escorted him with a Pergamene army along the eastern road to the frontier of the two realms. At their expense Antiochus was furnished with the externals of royalty. A solemn treaty of friendship between the Attalid and the new Seleucid king was made with sacrifice, and, surrounded by the troops of Eumenes, Antiochus descended upon Syria.

The position of Antiochus in Syria does not seem to have been at first an easy one. We have no exact information as to the sort of opposition he met with, but we can see that not only would Heliodorus confront him, but that his manifest usurpation, while children of Seleucus lived, would set against him many loyal adherents of the Seleucid house. We also gather that in southern Syria there was a faction at work for the restoration of the province to Egypt. Antiochus seems to have proceeded with a mixture of calculated mildness and equally calculated bloodshed. "And there shall arise in his (Seleucus IV's) place a contemptible man, upon whom they have not conferred royal dignity, but he shall come in unawares, and shall seize the kingdom by guile. And

forces shall be utterly overwhelmed before him. He shall practise fraud, and shall rise and become strong with (but) few men. And by stealth he shall assail the mightiest men of (each) province, and he shall do what his fathers have not done, nor the fathers of his fathers. Spoil and plunder and riches shall he scatter among them, and against strongholds shall he devise his devices”.

Whatever those maneuvers were which we can no longer trace, Antiochus succeeded in bringing all his brother's kingdom under his authority. The opposition melted away. Heliodorus is no more heard of. Apollonius, one of the persons of greatest influence with the late king, retired to Miletus. The Jew Hyrcanus, who had made himself a petty prince in the country east of Jordan, committed suicide. To get rid of the infant son of Seleucus, Antiochus resorted to the familiar device of employing an agent, whom he afterwards disowned. The child was assassinated at Antiochus' word by Andronicus; Antiochus then turned upon Andronicus and put him to death.

The man who had set himself upon the Syrian throne had for his contemporaries, and has for us, the fascination of enigma. No other king of his house had been such as he. We must take into account, of course, that no other king had had the same sort of education. Instead of growing up in a palace among eunuchs and courtiers, he had grown up in Rome. There was already in Rome the beginning of that corruption which reached such fearful proportions later on, but the tradition of a purer time had not lost its power. Nowhere else was there found the same proud and ordered freedom, and the political morality of the Republic was still (in comparison with that of his native land) the admiration of the contemporary Greek. The young Macedonian prince was received on friendly terms by the youth of the Roman aristocracy, and became intimate with many of the men in whose hands the destiny of the world rested. The effect of such surroundings can be traced in the character of Antiochus IV. He had come into contact with a political system more vigorous and effective than that of Asiatic monarchy, and a new vigour and *élan*, as we say, marked his rule. He had consorted as an equal with equals, and his character acquired a republican bent, his manner scandalized the court by its unceremonious freedom, its undignified familiarity. He had, besides that, violently caught the fashionable Hellenism with its republican ideals and shibboleths. We have seen that on being set at liberty he had at once gone to the metropolis of Hellenic culture, to Athens, and entered upon the life of a citizen.

These influences acting upon some temperaments might have made it tell powerfully in the world to valuable ends. But in Antiochus they were thrown away, owing to the incurable superficiality of his character. That quality in his father which had made him to be affected by the external aspect of things rather than by their real import, by what was showy rather than by what was sound—this was reproduced more saliently in Antiochus IV. His imagination and sentiment outran his reason. Pageantry, theatrical display were his delight. The reign of his quiet brother looked tame beside his, with its spirited movement and bold action, but it was Seleucus Philopator who amassed the money, and Antiochus Epiphanes who left the kingdom bankrupt.

Antiochus had something, I think, of the “Bohemian” in him, an unsubstantialness of mental frame, to which the common prose of life is too ponderous,

which needs to be continually gratified with new colour and sensation. While therefore he loved the splendour of royalty, its gold and purple, its fanfares and grandiloquent titles, the restraint and solemnity of court etiquette he found intolerable boredom.

At night, when the great city hummed around his palace with the murmur of obscure revelry, he was often drawn forth by a craving to share in the free life that went on in those populous streets. He would give his courtiers the slip and plunge down into the alleys with one or two intimates. Often some party of young men drinking late together might hear the noise of a fresh company of revellers drawing near with horns and psalteries and be startled by the sudden apparition of the King. Sometimes at midday he would be seen, flushed with wine, tossing money by handfuls into the street. People had met him, crowned with roses and habited in cloth of gold, wandering on some unknown quest; it was not advisable to follow him; from such curiosity he was capable of defending himself with stones! Even the life of grooms and porters had a curiosity for him, and any one of the cosmopolitan crowd which flowed through Antioch might find that he had the King for a boon-companion. He bathed in the public baths, and once, when his slaves brought the unguents which furnished the royal toilet—precious gums for which Asia was ransacked—some fellow of the crowd called out, “You kings are lucky people to use such things as that and smell so good!”. Antiochus marked him, and the next day ordered a vessel of choice myrrh to be broken upon the man's head. There was a general rush to wallow in the spilt unguent, a scrimmage and tumble on the slippery floor, in which among shrieks of laughter the King joined.

It was the formality, the routine of life against which Antiochus warred. With all his republican bonhomie he had fundamentally the nature of the tyrant. He would suffer no conventional restraint upon his impulse. He loved to do the unexpected. To some grave councillor he would ceremoniously present a handful of knuckle-bones or dates; at another time he would catch a chance man in the street, to bestow upon him a thing of price; in both cases for the pure delight of watching their faces. His caprices ran near insanity. Or again, his engaging geniality might be assumed to cover some deadly purpose. His incalculable vein had its sinister aspect. He felt no difficulty in pleasantries with the man at whom he designed to strike. There was something horribly dangerous and panther-like in his caresses.

In such a nature one might expect to find, with all its defects, some aesthetic sensibilities. And Antiochus was an enthusiastic virtuoso. When he escaped from the palace he was most commonly found among the workers in gold and silver, the engravers and jewellers, discussing with passionate intensity some nice point of technique. On a larger scale he gratified his love of art in his sumptuous building, in the adornment of his cities; Greek artists thronged to Antioch from all parts; new temples and public buildings rose under his eye.

Bearing in mind the general character of Antiochus, we can form some estimate of the quality of his Hellenism. It was the temples and external glories of the Greek states, the consecrated forms of their religious and civil life, which by their visible grace or their historic associations possessed his mind. One who looked deeper might have

seen that Greek religion, its mythology and its ritual, however much it had received some stamp of beauty and comeliness from the people among whom it took shape, was yet one of the least distinctive things in Hellenic civilization, a legacy from days when there was as yet no antithesis between Hellene and barbarian. Or again it might have been felt that the forms of the republican state had a value beyond the academic, only when they were the vehicle of a certain spirit. To Antiochus the forms themselves were dear. Antioch was compelled sometimes to enact the comedy of being Rome. The King himself appeared in the Roman toga, and canvassed in public places for the office of *aedile* or tribune. Being duly elected, he took his seat upon the regular *curule* chair and adjudged the disputes of the market-place with solemn concentration and care. Even so ugly and coarse a feature of Roman life as gladiatorial combats this apostle of Hellenism must introduce into Antioch. It was held to be a triumph when the Antiochene crowd was gradually accustomed, first to the sight of wounds, and then of butchery.

We have only to divine that Antiochus united to all his extravagances and enthusiasms some undefinable charm of boyish high spirits, of happy recklessness—some curious beauty of face I think one gathers from the coins—in order to understand the perplexity of contemporary opinion concerning him. There seemed no reconciling the strange contradictions of his personality. Was he a creature of splendid and effectual energy, princely in the scale of his undertakings and his large munificence? or a man of profound and devilish guile, a “king of fierce countenance and understanding dark sentences?” or a simple child of nature? or a fantastical madman? Moderate men really did not know what to say of him.

Having made himself master of Syria, Antiochus, says our authority, ruled with a strong hand. What we are told of his internal administration does not, it must be confessed, show it in a good light. His chief counselors were two youths, brothers, Heraclides and Timarchus of Miletus, who had obtained his favor in the vilest of ways; Heraclides was made minister of finance and Timarchus governor of the eastern provinces. Again, the principal cities of Cilicia, Tarsus and Mallus, found themselves made over to the King's mistress, Antiochis, and as a consequence Antiochus soon had an insurrection in that quarter upon his hands.

But there were certain forms of patronage which the cities of the realm no doubt found that the new king was ready enough to give. The pomp and display of a great civic festival would attract his interest. Tyre celebrated a festival with games every fourth year—a periodic principle almost certainly showing imitation of such Greek institutions as the Olympic games and the Panathenaea. And at the first of these, which came round after the accession of Antiochus, he himself was present, and caused the other communities of Palestine to send contributions to the expense of the games and the great sacrifice to Heracles.

The foreign policy of Antiochus during these early years had of course for its chief question the line to be pursued in view of the general anti-Roman movement of which King Perseus of Macedonia was the centre. There was this difference in the situation of the Seleucid court under the new king, that it had now a close understanding

with Pergamos. Pergamos, Cappadocia and Syria formed a sort of triple alliance in the East. The policy of the three powers was pronouncedly philo-Roman, and yet the mere fact of their alliance (as they all were well aware) put a certain check upon Rome, so that, although no handle for complaint was given, Rome was profoundly annoyed and visited Eumenes later on with conspicuous displeasure.

Antiochus observed a studiously deferential attitude to the Western power. The instalments of the war indemnity fell indeed into arrear during the first years after 176, years in which no doubt Antiochus was occupied in making his throne secure. But in 173 one of the chief persons of the court, a certain Apollonius, of apparently marked Roman sympathies, was sent at the head of an embassy to bring all that was owing, and beg for the confirmation of Rome's friendship to the new king. The embassy was well received and a formal renewal of amity accorded.

But it was well understood that the Seleucid King was at heart no friend to Rome. Perseus did not despair of his alliance. There had been goings to and fro between Pella and Antioch of which Rome did not fail to get intelligence. Yet Antiochus was able to convince the Roman mission which visited Antioch in 173-172 that he had been deaf to the tempter, and was absolutely at the command of Rome. And meanwhile he was quietly contravening the stipulations of the Peace, and new ships of war were being built in the Phoenician docks. There were still elephants, which we hear of in 170, stabled at Apamea.

Before it had come to actual war between Macedonia and Rome the thoughts of Antiochus were occupied in another quarter. When he had established himself in Syria, Egypt was being governed by his sister Cleopatra, the widow of Ptolemy Epiphanes who had died in 182; she was regent for her young son, Ptolemy Philometor. This circumstance relieved him of all anxiety on his southern frontier; but in 173 Cleopatra died. Then the anti-Seleucid party, represented by Eulaeus the chief eunuch, and Lenaeus, a native of Coele-Syria, came to the helm. Already Apollonius the son of Menestheus, whom Antiochus sent to represent him at the inaugural festivities of the young Ptolemy, reported the temper of the Alexandrian court as menacing. An immediate attack was apprehended. Antiochus advanced promptly with a force to repel an invasion, as far at any rate as Joppa. After satisfying himself that things were safe for the moment, he returned north. Yet the danger was only deferred. The party which now ruled Egypt had never acquiesced in the loss of Coele-Syria. It had been wrested from the kingdom at a moment of weakness; but the question which for a hundred and thirty years had been the standing ground of quarrel between the rival houses should not be closed to the disadvantage of the Ptolemaic. Preparations for renewing the appeal to arms were vigorously pressed forward in Egypt Antiochus could not be expected to wait quietly till they were completed; but if he were the first to open war he feared setting Rome against him. And now the storm in the West, which had been gathering so long, at last burst. In 171 actual war between Rome and Perseus began, and the Macedonian kingdom entered upon its supreme struggle for existence. The ambassador Meleager, whom Antiochus sent to lay before the Senate the aggressive attitude of Egypt and justify his own measures of defense, found that Rome at that moment was fully engaged elsewhere.

Early in 169 another embassy of Antiochus was in Rome. It was headed, like the former one, by Meleager. He was accompanied by Heraclides, the insinuating, unwholesome minister of finance, who knew to perfection how to touch the palm of every venal Senator. The mission of the embassy was to convince the Senate that in the conflict which was impending, or had even now begun, Egypt, not Antiochus, was the aggressor. Its work in Rome was watched by an embassy from Alexandria. But till the Macedonian business was decided, the Senate would give neither party a definite answer. It would put upon Quintus Marcius, the consul, who was about to sail for Greece, all responsibility for expressing the will of Rome to King Ptolemy.

Egypt about the same time took the offensive (170-169). The regents, Eulaeus and Lenaeus, marched out with an army to invade Coele-Syria. Before they left Alexandria they delivered a harangue to the populace. They would make short work with the enemy; they would do a great deal more than barely win back the lost province; they would make the whole Seleucid realm an appendage of the Egyptian crown. A strange accompaniment to the army were waggons of bullion, of gold and silver plate, of jewels and rich feminine attire, even furniture from the palace. These, the regents explained, were the means by which they would prevail over the constancy of Seleucid cities and strongholds.

Not many days had passed before the Egyptian army was in headlong rout and the Seleucid King stood at the doors of the land.

Antiochus had gathered a large army with the purpose of proceeding beyond the defensive. It is now that we find his son Antiochus, a child of three or four years, associated in the throne, a measure which implies that he expected to be engaged in warfare at a distance from the capital. He had already nearly crossed the desert between Palestine and Egypt, had passed Mount Casius and almost reached the frontier-fortress of Egypt, Pelusium, when the army of Eulaeus and Lenaeus were encountered on their way. The battle which ensued was a crushing defeat for the generals of Ptolemy. The news threw Alexandria from its vain confidence into unreasoning panic. Although Pelusium still blocked the way of the invader, all was given up for lost. The young king was hurriedly packed on board ship to escape, if he could, to the sacred island of Samothrace. It was a foolish step. Ptolemy was intercepted by the Syrian vessels, and fell into the hands of Antiochus.

The Alexandrian people showed in this crisis more spirit than the boasters who had so lightly entered into the war. They determined on resistance, and, since their king had deserted them, called his younger brother to the throne, a boy of about fifteen. He was given the auspicious surname of Euergetes, to which clung memories of that earlier Ptolemy who had marched victoriously through the heart of the Seleucid realm.

These measures, however, Antiochus, having got Ptolemy Philometor into his hands, could turn to his own account. He now represented himself as the champion of the legitimate king against the usurping brother. He had a specious pretext ready to hand for an invasion of Egypt. But first there was the obstacle of Pelusium to be surmounted. And the new government in Alexandria, alive to the emergency, sent a fleet to secure

the frontier city. But it was engaged by the Seleucid ships, and the naval battle went, as the land battle had done, against the Egyptians. To win Pelusium, Antiochus trusted not less to subtlety than to arms. He had already half-won the hearts of those who served King Ptolemy. In the first battle near Mount Casius, when the horror of flight was upon the Egyptian army, Antiochus had suddenly appeared riding amongst them as an angel of deliverance and ordering his troops to hold their hand. The impression thence conceived of him made for his advantage. Many of those who "ate of the meat" of King Ptolemy deserted to the invader. The garrison of Pelusium listened to his overtures, and then swiftly, without violating the letter of any agreement, Antiochus seized the city. It was an incident in his career which his admirers did not like to reflect upon.

The way into Egypt now lay open. A bridge was rapidly constructed over the Pelusiac branch of the Nile, and the Syrian army poured into the Delta. Lower Egypt was soon entirely in the hands of Antiochus, except Alexandria, which still held out for Ptolemy Euergetes. Antiochus fixed the seat of the rival government, for which Ptolemy Philometor was to serve as figure-head, at Memphis.

At Alexandria the formal life of the court went on unbroken. Euergetes espoused, as a matter of course, the royal sister Cleopatra whom his brother had left behind. He entered upon his majority with the usual ceremonies. Memphis was shut off from the larger world, and it was the king at Alexandria who was King Ptolemy to foreign states. The Achaean League sent an embassy to obtain from him a confirmation of the privileges accorded to its citizens (early summer 169). His patronage was solicited for the festivals in the various states of Greece. A second embassy from the Achaeans came in the matter of the Antigonea, and Athens sent no less than three for similar purposes.

But it was certain that Antiochus would not leave Alexandria unmolested, and it must look to its defenses. The administration was conducted for the young king by Comanus and Cineas. They formed a consultative board from the most distinguished officers in the Egyptian service. Campaigns were no longer to be conducted after the notions of eunuchs and clerks. It seemed also advisable to try what could be done by negotiation with the invader, and the happy thought occurred of using the services of the foreign ambassadors, who were certain to command the respect of the phil-Hellenic king. Antiochus had already sent on an envoy to state his demands and was advancing on the city.

The missions just mentioned from Athens and from the Achaeans were in Alexandria at the moment, and besides these there were envoys from Miletus and from Clazomenae. All these, accompanied by ambassadors from the Alexandrian court, took boat up the Nile to meet Antiochus. Their reception was gracious and magnificent. On the second day after their arrival Antiochus gave them a polite hearing. He learnt that the Alexandrian court fully admitted that Egypt had been in the wrong in opening war, but the blame for that wrong lay with the party, now fallen, of Eulaeus and Lenaeus, and the voices of the Greek ambassadors appealed to Antiochus not to visit the transgressions of those wretched men upon his sister's son, one little more than a boy. It seemed from the King's response that the kindly emotions to which the ambassadors appealed needed no quickening; he more than assented to all they said. And then he

dexterously shifted to the question of Coele-Syria, and went into the arguments on the Seleucid side with great convincingness.

But the ambassadors were uncomfortably conscious that this was wide of their mission. The Coele-Syrian question no longer held the field; that had been stopped by the defeat of Eulaeus; the Alexandrian court no longer justified the attack; it was the Seleucid occupation of Egypt which was in question. Antiochus, in the best diplomatic manner, had given the envoys an elaborate answer which was no answer at all.

The ambassadors remained in the company of Antiochus as he pursued his way down the river. At Naucratis, the old Greek city of Egypt, every citizen who could show his Hellenic nationality received a gold piece from Antiochus. And he still gave the ambassadors no real answer. He detained them till his own envoys to Alexandria, Aristides and Theris, should return; he wished, he said, to take Hellas in the person of the ambassadors to witness as to the righteousness of his cause.

The demand which Antiochus had addressed to the Alexandrian court was, no doubt, the recognition of Philometor instead of Euergetes as king. Such a demand could only meet with a refusal. Accordingly the great city had for the first time in its existence to experience the pains of a siege. Alexandria besieged! It was an event which shook the whole commercial world. At Rhodes the tidings caused especial dismay. Not only mercantile considerations, but that growing dread of Rome which led the maritime republic to desire above all things concord between the Greek kings of the East, made the Rhodians forward to negotiate peace. They sent an embassy to Antiochus, and urged upon him their friendship with both belligerents, his own affinity with the Ptolemies, and the interest which both powers had in peace at such an hour as this. To all this Antiochus had a ready answer. *Peace existed already between himself and the king of Egypt*; nay, more, they were good friends and allies. Let the capital open its gates to the real king and he would have nothing further to say.

The distress in that populous city, now that it was cut off from the interior, although its communications with the sea were still open, soon became acute. Of course it appealed to Rome. "Unwashed and unshaven, with olive branches in their hands, the ambassadors came before the Senate and flung themselves upon the ground; and piteous as their appearance was, their words were more lamentable still". Within a little Antiochus would possess himself of all the riches of Egypt. An embassy —only let Rome send an embassy, and he would not refuse to go away.

An embassy indeed was all that could be expected of Rome so long as the Macedonian war was on its hands. Whether the effect of an embassy at that moment was not rather overstated by the Alexandrian envoys may be a question. But suddenly Antiochus, after vainly attempting to take the city by storm, raised the siege and evacuated Egypt! The meaning of this abrupt move (dependent upon the secret history of the times or the impulses of a strange nature) is dark to us. It is easy to invent hypotheses. He had at any rate the satisfaction of leaving the kingdom in a state of civil war, Ptolemy Philometor reigning at Memphis in opposition to his brother at

Alexandria. Antiochus also took the precaution of keeping the door unbolted against his return by leaving a strong garrison in Pelusium.

Antiochus, when he returned to Syria in 169, was in a different situation from that of the year before. He was covered with the glory of conquering the country which had exalted itself over his ancestors. He had burst the treasuries, which since the days when it repulsed Perdiccas and Antigonus the Ptolemaic house had gone on securely filling. He had come back laden with spoil. The Seleucid kingdom was in the giddy position of someone who, after living on the verge of bankruptcy, suddenly acquires a fortune. Moreover, Antiochus had changed the balance in the East, not only without the consent of Rome, but against its liking. Even though Rome sent a special embassy to Antioch under Titus Numisius to make peace between Antiochus and the Alexandrian court, it returned, with fair words doubtless, but with nothing else. Perseus in the deadly grapple conceived new hopes of his alliance. He sent a last appeal to the Seleucid from the Antigonid to intervene as mediator or ally before it was too late.

But Antiochus still saw his advantage in honouring Rome the more, that his actions ran contrary. Fifty talents of his new wealth would, he conceived, be not unprofitably spent in a “crown” to be presented to the Romans. It was carried by the same ambassadors, Meleager, Heraclides and Sosiphanes, who had gone the year before. They also carried a hundred talents more to bestow upon various Greek cities which they took on their way.

But the triumph of Antiochus was soon crossed by disappointment. Ptolemy Philometor, as the rest of his life shows, was not apt for the part of puppet. He had been under no illusions as to the real purport of his uncle’s friendliness, and the suavity had been equally hollow on both sides. ”And as for both these kings, their hearts shall be to do mischief, and they shall speak lies at one table”. The Seleucid garrison at Pelusium now made further doubt impossible. No sooner was Philometor left to himself than he sent an emissary into Alexandria to Cleopatra, his sister and but recently his wife, to feel after a reconciliation. It soon appeared that while the people who had called Euergetes to the throne would not desert him, they were willing to receive back Philometor as joint-king. Cleopatra reverted to the elder brother. On these terms Philometor re-entered Alexandria and the schism in the kingdom was at an end.

At this unexpected break-down of his plans Antiochus was instantly strung for swift and deadly action. He was in an awkward position for retaining his hold on Egypt. He had proclaimed to the whole Greek world that his interference in Egypt had been solely in order to support the legitimate king. His letters to this effect were in the archives of numerous cities. But all that was now thrown to the winds. He flung his troops upon Cyprus, and in the spring of 168 led an army south to invade Egypt a second time. Greek public opinion last year had justified him; in his present designs it was against him. Polybius regards the second invasion of Egypt as an instance of virtue breaking down under temptation.

The attack of Antiochus was exactly what Ptolemy Philometor had expected when he reconciled himself with Euergetes. He had bestirred himself to meet it. Envoys

had come during the winter in the name of the two brother-kings to the Peloponnesus to invite *condottieri* like Theodoridas of Sicyon to raise bands for the Ptolemaic service. They approached the Achaean League with a request for 1000 foot and 200 horse under the command of Lycortas and his son Polybius (the historian who tells the tale). Polybius warmly supported the appeal and carried the people, he assures us, with him, till the party who favoured inaction circumvented him by producing a letter—which they had forged—from Marcius, the consul commanding against Macedonia, wherein he requested the Achaeans to remain neutral and second the Roman efforts at mediation. Instead, therefore, of the troops asked for, only another useless embassy embarked for Alexandria.

Nothing adequate seems to have been accomplished for the defence of Egypt when Antiochus early in 168 again marched south. At Rhinocolura, on the desert-road between Palestine and Egypt, he met the envoys of Ptolemy Philometor. With a careful correctness they thanked him in the name of their king for the support which had restored him to the throne of his fathers, and then proceeded to remonstrate against his warlike demonstrations, which had the less reason in that any desires he might express to the Alexandrian court would be considered in the friendliest spirit. The only answer of Antiochus was an ultimatum demanding the formal cession of Cyprus and Pelusium within a fixed time.

The demands, we must allow, would not have been outrageous had they been preferred before. After the unprovoked aggression of Egypt, Antiochus had, when victorious, every right to exact guarantees for his kingdom's peace. Pelusium in Seleucid occupation would lock the door against an attack by land, whilst Cyprus would be the base for a naval attack on Syria. But in that case the demands should have been made before Antiochus concluded peace with Philometor. The official contention of the Seleucid court had been last year that Antiochus made peace with the king of Egypt at the time when Ptolemy fell into his hands, or, as the Seleucid version seems to have had it, sought refuge in the camp of his uncle. Antiochus had no longer any right to raise fresh demands without a fresh offence.

The time specified in the ultimatum expired, and Antiochus again advanced. Once more his armies crossed the Egyptian frontier, and, as on the former occasion, seem to have struck first for Memphis. The natives had come to hate the Macedonian dynasty, and an invader gathered adherents as he went. Then Antiochus turned north and slowly drew down upon Alexandria.

But while the Seleucid king was moving among the ancient cities and luxuriant fields of the Delta, the last fight of the house of Antigonos was fought out. The battle of Pydna (22nd June 168) ended the struggle of Perseus and extinguished Macedonia as an independent state for ever. This entirely altered the situation; Rome was now free to act strongly in Egypt. Gaius Popillius Laenas, the chief of the embassy which had been sent out early in the year to induce Antiochus to retire, was awaiting in Delos the issue of the Macedonian war when he received the news of Pydna. He immediately set sail for Egypt. Antiochus had almost reached Alexandria; he had crossed the Canopic branch of the Nile at a place called Eleusis, and was encamped in the sandy region to the east of

the city when the Roman mission arrived. The historic scene which followed was one which Roman pride never allowed to be forgotten. Antiochus was prepared to receive Popillius—whom he had known in Rome—with that easy familiarity which belonged to him. As soon as he saw the ambassadors approaching he greeted Popillius in a loud glad voice and held out his hand as to an old friend. But the Roman came on with a grim and stony irresponsiveness. He reached the King a little tablet which he carried in his hand, and curtly bade him first read that through. Antiochus looked at it; it was a formal resolution of the Senate that King Antiochus should be required to evacuate Egypt. Then there sprang to his lips one of those diplomatic phrases which came so readily to him, something as to laying the matter before his Friends. But the Roman was determined he should not wriggle free. To the amazement of the courtiers, he drew with his walking-stick a circle in the sand all round the King: Yes or No before he stepped outside of it! Such methods were certainly a new sort of diplomacy, and Antiochus collapsed. When he got his voice, it was to say that he would agree to anything. The next minute he found the Romans shaking his hand and inquiring cheerfully how he did.

Within a limited time prescribed by the ambassadors Antiochus withdrew completely from Egypt. “Groaning and in bitterness of heart” he retraced his way along the coast of Palestine. The “ships of Kittim had come against him, and he was grieved and returned”. And meanwhile the Roman ambassadors proceeded to Cyprus, where the forces of Antiochus were carrying all before them. Ptolemy Macron, the governor of the island, had gone over to the Seleucid. But the appearance of the Roman ambassadors changed all this. They did not leave the island till they had seen the last Seleucid soldier out of it. It was shown that Rome set as strict a limit to the Seleucid dominion on the side of the Ptolemaic realm as on that of Asia Minor. The humiliation of Eleusis was in a way worse than the humiliation of Magnesia.

After inflicting it upon Antiochus the Senate may have apprehended that he would feel some soreness. Not in the least! so they were assured by his ambassadors, who presently came to bring his congratulations on the victory over Perseus. The satisfaction of pleasing the Senate was so great that no conquest seemed to Antiochus worth grasping at in comparison; orders delivered him by Roman envoys were equivalent to divine commands. The Senate replied that he had done well.

But if Antiochus had been robbed of the substance of triumph, he could still rejoice in its outward circumstance. In the following year (167) Lucius Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Macedonia, celebrated triumphal games at Amphipolis, to which the whole Greek world was invited. In this department Antiochus would not be bettered by a Roman. His envoys soon came in the track of those of Aemilius, bidding the Greeks to the great spectacle which a Greek king, the conqueror of Egypt, would display in Daphne, the paradise of Antioch. The invitation drew immense crowds from all shores of the eastern Mediterranean.

The procession is described for us in some detail. Its first part was a military display, men of many nations in all sorts of gorgeous armour, gold, silver, and wonderful embroideries, horses of the purest Nisaeon breed with bridles and frontlets of gold, mailed Scythian cavalry, Indian elephants, gladiators. And then followed the civil

procession—the epheboi of Antioch with golden crowns, a thousand oxen dressed for sacrifice, nearly three hundred sacred legations from the Greek cities, ivory tusks, statues of every conceivable god or demi-god gilt or in cloth of gold, allegorical figures, splendid vessels, painted women who flung perfumes from golden jugs or were carried in litters with golden feet. It was an astounding profusion of treasure. Dionysius, the secretary of state, was represented by a thousand slaves who bore silver vessels, none of which weighed less than a thousand drachmas.

The festivities—games, gladiatorial shows, wild beast fights—went on for a month. The chief city fountain sometimes ran with wine. Choice unguents were served from golden jars to the people in the gymnasium without price. At the palace, couches were laid for a thousand or fifteen hundred guests.

Antiochus was in his element. He outdid himself in indiscriminate familiarity. Functions which would naturally have been left to subordinates he insisted on performing himself—riding up and down the procession, shouting orders, standing at the palace door to usher in the guests, marshalling the attendants. He was up and down among the banqueters, sitting, standing, declaiming, drinking, or bandying jests with the professional mummers. The crowning moment was one evening towards the end of a feast, when the company had begun to grow thin. The mummers brought in a swaddled figure and laid it upon the ground. Suddenly, at the notes of the *symphonia*, it started from its wrappings and the King stood there, naked. The next moment he whirled away in the fantastic dance of the buffoons. The banquet broke up in confusion.

The festivities were hardly over and Antioch clear of the mob of revellers when the ominous face of the Roman envoy thrust itself upon the scene. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus headed a mission which came, after all this blare of trumpets, to see what was really going on. They were on the watch for some sign of ill-will in the Seleucid King, some coolness in their entertainment. But never had Antiochus been more genial and charming. He put his own palace at their disposal, he surrounded them with the state of kings. They returned declaring that it was incredible that this man could be cherishing any serious designs. There were few who could cover so deadly a hate with such disarming manners.

CHAPTER XXIV

ANTIOCHUS THE GOD MANIFEST

While Rome circumscribed the activity of Antiochus as a conqueror, he had great scope left him as the radiant champion and patron of Hellenism, both within his own dominions and abroad. He sustained this character abroad by bestowing magnificent presents upon the old seats of Hellenism in Asia Minor and Greece, and by throwing open to their artists and craftsmen lucrative employment in Syria. We may question whether any principal city did not look on some new embellishment, a temple, an altar, a colonnade, which declared continually the glory and the munificence of King Antiochus. The beloved Athens was, of course, chosen for special honor. To the south-east of the Acropolis stood the noble beginnings of a temple of Zeus Olympius, which Pisistratus had planned some 360 years before and left unfinished. Antiochus undertook to replace it by a new and more splendid fane. On his commission the Roman architect Decimus Cossutius began the construction of a gigantic temple surrounded by a double colonnade of Corinthian pillars, not in stone, like those of Pisistratus, but in Pentelic marble—"one of the largest Greek temples in the world", whose remaining columns, standing in bare isolation, make even today a principal feature of Athens. But Antiochus also did not live to finish what he began. His temple too stood for 300 years incomplete, the marvel of the world, till it was finished and opened by the Emperor Hadrian (130 *AD*). Another conspicuous gift of Antiochus in Athens was the gilt Gorgon's head upon a golden aegis, which flamed upon the southern wall of the Acropolis above the theatre. In Syria special privileges were conferred upon Athenian citizens.

Of the gifts of Antiochus elsewhere the following are recorded; at Delos, some statues about the altar; at Olympia, a curtain of Oriental embroidery; at Megalopolis, a wall (not completely carried out) about the city; at Tegea, a marble theatre (also not finished); at Cyzicus, golden plate for one of the tables in the public hall.

Within his own dominions the activity of Antiochus in the cause of Hellenism could be more various. Besides lavishing his treasure upon the adornment of existing Greek cities, he could create new ones. He could also adjust the constitutions and forms of city life more closely to the Hellenic ideal.

The capital naturally received a great share of his attention. He added a new quarter, Epiphanea, which climbed the slopes of Mount Silpius behind the older Antioch, and included within its wall precipitous places and rushing torrents. This made Antioch to be a complex of four cities, a tetrapolis, each city being divided off from the rest by an inner wall, while one outer wall embraced the whole complex, scaling the steep sides of the mountain and spanning the ravines.

The theatre, whose remains can still be traced, was in this region. It had perhaps existed before the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, only without the city. Here too was the Senate-house, erected doubtless by Antiochus, and perhaps already adorned with the porticoes and pictures described by Libanius. High up in the new city, near the Citadel, which tradition asserted to be the site of the prehistoric Greek settlement, Antiochus reared a temple of Jupiter Capitolinus—at once gratifying his passion for splendor and advancing his policy. It was in keeping with his other sumptuous works, and had not only the usual gilt ceiling, hut the walls covered with plates of gold.

There are evidences that of all the Greek deities it was Zeus Olympius who called forth the most enthusiasm in Antiochus. Not only was it for him that Antiochus built the vast temple in Athens, but this god now reappears upon the coins, where he had ceased to figure since the days of Seleucus I. At Daphne, in the temple of Apollo, there was an image of him which Antiochus set up. It was a close copy in form, material and size of the great chryselephantine work of Phidias at Olympia. The Nike, which it carried in its hand, was of gold. Daphne, of course, like Olympia, was a place for athletic contests; the *stadion* seems to have been close under the temple, and it would be as the dispenser of victory that Zeus would be worshipped.

On the cliffs above the city one can still trace the outlines of a sculptured colossal bust, feminine seemingly, with a mystic head-gear and lappets falling over the shoulders. This is the remains of a group of sculptures which was known as the *Charonion*. According to Malalas, it was made by Antiochus Epiphanes as a charm against pestilence. Nothing is left of any of the other works with which Antiochus embellished his capital—such as the statue of a man quelling a bull, which represented, according to the local tradition, Antiochus himself subduing the robber tribes of the Taurus.

Besides adding to the material splendors of Antioch, Antiochus gave its political institutions, in accordance with a plan which we shall see extended to other of the cities of the kingdom, a form which corresponded more nearly to the autonomy required by Hellenic theory. Now first do bronze coins appear, issued, not in the name of the King, but of Antioch-near-Daphne. Only the head of Antiochus appears as that of a patron-deity, invested with rays. *It is significant that the Senate-house was in the new city which owed its origin to him.* It may be owing to him that the Athenian model was copied in Antioch. The people assembled in the theatre to pass decrees. Antiochus perhaps introduced the names of the Athenian months. Antioch even had a body of citizen cavalry, like the Athenian knights. They rode in the procession at Daphne with crowns of gold and silver.

The extension of the freedom of Antioch appears, it has just been said, as part of a general scheme by which Antiochus adjusted the status of the cities of the kingdom. In many cases it involved the adoption by the city of the name of Antioch or Epiphanea. In Cilicia, Adana becomes Antioch-on-Sarus, and Tarsus Antioch-on-Cydnus, and both issue coins in their new name. Oeniandus became Epiphanea. Mopsuestia strikes with the head of Antiochus and the name of Seleucia-on-Pyramus; Castabala with the head of Antiochus and the name Hieropolis.

In Syria, not only the capital, but the other principal cities now strike bronze—Seleucia, Apamea, Laodicea-on-the-sea, Alexandria (*mod.* Alexandretta), Hieropolis, all in their own names, but with the radiate head of Antiochus and a type connected with Zeus upon the reverse. In all these cases the existing name was safe from change, but in other places new Antiochs and Epiphaneas appeared. The ancient Hamath in the Orontes valley (*mod.* Hamat), the rival of Damascus in the time of David, became Epiphanea; an Antioch and an Epiphanea are mentioned close together on the Euphrates. In the country conquered from Ptolemy by Antiochus III, Gadara bore for a time the names of Antioch and Seleucia. In the same region there was an Antioch-near-Hippus. Ptolemais strikes bronze of a similar type to that already mentioned, calling itself Antioch-in-Ptolemais. Lastly, Jerusalem, when reconstructed as a Greek city, took rank among the Antiochs.

The coins (bronze) which the Phoenician cities and Ascalon strike with the radiate head of Antiochus differ from those before mentioned in having not only the image of the King, but the superscription King Antiochus. Does this correspond to any difference in their status, any imperfection in their Hellenic character? The superscription of the city usually appears in addition to that of the King, sometimes in Greek, sometimes in Phoenician: “(Coin) of Gebal the Holy”, “Of Tyre, Mother of the Sidonians”, “Of Sidon, Mother of Chamb (Carthage), Hippo, Cheth (Citium in Csrprus), Tyre”, “Of Laodicea which is in Canaan”.

In Mesopotamia the two chief cities strike bronze with the head of Antiochus. Nisibis had probably already the name of Antioch-in-Mygdonia. Even Edessa, where the Aramaean element was so strong, is now Antioch-on-Callirhoe.

But the Hellenism which Antiochus propagated went further than political forms, or even real political privileges. It extended to the sphere of social and private life, to the manner of thought and speech, to religious practice. “And king Antiochus wrote to his whole kingdom, that all should be one people, and that each should forsake his own laws”. Beneath the naïve phrase of the Hebrew writer there lies the truth that the transformation which he saw going on around him in the life of the Syrian peoples was forwarded by the active encouragement of the court. It worked in with a policy deliberately adopted by those that ruled. Imaginative and sentimental Hellenism was no doubt in part the motive which governed Antiochus, but there were considerations of policy as well. Some principle was needed to unite and fuse a realm whose weakness was that it had no national unity. And Antiochus, like Alexander, of whom indeed he often reminds us—an Alexander run wild—sees such a principle in a uniform culture, resting upon a system of Greek cities, and obliterating or softening the old differences of race and tradition. It was not exactly a new idea, but it no doubt revived with a new sort of splendor, it stood out more distinctly as an imposing ideal, in the glow and color it took from the strange fire of Antiochus the Fourth.

Perhaps we are in some danger of misconceiving this process of Hellenizing. We think of it chiefly in connection with the peculiar case of the Jews, or with the opposition of “Oriental conservatism” to “Western ideas” in our own day, and are inclined to picture Antiochus as forcing at the point of the sword an alien civilization

upon an unwilling people. Nothing could be further from the truth. There is no trace of opposition to Hellenism from the Orientals generally. “All the nations agreed according to the word of the King”. The conversion to Hellenic cities was not something which the King compelled ancient communities to undergo, it was something which he conceded as a favor. Envoys from such communities were seen about the court, petitioning that it might be allowed them “through the King’s authority to set up a gymnasium and form a body of *epheboi*, and to register the inhabitants of the city as Antiochenes”. There was enough force and attraction in Hellenism itself to render compulsion, had Antiochus contemplated it, superfluous.

It must be taken into account that Hellenism, as understood by Antiochus and the Syrian cities, was not the Hellenism of the great days of Greece. That had implied some sterner virtues—reverence for the ideal of Law, sacrifice for the ideal of the City, self-respect, honor, sobriety. Without these qualities perhaps Hellenic culture had never grown, but, once grown, it yielded certain products, certain political and religious forms, articulate ideas, intellectual methods, which might be imparted without the moral strength of the old Hellenic character. The reception of this easy Hellenism put no demand upon the will and offered gratifications to self-conceit. Between Hellenic religion and the religion of the heathen Syrians there was no incompatibility. The Phoenician had no objection to celebrating fourth-year festivals after the Greek manner, or to calling Melkarth Heracles when he spoke Greek, and the Seleucid court did not object to the ancient Phoenician script appearing on the same coin as the head of the deified Antiochus.

The deified Antiochus! For this later Hellenism could not only supply the kingdom with a uniform culture but with a common cult. And here again Antiochus did no more than accentuate what he inherited from his predecessors. The worship of the Macedonian kings in the Greek cities goes back, as we saw, to the time of Alexander. But undoubtedly Antiochus IV lays more stress upon his deity than former kings. His surname Theos Epiphanes declares him to be an effulgence in human form of the Divine, a god manifest in flesh. Now first the addition of Theos is put upon the money, and the head which appears on the new coinage of the cities is crowned with rays. There is even ground to believe that Antiochus identified himself with the Supreme God, with Zeus; he sometimes adds to his surname the epithet *Nikephoros*, which distinguished the Nike-bearing Zeus of Olympia. It was no doubt in part his love of theatrical pomp, of what kindled the imagination, which made Antiochus “magnify himself above all gods”, but he was also acting consistently with his great plan. It seemed natural to the ancients that every association—the family, the club, the city, the nation—should be bound together by some common worship, and when a number of communities and peoples were brought under a single sceptre, the unorganized medley of religions presented a serious difficulty. Merely to Hellenize them superficially by identifying the various deities with this or that Greek god hardly met the case; the Zeus of this place remained as different from the Zeus of that place as when they had had no common name. Hellenic religion in itself was too unorganized to be a means of organization.

But the God-King gave a fixed object of worship among the chaos of local cults. His worship, regarded in one way, agreed with the rationalistic tendencies developed in

later Hellenism; while, on the other hand, if there were circles in which it was mingled with any real faith, it might so far supply the need which, now that the barriers of the old societies were done away, the world was feeling—the need of a God. And his worship corresponded with the actual facts, for if, as has been said, in antiquity “Church and State were one”, and the monarchical state with no bond of union but the subjection to one man had to find its religious meeting-place, the identification of God and King was not far to seek.

Nor do we hear of any opposition to this worship on the part of the peoples of Syria generally. Had their national worships been suppressed by it, there might have been trouble, but their gods were not jealous gods, and tolerated the new deity in their midst quite comfortably. One may see on a coin of Byblos, the “holy Gebal”, its ancient Oriental deity, with his six wings and branching head-dress, on one side, and on the other side Antiochus with his crown of rays. Even the Samaritans, if the letter in their name is genuine, addressed him as the Manifest God.

That a point of union was consciously sought in this worship the new coinage of the cities immediately suggests, struck in different places from Adana to Ascalon, but all with the same glorified head. And the uniformity extends beyond the King's head. Nearly all have for their reverse type a form of Zeus. But if Antiochus identified himself with Zeus, this further uniformity receives a clear explanation. The identification, again, with Zeus, over and above the abstract claim to deity, may have had some motive in policy. We find in Egypt that the Ptolemies turned their deity to profitable account by diverting religious revenues from the temples to their own treasury. And although the case of Egypt, where the deification of kings was traditional and taken seriously, differs from the case of Hellenistic cities, we may still suspect that the identification of the King with Zeus in Syria gave him a pretext for appropriating the funds of the temples. And that this was so is borne out by what we are told of the actual dealings of Antiochus. He identified the God of the Jews with Zeus Olympius and he took the treasures of the Temple. At Hieropolis, where the deity was feminine, but identified with Hera, he claimed the temple treasures as his wife's dowry. His spendthrift magnificence drove him to perpetual necessity, and before the end of his reign he had laid hands on the riches of nearly all the temples in Syria.

The regeneration of what remained of the Seleucid Empire by means of Hellenism was perhaps joined in the thought of Antiochus Epiphanes with the restoration of it to something of its former extent. He knew himself not strong enough, as he was, to break with Rome, but in the north and east the field was held only by native powers, and, once conqueror of the East, he might face the western situation with quite another countenance. Where Rome forbade him he would not yet intrude, but in Asia Minor at any rate he disappointed Rome of its advantage by his alliance with the ruling courts.

In Cappadocia his sister Antiochis was queen, and seems to have had her mild husband, Ariarathes IV Eusebes, completely in her hands. It was afterwards said (with what truth we cannot judge) that the two elder sons, with whom she presented him, Ariarathes and Orophernes, were supposititious; it was at any rate the youngest, called at

first Mithridates, upon whom his parents fixed their affections. The two elder were sent to be educated away from Cappadocia, Ariarathes at Rome, and Orophernes in Ionia. Mithridates was designated for the throne. Perhaps it was already during the life of Antiochus Epiphanes that Antiochis came with one of her daughters to Syria. Whether it was merely on a visit to her brother that she came, or to reside in her old home, we do not gather. But that she died in Antioch we may infer from the fact that her bones were there in 163.

In Armenia, it will be remembered, Artaxias in the northern country, and Zariadris in Sophene, had declared themselves independent kings after Magnesia. Later on their example had been followed in a region as near to the capital as Commagene, whose governor, Ptolemy, renounced his allegiance to the Seleucid court, and tried to wrest from Cappadocia the district of Melitene across the Euphrates. In this he was foiled by Ariarathes Eusebes.

In the summer of 166 or 165 Antiochus marched out from Antioch at the head of an army for the reconquest of the North and East. He left behind him his child Antiochus Eupator, who had been associated in the throne since 170, and Lysias to be guardian and regent. He was propelled not only by the desire of glory, but by the urgent necessity of money, since neither the savings of Seleucus Philopator, nor the spoils of Egypt, nor the treasures of the Syrian temples had been able to meet his reckless expenditure, and it was no longer possible to do without the tribute from the revolted provinces.

His first attack seems to have fallen upon Armenia. It was a brilliant success. The defence of Artaxias collapsed. But Antiochus, in accordance with the policy of his father in this region, did not remove him. He contented himself with the acknowledgment of fealty, and, still more important no doubt, the payment of tribute.

From Armenia Antiochus moved to Iran. But in doing so he moves, as Seleucus Nicator and Antiochus III did, out of our field of vision.

The most serious part of his task would be to try conclusions with the house of Arsaces, now represented by the able Mithridates I (Arsaces VI, 171-138). Already his father Phriapatius or his brother Phraates had torn from Media the northern region about Rhagae before his accession; the southern Media with Ecbatana still obeyed the Milesian Timarchus who ruled the eastern provinces for King Antiochus. There were also other princes of lesser power with whom Antiochus would have to reckon, such as the king of Lesser Media (Atropatene), or the ruler of Persis, not to speak of the petty chiefs of the hills. Persis had probably already broken away under a native dynasty on whose coins are emblems of the Zoroastrian religion and the title "Lord of lords". Their forces even set foot on the opposite Arabian coast, and were engaged there by Numenius, the Seleucid satrap of Mesene.

The attempt of Antiochus Epiphanes to reconquer the East was one of several attempts made by the house of Seleucus in the last century of its rule. And it is important to realize once for all the existence of the element there which gravitated

towards union and gave the Seleucid kings an immense advantage—if they were able to use it. In the provinces which passed under barbarian rule the Greek cities planted by Alexander, Seleucus and Antiochus Soter continued to exist; yes, and to form, we may be sure, the centres of the life, the commerce and the energy of the lands in which they were. But the barbarian yoke only made them more passionately Hellenic; they turned with a sort of national sentiment to the house of Seleucus, the mightiest and most glorious representative of Hellenic supremacy in the East. We have seen that at the time of Antiochus III's invasion of Hyrcania his adversaries had thought it necessary to put the Greek population of Syrinca to the sword. But the Arsacid kings were too shrewd to think of exterminating the Greeks; they tried hard to conciliate them. To what extent Hellenism had penetrated the Parthian court at this time we do not know, but it is obvious that the Arsacids were fain to present themselves to their Greek subjects as sympathetic protectors. The money of the kingdom was stamped exclusively with Greek legends, and from the time of Mithridates I they commonly added to their other surnames that of "Phil-Hellene". But they were unable to make the Greeks overlook the difference between a barbarian and a western dynasty; the cities of the Parthian kingdom were always ready to make common cause with a Seleucid, and later on with a Roman, invader. This condition of things was a conspicuous justification of the colonizing policy of Alexander and his successors. It made the reconquest of the East by Oriental dynasties enormously more difficult and slow, and with a stronger Hellenic power than the later Seleucid, or a nearer than Rome, might have saved Western Asia for Hellenism.

Bearing all this in mind, we see that an important part of the task of Antiochus Epiphanes in the East would be the strengthening of the Greek cities. And in fact there are indications that he did not neglect it. Ecbatana exchanged even its old and famous name for Epiphanea, perhaps on receiving a new Greek colony. The Alexandria on the lagoon between the Tigris and Eulaeus, which had been destroyed by floods ("an indication that the canal-system of Babylonia had been allowed again to fall out of repair") he restored as an Antioch. Antiochus also resumed the work of Alexander in having a survey made of the coast westward from this Antioch, and it was not improbably in accomplishing this that Numenius, the satrap of Mesene, came into collision with the Persians.

In contrast with measures which have every appearance of wise policy is the fresh attempt of Antiochus to get the treasures which were heaped up in the Elymaean temples into his hands. He tried to break into a temple of some native goddess, Istar or Anaitis, and fared so far better than his father that he escaped with his life. Against a people filled with religious frenzy the royal mercenaries could not make head. The same thing was appearing, as we shall shortly see, in other fields. It was soon after this repulse, in the midst of his hopes and projects, that Antiochus Epiphanes was seized by a fatal malady—epilepsy, perhaps, or something which affected the brain. He died at Tabae in Persis in the winter of 165-164.

CHAPTER XXV

ANTIOCHUS AND THE JEWS

We have followed the career of the fourth Antiochus apart from that special appearance which he makes in the history of Israel, and with which his name is pre-eminently associated in the ordinary thought of Christendom. It seemed that we should in this way best gain an independent point of view from which to consider that episode—an insignificant one in his life, it must have appeared to himself, incomparably the most momentous we see it to be, in its effect on the destinies of man.

There are few gaps in history which we can so ill put up with as that which comes in the history of Israel between the time of Ezra and Nehemiah and the time of Judas Maccabaeus. It is an almost unrelieved blank. To fill it in, Jewish writers, after the Maccabean epoch, had nothing but the fables they spun out of their imagination. They knew no more about it than we do today. And yet it was a period of great importance in the history of Israel, if not rich in political events, yet a period in which much germinated and much took shape, institutions, beliefs, characteristics, which made the later Jew what he was, and thereby are of eternal interest for those peoples who owe it to the Jew that they are what they are. It is a period which, although dark for us, is not altogether dumb, for in the Old Testament there are perhaps many voices which come to us from it, psalms familiar to our lips, cries out of unknown hearts in unknown troubles and conditions, voices out of the darkness.

Nehemiah left a little community gathered about the Temple of Jehovah in the restored Jerusalem, and there we still find the community about the Temple, with the High-priest for its chief ruler, 260 years later, under a Seleucid king. The country round Jerusalem was inhabited and tilled by Jews to a radius of some ten to fifteen miles. The Jewish state had been involved in the struggle of Seleucid and Ptolemy for Coele-Syria. Jerusalem had been taken by Ptolemy I on the Sabbath day and dismantled. After Ipsus the High-priest had paid tribute regularly to the house of Ptolemy. It was no doubt because the Jews hated the yoke which they were actually bearing that they inclined to the Seleucid cause in the war between Antiochus III and Ptolemy Epiphanes. They were subjugated by Scopas for King Ptolemy in 199-198, and a Ptolemaic garrison lodged in Jerusalem. After the battle of the Panion they declared for Antiochus, just when Gaza, found naturally on the opposite side to Jerusalem, held out to the last for Ptolemy. Antiochus, relieving them of the garrison, appeared in the light of a deliverer.

The administrative system which had obtained in Coele-Syria under the Ptolemies seems to have continued under the Seleucids. The province was still under a single strategos; it included (whether regularly or only occasionally is not clear)

Phoenicia as well. In an inscription the strategos of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia is also high-priest—that is, he presides over the provincial worship of the King.

Under the eye of Greek and Macedonian officers the old cities of the land, Canaanite, Phoenician, Philistine, had taken on the aspect and the ways of Greek cities, and had in many cases actually received large bodies of European settlers. Samaria, for instance, in the middle of the land, was Greek and pagan, having been already colonized with Macedonians by Alexander in 331. Only the country villages were inhabited by "Samaritans", with their religious centre on Mount Gerizim.

And while the world was changing all-round the little Jewish state, what action and reaction went on between the Jews and the other peoples under Macedonian government? There are few questions in history it would be more important to have answered, and there are few to which there is less chance of getting any answer, except a very doubtful one. The question practically resolves itself into two, (1) to what extent had the Diaspora come to exist before Maccabaeian times—that is, was there any general dispersion of the Jews among the nations? (2) to what extent had the Jews, in Judaea or out of it, been affected by contact with Hellenism?

The dispersion of the Jews, whenever it came to pass, was a circumstance of immense moment to Judaism, because through these scattered members, influences from every quarter reached the main body. The Jews, for instance, who absorbed Hellenism abroad, would be the most potent conductors of it to their brethren in Judaea. But it would also be a circumstance of great moment to the world at large. The existence of a community everywhere, diffused yet never losing contact between its several parts, would be an important factor in the problem which vexed the Macedonian kings—how to bind together a heterogeneous empire. The influence, again, of a Jewish Dispersion in the sphere of religion would be a not negligible force in the inner life of the times; its power later on was enormous till it was transmitted to the Christians and all the nations flowed to Zion. A figure of capital significance in the history of antiquity, Mr. Hogarth is fond of telling us, is the Hellenized Jew. That we should confess ourselves unable to say how far he existed at all before the Maccabaeian age is to confess how very ignorant we really are of the life of those times, of anything outside the dynastic game of kings. The admitted evidence bearing on a Jewish Dispersion is, I think, as follows: —

1. Communities of other Orientals—Phoenicians and Egyptians—are proved in the great Greek trading centres, Athens and Delos, before the time of the Maccabees; in Athens as early as the fourth century BC.

2. Clearchus of Soli, a disciple of Aristotle, introduced in one of his dialogues a "Jew from Coele-Syria, Hellenic not in speech only, but in mind", representing him as having come in his travels to Asia Minor, and there conversed with Aristotle. There is, of course, no reason to suppose any greater foundation of fact to the dialogue than underlies the dialogues of Plato. But that Clearchus should introduce, even as an imaginary character, a Hellenized Jew in Asia is noteworthy.

3. There were large numbers of Jews who did not take part in the Betum, and whose descendants continued to form a Jewish population in Babylonia.

4. In Syria, in the days of Judas Maccabaeus, there were bodies of Jews settled in Galilee (then, of course, pagan) and east of the Jordan, but small enough to be capable of being transported *en masse* to Judaea.

5. In Egypt the papyri prove the presence of Jews and Samaritans under the earlier Ptolemies in sufficient numbers for villages predominantly Jewish or Samaritan to exist.

It will be seen that the evidence of admitted genuineness does not take us very far. And accordingly it is the view of some scholars that there was practically no Dispersion before the Maccabaean age. On the other hand, if we accept the statements of later Jewish writers, we must form a very different picture of the condition of things. Masses of Jews, including the High-priest himself, were transported to Egypt by Ptolemy I. In Alexandria the Jews were given full citizen-rights by Alexander. In the new cities which sprang up in Syria and Asia Minor under Seleucus I a colony of Jews was regularly found who were given equal rights with the other citizens. At Antioch in particular Seleucus is said to have given them the full citizenship, and in Asia Minor, "Ephesus and the rest of Ionia" is mentioned as a region where the Jews had been put on a level with the native Greeks by "the Successors". Antiochus III ordered 2000 Jewish families to be transported from Mesopotamia and Babylonia into Lydia and Phrygia.

It will be seen how much turns upon the view taken of these statements of Josephus and the documents he adduces to support them. As it appears to me the state of the case is this. On the one hand there is nothing impossible in the statements themselves; in fact, supposing the Diaspora existed, we can very well see how policy might lead Alexander and his successors to make a great point of securing the loyalty of the Jews. On the other hand, the statements are made in an age of prolific forgery among the Jews, of reckless mendacity as to their past. And not only so, but the romances put forth as history and the forged documents have largely for their object this very thing, to persuade the heathen how specially favored the Jews had been by the great kings of former days. In a word, the evidence for the Diaspora is very bad, but there is no real evidence against it. Under such circumstances what is left us but to admit our ignorance?

To the first part of our question, that concerning a pre-Maccabaeon Diaspora, we have not got a very satisfactory answer; in coming to the second part, how far the Jews had admitted Hellenic influence, we again stumble into controversies.

Without losing ourselves in their mazes we may, I think, arrive at some more or less shadowy facts. The Jews before the Exile, as we know from the prophets, had shown no want of readiness to assimilate themselves to the nations round about them. Under the Exile the work of the prophets bore fruit in the formation of a stricter and more disciplined Judaism, which saved the people of Jehovah from being merged in the heathen among whom they dwelt. But even so there were lapses from the ideal of

complete separation. In the community at Jerusalem at the end of the fifth century *BC* Ezra and Nehemiah had once more to repel the encroachments of the heathen environment and make the fence of the Law yet more strong. And their labor was not lost. The little people dwelt separate in their hill country and, while wars rolled past them and kingdoms clashed and changed, nursed the sacred fire and meditated on the Law of the Lord. Strange among the nations, a people apart, bound in all their practice by a mysterious rule, they were taken by Greek writers of the fourth century not so much for a nation or a political organism as a sect of “philosophers”, who stood to the other Syrians as the Brahmins did to the other Indians—in fact, they were no doubt an offshoot of the Brahmins. Then in 332 the Jews came under the political supremacy of the Greeks.

Hellenic rule, as we have seen, penetrated far deeper than the old superficial Babylonian and Persian Empires. Hellenism was a force which partly by a deliberate policy, partly by its inherent power, changed the East as nothing had changed it before. The fourth kingdom “shall be diverse from all the kingdoms, and shall devour the whole earth, and shall thresh it and break it in pieces”. If the Jews had hardened themselves in a more rigid exclusiveness than in their early days, they had on the other hand never been exposed to so over-powering an ordeal.

That the temptation to conform with the fashion of the world should not have been felt in Judaea is impossible. The new stateliness of the Hellenized cities, the magnificence of Alexandria and Antioch would beset the peculiar people with the lust of the eyes and the pride of life. The temptation would, of course, appeal to the rich, to the dwellers in Jerusalem, rather than to the poor and the countryside. And if we can say anything of the history of the Jews in the days when Antiochus IV came to reign in Syria, it is that a part of the Jerusalem aristocracy were ready enough to make pacts with the rulers of the world. One family above all was marked out by its riches and its worldly propensities—the house of Tobiah.

It is a cardinal fact to be grasped in estimating the policy of Antiochus Epiphanes that the initiative in the Hellenizing of Jerusalem was not on the side of the king, but of the Jews themselves. Soon after the accession of Antiochus a deputation of principal men of the Jews came to the court begging for leave to convert Jerusalem into an Antioch and erect that essential mark of a Hellenic city, the gymnasium. There was of course a party among the Jews vehemently opposed to the innovations, and the conflict of principles was complicated, as usually happens, with a conflict of persons. Onias, who had been High-priest in the reign of Seleucus IV, seems to have been looked to as their leader by the party faithful to the old way. He was no longer in Jerusalem when Antiochus took the diadem. The broils which had distracted the Holy City during the preceding reign had driven him to withdraw to the Seleucid court to represent his cause personally to the King. Antiochus on his accession replaced Onias by his brother Jesus. The reason is alleged to have been that Jesus undertook to pay a larger tribute. This is likely enough. The Seleucid court would concern itself little with the internal affairs of Judaea and consider mainly who would rule there on the terms most favorable to the royal coffers. It is the ordinary principle of the Oriental court.

The new High-priest threw himself into the Hellenizing movement. He had transformed his Hebrew name Jesus (Yeshua) into the Greek Jason. It was he who obtained the King's leave to make Jerusalem an Hellenic city. The conservative party were overborne by the torrent. The gymnasium was built and soon thronged with young priests, pursuing the Hellenic ideal of bodily strength and beauty. The Greek hat, the *petasos*, was seen about the streets of Jerusalem. Everything must have seemed to Antiochus happily arranged. He himself visited the new Antioch-Hierosolyma, and was “magnificently received by Jason and the city, brought in with torches and shoutings”.

But there were some who looked with grief and horror at the transformation. Those who were zealous for the tradition of the fathers, who regarded all yielding to foreign influence as apostasy from the Lord, had drawn together as a band resolutely set against the prevailing current. They were known as the Hasidim, the Pious or Godly Ones, who refused to stand in the way of sinners, and meditated day and night in the Law. But now the ground seemed giving way under their feet. Wealth, influence, political power, perhaps numbers, were against them. “Help, Lord, for the godly man (*hasid*) ceaseth; the faithful fail from among the children of men”.

It is a moment of profound significance for all future time—this first trial of strength between the religion of Israel and Hellenic culture. The principles engaged are so vast that our sympathies today, when we consider that first moment of conflict, cannot be determined by mere historical criticism. The conflict is still with us, in modern society, in our own minds. Our estimate of the conduct of the Hellenizers, of the Hasidim, must be determined by our belief as to the value of that for which either party stood; and there belief depends upon our attitude to the world and to life, as a whole. But the historian may raise at any rate this inquiry—whether that part of Jewish belief and practice which, as being of absolute value, is maintained in combination with Hellenism by Christian Europe was assailed by the innovations of Jason. Did the Hellenizers, for instance, forsake Monotheism or introduce the immoralities of the heathen? The question, of course, with our very imperfect records can only be very doubtfully answered. Jason himself was evidently a man of low ambition, and the moral tone of the new *epheboi* may, for all we know, have justified the evil names fixed upon them by the Hasidim. It is, however, remarkable that in a work which holds the Hellenizers up to abhorrence it should be specially stated that the envoys of Jason to the games at Tyre were unwilling to contribute to the sacrifice to Heracles, and obtained leave to divert the money they carried to a secular purpose. And if any overt immoralities were connected with the new institutions, it is surprising that the writer should omit to let us know them. The chief charges brought against the Hellenizers are that they conceived a zeal for athletic exercises and that they wore Greek hats. But even if we were able to acquit the Hellenizers of formal transgressions, we should not necessarily condemn the Hasidim. The temper of the new society might still be incompatible with the Spirit who moved in Israel as that people's distinctive heritage.

New rivalries were not slow to break out in the dominant Hellenistic party. Menelaus, a Benjamite, supported by the house of Tobiah, intrigued at court against Jason, and induced Antiochus to make him High-priest in Jason's stead. He did not even

belong to the priestly tribe. He was instated by a royal garrison, now lodged in Jerusalem, and Jason fled over Jordan into the Ammonite country.

This provoked a more violent agitation than the appointment of Jason had done. Menelaus may have feared that it would end in the return of Onias. On the occasion of a journey he made to Antioch he bribed Andronicus, whom Antiochus had left at the head of affairs during his absence in Cilicia, to make away with the old High-priest, in spite of his having taken sanctuary in the precinct of Apollo at Daphne.

It is curious that our account does not represent Antiochus himself as hostile at this time to any section of the Jews. So far from being the inhuman monster we expect in a book written to glorify the Maccabaeen revolt, he is depicted as weeping at the death of the inoffensive Onias, and when later on at Tyre Menelaus is accused before him by the Jewish *gerusia*, he is only talked over to the side of Menelaus at the last moment by one of his councilors, Ptolemy the son of Dorymenes, with whom Menelaus had tampered. But not only was Menelaus acquitted; the Jews who had appeared against him were put to death. Perhaps Ptolemy had already brought Antiochus to construe enmity to Menelaus as disloyalty to the house of Seleucus.

The definite quarrel of Antiochus with the Jews—or, as he perhaps regarded it, with the faction among the Jews opposed to the High-priest and to the great Jewish families who supported the High-priest—began when the intelligence reached him during one of his campaigns in Egypt that Jerusalem had risen for the house of Ptolemy in his rear. Jason had suddenly (on a false report that Antiochus was dead) come back from the Ammonite country with a band he had got together and possessed himself of Jerusalem, except the citadel, where Menelaus had taken refuge. Those whom Jason found of the party of Menelaus—from the Seleucid point of view, the loyal party—were put to the sword. It was not Antiochus who drew the first blood in Jerusalem.

The defection of Jerusalem at a critical moment determined the King to visit it with signal chastisement. A city so near the Egyptian frontier must be made sure beyond question. We can well believe that the passionate and willful nature of Antiochus took a direction of strong vindictiveness towards the treacherous city. On his return from Egypt he turned aside, and came to Jerusalem with a fierce countenance to wreak vengeance. That the people generally, whose religion had been outraged by the high-priesthood of the Benjamite Menelaus, and still more by his manner of exercising the office, had given a welcome to Jason we can hardly doubt. Jason, before the arrival of Antiochus, had already played the part of the hireling shepherd; he was safe once more across the Jordan, and upon the people the punishment fell. It shows, of course, not that Antiochus was a fiend, but that he was of that order of statesmen who would repress disaffection by unscrupulous violence without ascertaining whence it springs. Once more blood ran in the streets of Jerusalem, and the Syrian soldiery told off for the work of massacre were probably no more merciful than those whom the Ottoman Sultan sets upon the Armenian Christians.

It was not in blood only that Antiochus made the Jews pay. Their rebellion had given him the excuse to take into the royal treasury the precious things of the Temple of

the Lord, as, on one pretext or another, he appropriated the riches of the other Syrian temples. With unspeakable horror the Jews saw him enter within the holy doors which might be passed by the priests alone. And the Lord withheld His hand!

Antiochus had not yet declared war on the Jewish religion. He had but chastised Jerusalem as another rebellious city might have been chastised. The further development of his policy did not manifest itself till after an interval. Since Antiochus could no longer after 168 protect the Coele-Syrian province by holding any Egyptian territory, its internal consolidation became imperative in the first degree. The weak spot was Jerusalem. What the Seleucid court believed it saw there was a loyal party, readily accepting the genial culture which was to harmonize the kingdom, on the one hand, and on the other a people perversely and dangerously solitary, resisting all efforts to amalgamate them with the general system, and only waiting the appearance of a foreign invader to rebel. And on what ground did this people maintain its obstinate isolation? On the ground of an unlovely barbarian superstition. Very well: the religion of Jehovah must be abolished. The Hellenization of Jerusalem must be made perfect. If part of the population took up an attitude of irreconcilable obstruction, they must be exterminated and their place filled by Greek colonists.

Apollonius, the commander of the Mysian mercenaries, was charged with the first step of effecting a strong military occupation of Jerusalem. His errand was concealed; he went with a considerable force, ostensibly in connection with the tribute from southern Syria, and seized Jerusalem by a *coup de main*. A fresh massacre, directed probably by Menelaus and his adherents, cleared Jerusalem of the obnoxious element. A new fortress of great strength was built on Mount Zion, and a body of royal troops, Macedonians, established in it to dominate the city. But now came the second part of the process, the extinguishing of the Jewish religion. It was simple enough in Jerusalem itself. Jehovah was identified with Zeus Olympius, and Zeus Olympius, it would appear, with Antiochus. The ritual was altered in such a way as to make the breach with Judaism most absolute. A Greek altar — the "Abomination of Desolation" — was erected upon the old Jewish altar in the Temple court, and swine sacrificed upon it. The High-priest partook of the new sacrificial feasts, of the "broth of abominable things". To partake was made the test of loyalty to the King. The day of the King's birth was monthly celebrated with Greek rites. A Dionysiac festival was introduced, when the population of Jerusalem went in procession, crowned with ivy. That everything might conform to the purest Hellenic type, the framing of the new institutions was entrusted to one of the king's friends from Athens.

At the same time that the transformation was accomplished in Jerusalem, the other temple built to Jehovah in Shechem, the religious centre of the Samaritans, was constituted a temple of Zeus Xenios.

To purge Jerusalem of all trace of Judaism was comparatively easy; it was another matter to master the country. In the country villages and smaller towns of Judaea the royal officers met with instances of extreme resistance. Their instructions were to compel the population to break with the old religion by taking part in the ceremonies of Hellenic worship, especially in eating the flesh of sacrificed swine, and to

punish even with death mothers who circumcised their children. The books of which the Jews made so much were destroyed, if found, or disfigured by mocking scribbles, or defiled with unholy broth.

There can be no question that these measures threw the bulk of the Jewish people, who had perhaps wavered when there seemed a possibility of combining Judaism with Hellenism, into definite antagonism. But immense force was brought to bear upon them. Antiochus did not omit to have the reasonableness of Hellenism put in a friendly way to those who would hear, and he punished without mercy those who would not. And under the stress of those days numbers of the Jews conformed; those who held fast generally forsook their homes and gathered in wandering companies in desolate places. But there also shone out in that intense moment the sterner and sublimer qualities which later Hellenism, and above all the Hellenism of Syria, knew nothing of uncompromising fidelity to an ideal, endurance raised to the pitch of utter self-devotion, a passionate clinging to purity. They were qualities for the lack of which all the riches of Hellenic culture could not compensate. It was an epoch in history. The agony created new human types and new forms of literature, which became permanent, were inherited by Christendom. The figure of the martyr, as the Church knows it, dates from the persecution of Antiochus; all subsequent martyrologies derive from the Jewish books which recorded the sufferings of those who in that day “were strong and did exploits”.

The resistance was at first passive. The people of the country villages, if they did not flee and join the roving bands, either conformed, which was probably the most common, or underwent martyrdom. The roving bands were without any general leader or clear principles of action. When one band had been overtaken on the Sabbath by a party from the *akra* in Jerusalem, they allowed themselves to be butchered without resistance, that they might not profane the holy day but rather “die in their simplicity”.

It was when the Hasmonaean family came forward that all this was changed. The passive resistance passed into a revolt. But the beginnings of the Maccabaeen revolt are wrapped in a certain degree of uncertainty. The origin of the name Hasmonaean is a question.

The personality and the rôle of Mattathiah, which the First Book of Maccabees presents to us, have been recently pronounced a fiction. Our two accounts of the first conflicts with the Seleucid power do not easily admit of reconciliation. But this much may be taken for history. Before the persecution had continued long, a certain family among the refugee bands marked itself out by its gifts of leadership, the children of Hashmunai, of the priestly tribe, with their home in the little town of Modin (*mod. al-Madya*). They made a nucleus round which the scattered bands drew together, and they were strengthened by the adhesion of the Hasidim. It was resolved to fight, even on the Sabbath day, and thereafter the towns and villages which had settled down comfortably to a Hellenic regime found themselves suddenly visited by bands of fierce zealots, who repaid massacre for massacre, circumcised the children by force and destroyed the emblems of Hellenic religion.

Naturally the Seleucid government was concerned to protect the new order of things from such disturbance. But it had not sufficient force on the spot to cope with the mobile irregular bands. Some collisions between the local forces and the Jewish insurgents took place, with the result that the royal troops were swept away by the furious onset, or found the enemy upon them in dark nights before they were aware.

In these encounters the people of Israel learnt that the Lord had raised up a man to lead and deliver them as of old. Of the five Hasmonaean brethren it was Judas, surnamed Maccabaeus, who bore the military command and became surrounded with the halo of a popular hero. The effect of his successes was to rally to the cause all those who had only unwillingly and from fear accepted Hellenism, and these, together with the refugees, made the mass of the population of Judaea. The country towns and villages resumed their Jewish complexion; those who loved Hellenism, or were too deeply compromised, fled to the Greek cities. Jerusalem was still held by the Macedonian garrison in the *akra*, but the rest of Judaea was won back for Judaism. So long as Jerusalem continued a heathen city, Mizpeh, where there had been “a place of prayer aforetime for Israel”, was the national centre. What had been scattered bands were now organized under Judas as a national army.

Things had perhaps not reached this stage when Antiochus left Syria for his expedition in the North and East. It was thenceforth upon Lysias, the guardian of the young Antiochus, that the responsibility for restoring order in southern Syria fell. How Antiochus himself construed the revolt we do not know, or if he divined its gravity, but the letter given in the Second Book of Maccabees, if genuine, throws light on his attitude. The letter is addressed, not as Jason of Cyrene would have us think, to the insurgent Jews, but to the Hellenizing Jews of Jerusalem, whom Antiochus regards, or affects to regard, as the Jewish people. He addresses them, in well-understood contrast to the other part of the nation, as the loyal Jews. He describes himself as their fellow-citizen and strategos. He writes from the East, mentioning his illness and stating his hope of recovery, but requesting the Jews, in the event of his decease, to remain loyal to the young Antiochus. *The bands of Judas are ignored.*

CHAPTER XXVI

ANTIOCHUS V EUPATOR AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF LYSIAS

When Antiochus Epiphanes left Syria in 166-165 the government of the West was confided, as has been said, to Lysias, one of those who held the rank of Kinsmen. It was in the early days of his administration that the first attempt of any importance was made to quell the Jewish insurrection. The matter having proved too great for the troops on the spot, the forces of the Coele-Syrian province had to be concentrated to deal with it. Under the authority of the strategos of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, Ptolemy the son of Dorymenes, an army was launched upon Judaea, commanded by Nicanor and Gorgias. Such complete confidence was felt in the Gentile cities as to the result of the expedition that the force was followed by a great company of merchants, alert to buy up the numbers of Jewish prisoners who would be thrown upon the slave-market. The way of approach chosen was one of the western valleys which run down from the Judaeian upland to the Philistine plain. At Emmaus, in the valley of Ajalon, the force encamped before making the ascent.

It was the first great ordeal through which the new Jewish army was to pass, and many lost heart as the crisis approached and slunk away. Judas with those who remained took up a position on the slopes to the south of Emmaus.

It was resolved in the camp of Nicanor, our account says, to avoid one of those surprises, in which the Jews—irregulars fighting in their own country—had shown themselves so deft, by the royal forces effecting a surprise themselves. Gorgias was detached with about an eighth of the entire force to make a night attack on the enemy's encampment. Men from Jerusalem were ready to act as guides. Judas, however, got wind of the design, and moving out by the hill-paths, evaded the attacking force. Gorgias reached the camping-place to find it deserted. He then committed the indiscretion of pressing on into the hills, whither he conceived the enemy had retired, without ascertaining his real whereabouts. Judas suddenly flung himself at daybreak on the main body at Emmaus, which, taken completely unawares, fled down past Gezer into the Philistine plain. Gorgias was still wandering about in the hills when the columns of smoke rising from Emmaus told their tale. He at once withdrew his men, without risking an engagement, to join the fugitives in the plain. The Jews fell upon the deserted camp, and “got much gold and silver and blue and sea-purple and great riches”. They returned up the valley, intoning the ancient burden of their psalms, “Because He is good and His mercy endureth for ever”.

The provincial forces had proved inadequate to the task of suppressing the Jewish revolt.

The regent Lysias must now take the matter into his own hands. In 165 he moved from Antioch at the head of a larger army than had yet been put into the field against the Jews. Lysias resolved to attack from the south where the Judaeian upland falls by gentle degrees towards Hebron. These slopes as far north as Beth-sur were peopled, not by Jews, but by Idumaeans, and at Beth-sur the edge of the plateau was already gained. Beth-sur itself seems to have been held by a company of Jews. It was attacked by the royal forces.

The engagements which took place between the troops of Lysias and the insurgents are represented in the Books of the Maccabees in the guise of a notable victory of Judas. But in view of the ease with which even distinct defeats are seen to be transfigured in the imagination of the Jewish writers into victories, it may be questioned whether much damage was inflicted upon the regent's army. Before, however, any decisive result was reached, it was known in Antioch and in the camp of Lysias that Antiochus Epiphanes was no more. It was possibly this material change in the situation which inclined Lysias to make terms with the nationalist Jews.

Nor were the nationalists unwilling to avail themselves of a way of escape from the predicament in which the presence of such an army as the regent's had placed them. Their envoys, John and Absalom, carried to Lysias a written statement of their desires. At the same time they entreated the good offices of some Roman commissioners who were in the neighborhood—on their way presumably from Alexandria to Antioch. The requests of the insurgents were referred to the court at Antioch, and supported, it appears, by the Roman commissioners. Possibly Lysias himself, who had on his own authority made some concessions, advised conciliation. At any rate, the policy of Antiochus Epiphanes was now definitely renounced by the Council of the boy-king, Antiochus Eupator. The rescript sent in reference to the questions submitted by Lysias conceded to the Jews full liberty for the exercise of their ancestral religion, the restoration of the old Jewish institutions in Jerusalem, and amnesty for all those returning to Jerusalem within a given time. But the nationalists do not seem to have had it all their own way. They were probably obliged to agree to some *modus vivendi* with their fellow-countrymen who had attached themselves to Hellenism and the Seleucid house. It is remarkable that Menelaus, who of all men was most odious to the nationalists, remained in power. Seeing how things were tending, he had made himself the spokesman of Jewish feeling at Antioch, and was deputed by the court to direct the work of pacification. The garrison, of course, remained in the akra.

These rescripts mark the end of the first phase in the Maccabean struggle. The ban was now taken off the Jewish religion; the cause for which the nationalists had hitherto been fighting, the liberty of Judaism, was won. Thenceforward, when they took the sword, it was to fight, not for religious, but for political, freedom.

The Hasmonaean family and the people who followed them had now access to Jerusalem. The refugees returned to their homes. In the following December (164) the restoration of the old worship in the Temple ensued. The altar of Zeus was broken up and the stones cast into an unclean place. The old altar of burnt offering, upon which the heathen altar had been erected, could not be used again. Its stones were put away in a

place on the Temple hill, “until there should come a prophet to give an answer concerning them”. A new altar was made, and on the 25th of Ghislev the smoke of the first sacrifice went up from it to the Lord—on the very day when the profanation had taken place some years before. For eight days the ceremonies of rededication went on. It was a moment to be remembered, and in years to come the anniversary was celebrated by Israel in the Feast of the Dedication.

By the death of Antiochus Epiphanes the young Antiochus Eupator, now a boy of nine years, became sole king. The administration was, of course, in the hands of those whom the ill-regulated favor of Antiochus Epiphanes had raised to power, wretched men like Heraclides of Miletus and his brother Timarchus under whose extortionate rule the eastern provinces groaned. The drastic policy of Antiochus Epiphanes was given up; the kingdom entered on a period of inertia and abasement. This result was contemplated with extreme satisfaction at Rome, and there was no relaxing of the grasp which held the rightful heir to the Seleucid throne, Demetrius the son of Seleucus, a prisoner.

The history of those days in Syria is preserved for us only in so far as the Jews are concerned. They show us the new military power created by the Hasmonaean brethren engaged in conflict with all the neighboring peoples. In the picture we get of southern Syria the power of the Seleucid court seems to be of a shadowy kind. Only in the Philistine plain is it substantial; there Gorgias, the captain unsuccessful at Emmaus, holds Jamnia (on the great road north of Azotus) with a royal garrison. The Idumaeans (Edomites), the peoples between Jordan and the eastern wilderness, the Arab tribes, appear practically independent.

Nearly all these races, however, are united in sympathy with the Seleucid government by their common hatred of the Jews. *The division in this conflict is not between Hellene and Asiatic, but between Israel and the nations.* It is true that the zeal with which the heathen nations of Syria adopted the Hellenic culture focussed in the new cities may have had something to do with their hatred of the race who remained stubbornly "barbarian". It is noteworthy that the Nabataean Arabs, who had perhaps been the least affected by the Hellenistic movement, were friendly to the Jewish rebels. But in the cities of Syria the successes of the nationalists, and above all the restoration of the old ritual, roused a flame of anti-Jewish rage. The little communities of Jews who resided among the heathen found themselves in danger of massacre. In the district of Tob, beyond Jordan (*mod.* Tayziba, opposite Beth-shan?) a massacre actually took place. In Idumaea an outbreak occurred, and parties of Jews were besieged in the fortresses where they had taken refuge. Travelling companies of Jews were cut up on the road by the marauding tribe of the Beni-Baian.

But Judaism did not lack a champion. The Hasmonaean brethren made a series of avenging raids into the surrounding countries. The chronology of these “Neighbour Wars” is perplexed. They possibly began before the return of the nationalists to Jerusalem. But their character is more plain. In contrast with later Hasmonaean wars their object is the concentration, not the expansion, of Judaism. Jewish colonies are not established in the Gentile lands, but the Jewish communities actually residing in them

are brought back *en masse* to Judaea. Gentile communities which had not shown any hostility to the Jews do not seem to have been molested. The case of the Nabataeans has been mentioned. The Greek colony of Scythopolis (Beth-shan) protected the resident Jews and received the thanks of Judas when he passed with his bands that way. On the other hand, wherever the Jews had been persecuted, scenes of frightful carnage took place. At Bosra and Maspha it is expressly stated that Judas put all males to the sword.

While the King's peace was thus broken in southern Syria by the agitation against the Jews and the sanguinary reprisals, the nationalists and the friends of the Seleucid government were not living happily together in Jerusalem.

The former had the upper hand and things went hard with their adversaries. It was now the turn of the nationalists to persecute. Those guilty of Hellenizing were put to death and their possessions seized by the dominant party. The remnant of the Hellenizing party fled. Some took refuge in the akra. Others were received in the strongholds of Idumaea. Their cries reached the court of Antioch. Were the loyalists to be abandoned to the vindictiveness of the rebels? The Seleucid court was bound in honor to protect those who maintained its cause.

It was obvious that the concordat arranged by Lysias had broken down, and the court was angry with Menelaus, who had been more or less responsible for it. Nor was it only for the sake of the loyalists that the Seleucid government must take action. The garrison in the akra, its one hold left in Judaea, was hard pressed by Judas. He had begun a regular siege, and held the garrison strongly invested.

In 163 an army greater than the last moved out from Antioch, complete even to the corps of elephants. It was led by Lysias, and accompanied by the boy-king himself. The line of attack chosen was again by the south, and once more the frontier fortress of the Jews, Beth-sur, was besieged. Judas came as in former years to battle. But against the real force of the kingdom his bands could not make head. He was defeated at Beth-Zachariah near Beth-sur. His brother Eleazar was among the slain. Eleazar had fallen, the story says, in an attack upon one of the elephants, which he supposed to carry the King. Judas fell back, leaving the way open, to the neighborhood of Gophna. The King and Lysias advanced to Jerusalem and laid siege to the nationalist fortress on Mount Zion, while part of the royal army was left to prosecute the siege of Beth-sur. There was a great scarcity of food in Judaea, both because of the number of refugees brought in during the last years, and because at that moment a Sabbath year was in course. Beth-sur was compelled by famine to surrender, and a royal garrison took the place of the Jewish one.

But once more the nationalists were saved from a desperate predicament by outside events. A certain Philip who had been with Antiochus Epiphanes in Persis, and received from the dying king, it was said, the diadem and seal which carried the chief authority in the kingdom, now set himself up against Lysias in Antioch. It was imperative for Lysias to come to terms quickly with the Jews. What the terms of the agreement were it is impossible to make out precisely. Liberty for the Jewish worship had been already conceded in 164, and the question since then had been whether equal

liberty was to be given by the nationalists to Hellenism, or whether the Hasmonaean party were exclusively to possess the state. It would appear that Lysias must now have abandoned the Hellenizers and offered the friendship of the Seleucid government to the Hasmonaeans, if they on their part would recognize the Seleucid supremacy. Judas was to hold the chief power in Judaea, but hold it as the King's *strategos*. Menelaus, the head of the Hellenizing party, the old instrument of the Seleucid court, Lysias made haste to destroy. He had presented himself in the royal camp with the petition to be reinstated in the high-priesthood. Instead of this, after the compact with the Hasmonaeans, Lysias took him back with the army on his return, and at Beroea in northern Syria (Aleppo) he was cast into the fiery furnace.

The Seleucid King entered Jerusalem as a friend and made an offering in the Temple. But the garrison was left in the Akra, and before he departed the nationalist fortress in Jerusalem was dismantled. The situation now created there—the Hasmonaeans in power, but trammelled by an irksome allegiance and overlooked by a garrison—had no promise of stability. And now we turn away our eyes for a while from Judaea to northern Syria.

As soon as Lysias returned with the King to the north, a trial of strength took place between him and Philip. In this Philip was worsted, and, flying to Ptolemy Philometor, disappears from history. The palace gang to which Lysias belonged were now absolute. How reckless their administration was is shown by the fact that they committed some crime (perhaps the murder of queen Antiochis whilst she was residing in her old home), which utterly alienated the Cappadocian court, and undid the alliance which had been part of the policy of Antiochus Epiphanes.

In Rome it was resolved to take advantage of the weakness of the Seleucid kingdom to cripple it still further. A mission was dispatched in 164, soon after the death of Antiochus Epiphanes was known, consisting of Gnaeus Octavius, Spurius Lucretius and Lucius Aurelius, to “regulate the affairs of the kingdom”. By regulating its affairs the Senate understood the destruction of the newly-formed fleet and the corps of elephants, both of which contravened the provisions of the Peace of Apamea. It was believed that the gang would agree to anything, however disastrous or dishonorable to the kingdom, so long as they might hold their places and be secured against the thing they dreaded—the return of Demetrius. The mission moved slowly, looking into other matters in the eastern countries on its way. In 163 apparently they had come to Cappadocia, and now the fruits of the fatuous policy of Lysias showed themselves. The throne was held no longer by Ariarathes IV Eusebes, but by his son Mithridates, who had taken the name of Ariarathes on his accession, Ariarathes V Eusebes Philopator. He threw himself heart and soul into any project for humiliating the Seleucid court. He drew a lively picture of the misgovernment and weakness of Lysias and the gang, and offered military support to the Roman envoys. So mean an opinion, however, had the envoys of the present government in Syria that they thought military support quite unnecessary.

Their estimate was right as far as Lysias and his associates were concerned. They raised no objection to the destruction of the fleet and elephants. But Octavius had left

out of account the popular feeling, which was stirred to frenzy at the sight. And he paid the penalty. At Laodicea, whither the envoys had come (to destroy the ships in the harbor or embark on their further journey to Egypt), Octavius, while taking his exercise in the public gymnasium, was set upon by a citizen, called Leptines, and killed. The man instantly became a hero, and went about Laodicea declaring that he had acted under divine inspiration. Among the loudest voices raised in his glorification was that of Isocrates, a professor of letters from Greece, who was now swept by the wave of popular excitement into politics. He began to clamor that the other envoys should share Octavius' fate. He gave voice to all that bitterness against Rome which had become general among Greek idealists. But the colleagues of Octavius made good their escape (163-162).

The government, of course, was horror-struck at the tragedy. Ostentatious honors were shown to the body of the murdered envoy, and ambassadors went in haste to Rome to assure the Senate that the court was entirely innocent of any share in the crime. But the Senate was not in a hurry to acquit. It maintained that impressive reserve (often the consequence of ignorance or indecision) which so puzzled and frightened the Greeks. It was not, however, from the Senate that the doom of Lysias and the gang came.

CHAPTER XXVII

DEMETRIUS THE SAVIOUR

All this while the boy who had been growing up in Italy had not lost the hope of coming to his own. When the news of his uncle's death arrived in Rome (164) he had approached the Senate with fair words, begging to be possessed of his inheritance. The Senate need have no doubt that a friendly king would sit upon the Seleucid throne; Demetrius assured them that he actually felt one of themselves, that he looked upon the Senators as his fathers and the young Roman nobles as his brothers. The Senate, Polybius says, was made uncomfortable by this appeal; they had a bad conscience, but they thought they understood Roman interests better than Demetrius, and preferred a powerless child and a palace camarilla to an active prince, however friendly. So the mission was sent to destroy the ships and the elephants.

Demetrius at that time was twenty-three years old. He bore his captivity impatiently. But it had been a magnificent school. As in the case of Antiochus Epiphanes, to have been educated in Rome, not in a Syrian palace, meant a great deal to the ruler of a kingdom. It was not only that he had grown up in contact with the finest aristocracy and the most vigorous political system of the world, but there met in Rome—as captives, ambassadors, teachers—the greatest of the contemporary Greeks. The circle of Scipio Aemilianus comprised the philosopher Panaetius and the historian Polybius. For the friendship of Demetrius with Polybius we have the authority of Polybius himself. The Achaean statesman and the Seleucid prince were both enthusiastic sportsmen, and this in the first instance had drawn them together. How much Demetrius owed to his intercourse with this man, the widest observer of contemporary politics, the most original historian since Thucydides, we can only speculate. Something the younger man, spirited and sanguine, must have gained from the manifold experience, the matured reflection of the elder—from long conversations as they rode or drove home together through the declining afternoons from hunting the pig in the woods of Anagnia.

Another acquaintance whom Demetrius made in Rome was his cousin, the best of the Ptolemies, Philometor. In 163 Philometor came to Italy as a suppliant. For the double kingship established in Egypt since the invasions of Antiochus Epiphanes had not worked well, and Philometor had now been driven out by his brother Euergetes. He landed with three slaves and a eunuch only. People arrived in Rome with the news that they had seen the King of Egypt tramping along the road on foot with this poor attendance. Impulsively Demetrius hurried to meet him, with royal apparel and a magnificent horse, richly caparisoned. He was received with a smile. He must not spoil a calculated stage effect. Ptolemy begged his cousin to wait with his horse and royal

robes in one of the towns on the road; he himself proceeded as he had begun, entered Rome, a pathetic figure, and took up his lodging with a penurious Greek painter in an attic. He was restored after this by Roman authority to Egypt, although he was obliged to surrender Cyrene to Euergetes.

It was only a short time after the visit of Ptolemy Philometor that the startling news of the murder of Octavius came to Rome, and was immediately followed by the ambassadors sent from the court at Antioch (162). How would this affect the disposition of the Senate to the existing government and to Demetrius? Polybius tells us that Demetrius came to him in high excitement. Would not Polybius advise him to approach the Senate once more? “Polybius told him”, the historian writes of himself, “not to stumble twice at the same stone”. Demetrius would never induce the Senate to move in his favor, but if he took the matter into his own hands and acted boldly, the hour was favorable. Demetrius understood, but he said nothing. Presently he consulted a friend of his own age, Apollonius, who had, Polybius explains, an innocent and childlike belief in the part played by logic in practical politics, and, since it was unreasonable for Demetrius to be a hostage for the son of Antiochus Epiphanes, advised him to try the Senate again. Demetrius did. The Senate showed a disconcerting impassivity to argument—as Polybius had foreseen.

The resolution of the young prince, who had plenty of high courage and determination, now began to rise to the pitch of independent action. The man who had nurtured him in boyhood, Diodorus, had recently returned from Syria, whither he had gone to spy out the situation. Demetrius took him into confidence, and the report of Diodorus confirmed his purpose. The incidents of the Roman mission and the murder of Octavius had led to a profound breach between the people and the palace gang. The people mistrusted Lysias, and Lysias the people. Let Demetrius appear there, were it but with one attendant, and the kingdom would be his! This clinched his resolve. Polybius received a summons to come and see him, and was then asked to deliberate on ways of escape.

It occurred to Polybius that the man who must help them was Menyllus of Alabanda. Menyllus was now in Rome as the ambassador of Ptolemy Philometor; Polybius knew him well and trusted him absolutely. He introduced him to Demetrius, and Menyllus was let into the plot. The ambassador soon had a plan ready. He went down to Ostia and found a state-vessel of Carthage, carrying the customary offering to the gods of the mother-city, Tyre, in the harbor. Menyllus saw the captain, told him he was shortly returning to Alexandria, and made arrangements for himself and his party to be taken on board.

Before the ship sailed, Diodorus was sent on ahead to Syria to watch the drift of public feeling in the great cities. Demetrius made his final preparations. The only persons in the plot beside Polybius and Menyllus were Apollonius and two sons of that older Apollonius who had been of influence in the court of Seleucus IV, called Meleager and Menestheus.

The night came, in which the escape was to be made. Demetrius dined that afternoon with one of his friends, not at his own house, where he always kept a large table, and the presence of numbers would be inconvenient. It was given out that the prince would hunt next day at Anagnia, and a tent was pitched for him that night without the city; those in the plot had already sent on their slaves to make preparations. Only one slave was to accompany each of them in the voyage. The arrangement was that on leaving the banquet they should proceed with all secrecy and speed to the ship.

At this critical moment Polybius was confined to his bed by an illness. It was a great annoyance to him to be cut off from participation in the action, but Menyllus came regularly to his bedside to report every fresh development. On the final evening he knew that Demetrius was making merry with his friends; he knew also that Demetrius had all the buoyant carelessness of youth and drank freely in his convivial hours. The thought of possible indiscretions which might wreck the enterprise tormented him. He lay fretting on his bed, lest Demetrius should drink too deep into the night. At last he took a tablet, wrote upon it a few words, sealed it, and gave it to a slave to carry to the house where the feast was going on. It was now growing dark. The slave had orders to ask at the door for the prince's cup-bearer, and deliver him the tablet to give Demetrius, but he was on no account to say who he was or from whom he came. In the tablet were no compromising names; nothing but certain proverbial verses from the poets :

“He that acts carries away the prize from him that tarryes.

Night bringeth the same to all, but they that adventure get more profit of it.

Make a venture, hazard, act, fail

Or succeed — anything rather than let thyself be carried by chance.

Be sober and remember to mistrust : these are the hinges of the soul”.

The tablet was soon in the hands of Demetrius, and he recognized the sententious tone of his old friend. Presently he rose, said that he felt sick and left the house. His friends escorted him to the tent. There he chose the slaves to take the nets and the dogs to Anagnia for tomorrow's sport. The rendez-vous was appointed them and they were sent off. Some others of his friends, including Nicanor, were now admitted to the plot. They were all instructed to go to their several places of abode, send off their slaves to join the others at Anagnia, and change their dining garb for such clothes as men wore hunting—or on a journey. Having done this they were to return each one to the tent.

At last all were assembled, and in the dead of night the party hurried down to Ostia. Menyllus had been before them with a story to satisfy the people of the ship. A communication, he said, had just come from King Ptolemy which would cause him to prolong his stay in Rome, but he wished to dispatch some trusty young men who would take secret intelligence to Alexandria concerning the movements of Euergetes. The young men would present themselves about midnight. All that the people of the ship cared about was the passage money, and when Menyllus assured them that the original

sum stipulated for would still be given, they asked no more questions. Everything on board was in readiness for departure. Towards the end of the third watch Demetrius and his company appeared, eight men, five grown slaves and three boys. There was some talk with Menyllus apart; then he showed them the provisions got ready for the voyage, and introduced them with earnest words to the captain and the crew. In the grey of the dawn the vessel loosed her moorings and glided out to sea. The steersman had no inkling whom he carried; he never doubted but they were soldiers in the Egyptian service going to King Ptolemy.

For some time Demetrius was not missed. His friends in Rome thought him at Anagnia; his servants at Anagnia thought him on the way from Rome. But on the fourth day his disappearance became patent. On the fifth day a meeting of the Senate was called to consider the matter. But by that time Demetrius must have passed the Straits of Messina. To try to arrest him and fail would, they thought, be undignified. In a few days they had fallen upon the inevitable expedient of a mission—an expedient which always deferred the trouble of a decision. Tiberius Gracchus and two colleagues were chosen to go and watch events in the East.

In this first-hand narrative, which stands out in ancient literature for its vividness and authenticity, we are brought close to the actors and know them for persons of flesh and blood. It is a moment of life long ago handed down still living to our own day. But the illumination ends. Once more we perceive through bad or fragmentary records only the outline of events; the person of Demetrius recedes, becomes doubtful; the warm-blooded youth who hunted at Anagnia and drank carelessly with his friends we feel we know, but the King is far removed; we can see the general figure of his public action, but what heart he now bears beneath it we are too far off to discern.

The Carthaginian vessel touched at Tripolis on its way, and here Demetrius and his friends left it. In this Phoenician city Demetrius published his advent and assumed the diadem. The news travelled rapidly over Syria, and it soon appeared that Diodorus had not exaggerated the unpopularity of the present government. Everywhere the people rose for Demetrius. Almost automatically, and without, it would seem, a blow struck, he found himself master of the country. In Antioch the troops declared for him. They seized the sons of Antiochus Epiphanes and Lysias, and set off to deliver them up to Demetrius. Fresh from the open-hearted convivialities of his life in Rome, the young man had to begin the life of kingship with a deed of blood. There could be no question, from the point of view of the worldly politician, that the boy who had usurped the name of King Antiochus and the minister who had supported him must be put out of the way. Demetrius wished at any rate to have the thing done before he had any personal contact with his cousins. He sent a message to the troops who were bringing their prisoners, "Show me not their faces". And the army slew them. And Demetrius sat upon the throne of his kingdom, 162.

In Syria the old régime collapsed instantly on the appearance of Demetrius, but in the eastern provinces Timarchus the Milesian, although unpopular, was not so easily displaced. When the system to which he belonged broke up, he followed the precedent of Molon and took the diadem.

Whatever success Demetrius had won, he was dogged by the displeasure of Rome, an impalpable disability, but one which counted for a great deal in the East. Timarchus, on the other hand, reckoned upon Rome's friendship, not only because he was a counterpoise to Demetrius, but because he had often gone with his brother as ambassador to Rome in the days of Antiochus Epiphanes, and not a few of the Senators had swallowed his golden baits. Demetrius was hardly established in Syria when Timarchus appeared in Rome. He had come now to ask for a kingdom, to be recognized by Rome as King of the Medes. The Senate graciously handed him a piece of paper which announced that "as far as Rome was concerned Timarchus was King". That was enough; Timarchus went back happy with his piece of paper to display it to the other Eastern powers. Artaxias of Armenia, whom Antiochus Epiphanes had compelled a few years before to do homage to the Seleucid throne, gave Timarchus his alliance. The new King multiplied his forces. He subjugated many of the surrounding peoples.

Demetrius, who had set out in defiance of Rome, was not frightened by Timarchus' piece of paper, nor even by his military establishment. It would seem that Timarchus was advancing to the invasion of Syria, making for the Zeugma upon the Euphrates, when Demetrius encountered him. And once more at the advent of the Seleucid the ground gave way under the feet of the rebel. Timarchus, who had followed the example of Molon, shared his fate. In Babylonia, Demetrius was received with transports of joy. After the tyranny of the base man, Seleucia hailed the true King with the shout of Saviour. It is the surname by which he is known (about 160)

While Demetrius was fighting Timarchus, he also labored to rid himself of the ban fastened upon him by Rome. Its practical inconvenience was seen when he attempted to renew the alliance with the Cappadocian court. Ariarathes V had been alienated by Lysias, and it might be thought that he would be ready to welcome the overthrower of that criminal administration. He was a man of whom our authorities speak highly, as having inherited from his mother Antiochis a love of Hellenic culture without her unscrupulous ambition. The Cappadocian court now for the first time attracted Greek men of letters. Ariarathes himself seems to have studied philosophy, and even applied its precepts to his practice. When discord broke out in the family which ruled Sophene—the house of Zariadris—the rival claimants betook themselves to the two neighbouring kings—Mithrobuzanes to Ariarathes, and the other to Artaxias of Armenia. Ariarathes brought back Mithrobuzanes into the principality with a Cappadocian army. Artaxias now proposed to him that they should each make away with his protégé and divide Sophene between them. Ariarathes rejected the suggestion with loathing. Nay, more, his representations were so powerful with Artaxias, that the young man whom Artaxias had proposed to murder found himself treated with more courtesy than before.

Demetrius, soon after coming to Syria, made overtures to his cousin, the king of Cappadocia. He offered him the hand of his sister. But Ariarathes thought to win the favor of Rome by repelling these advances. He refused the Seleucid princess. Naturally, any possibility of friendship between the two courts instantly vanished.

Demetrius left nothing undone to conciliate Roman opinion. The embassy, headed by Tiberius Gracchus, dispatched in 162 after his flight, arrived, perhaps not till the following year, in Cappadocia. It was here met by Menochares, the ambassador of Demetrius. Menochares was probably instructed to ascertain its intentions, and he returned to Antioch to report the result of his interview. Could Demetrius win the commission to his cause? Fortunately Gracchus himself was well disposed to him, and Demetrius plied the envoys with fresh deputations before they reached Syria. They were met in Pamphylia, and again in Rhodes, with assurances that Demetrius would do everything to meet the wishes of Rome. Let only Rome utter the word "King Demetrius!". The friendship of Gracchus stood Demetrius in good stead. His report was favorable, and the momentous word was uttered. But Demetrius, although recognized as King, had not yet won confidence. In fact the Senate could not have confidence in any possessor of the Seleucid throne unless he were a nonentity.

Envoys of Demetrius could now be received in Rome, and immediately on his recognition (160) Demetrius sent Menochares to convey a "crown" of 10,000 gold pieces—a "thank-offering" for his nurture—and the slayer of Octavius. Beside Leptines, who had done the deed, there was sent the unhappy rhetorician, Isocrates, who had glorified it. Leptines maintained the calm confidence of the fanatic to the end. He had presented himself to Demetrius soon after his accession, begged him to hold the city of Laodicea in no wise responsible for what had occurred, and stated that he was perfectly ready to go and convince the Senate that he had been inspired. His enthusiasm was so evidently genuine that it was deemed superfluous to fetter or guard him. Isocrates on the other hand was put into a wooden collar and chains, and abandoned himself to despair. Polybius, who describes the arrival of the pair in Rome, writes no doubt of what he saw. Isocrates had hardly eaten for months. He made a *marvellous figure*. For more than a year he had not washed or cut his hair or his nails. Through the matted growth which covered his head his eyes glared and rolled strangely. "A man who has lost his humanity", the sententious historian observes in this connection, "is more frightful than a beast". Leptines was still quite happy; he felt quite sure that the Senate had only to hear him to set him free.

The Senate was thrown into some embarrassment by the embassy, as they did not want to make up their quarrel with the Seleucid King. They decided, however, to receive the gold, but they refused the murderer. They did not at all want to seem, by executing justice, to have settled their score. They returned Demetrius a frigid answer: "he would meet with consideration if his conduct were satisfactory to the Senate".

This was high language; it might be thought to argue that the days of independent states in the eastern Mediterranean were already numbered, that Syria was practically a province of Rome. But, as a matter of fact, we see in the period of nearly a hundred years, which opens with the return of Demetrius, a great waning of Roman influence. In 162 Rome by its commissions dictated to Cappadocia, destroyed the material of war in the Seleucid kingdom, apportioned the dominions of the Ptolemies. It seemed on the point of assuming the formal sovereignty in these regions. But from the return of Demetrius its overt domination ceases. The eastern powers are once more left for the most part to their own devices. The family quarrels of the houses of Seleucus

and Ptolemy are fought out with no interference from Rome, no repetition of the diplomacy of Popillius.

The cause of this retrogression is the change which passed over the ruling aristocracy. In the day of adversity, when Hannibal was at the door, the Roman aristocracy had showed inflexible resolution; it was rapidly becoming corrupt and indolent in the day of prosperity. No settled policy could coexist with the corruption which became every day more flagrant. Decrees of the Senate could be procured by the highest bidder; an offender against the majesty of Rome could buy himself off. The prestige of Rome was impaired when it was found to issue declarations which it did not enforce. It had given its countenance, if not its friendship, to Timarchus; he had perished unsupported and unavenged. It had refused its countenance to Demetrius, and he had established himself without it. When Rome once more imposed its will upon the nations, the power was wielded by the aristocracy no longer. It was then in the hands of this or that great general, who used his legions for his own ends. It was the state of things which became regularized in the monarchy of the Caesars.

But even during the period of oligarchic misrule Rome maintained a certain influence in the East, and that in two ways. In the first place, much of the prestige it had acquired by the overthrow of Antiochus III and of the Macedonian kingdom kept its hold upon the minds of men. The world is always ruled half by imagination. In the second place, the functions it had come to exercise as universal arbitrator and regulator gave it a commanding position for diplomatic intrigue, and without any overt intervention it could play off one potentate against another, promote all elements of intestine discord, and in fine make it very unpleasant for anyone who had incurred its ill-will. Naturally this subterranean influence of Rome may often be suspected rather than proved.

The Senate continued therefore to trade upon the terror of the Roman name, to issue decrees and send out interminable commissions to arbitrate the affairs of the nations. Its countenance and favor continued to be worth seeking, and the ambassadors of eastern princes did not cease to bring their crowns of gold and elaborate flatteries. But at home the same princes took their own way with little restraint.

Demetrius, with the friends of Rome looking askance upon him, was thrown upon his own resources. But his resolution was only stiffened by his isolation. Was it impossible for a strong ruler to restore even now the Seleucid kingdom to strength, independence and glory?

The internal government of Demetrius Soter we can gauge by what took place in Judaea. An unstable compromise was what we saw result in that quarter from the feeble administration of Lysias; the Hasmonaeen party had been left in power. But it was quite obvious that the Hasmonaeen house, stimulated by the glory it had won in the war for religion, would rest short of nothing but its own absolute supremacy within the Jewish state, and the emancipation of that state from any outside control. From the point of view of a statesman whose object was to hold together the Seleucid kingdom, the Hasmonaeen house must certainly be deposed. A statesman would, of course, spare in

every possible way the religious sensibilities of the Jews, but to leave the Hasmonaean house in power would be blind folly. His task would be the easier in that the object for which the Hasmonaeans now contended—their own supremacy—did not command the same passionate adherence on the part of the more earliest spirits of the nation that the cause of religion had done. The Hasidim were satisfied if the Law was safe.

These considerations perhaps hardly needed to be pressed upon Demetrius by the man who soon after his accession presented himself in Antioch. He called himself Alcimus, after the sound of his Hebrew name Jakim. He belonged to the priestly tribe, the house of Aaron, and he was come to claim the high-priesthood from King Demetrius. According to one account he had already at some period in those days of confusion officiated as High-priest. But he had associated himself with the Hellenists, and since the Hasmonaeans had got the upper hand had been driven out of the country together with every other prominent person of that party. Alcimus had a long story of all that the friends of the Seleucid government had suffered at the hands of their countrymen; it was easy for him to convince the King that a government which abandoned its adherents was not likely to serve its own cause. Bacchides was charged to instate Alcimus as High-priest in Jerusalem by military force.

Alcimus came to Jerusalem as the legitimate High-priest of the family of Aaron. Possibly the functions had been usurped of late by the Hasmonaean brethren. If so, it would account for the fact that their old associates, the Hasidim, had been stumbled by this violation of the Mosaic order, and were prepared to receive the Aaronic High-priest with good-will.

Their only stipulation was that the blood-feud between the two parties should not now be continued by reprisals upon those faithful to the Law. This condition Alcimus thought it politic to agree to, and equally politic to violate soon after. He thought the opposition would be broken by a fresh proscription. Bacchides also did some killing on his own account before leaving. The anti-Hasmonaean party, who had been scattered abroad, flocked home again.

Judas and the nationalists had been driven out of Jerusalem, but they had not been crushed. They were still at large, and their flying raids made them a terror in the open country. It became unsafe for the partisans of the High-priest to venture outside the walled towns. Alcimus felt the scale turning against him, and within twelve months of his instatement carried a fresh appeal to Antioch.

The task of crushing the Hasmonaeans was entrusted by Demetrius to Nicanor, whom one seems to see through the more or less distorting medium of our Jewish records as a bluff, outspoken, simple-hearted man. He began by inviting Judas to a personal interview; and when the Jewish patriot and the Macedonian captain came face to face, the result was that the two men became friends. In Jerusalem, Nicanor gave the nationalists his favor. His idea seems to have been that if they were not worried, the Hasmonaean brethren would follow his advice to settle down in quiet domestic life, and everything would go happily. He dismissed the levies from the neighboring countries whom he had gathered about him. Judas showed himself openly in Jerusalem by

Nicanor's side, and indeed, we are told, took a wife, as Nicanor wished, and began family life.

The turn things were taking could not but be very disquieting to Alcimus. It can hardly be doubted that he was justified in questioning the possibility of "killing home rule by kindness". On his representations to the court an order came to Nicanor to apprehend Judas and send him a prisoner to Antioch. This was hard on Nicanor, but he was a soldier and knew his duty. He was, however, too transparent for Judas not to divine at once by his manner what had happened. Judas instantly vanished, and Nicanor found himself placed in an ugly position with regard to the court. He had no idea of how to attain his object except by direct vehemence, and he felt sure that the priests were secretly in league with Judas. He knew at any rate that it was through the Temple and the sacred ritual that the Jews' most sensitive point could be reached. To the Temple he went, and ordered the priests, whom he found officiating, to deliver Judas into his hands. Naturally he was only answered by blank looks and protestations of ignorance. He believed that this was all cunning, and then took place that scene which stamped itself upon the recollection of the Jews—Nicanor standing in the Temple court, his arm stretched out toward the House of the Lord, and protesting that if the man were not given up he would lay it even with the ground and erect in its place a temple to Dionysus.

Meanwhile Judas was gathering his forces in the country, and Nicanor presently learnt that the man he was ordered to seize was surrounded by his armed bands. There was nothing for it but to go out and engage him in battle. But Nicanor had dismissed a great part of his troops; he was obliged to rely to a certain extent upon the Jewish levies who followed him by constraint. And these were an obstacle rather than a help. They refused to attack when ordered to do so on the Sabbath, and talked to him about the Sovereign in heaven. "And I", cried the plain man in extremity, "am a sovereign on earth, who command you to take up your arms and do the King's business".

With such forces as these Nicanor closed with the bands on Judas at Adasa (about 3,5 miles north-east of Beth-horon) on the 13th of Adar (March) 161. The victory of Judas was signal and complete. Nicanor was found on the field "lying dead in full armor". His head and the arm which he had stretched out against the Temple were cut off and carried by Judas in triumph to Jerusalem to be hung up over against the sanctuary. It was the last victory of Judas, and, in respect of the high standing of Nicanor, his greatest. The anniversary of the battle was kept as a day of rejoicing. It is only within the last few centuries that the Jews have forgotten "Nicanor's day".

It was significant of the transference of the nationalist struggle from the plane of religious enthusiasm to that of worldly policy that Judas now looked about for a foreign alliance. And, like Timarchus, he looked to Rome. Rome had not yet in 161 recognized Demetrius as King. Eupolemus and Jason, two members of the nationalist party who had nevertheless learnt to speak Greek, were sent to declare to the Senate the desire of the Jewish people for separation from the Seleucid kingdom, and to invoke the influence of Rome on their behalf. The Senate, welcoming at this moment any opportunity of furthering the disintegration of the kingdom of Demetrius, concluded an

alliance with “the nation of the Jews”, which yet was so framed as to leave Rome a loophole of escape from its obligations should they prove inconvenient.

Before, however, the effect of the Jewish embassy could be known in Syria, Demetrius had disconcerted all the designs of the nationalists by his promptitude of action. There was now a government which was not put off its purpose by a single check. No sooner was the news of Nicanor’s disaster come to Antioch than an adequate army under Bacchides was sent to deal with the situation. About a month after the battle of Adasa, Bacchides was in Jerusalem (April 161). The nationalists were perfectly aware of the different character of this expedition, and their self-confidence deserted them. When Bacchides established his camp in Berea (Bi'r-az-Zait, north-west of Gophna?) the bands of Judas began to melt away. The tactics of the King's general reduced him to the alternative of flight or the risking of an immediate battle. Judas, in spite of the entreaties of his friends, disdained the former, and with forlorn heroism his little band charged the royal army. At the end of the day Judas himself lay dead upon the field of Eleasa. His last followers were scattered in flight. Demetrius had taken speedy recompense for Nicanor.

Alcimus, who since the battle of Adasa had fled to Antioch, was now once more restored to power in Jerusalem. The anti-Hasmonaeen party came again into the ascendant. But the vital problem—that of subjugating the country districts, where the Hasmonaeen power had its roots—required more drastic measures than had hitherto been used. The organization of the country in the government interest must succeed the dispersion of the rebels, and the wandering remnants of the bands of Judas be cleared out of it. Bacchides chose members of the party of the High-priest to rule in the country with the King’s authority, and to track down on the spot the adherents of the Hasmonaeans. Jonathan, Simon and John, the brothers of Judas, were still alive to take the place of the fallen leader. They drew off with their followers into the wilderness of Tekoah, the bare pastoral country by the Dead Sea, and mingled in the petty warfare of Arab or Ammonite tribes, which went on without interference from the government in these regions. The Jewish bands raided, and were themselves raided, by turns; they lost one of their leaders, the Hasmonaeen John, in some obscure affray. Bacchides attempted to follow them up and exterminate them, but they escaped across the marshes where the Jordan falls into the Dead Sea. The wilderness has in all ages limited the success of the royal governments in Asia.

But Judaea at any rate Bacchides cleared of rebels, and he adopted the only measure likely to ensure permanent tranquillity—planting strong posts around all its approaches. The akra in Jerusalem, Gezer and Beth-sur, where garrisons already sat, were furnished with fresh supplies and strengthened. New posts were fixed at Bethel, on the northern entrance into Judaea from Samaria, at Emmaus and Beth-horon to guard the western defiles, at Jericho to command the ascent from the Jordan valley, and in certain other places whose sites cannot be identified. As an additional security the sons of the principal men were lodged in the akra. Bacchides then returned home. The aspect of Judaea with its chain of military posts itself declared the difference between the government of Demetrius and that of Lysias.

As for Alcimus, he did not enjoy his elevation long. He died, just before Bacchides left Judaea, of a paralytic stroke. His countrymen saw in this a judgment for his impiety in beginning some alterations in the Temple buildings which involved a disturbance of the “works of the prophets”.

In 160, as we saw, Demetrius obtained the recognition, though not the favor, of Rome. The principle once given him by Polybius, “Do boldly, and Rome will acquiesce in the accomplished fact”, seemed to have been justified by its success. And if he had got his kingdom in spite of Rome's veto, it was possible that the veto might be as safely disregarded in an attempt to restore the Seleucid influence in lands whence it had been excluded since Antiochus the Great King. On the north the Cappadocian kingdom adjoined the Seleucid across the barrier of the Taurus. To make Cappadocia once more a vassal state would be a great step towards the recovery of Asia Minor. Beside this, Demetrius had to show Ariarathes that a Seleucid princess could not be slighted with impunity even by a friend of Rome. The situation in Cappadocia soon of itself invited interference.

If there is one characteristic feature of this final period of decline in the kingdoms of the Nearer East which were formed out of the break-up of Alexander's Empire it is the universal domestic quarrels. We have just seen how the quarrel of Philometor and Euergetes in Egypt gave an opening for Roman interference. The domestic wars of a kingdom are invariably used at this time by its neighbors for their own advantage. A principal weapon one power employs against another is a rival claimant.

A quarrel broke out in the royal house of Cappadocia. Ariarathes V had, as we saw, two elder brothers, or putative brothers, one of whom, Orophernes, had been educated in Ionia. Demetrius entered into an agreement with Orophernes to set him instead of Ariarathes upon the Cappadocian throne for the sum of 1000 talents. Once more, therefore, a Seleucid army appeared north of the Taurus and drove the king of Cappadocia from his throne. Orophernes was successfully instated in his place.

Ariarathes carried his cry to Rome, but there also came ambassadors from Orophernes and ambassadors from Demetrius to tell a very different story from that told by Ariarathes to the Senate. The Senate, of course, had no means of judging what was true, but the multitude of voices told more forcibly than the one, and the fugitive King made but a poor figure to the gorgeous ambassadors (157 BC). The Senate decided haphazard that Ariarathes and Orophernes should divide the kingdom between them. And even so it does not appear to have done more than issue a paper decree.

Demetrius had reached the zenith of his fortunes. The eyes of the eastern kings began to be fixed with alarm upon the resuscitated power. There was once more a man on the throne of Seleucus who did as he would in the East, who helped more effectually than Rome, and against whom the protection of Rome availed nothing. There were many men living who remembered the days of Antiochus the Great King before Rome had intervened in the East, and now that the vigor of Rome seemed to be waning, was it impossible that the grandson of Antiochus might yet again restore the Seleucid Empire?

But no personal ability and vigor in Demetrius could compensate for some of the essential weaknesses in his position. Philip of Macedon could make a strong state because he had the hardy Macedonian stock to build upon as a foundation; but what empire could be based upon the hybrid population of Syria, pleasure-loving and fickle, in whom Greek lightness and Oriental indolence were combined? Demetrius had none of the unfastidious bonhomie of his uncle Antiochus. He was not, as we saw in Rome, averse to conviviality, but he made distinctions as to his company. He despised the race which was found in Antioch and the Syrian cities, and did not take pains to conceal what he felt. Naturally this did not make him popular. Antiochus Epiphanes had been a typical representative in his character and manners of Syrian Hellenism; the Antiochenes had felt him one of themselves, but Demetrius withdrew from contact with them; he built himself a square tower outside Antioch, wherein he sat inaccessible to brood over schemes of conquest. His eagle face, rarely shown, his *hauteur*, his demand upon them for serious national effort, vexed the Syrians and made them ripe for revolt.

There was also another circumstance against him, that the neighboring kings, however much they may have disliked their position as vassals of Rome, much preferred it to being vassals of the Seleucid King. Rome was farther off and apparently growing indolent. In proportion as Demetrius grew strong there was added to disaffection at home hostility abroad. Orophernes only might be counted his ally, and had Fate given him in Orophernes an ally of any worth, things might have taken a very different course. But Orophernes proved a ruler of the worst kind. He wrung all the money he could from the country by the most violent extortion, and lavished what he got upon favourites and strangers. His manners, acquired in Ionia, outraged the feelings of the Cappadocian barons. He trampled upon their religious and moral traditions, and they were shocked to see him following wild and dissolute cults unknown to their fathers. It was impossible that the protégé of Demetrius should hold his throne long.

In Pergamos the interference of Demetrius in Cappadocia had been very ill received. Eumenes ' at once struck a blow on his own account. We have seen that one of the chief weapons with which a king was attacked was a rival claimant. The world soon learnt that the second son of Antiochus Epiphanes, Alexander, had been secretly conveyed away when Eupator was put to death, had been discovered by Eumenes in Smyrna, brought to Pergamos, and there crowned with the diadem as the genuine Seleucid King. On the other hand the court of Antioch asserted, and many well-informed persons believed, that it was a trick of Eumenes, who had bethought him of supplying the required claimant artificially, and had picked out some good-looking boy of fourteen who bore an accidental resemblance to the late King of Syria. Eumenes sent the boy on to Cilicia, placing him under the protection of Zenophanes, a chieftain friendly to himself who maintained in the hills his independence against the Seleucid government. Here Alexander was like the sword of Damocles over the head of Demetrius. Zenophanes industriously circulated the report that the son of Antiochus was about to cross the Amanus to claim his own. The expectation served to keep alive the unrest in Syria. At the same time, should any outbreak occur, Alexander was at hand.

Almost immediately after his elevation of Alexander, Eumenes died (159). But his brother, Attalus II Philadelphus, who succeeded him, prosecuted his plans against

Demetrius with vigor. When it appeared two years later that Rome was not prepared to give Ariarathes anything but platonic benevolence, Attalus invited him to return to Asia and avail himself of a more effectual champion. Ariarathes was glad enough to do so. But his journey home was not unattended with danger. The ambassadors of Orophernes dogged him from Rome, and in Corcyra formed a design to kill him; but Ariarathes was beforehand with them, and they were dead men before their plot had come to a head. Again at Corinth agents of Orophernes were about him, and he had a hair's-breadth escape.

Attalus escorted him with Pergamene troops to Cappadocia, the Senate perhaps blessing the enterprise from afar. The power of Orophernes was already tottering. Not only had he alienated his subjects, but he had no money left, after his lavish expenditure, to pay his mercenaries. They were on the brink of mutiny. In this extremity he pillaged the great temple of the Cappadocian Zeus on Mount Ariadne, which had been inviolate from time immemorial. On the attack of Attalus his defence collapsed. He fled to Antioch and Ariarathes was reinstated in the kingdom.

Demetrius had encountered an ominous check in Asia Minor. Two fragments of Polybius throw a momentary light upon his schemes in another direction. The island of Cyprus, long coveted by the Seleucid kings, was about this time the battle-ground of the two brother Ptolemies. Demetrius sent a secret offer to Archias, who commanded there for Philometor, of 500 talents and high honors at the Seleucid court if he would put the island into his hands (154). Archias consented, but before the arrangement could be carried out, the plot was discovered by Philometor, and Archias was arrested. He hanged himself with the rope of a curtain. Demetrius had turned another cousin into an enemy.

The smouldering discontent in Syria was receiving fresh fuel. We have a record of one of the incidents which served to increase it. Among the condottieri in the King's service at Antioch was a certain Andriscus of Adramyttium, who professed to be the son of Perseus, called himself Philip, and expressed his hope of being restored by Demetrius, "his kinsman", to the throne of his fathers. He roused a strong sensational interest in the populace of Antioch, and calls began to come to Demetrius from the "Macedonians" of the street that he should set King Philip in the ancestral kingdom. It was not the defect of Demetrius to lack enterprise, but he treated this demand with the contempt it deserved. Then the clamour grew; crowds surged about the palace doors. A cry arose that Demetrius must restore his cousin or give up the pretence of being a king. Demetrius saw he must take drastic steps. He caused Andriscus to be seized at night and sent to Rome (about 151-150)

The isolation of Demetrius became daily more patent. Even Orophernes, residing at Antioch under his protection, conceived the idea of turning the general sedition to his own profit and supplanting his patron. He entered into secret negotiations with the leaders of the Antiochene mob. Demetrius penetrated his designs, and put him under close guard at Seleucia, upon the loyalty of which town he could perhaps better depend. As the rival claimant to Cappadocia he might again be useful some day, and was therefore not put to death.

But already the danger from Alexander, the would-be son of Antiochus, had taken a far more menacing form. He was no longer threatening from the Cilician hills. In the summer of 153 he had appeared in Rome with Laodice, the daughter of Antiochus. They were conducted by the old intriguer, Heraclides of Miletus, who had now the grateful task of damaging his brother's destroyer. For a long time the party resided in Rome, making such a figure as was best calculated to impress public opinion before Heraclides thought the psychological moment come to approach the Senate. Nor did he during that time forget the old art by which he had made his way in Rome. At last the two children of Antiochus were brought before the Senate. Alexander spoke first—a formal speech about the cordial relations which had subsisted between his father and Rome, and so on. Then Heraclides made a moving oration. He began with an encomium of Antiochus Epiphanes, went on to denounce Demetrius, and finally delivered an appeal in the lofty name of Justice for the restoration of the true-born issue of the late King. It was all beautifully staged, and the Senate was immensely impressed. Only a few of the shrewder heads, Polybius says, saw through the business. A decree was made to the effect: “Whereas Alexander and Laodice, the children of a king who was sometime our friend and ally, have approached the Senate and represented their cause, the Senate has given them authority to return to the kingdom of their father, and has decreed that they shall receive assistance, as they have required”. It was a triumph for Heraclides. He returned to Asia with his charges, and fixed his headquarters at Ephesus, to prepare for the invasion of Syria. The *condottieri* of most renown in the Hellenic world received a summons to take service under a king approved by Rome.

The children of Antiochus would not want for allies. The policy of Demetrius had brought about a coalition against him of his three neighbour kings. Attalus, Ariarathes and Ptolemy Philometor. Alexander was “girt with the might of all the (Nearer) East”. And Demetrius had no security at home. Antioch was almost in open rebellion. That he knew how desperate the struggle was which lay before him is shown by his sending two of his sons, Demetrius and Antiochus, out of the country.

The first move in the attack was for Alexander to make a descent upon the coast town of Ptolemais. It was held by the garrison of Demetrius, but they had been infected by the prevailing sedition and opened to Alexander. Alexander had thus got a footing in his “paternal realm”, and in Ptolemais he set up his rival court till his cause should have made further progress. There were now two kings in the country, each bidding for the support of its various communities and races.

Our scanty authorities do not permit a connected narrative of the war. The Book of Maccabees and Josephus, who follows it, make no mention of the allied kings at all. But the expressions of Justin, Appian and Eusebius imply that the allied kings took a principal part. In the first battle, Justin says, Demetrius was victorious. Possibly Alexander risked a battle with his mercenaries before his allies arrived upon the scene. In the final battle Demetrius had, no doubt, the whole forces of the coalition against him. Undaunted to the end, he was still able to make a good fight. His left wing routed the enemy's right, and pursued it for a long way, inflicting heavy loss. Even the camp of the enemy was sacked. But the right, where Demetrius himself was, gave way. He found himself almost alone among the enemy. In those days of close fighting, a single

expert horseman could do some damage. But, charging hither and thither, Demetrius rode his horse into some boggy ground, where it plunged and threw him. Then the enemy made a ring about him, and he became the mark for missiles from all sides. Showing no sign of surrender, he sank at last full of wounds, dying worthily of the race of fighters from which he sprang (150).

CHAPTER XXVIII

ALEXANDER I AND THE PTOLEMAIC ASCENDANCY

The chief part in overthrowing Demetrius and bringing in Alexander had been taken by Ptolemy Philometor. It had been shown abundantly how dangerous to the Egyptian realm an ambitious and enterprising Seleucid king was likely to be. Philometor had therefore supported Alexander with the design of having upon the Seleucid throne someone entirely subservient to himself, of establishing a dominant interest in Syria. Attalus and Ariarathes, who simply wished to secure themselves from aggression on the side of Syria, were probably quite agreeable to a settlement which left the country in this sort of informal dependence upon the Ptolemaic crown. Immediately Alexander was in his seat, Philometor caused him to marry his daughter Cleopatra. Just as her grandmother, the Seleucid Cleopatra, had been married half a century before to Ptolemy Epiphanes in order to promote the Seleucid interest in Egypt, so she was now sent to the Seleucid court by the son of Ptolemy Epiphanes to confirm his ascendancy over Syria. And her rôle in the country would indeed be a principal one someday, for in the person of the young princess Destiny was introducing the Erinys of the house of Seleucus. She was received by the bridegroom at Ptolemais, whither she had been escorted by her father. There the marriage was celebrated “with great pomp, as the manner of kings is”.

As for the Syrians, they hailed a new king with delight. The handsome, genial youth of twenty-three was a happy exchange for the eagle face and proud aloofness of Demetrius. He would not turn a dark brow upon their easy, festive life, or harass the country by bringing it into continual collisions with its neighbors. His relations with all the powers were extremely friendly. The three neighbor kings had been his supporters. Rome had smiled upon his enterprise.

So Alexander, whoever he was, sat as king upon the throne of Seleucus. He bore the surnames of Theopator Euergetes. For these two we sometimes find Epiphanes Nicephorus, those of his (alleged) father, or Eupator, the surname of his brother. But the name by which he was known in the mouth of the people was *Balas*.

It is impossible to gauge the extent or form of the Ptolemaic ascendancy. It seems to be implied that the seat of the Seleucid court was now usually at Ptolemais, where it would be in closer touch with Alexandria. The silver money minted in the King's name in the Phoenician cities was assimilated to the standard of Egypt instead of to the Attic, which was the ordinary standard for Seleucid money, and it bore for emblem the Ptolemaic eagle.

As a ruler Alexander proved himself utterly worthless. He fell under the dominion of mistresses and favorites, while the government was abandoned to the prime

minister Ammonius, who made himself detested by his crimes. The minister's jealousy raged like fire in the court. All possible rivals among the Friends were removed by a series of murders. Among his victims were Laodice, either the queen of Antiochus Epiphanes (and therefore the putative mother of Alexander) or the queen of Demetrius, and Antigonus, one of the sons of Demetrius, whom he had not sent out of Syria. The government of Antioch itself was given over to two favourites, Hierax and Diodotus.

A page from the lost work of Athenaeus which dealt with the Seleucid kings gives a momentary vision of the court of Alexander Balas. Among the royal favorites was a certain Diogenes, from the Babylonian Seleucia, who had some standing as an exponent of the Epicurean philosophy. The King, who amused himself with philosophic discussion, preferred the doctrine of the Stoics (!). But he found Diogenes very good company, for the man had a daring, pungent wit, and did not spare even the royal family when he could make matter for a jest. One day Diogenes told Alexander that he was resolved to be the priest of Virtue (his life, of course, was outrageous), and he asked leave to wear in that character a crimson vestment and a golden crown with a figure of Virtue in the middle of it. Alexander was charmed with the idea, and himself made Diogenes a present of the crown. In a few days the philosopher had given the things away to a singing girl, his latest passion. It came to the ears of Alexander. He at once made a banquet for philosophers and men of note, and invited Diogenes. When he presented himself, the King begged him to put on his vestment and his crown before taking his couch. Diogenes made some vague excuse, and at that the King waved his hand. Instantly a troop of players came in, and among them the singing girl, crowned with the crown of Virtue, and wearing the crimson dress. A shout of laughter went up from the company, but the philosopher was not put out of countenance. The more the company laughed, the more he faced them out with the girl's praises.

But this life of laughter—with the sinister background of murder—could not go on long when stronger hands than Alexander's were ready to seize the inheritance. In three years the Syrians were tired of him, and they hated Ammonius. They began to want a genuine king again. Alexander was thoroughly popular only in one quarter — with the Jews. The Jews liked him because he left them alone.

We must observe what had happened in Judaea since we last saw it, subjugated by Bacchides and pegged down with strong military posts.

Two years after that date (*i.e.* in 158) the Seleucid government had withdrawn its ban from the Hasmonaean party. This change in its attitude is so impolitic that we want some further explanation than that given by the Jewish book which is our only authority. It is there represented as due to the vexation of Bacchides, who had been called in by the Hellenistic party to seize the Hasmonaean leaders, which they assured him could be easily done—only to find that he was involved in the fruitless siege of some stronghold in the wilderness. Whatever the motive of the change of policy, the government apparently, in the person of Bacchides, made peace with the Hasmonaean, granted them an amnesty, and liberated those of their adherents (except, of course, the hostages) whom they held prisoners. Jonathan, Simon and their followers were allowed to return to Judaea, although Jerusalem and the chain of fortified towns remained in

possession of the government. But when once the brothers of Judas were back in the country and countenanced by the government, the party grew daily in strength, commanding as it did the sympathy of the mass of the people. It came to be once more—*de facto*, at any rate—the dominant power in the Judaeen countryside. With his headquarters at Michmas, Jonathan steadily advanced his power at the expense of the Hellenizing Council which sat in Jerusalem. The formal deficiencies of his position—his lack of recognized title, his exclusion from the capital—were nevertheless sensible. Jonathan could not feel his object attained till he ruled as High-priest in Jerusalem.

Quite new prospects opened out for the nationalist Jews in 152, when there were two rival kings in the land. This condition of things will recur over and over again, and we shall now see the Hasmonaeen power growing, not so much by its own strength, as by the favors of those who bid against each other for its support. *Its growth is the work of the Gentile kings themselves.* The conditions will be entirely different from those under which Judas fought and died.

Jonathan, who had become by 152 the real ruler of Judaea, found both Demetrius and Alexander willing to give almost any price for his support. The two immediate objects of the Hasmonaeans were the recovery of Jerusalem and the acquisition of the high-priesthood. Demetrius, beforehand with his offers, conceded the first Jonathan was authorized to take possession of Jerusalem, the *akra* excepted, and to form a Jewish army. The hostages in the *akra* were restored. In the stress of the war between the two kings the garrisons were withdrawn or fled from all Bacchides' chain of posts, except the *akra* and Beth-sur, where a number of the Hellenizers had taken refuge.

Jonathan used the concession of Demetrius to the full, and at once set about refortifying the city. Again a nationalist stronghold confronted the *akra*.

Alexander proceeded to outbid Demetrius by conceding the second point. He authorized Jonathan to assume the supreme office, the high-priesthood. At the Feast of Tabernacles in Tishri (October) 152, Jonathan appeared for the first time in the robes of his sacred office. At last the brother of Judas Maccabaeus had attained the coveted prize—as the gift of a heathen king! Jonathan was also admitted by Alexander to the order of Friends.

When the marriage of Alexander and Cleopatra was celebrated in Ptolemais, and the town gave itself up to festivity at the presence of two kings, the Jewish High-priest was among those who came bringing gold to Alexander and Ptolemy and the great men of their suites. The Hellenistic party made a desperate attempt to get the new King's ear, but Alexander would not listen to them, and treated Jonathan with marked consideration, clothing him in a crimson dress of honor. He was raised to the rank of the First Friends. His position as High-priest and ruler of the nation was fitted into the general system of the kingdom by constituting him *strategos* of Judaea for the King.

Thenceforward under King Alexander the Hasmonaeen High-priest ruled without interference. The Hellenistic party melted away. Only the garrison of Gentile soldiers

remained in the akra. But nothing occurred to impair the good-will of the Jews to the King, who was too indolent to be troublesome.

A curious picture of the relations of the cities of the realm to the Seleucid government under Alexander is given us by the story of Aradus and Marathus. Marathus, on the mainland, was formally more subject to the Seleucid King than the island Aradus, but it was not burdened with any royal garrison. Aradus wished to see Marathus blotted out—one supposes commercial rivalry or some such reason. To compass its end it intrigued in the usual way at the court; 300 talents came into the hands of Ammonius as *bakshish*, and it was agreed that a royal force was to enter Marathus under false pretences and then put the Aradians in possession. *But Marathus refused to admit the King's men*, and, believing Aradus friendly, sent an embassy to entreat their mediation; their influence at the court was well known. The Aradians murdered the envoys and cunningly sent back letters to Marathus in the envoys' name and stamped with their signets, announcing that Aradus was sending troops—the city had troops of its own—to help Marathus against the royal force. The plan failed because there was a fisherman in Aradus, a “just man”, who swam the channel, all boats having been seized by the Aradian authorities, to warn Marathus what was toward. The noteworthy thing from our point of view is the large degree of independence with which the cities act, how loose an organization of the kingdom is displayed.

While Alexander was wantoning in the palaces of the Seleucid kings, the two sons of Demetrius in Asia Minor were growing to manhood. In 148-147, when the elder, Demetrius, can have been at the most fourteen years old, those who had the boy in their keeping thought the time ripe for attempting to set the true King upon the throne. The first step, of course, was to get a body of mercenaries, and Crete, with its interminable petty wars, was the best recruiting ground. A noted Cretan *condottiere*, Lasthenes, was ready enough to undertake the management of the expedition. With an army drawn from Crete and the Greek islands, and commanded by Lasthenes, Demetrius set foot in “the land of his fathers”.

The presence of the young Demetrius in the kingdom came as a rude shock to break upon the voluptuous paradise of Alexander Balas. He hurried north to Antioch, which was known to be disaffected. But the peril of insurrection was not confined to Antioch. Apollonius, the governor of Coele-Syria, declared for Demetrius as soon as Alexander had turned his back. Immediately the adherents of the respective kings came to blows in Palestine, as they were perhaps doing in other provinces of the kingdom—if Alexander had elsewhere friends as devoted as the Jews. The Hellenized Philistine cities, who had seen with great displeasure Alexander's patronage of the Jewish leader, followed their governor zealously in striking for the cause of Demetrius. But in a battle near Azotus (Ashdod) the Jews gained a decisive victory. The defeated army of Apollonius fled into Azotus, and crowded for safety into the temple of Dagon. Jonathan entered after them and burnt the temple over the heads of the living mass. Soon the smoke was going up, not from Azotus only, but from the neighboring villages of the plain. Only Ascalon by timely obsequiousness bought immunity.

Alexander might congratulate himself at this critical moment on the friendship of the Jews. They had destroyed, without his lifting a finger, the revolted army which menaced his rear. He lost no time in confirming their loyalty. He raised Jonathan yet another step in rank, sending him the golden clasp which distinguished the King's Kinsmen. He granted to him and his heirs the town of Ekron and its territory for personal possession.

But the disturbers of the existing settlement in Syria would have to reckon with the virtual suzerain, the King of Egypt. Ptolemy Philometor could not look on while his nominee was thrust aside. He was soon upon the scene in commanding force. The government of Alexander Balas had convinced him that the veiled and informal ascendancy he had designed to keep over Syria was not enough. An enterprising and independent Seleucid king menaced Egypt, a weak and dependent one was unable to hold the country in the Ptolemaic interest. Philometor therefore now determined to assure his supremacy in a more direct and open way. He crossed into Palestine with an imposing army, while his fleet moved up along the coast. In each of the principal cities of the sea-board, as he went north, he dropped a garrison of his own (perhaps in 147). At Azotus the inhabitants showed him the appalling relics of the Jewish visitation — the blackened shrines and heaps of charred corpses. Ptolemy reserved his judgment. He had not yet repudiated Alexander, and the Jews were ostensibly fighting on the same side. Jonathan himself came to meet the King of Egypt at Joppa, and accompanied him as far as the river Eleutherus (*mod.* Nahr-al-Kebir), the frontier of the Coele-Syrian province.

When all the coast cities as far as Seleucia were occupied by Ptolemy's garrisons, the alliance between Ptolemy and Alexander was severed by an open quarrel. Ptolemy asserted that whilst he had been at Ptolemais he had detected an attempt upon his life on the part of Ammonius, Alexander's prime minister. Ammonius had fled to Alexander at Antioch, and Ptolemy demanded that he should be given up for execution. Alexander evaded the demand, and Ptolemy renounced his alliance.

But he did not intend even now to take formal possession of the Seleucid kingdom. To leave the kingship and government to a king of his own making, married to his daughter, was more convenient, and now that he held the coast cities in his own hands, seemed safe. He therefore proffered his support and the hand of Cleopatra to Demetrius.

Demetrius, or rather the people who directed his action, naturally accepted the offer. Cleopatra was to take as her second husband a boy of fourteen or less. Alexander's position was hopeless. It must have been now, if not earlier, that he sent Cleopatra's child, Antiochus, to the Arab chieftain Yamlik, to be reared in the wilderness. Soon he was unable to hold down the discontent of Antioch. Even Hierax and Diodotus, who had been his instruments for governing the city, went over to the majority; they used their position to expel Alexander from the city. He fled to the Cilician hills, where, if anywhere, there was a chance of his getting together bands to retrieve his fortunes. Ammonius was left exposed to the vengeance of the Antiochenes. He tried to escape in feminine attire, but the hated face was recognized, and he was done to death.

Antioch was now at a stand. It had expelled Alexander, but it had also a short time before risen against Demetrius Soter, and apprehended what would follow the return of his son. A solution of the difficulty seemed for Ptolemy Philometor to take himself the inheritance of Seleucus. He was an able statesman, and a man of gracious and lovable character; he was also a Seleucid on the mother's side. When he came to Antioch, citizens and soldiers alike called upon him to ascend the throne; they were for binding two diadems upon his head, those of Egypt and Asia.

But Ptolemy saw his interest too clearly to be dazzled by the temptation. He urged the Antiochenes to receive Demetrius, and gave his word for it that there should be no reprisals for their infidelity to Demetrius I. So Demetrius entered his capital, and was acknowledged as Seleucid King. Only Coele-Syria, as one might have expected, he was obliged to give back to the house of Ptolemy, and the Egyptian garrisons continued to hold the Phoenician coast. Immediately on the return of Demetrius his marriage with Cleopatra was consummated.

By 145 Alexander had collected in Cilicia a force which seemed adequate for renewing the contest. He crossed the Amanus and descended into the plain of Antioch, which he began to devastate. Ptolemy advanced to meet him, and the two armies closed on the river Oenoparas. Alexander was routed, but the battle was not without disaster for the victorious side. The King of Egypt had mingled in the thick of the fighting, where his horse had taken fright at the trumpeting of an elephant and thrown him. Instantly Alexander's Cilicians had flung themselves upon him and rained down blows. He was rescued by the royal body-guard and carried off alive, but his skull was fractured and he had lost consciousness.

Meanwhile Alexander fled for his life eastwards, to Abae in the wilderness, with five hundred followers. He hoped to find shelter with the friendly Arab chief to whom he had confided his son. But his little company contained traitors. Some of his Greco-Syrian officers contrived to send back a message to Demetrius, offering to assassinate Alexander as the price of their own pardon. The promise was given in the King's name, and Alexander was murdered. An Arab chief called Zabdiel cut off his head and sent it to Ptolemy.

On the fifth day after the battle Ptolemy recovered consciousness. The ghastly relic was shown him of the man who had been his son-in-law. Three days later he died under the hands of the surgeons, while they were trying to adjust the broken bone (early summer 146).

The position of Ptolemy Philometor just before his death had been the most commanding held by any king of his house since Ptolemy III. He was practically supreme in Syria; the Seleucid King was little more than a puppet in his hands. But at his unexpected death all this fabric of power melted away. Egypt was confronted with a doubtful succession, for Philometor left an infant son in the charge of his sister and wife Cleopatra (II), whilst his brother, Ptolemy Euergetes, who now reigned in Cyrene, had been even during the life of Philometor a rival claimant for the Egyptian throne. The Ptolemaic forces in Syria were a helpless body without master or direction, and at the

court of Demetrius, now swayed by Lasthenes, the Cretan adventurer, it was resolved to destroy them before a new government was consolidated in Egypt. A massacre of the Ptolemaic troops was ordered in the name of Demetrius, and the population of the coast-towns rose to annihilate their garrisons. Crowds of fugitives, who had once been part of the grand army, made their way back to Alexandria. The elephants remained in the hands of Demetrius. There was no longer any question of retroceding Palestine. The ascendancy of the house of Ptolemy in Syria had vanished like a dream.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE CRETAN TYRANNY

Alexander Balas had perished and the hand of Egypt was removed, but the throne which Demetrius ascended as Demetrius Theos Nicator Philadelphus was nevertheless a tottering one. It was only the influence of Ptolemy which had prevailed on Antioch to receive him. He could not trust the soldiery drawn from the native Greeks and Macedonians. The frequent revolutions had set up an agitation in the public mind which was favorable to further change. The one remedy would be a firm and considerate government to allay by degrees the dangerous unrest—at once to reconcile the people to their ruler and give a confidence in the stability of the existing regime. Such considerations were, however, far from the minds of the Cretan captains who now dominated the Seleucid throne. To them the kingdom they had seized was simply a source of gain. The ambitious foreign policy of Demetrius Soter was not to be resumed; they were simply to settle upon the unhappy land and subordinate everything to the one end of gaining power and leisure to drain it. They had no permanent connection with the land or interest in its well-being. It was the government of pirates.

How ready they were to agree with any adversary quickly, in order to enjoy their prey undisturbed, is shown by what took place in Judaea. Jonathan, we saw, had gained under Alexander a supremacy in Judaea which was infringed by nothing but the garrison in the akra. He seized the occasion of the times to assail this last relic of the Seleucid government, and subjected the akra to a close blockade. The court made some show of protest. But Jonathan understood the temper of the new government so well that when the young King came to Ptolemais he presented himself before him with rich presents, although the siege of the akra still went on. He received not only pardon, but a confirmation of his honors. He was placed in the order of First Friends at the new court. His request was granted that a sum of 300 talents should be accepted in discharge of the annual tribute, taxes, and customs due from Judaea to the King. At the same time the Judaeian territory was extended on the north by the addition of the three “toparchies” or “nomes” of Lydda, Aphaerema and Ramathaim, which had hitherto belonged to Samaria. Jonathan probably on his part agreed to leave the akra alone.

So the Cretans addressed themselves with a secure mind to the business of plundering the country. All pretence of conciliation was given up, and the government orders became more atrocious and flagrant every day. Outrageous penalties were laid upon all who had been the partisans of Alexander. Antioch revenged itself by pasquinade, and the Cretan soldiery punished the sharp words by spilling blood in the

streets. The home-born troops regarded the strangers and their puppet king with bitter displeasure. As these troops might give trouble, and they were no longer necessary when the court did not dream of going to war, it was resolved to disband them. An order was issued which removed all the army from the active list, except the mercenaries from overseas, and the pay usually given to men in reserve was diminished for the benefit of the aliens. It was an unprecedented action, since all former kings had considered their interest deeply involved in binding the military class to their cause, and had usually been punctual in their payment even in times of peace. Nor were they only disbanded; they were also to be disarmed. The measure met in Antioch with the liveliest resistance; riots ensued in the streets, in which blood flowed freely. Recalcitrants were cut down in their houses, together with their women and children. Antioch was the theatre of a hideous intestine war.

The people, maddened, fought desperately. They barricaded the streets, and a yelling crowd of many thousands beat upon the palace doors. The mercenaries who attempted a sortie were driven back. But the crowd could not face the storm of missiles which presently fell upon them from the palace roof. They gave back, and the King's men set the buildings adjoining the palace, which the people had held, on fire. The flames spread rapidly along the narrow wooden streets, and soon a great part of Antioch was in a blaze. A terrified stampede took place; every one pressed on to rescue his family and property, while the mercenaries charged the jammed, helpless mass through the cross allies, or, leaping along from roof to roof, shot into the thick of them below. The spirit of resistance did not survive such horrors. Antioch was cowed for the time. A band of Jewish fighting men, trained in the wars of the Lord, were among the King's auxiliaries. They had been picked and sent by Jonathan. They returned home laden with the spoils of the great Gentile city, to tell in the courts of the Lord's house the delight of that wild pursuit along the roofs, the unlimited massacre of panic-driven heathen, mad to save their children from the fire. The Book of Maccabees would persuade us that a hundred thousand persons were killed by the Jews alone.

The suppression of the revolt was followed in Antioch by a red reign of terror. A proscription of those supposed to be implicated was instituted, and their property flowed into the royal coffers. Executions and confiscations were everyday events. "Many of the Antiochenes were driven by fear or detestation to quit their native city, and were scattered as wanderers over all Syria, waiting for an occasion against the King".

They had not long to wait. Diodotus—we have already become acquainted with him as one of the two men who ruled Antioch under Alexander Balas—read his opportunity in the disaffection of the home-born soldier class to the new regime. He probably was in closer touch with that class in that he was a citizen of Apamea, the military centre of the kingdom, having been born at Casiani, a village or small township dependent upon that great city. He had himself risen through the army. Within a few months of the death of Ptolemy Philometor, Diodotus betook himself to the wilderness, to the chieftain Yamlik, to fetch his old master's son and proclaim him king. The Arab had a conscience as to his trust, and was somewhat suspicious of the Greek intriguer. But at last he consented to put the son of Alexander into Diodotus' hands.

Diodotus showed himself with the boy in the region of Apamea. Here he proclaimed Antiochus Theos Epiphanes Dionysus king, and he called on the military colonies of the region to join his cause. His headquarters were first at Chalcis toward the wilderness, where the free Arabs, like Yamlik, could give him support from their strongholds. Soon the important town of Larissa, with its population of Thessalian horsemen, the proudest of the home-born troops, joined him. Demetrius—that is, of course, Lasthenes the Cretan—refused at first to regard Diodotus (who now assumed the name of Tryphon) as more than a common bandit, and haughtily sent some soldiers to arrest him. But the court at Antioch had soon so far to lower its dignity as to send a regular general with an army against him. The war went unfavorably for Demetrius. Tryphon got possession of the province of Apamea, with all its royal arsenals and the elephants of war.

How long it took Tryphon to consolidate his position in the province of Apamea we do not know. But the first proclamation there of Antiochus Dionysus was only a few months after the death of Alexander. Coins are found with the name and childish head of Antiochus which are dated the year 167 *aer.* Sel., *i.e.* before October 145. So that it was with this formidable rebellion growing that the atrocities were committed at Antioch in the name of King Demetrius.

The consequence, of course, was that when Tryphon assailed Antioch, the city was ready to welcome him with rapture. It had expelled Alexander Balas shortly before, but an experience of Cretan rule had convinced it that King Log was after all preferable to King Stork. So Antiochus VI entered Antioch in triumph.

The possession of Antioch and Apamea made the cause of Antiochus preponderant in Syria. But Tryphon was not strong enough to drive out the legitimate king altogether. The court of Demetrius was transferred to Seleucia on the coast, where the traditions of loyalty to the rightful line were firmer than at Antioch, or where they had not perhaps been put to so severe a test. And again, with two rival kings in the land, a confused civil war went on in the various provinces. It is naturally impossible to say how the two parties lost and gained in its vicissitudes. Roughly speaking, the power of Tryphon seems to have been firm in the Orontes valley from Apamea to Antioch, the central region, politically, of the kingdom. On the other hand, the outlying provinces—those away from the scene of the Cretan misrule—were faithful, as far as can be traced, to Demetrius. For Cilicia there is the evidence of a coin struck at Mallus, but it is not dated. But Tryphon had some footing in Cilicia, since we hear that he made the strong sea-side fortress of Coracesium a base for piratical expeditions against the Syrian coast, that in fact it was from the pirate body at his command that the great pirate power of the next seventy years grew. All the Syrian coast from Seleucia to the Lebanon, Demetrius held. We hear of him at Laodicea. The coins prove the continuance of his authority in Tyre and Sidon. In Mesopotamia and Babylonia also we have proof that Demetrius was the recognized king.

In Coele-Syria, on the other hand, the cause of Antiochus Dionysus prevailed. The Jews had lent their services to Demetrius for slaughtering the Antiochenes, but they were soon discontented when they found he did not remove the garrison from the akra.

They were ready therefore to respond to the appeal of Tryphon to support the son of their old friend Alexander Balas. In the name of Antiochus, Tryphon sent to Jonathan the crimson robe and golden clasp of the King's Kinsmen, and his brother Simon was made the *strategos* of Antiochus in the whole province "from the Ladder of Tyre to the borders of Egypt", *i.e.* of Coele-Syria without Phoenicia, which held by Demetrius.

Jonathan now, as the King's man, had royal troops as well as the Jewish levies at his disposal, and he was very active in the cause of Antiochus, moving about from city to city of Coele-Syria and summoning them to acknowledge the son of Alexander. Gaza offered stubborn resistance, but Demetrius had no means of relieving it, and it succumbed to a siege. Jonathan's operations extended as far as Damascus. The power of Demetrius ceased altogether for a time in the south of the kingdom.

Some collisions took place in Galilee between Jonathan and the generals of Demetrius, one by the sea of Merom in the plain of Hazor, and another farther north near Hamath, but as we have no account of them except the Jewish one their true description is unknown.

But while the Hasmonaean leaders were warring in the name of King Antiochus, they were improving the occasion for other ends than those for which authority had been lent them. Simon, having compelled the Gentile garrison to withdraw from Bethsur, replaced it by a Jewish one. He also fortified Adida, which commanded the road from Joppa to the Judaeian upland, as a Jewish stronghold. In Joppa itself, ostensibly to guard it against being occupied by Demetrius, Simon put a garrison of Jews. The blockade of the akra was resumed and drawn close. The fortifications of Jerusalem were repaired and strengthened.

At the same time the Jewish community began to act as an independent state toward foreign powers. Jonathan, as High-priest, sent envoys to Rome to regain the patronage which had been momentarily won by Judas in 161. The envoys were also to establish friendly relations between the Jewish state and some of the Greek states, notably Sparta, on their way.

All these proceedings on the part of the Jewish leaders did not naturally find favour at Antioch. Tryphon, who had risen to power as the representative of a national Greco-Macedonian movement, could hardly show himself less eager than former rulers to vindicate the Macedonian supremacy in Judea. He determined to strike a sudden and stealthy blow before it was too late. He moved with a force to Scythopolis (Bethshan), and Jonathan came to meet him as a friend with a great following of Jewish troops. Tryphon received him with full honors and persuaded him to dismiss his army and accompany him with a thousand men only to Ptolemais. When once the gates of Ptolemais had shut upon Jonathan, his thousand men were suddenly massacred and he himself made prisoner.

The news of what had happened caused absolute panic at Jerusalem. But Simon rose to the occasion and caused the people to feel that they had yet a leader left. Instead, therefore, of giving way to despair, the Jews pushed forward the defences of Jerusalem

and took strong action at Joppa. It was already held by a Jewish garrison; now the whole population was turned out neck and crop, and their place taken by Jewish families.

Tryphon advanced upon Judaea, bringing Jonathan with him. He demanded 100 talents, said to be due from Jonathan in his capacity of royal officer, and his two sons as hostages. Simon, lest his motives should be misconstrued, was obliged to comply. Needless to say, Jonathan was not released. Tryphon did not accomplish the invasion of Judaea. He marched round the upland, while the garrison in the akra, now at starvation point, sent him a bitter cry. But the ways were blocked, that on the west by the prudent fortification of Adida, and that on the south, from Adora, by an unusual fall of snow. He drew off to the other side of Jordan, and at Bascama (site unknown) put Jonathan to death. Thence he returned north. "And Simon sent and took the bones of Jonathan his brother, and buried him at Modin, the city of his fathers". The great monument of the Hasmonaean house there could be descried from the ships at sea.

In 143-142 it was given out at Antioch that the young Antiochus had contracted an internal disease which required an operation. It was next declared that the operation had ended fatally. In after days nobody doubted but that Tryphon had tampered with the surgeons and that the boy had been murdered. His study of the situation in Syria, at any rate, had convinced Tryphon that he might now safely venture on a bolder step than that of removing the child of Alexander Balas; he believed the time was come when the *house of Seleucus might be set aside*. It had—so he read the times—lost its basis in the popular will, the will of the Macedonian people of Syria, and that will could now raise another to the place which the degenerate heirs of Seleucus had forfeited. He offered himself as the national king. A decree of the people or of the army was necessary to make his royal authority valid. This he exerted himself by the usual arts of the popular leader to procure, and an assembly at Antioch or Apamea which purported to be the Macedonian soldier-people elected Tryphon king. It was to be the beginning of new things. In the title of the new monarchy *Autokrator* was added to *Basileus*. The old era, which dated from the accession of the Seleucid line, was naturally dropped and a new era begun. The emblem of King Tryphon was the national helmet of the Macedonians.

But to give respectability in the eyes of the world to a new dynasty, the recognition of Rome was highly desirable. Tryphon thought he had discovered an ingenious means of getting a favourable decree of the Senate. He sent as a present to Rome a golden figure of Victory. The religious Senators would shrink from so ill-omened an action as to reject Victory, even if the splendor of the bribe (for the gold in the statue was equivalent to 10,000 gold pieces of money) did not overcome them. But the Senate was more ingenious than the adventurer. It accepted the gift certainly, but it inscribed as donor, not Tryphon, but the murdered boy-king Antiochus.

In Coele-Syria the immediate result of Tryphon's action was that the Jews made the final step to practical independence. They had definitely broken with Tryphon at the seizure of Jonathan; the disappearance of the son of Alexander Balas removed the only link which bound them to the cause he represented. Simon sent envoys to effect a reconciliation with Demetrius, and the rival court, glad enough to detach them from Tryphon, was ready to grant anything. In the name of King Demetrius peace and a

general amnesty were conceded to the Jews, but, more than that, all arrears of taxes were remitted, and for the future the Seleucid renounced any right to claim tax or tribute from the Jewish state. The new fortifications in Judaea were sanctioned. What remained to the Seleucid King of suzerainty was of a very shadowy and indefinite kind.

Another province was gone from the kingdom to make an independent state! The Jews regarded the King's rescript as the beginning of freedom. "The yoke of the heathen was taken away from Israel"— the yoke that had been upon their necks since Josiah fell at Megiddo 466 years before. Jerusalem began a new era, and documents were dated "In the Year One, Simon being High-priest and General and Ruler of the Jews". In the following year (171 aer. Sel. = 142-141 *BC*) the garrison in the akra, decimated by famine, at last surrendered. On the 23rd of Ijjar (May) 141 the victorious nationalists entered "with praise and palm branches and with harps and with cymbals and with viols and with hymns and with songs". Even before the citadel fell, the fate of Joppa had overtaken Grazara (Gezer), another place which commanded the approaches of Judaea on the west Simon made a triumphal entry, with hymns to the One God. The houses of the idols were cleansed, and the heathen population expelled to make room for the "keepers of the Law". John, the son of Simon, who was given the post of commander of the forces, had Gazara for his head-quarters.

In 140 a surprising departure was taken by Demetrius. He had then, perhaps, reached the age of twenty, and was old enough for his own personality to assert itself in distinction from the ministers who had given his reign such a bad name. And now, while the central region of Syria was held by a rival king, Demetrius set out to recover the lost provinces of the East from the Parthian!

In the East, as Antiochus the Great King had found, and as Antiochus IV had hoped to find, lay fresh sources of strength and replenishment when those in the West were failing. There the supremacy of the house of Seleucus was grounded firmly in the hearts of the Greek and Macedonian population. To that quarter it would be of no use for the upstart Tryphon to appeal. But possessed of these resources, the Seleucid King might turn and overwhelm the adventurer who had risen up in the West. Something of this sort must have been the rationale of the bold move of Demetrius.

Demetrius had not to appeal to the eastern Greeks; it was they who appealed to him. Men from the distant provinces were constantly arriving at the court on the Mediterranean coast, all carrying the same cry from their country-men, all telling the same story of hatred to the barbarian conqueror, of impatience to see the banners of the old house, of readiness to rally to its cause. The young man, lately become his own master, saw visions of military glory, of assured conquest, of renewed empire, and exhaustless treasuries.

Accordingly in 140 Demetrius set out for the East. During his absence the war in Syria against Tryphon was to be prosecuted by his generals. Queen Cleopatra was left at Seleucia under the protection of Aeschrion. At an earlier stage it might have been unsafe to leave that strong-willed woman to her own devices, it might have been questionable whether she would not prefer the cause of her son to that of a husband

united to her by a loveless political marriage. Now Tryphon was not only her husband's enemy, but her son's murderer.

How far the Parthian conquests extended when Demetrius II moved to the East may be matter of doubt. Mesopotamia we know was his; it was held for him by Dionysius the Mede. Babylonia is proved by a cuneiform inscription to have been his in 144. But if the phraseology of our inferior sources can be pressed, Babylonia had in the interval between that date and the expedition of Demetrius been conquered by the Parthians.

Of course, if Babylonia had really been conquered, Media must have been conquered first. But as to Media we have no direct evidence.

The Arsacid throne was still held by the able prince Mithridates I, against whom Antiochus Epiphanes had marched a quarter of a century before. Since then Mithridates had extended the Parthian power on the East at the expense of the Greek dynasties of Bactria.

Demetrius crossed the Euphrates into Mesopotamia and marched on Babylonia. His appearance in the East was the signal for a great rising, and he was received with enthusiasm wherever he came. Not only the Greeks of the Babylonian and the Median provinces rose, but all who felt menaced by the growing Parthian power were ready to make common cause with him—the Bactrian kings, the little kings in the mountains of Kurdistan, the new principality in Persis (mod. Fars). In a series of battles Demetrius defeated and drove back the armies of Mithridates. But when all seemed to promise fair, the successes of Demetrius came to a sudden end. By a treacherous peace (if our account can be trusted) the Parthians contrived to lay hold of his person. Demetrius became a prisoner; his great army disappeared.

The captive Seleucid was shown publicly in the cities under Parthian sway to teach the Greeks in whom they had trusted. But this lesson taught, Mithridates did not use his prisoner ill. Demetrius was conveyed to Hyrcania, a favorite residence of the Arsacid court, and, while closely guarded, was given the attendance and consideration which befitted his rank.

The Parthians were soon after this masters in Babylon.

And now that Demetrius was gone, Tryphon seemed to command the situation in Syria. He spurned, we are told, the arts of conciliation by which he had mounted. Probably he had also underestimated the hold which, in spite of everything, the Seleucid name had upon the Macedonians of Asia. His soldiers deserted in numbers to the legitimate side; Seleucia lay only some twelve miles from Antioch.

Of the war, as it went on during those days, we know only one incident. Sarpedon, one of the generals of Demetrius, made an attempt to wrest the city of Ptolemais from Tryphon, but was defeated and compelled to retire. After the victory the soldiers of Tryphon were marching along the shore, when they were overtaken by an

enormous wave and drowned. The wave also deposited a quantity of fish, so that when the forces of Sarpedon returned, they found dead men and fish in mingled heaps. “The corpses of their enemies were a pleasant sight, and they carried away great abundance of fish. They sacrificed to Posidon Tropaios in the suburbs of the city”.

CHAPTER XXX

ANTIOCHUS SIDETES

The tedious circle in which the later history of the Seleucid kingdom runs—the rival claimant ousting the King in possession by the favor of the army and people, then making himself unpopular, and being in turn ousted by the oscillation of the people's favor to another claimant—was about to fulfill itself in the case of Tryphon.

But the new claimant was not a man like the other ineffectual personalities who flit across the stage in that time of ruin and confusion. One more man capable of rule and of great action, one more luminous figure, the house which had borne the empire of Asia had to show the world before it went out into darkness.

Antiochus, the younger surviving son of Demetrius I, had grown up in the Pamphylian city of Side. Its people were among the boldest seafarers of that coast; their naval contingent had formed a principal element in the fleet of Antiochus the Great King. And that the seafaring tradition was maintained is shown by the fact that in the last century *BC* the people of Side were prominent among the pirates, and Side was a great pirate stronghold and mart. It was in close touch with the hill-peoples behind, who, as we have seen, were ready to join any adventure which promised fighting and loot. Such an environment might not be an ideal one for the education of a prince, but it was incomparably better than a Syrian palace, and wild seafaring men were better comrades than eunuchs and panders.

The young prince, now about twenty, was in Rhodes when the news that his brother was a captive in Iran reached him. He at once made ready to step into the breach and rescue the heritage of his house from strangers. The mercenaries were got together and a fleet, prepared no doubt in the docks of Side! He sent letters to the various communities of Syria announcing his purpose, and summoning them to give him their allegiance. If the document in the Book of the Maccabees can be trusted, he already assumed in these letters the title of king. But the coast cities of Coele-Syria, overawed by the garrisons of Tryphon, refused to open to him. Nor does he seem to have anticipated a favorable reception in those which acknowledged Demetrius.

But it was impossible for the party of the legitimate house to continue the struggle against Tryphon without a head. Even at Seleucia there was a movement to deliver up the city to Tryphon. The councillors of Queen Cleopatra at last told her that there was no course left but to call in Antiochus to take the place of Demetrius, both as king and as her (third) husband. Thus was entrance into the kingdom opened for

Antiochus. He arrived at Seleucia in 138, married Cleopatra and assumed the diadem as King Antiochus Euergetes.

Antiochus was in Seleucia! At the tidings the star of Tryphon finally declined. Another king of the old house, whose record was as yet unstained, of whom men might hope anything—the news awoke all the old loyalty, and the soldiery upon whom Tryphon relied were soon flocking to Seleucia. Tryphon was left with only a remnant. He was rapidly driven from northern Syria, and Antiochus entered the capital.

Tryphon fell back upon the southern coast, the region with which his relations, like those of Alexander Balas, had been close, and shut himself in the strong town of Dora. Antiochus pressed his flight and invested the place both by sea and land. At last, reduced to extremities, Tryphon slipped out of the harbor in a boat and reached Ptolemais. But it was not safe apparently for him to stay there, for he went on to Orthosia, and thence crossing the hills into the Orontes valley, made his last stand in the place where he had been bred and had first built up his power, Apamea. In some fortress of that region he was again besieged and finally captured. Antiochus would not, of course, allow him to live, but he permitted him to be his own executioner. With the disappearance of Tryphon there were none left to claim the Syrian throne but the children of Demetrius Soter.

The vigorous spirit and the ability of his father had been inherited by Antiochus “of Side”. He addressed himself with success to remedy the frightful disorganization which the double kingship had produced in Syria. Communities which had broken away from all superior authority were taught that they were once more members of a kingdom. Among such communities was the Jewish state.

Already while Antiochus was sitting before Dora there were ominous signs of his intention to regulate this quarter of the kingdom. The immunity and internal freedom conceded to the Jews he did not revoke, but he could not pass over the complaints brought him by those who had been driven from their homes or subjected to forced contributions by the Jewish bands in the regions round Judaea, nor the seizure of places beyond the Jewish border, such as Gazara and Joppa. For the injury done to his subjects he demanded from Simon an indemnity of 500 talents, and for the places he had seized 500 talents more—a perfectly rational and, as far as we can judge, moderate demand.

Athenobius, one of the Friends, was sent to convey the King's requisition to the High-priest Simon, according to the custom of the East, tried to bargain, and started low down with the offer of 100 talents. But the King's officer had had an opportunity to observe the great wealth already accumulated by the ruling family of the Jews, and he met Simon's attempt to bargain with stony silence.

Antiochus, on receiving his report, instructed Cendebaeus, the governor of the Philistine coast, to apply force. He himself was occupied for the time with the pursuit of Tryphon. But the attempts of Cendebaeus to enter Judaea were unfortunate. Simon was now too old to take the field in person, but his sons, Judas and John, commanded the Jewish forces and drove Cendebaeus back into the plain.

As soon as Antiochus had settled more pressing concerns he himself undertook the reduction of the Jews to order. This was not till the fourth year of his reign (in the spring or summer of 134). By then the last of the brethren of Judas was no more. Simon had ended his life a year before (February 135) by a family tragedy. His son-in-law, Ptolemy the son of Abub, designing to secure the first place in the Jewish state for himself, had invited Simon to a carousal in the fortress of Dok, and then fallen upon the old warrior while he was in his cups. But Ptolemy's design failed owing to the promptitude of John, the son of Simon, who at the time of the murder was in Gazara. Before Ptolemy could seize Jerusalem, John was already there installed in the room of his father as High-priest and head of the state. It was in the first year of John, surnamed Hyrcanus, that Antiochus took the subjugation of Judaea in hand.

The King came with a strength sufficient for the task before him. He had a just appreciation of the mixture of force and conciliation required to meet the case. To put down the religion of Israel, to trample upon Jewish prejudice were ideas that he was too good a statesman to entertain. But till the supremacy of the Seleucid government had been asserted there could be no talk of compromise, and Antiochus, when he struck, struck home. The Jewish forces were driven from the field into Jerusalem and a business-like siege of the city begun. Seven camps hemmed it in. The pinch of famine was soon felt, and Hyrcanus was embarrassed by the great population of non-combatants. He tried to expel them, but they were not allowed to pass the besiegers' lines, so that they wandered starving under the walls of the city. The feeling which the spectacle awoke in the city overbore the plans of Hyrcanus, and when the Feast of Tabernacles (October 132 ?) came round, he was compelled to receive the miserable people back. Antiochus showed his conciliatory spirit by granting a truce during the sacred season. He even sent in on his own account a splendid offering of victims and incense to the Temple. This wise consideration on the point where the Jews were most sensitive effected as much as his victorious arms. Hyrcanus sent to ask for terms. The short-sighted councillors of the King now urged him to follow the policy of his great-uncle Antiochus and break down Jewish exclusiveness by the forcible violation of its sanctities. Now that the Jewish state was at his feet, let him take the opportunity to make away with it once and for ever. The character of Antiochus VII emerged above the influences which surrounded him. He would not even attempt to re-impose the financial burdens, whose remittance he had promised, before coming into the kingdom, to confirm, or interfere with the internal affairs of the Jews. But he insisted that the besieged should surrender their arms, that a rent or tribute should be paid for the places occupied by the Jews outside Judaea, like Joppa and Gazara, and that the city should admit a garrison. To this last condition, however, the Jews showed such repugnance that Antiochus accepted their alternative proposal that they should pay 500 talents of silver and give hostages, amongst whom was to be the brother of Hyrcanus himself. Antiochus also, before he retired, saw the strong ring-wall built by the Hasmonaeans around Jerusalem pulled down (132).

Antiochus had attained a satisfactory result with the minimum of irritation. Respect had been won for the Seleucid power and the Jewish state rendered inoffensive, whilst its religious and internal liberty was left unimpaired. It is a remarkable testimony

to the greatness of Antiochus as a statesman that he, the very prince who broke the Jewish power and took Jerusalem, should have got from the Jews the surname of *Eusebes*, the Pious.

It is regrettable that we cannot trace the reorganizing and adjusting work of Antiochus in the other provinces of the kingdom besides Judaea. Now those who had been true to the house of Seleucus in the day of adversity received their reward. Seleucia, the faithful city, appears as “sacrosanct and inviolable” from the accession of Antiochus VII.

About 134 the ambassadors of Antiochus were in Rome. It is recorded that they were charged with splendid presents for Scipio Aemilianus, who was then besieging Numantia in Spain, presents which, instead of receiving in secret, as other Senators did in like cases, he publicly made over to the state.

In 130 Antiochus considered that the reorganization of Seleucid rule in Syria was sufficiently complete for him to take in hand the recovery of the Eastern provinces.

Demetrius was still a captive at the Parthian court in Hyrcania. He had become more or less transformed into a Parthian prince. His beard had been allowed to grow, as the fashion was among barbarian kings. Mithridates had even, before he died in 138, caused him to establish a new household, and had given him his own daughter Rhodogune for wife; he used to talk to his captive about one day driving out Tryphon by the Parthian arms and restoring Demetrius to his throne. We are already familiar with such promises given to an exiled king, and know in what sense they were intended to be carried out. Mithridates was succeeded by his son Phraates II. After this Demetrius made attempts to escape. He was helped by the most faithful of his friends, a certain Callimander, whom, when he went to the East, he had left behind in Syria. When later on the news came of his capture, Callimander resolved, however difficult it might be, to join him. He had found some Arabs willing to conduct him for a sum of money to Babylon by the desert tracks, and when the party arrived in Babylon, Callimander was disguised as a Parthian. Thence he had made his way to Hyrcania and revealed himself to Demetrius. His experience on this adventurous journey he thought to turn to account by making it, together with Demetrius, in the reverse sense. The two set out, but before reaching the frontier they were headed off by the horsemen sent in pursuit and brought back to the Parthian king's presence. For Callimander, Phraates had nothing but praise, and he rewarded so signal an instance of fidelity substantially; but Demetrius he reprimanded severely, and sent him back to his Parthian wife. His confinement was made stricter. When, however, Rhodogune had borne him children he was thought to be rooted, and the guard was relaxed. But again Demetrius made the attempt with Callimander, and again they were dragged back from the frontier. Phraates sent Demetrius in mockery the present of some golden dice, to give interest to a life which he apparently felt irksome. But Demetrius' possible usefulness as a tool in Syria preserved him from worse treatment.

Whatever the intentions of Antiochus with regard to his brother may have been, it was of prime necessity to get him out of the Parthians' hands. He set out with an army

of 80,000, drawn in great part from Syria itself—a visible sign and outcome of its restored unity. Even the Jews furnished their contingent, commanded by the High-priest Hyrcanus himself. The army, according to the bad custom of the East, was accompanied by women and children of the royal house: Antiochus had at any rate his young son Seleucus with him in 129, and a daughter of Demetrius. The appearance of Antiochus proved, as that of Demetrius had done, a signal for all the discontented elements under Parthian supremacy to rally. Petty kings and chieftains with their various followers continually arrived in his camp, eager to range themselves against the house of Arsaces. Antiochus seems to have encountered opposition at an earlier stage than Demetrius. Three battles had to be fought before he was master of Babylonia. In one of them he defeated the Parthian general Indates on the river Lycus (mod. Greater Zab)—the region where Alexander had won his crowning victory at Gaugamela over the Persians. The Parthians evacuated Babylonia, and their general Enius—the Parthian satrap presumably of Babylonia—found a frightful end at the hands of the people of Seleucia. Antiochus pressed the enemy's retreat into Iran. Instantly the rebellion against their rule became universal. When the winter of 130 closed in, Nearer Iran had once more been joined to the Seleucid kingdom. The Arsacid dominion, which was in fact mere military occupation, had ceased, except in the northern valleys which constituted Parthia. A greater result could not possibly have been desired for the first campaign. Antiochus, as conqueror of the East, began to be styled, like his ancestor, Great King.

But what the campaign had achieved the winter rest was fated to undo. The problem of housing and feeding the great army and its still greater following during the winter months was no doubt a difficult one. Antiochus adopted the expedient of quartering his troops in dispersed bodies on the several cities. It was to put too great a strain upon their loyalty. One of his generals, Athenaeus, aggravated the burden by wanton annoyances. The adherence of the Greek cities had given Antiochus his advantage; their alienation turned the scale against him.

The spring of 129—the Median spring with its transitory burst of greenness and beauty—opened under clouded circumstances for Antiochus. Phraates understood that the position of the conqueror had changed for the worse, and tried negotiations. But Antiochus had come to restore the Empire, and he would entertain no terms which did not make Arsaces tributary. His authority in Parthia Antiochus would allow Phraates to retain, but he was immovable on the three conditions—(1) that the Arsacid king must abandon everything outside Parthia; (2) that he must pay a regular tribute; and (3) deliver up Demetrius. Phraates threw up the negotiations and prepared to renew the fight. That, in spite of the change of mood in the cities, he felt the conflict a redoubtable one, is shown by the fact that in order to raise complications for Antiochus in the rear, he let so valuable a tool as Demetrius go. Demetrius was sent westward with a Parthian escort to re-establish himself in Syria.

Before the army of Antiochus was concentrated for the new campaign, Phraates dealt his blow. The scattered detachments were suddenly and simultaneously attacked by the population of the various Median cities. It was a plan arranged by the secret agents of Phraates. When the intelligence was carried to Antiochus—living too jovially, one fears, in the palace of Ecbatana—he hastened out with the troops he had by him to

support the nearest of the bodies attacked. The confused fighting which followed we cannot trace, but the last scene can be reconstructed. It was in some place near the hills that Antiochus, marching along with his own column, became aware that the main Parthian army, commanded by Phraates himself, was coming down upon him. His staff besought him not to risk an engagement; the Parthians had only to withdraw into the steep places behind them to baffle the Syrian cavalry. But Antiochus would not hear of retiring. Were the Macedonians to show weakness in the face of barbarians whom they had beaten again and again? He ordered a stand. The Parthians came on and closed, and Antiochus fought where the fight was hottest. Presently the barbarians gave back into the hills. Antiochus and the Syrians imprudently followed. They found themselves caught in a narrow gully. Athenaeus, the general who had vexed the Greek cities, was the first to flee, and the panic was infectious. Antiochus was left almost alone, and he saw that the end of all his ambitions was come. But it was only the dead body of the Great King of which the Arsacid was allowed to become master.

The great army which Antiochus had brought to the East was made captive. How much of it survived to become the slaves of the Parthian we do not know. We are only told of the fate of the traitor Athenaeus. He came as a starving fugitive to those villages which he had afflicted in the day of his authority. No one would now receive him or give him a morsel to eat, and he died outcast by the wayside. Phraates also got possession of those members of the royal house who had come in Antiochus' company. But to offer indignity to the imperial house of the East would not have been according to the Parthian king's view of what was fitting. The body of Antiochus he had treated with all possible honor. The son of Antiochus, the boy Seleucus, was brought up at the Parthian court as a son of kings. The daughter of Demetrius was taken into the royal harem.

But the generosity of Phraates, shown as that of a king to kings, did not extend to those whom he held rebellious subjects. He remembered against the city of Seleucia what it had done to his officer. When it sent envoys to implore forgiveness, they were taken to a place where an eyeless man was sitting upon the ground. He was a Greek, perhaps a Seleucian, on whom the Parthian government had set the mark of its displeasure. The envoys were ordered to go and tell the Seleucians what happened to rebels. We hear of the city soon after suffering days of horror under the rod of Himeros or Euemerus, a vile favourite of Phraates, to whom he delivered the kingdom during his expedition against the Scythians. The Greek cities had cause to regret their desertion of Antiochus.

In Antiochus Sidetes it was not only an individual who perished. It was the death-blow of the Seleucid dynasty. The last great king of that house was gone; for the last time it had stood before the world as the imperial house of the East. It had no more revivals. And the last real king whom it produced embodied in a striking way the typical qualities of his race—impulsive energy, a high and generous courage, the old Macedonian delight in wassailing and war. Like his predecessors, Antiochus VII drank freely in his convivial hours. "Boldness and wine", Phraates is recorded to have said, "these, Antiochus, were thy destruction! Thou didst think to drink up the kingdom of Arsaces in thy large cups". But his success in dealing with the Jews—the only case

where we can observe his political action—seems to argue a degree of adroit statesmanship more than belonged to the majority, if to any, of his predecessors. On the other hand, it is perhaps characteristic of the history of his house that its ultimate fall was due to neglect of the dull work of organizing the winter quarters and commissariat of troops which on the field of battle the king would lead with such splendid *élan*. Here we perhaps touch the weakness which rendered so much of the brilliant ability of Antiochus VII, so much of the shining qualities of the Seleucid dynasty as a whole, ultimately frustrate.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE LAST CONVULSIONS

His victory made the Parthian king sorry that he had let Demetrius go, and horsemen were sent in desperate pursuit to overtake him, but Demetrius was already beyond the reach of his arm. Phraates meditated an instant move upon Syria itself before the new government was established. Had he carried it out, the Parthian dominion might have touched the Mediterranean within the next year. But a mutiny of his Scythian mercenaries—hordes from the steppes of Central Asia—made him instead march east. What remained of the army of Antiochus was compelled to go along with him, but they only waited for the battle with the Scythians to turn their swords against the Parthian, and by the irony of fate the army which Antiochus had led against Phraates did thus in the end destroy him.

To the Syrian cities the disaster in the East came as an appalling calamity. It was not only to the Greco-Macedonian population a national humiliation. There was hardly a house without its private bereavement, for nearly 300,000 men were taken away at a blow. Antioch was filled with the noise of women's lamentation. For days it was given up to mourning.

Nor was there anything about Demetrius to console the people of Syria for the loss of the well-beloved Antiochus—this foreign figure with the long beard and the manners of a Parthian. With how much affection Cleopatra returned to her former husband the event shows. The second surviving son of Antiochus VII, called also Antiochus, she sent hurriedly out of the country under the charge of the eunuch Craterus to be reared in Cyzicus, at the other end of Asia Minor.

Demetrius in his former reign had been in leading-strings. He had now an opportunity of showing his true quality. The thing most needful for Syria was a period of absolute rest, a time for recuperation, for filling the empty places of 300,000 men. No sooner, however, was Demetrius in the seat than he was elaborating plans for the conquest of Egypt! His mother-in-law, Queen Cleopatra of Egypt, had come to Syria, driven out of Egypt by her brother, Ptolemy Euergetes. She now urged Demetrius to restore her, and promised him that, if he did so, he would certainly add Egypt to his dominions. Demetrius actually marched out to do so, but he got no farther than Pelusium, for there his way was barred by the forces of Euergetes, and Syria, the moment his back was turned, sprang into insurrection behind him. Antioch and Apamea had already renounced Demetrius—the same regions which had before broken away under Tryphon. The disaffection was found to extend to the army which Demetrius had with him. He was obliged to turn back to restore order in his own kingdom.

Nothing save the rival claimant was wanting to complete the situation; but negotiations on this subject had already passed between Antioch and the king of Egypt. Euergetes was only too willing to put in a creature of his own, to counteract the machinations of his sister in Syria. He chose a youth who was given out to be of the Seleucid stock and the adopted son of the beloved Antiochus: he was really, according to the hostile account, the son of Protarchus, some Egyptian Greek of the commercial class. He was accepted by Antioch, and installed with the support of an Egyptian force as King Alexander. The people added the nickname, derived from the native Aramaic, of Zabinas, the "Bought-one". The situation was once more very much what it had been before the captivity of Demetrius, the legitimate king holding the coast, with his base at Seleucia, and the usurper holding Antioch and the middle Orontes. But although the Jews were adherents of Alexander, he was not so strong in Coele-Syria as Tryphon had been. Ptolemais, for instance, Demetrius retained.

In Judaea, of course, the work of Antiochus VII was immediately undone by his death. Hyrcanus had returned to Jerusalem before the fatal spring of 129. When the news of the catastrophe came he once more felt himself an independent prince, and resumed the schemes of aggrandizement which the Hasmonaeans, their independence once secured, had come to form. He pushed out the frontiers of the Jewish state in all directions, across Jordan by conquering from the Nabataeans the plateau north of the Amon dominated by Medeba, in central Palestine at the expense of Samaria, taking even the rival sanctuary on Mount Gerizim, whilst in Idumaea he not only seized fresh territory, but compelled the conquered to embrace Judaism or go. It was the beginning of that expansion of Israel over Palestine by forcible proselytism which was one of the great works of the Hasmonaean princes.

The decisive battle between Demetrius II and Alexander Zabinas was fought near Damascus—on one of the roads of communication between the Orontes valley, where Alexander was established, and Coele-Syria, which seems still to have been held (so far as it was not independent) by Demetrius. Demetrius was badly beaten and retreated to Ptolemais, where he had left Cleopatra and his children. But Cleopatra had had enough of him, and shut the gates in his face. The Seleucid King found himself an outcast in Syria, not even his life safe. He designed to take sanctuary in the temple of Heracles (Melkarth) at Tyre, but while on board a ship in the harbor of Tyre he was cut down by order of the governor of the city. It is almost certain that the governor was himself acting on the directions of Queen Cleopatra (126-125).

She had lost all patience with the wretched creature under whom the Seleucid kingdom was going to pieces. She herself was the daughter of Ptolemy Philometor and had in her the blood of the Seleucids, and among the crowd of incapables she aspired to take the power into her own hands. Seleucus, the elder of her two sons by Demetrius, assumed the diadem on his father's death without bowing to her superior authority, and she had him promptly assassinated. From her girlhood she had been treated as a thing whose heart did not come into consideration, a mere piece in the political game. What wonder that she became a politician whose heart was dead?

Whether she reigned for any time in her own name alone we do not know. But before many months at any rate from the death of Demetrius were elapsed she had associated with herself the second of the sons of Demetrius, Antiochus, nick-named Orypos, the “Hook-nosed”, who had been educated at Athens. His functions, of course, were to be purely subordinate. His name and hers appear together on the coins, and her head is sometimes placed with his, and *in front*. Antiochus VIII was at this time about sixteen years old.

The war between the legitimate house and Alexander went on. And, like these later Seleucid wars as a whole, it was complicated with the family wars of the house of Ptolemy. In both kingdoms, the last survivors of the Macedonian monarchies, the same disease of family strife was working doom. Alexander had been the tool of Euergetes, but after the death of Demetrius, Euergetes was reconciled with his sister Cleopatra, and allied himself with Cleopatra of Syria. He sent his daughter Tryphaena to be the young Antiochus' wife, and supported the legitimate house with his own troops.

That Alexander's power after the death of Demetrius extended beyond the Orontes valley is shown by the coins struck for him between 126 and 123 in Ascalon. We hear of his capturing a Laodicea, and this may be Laodicea-Berytus, of which coins are found with his name.

Alexander Zabinas was a jovial, easy-going youth, the sort of king sure to be popular in the streets of Antioch. There is a kind of happy *gamin* impudence in the face which appears on his coins. Soon after his entry into Antioch the body of Antiochus Sidetes was sent home by the Parthian king in a silver coffin. It was received in the cities through which it passed with marks of impassioned affection. Alexander sought to give credit to his impersonation by paying it ostentatious honor. The tears which he shed over it publicly much edified the Antiochene people.

The establishment of Alexander Zabinas (129-128) was a fresh blow to the unity of the Seleucid kingdom. The line of Seleucus was indeed fallen from its high estate. Sixty years before, the battle of Magnesia had reduced the heirs of Seleucus from being practically emperors of the East to being kings of Syria. The battle in Media left them not even that. They were now mere captains of mercenary bands, who, in the anarchy to which the East was fallen, were one moment strong enough to keep a prodigal court in one of the ancestral palaces and to devour some part of the country, and the next moment were wandering over-seas to get together new bands of desperados. They were fighters to the end; in the ceaseless battles of the rival claimants the remnant of that energy which had once governed Asia frittered itself away. And the inheritance over which they fought naturally itself dwindled in the process. All who were strong enough broke away from connection with any part of the kingdom, and in the absence of any one central authority, the cities and the numberless local tyrants came more and more to the front as independent agents. Except for the peculiar character which the Greek or Hellenistic cities give to the scene, we have the ordinary phenomena of the break-up of an Oriental Empire.

But with the help of Ptolemy the legitimate house prevailed. The tide of desertion set in its favor. In 123-122 Alexander sustained a shattering defeat. He fell back upon Antioch. There he set about robbing the temples. He first took the golden Nike which stood upon the outstretched hand of Zeus at Daphne. Zeus, he said to the Antiochenes jestingly, had given him victory. But when he gave orders for the image of Zeus itself to be removed, a storm of popular indignation drove him from the city. He fell into the hands of Antiochus and took poison.

After the disappearance of Alexander Zabinas, Antiochus became more and more impatient under his mother's dictation. Cleopatra saw her supremacy imperilled. On a day when the King came in heated from exercise, she tendered him a cup. But her designs had been betrayed, and Antiochus insisted on her drinking the potion herself (121-120).

Antiochus VIII (Grypos) was now in sole possession of all that remained to the house of Seleucus in Syria. He reigned in Antioch, dissipating in gorgeous feasts at Daphne the scanty treasure of the kingdom, or composing verses on a theme that had a morbid fascination for the verse-writers of that age—that of poisonous snakes.

About 116 came the attack of Antiochus IX, the son of Sidetes and Cleopatra, whom his mother had sent in 129 to be educated at Cyzicus—whence his nickname, Cyzicenus. He had, of course, no legal right to the throne, but an attempt of Grypos to have him poisoned (real or alleged) gave him an excuse to attack his half-brother. In his favor was the memory of his great father, which his surname of Philopator put forward. It was the expectations founded on his parentage probably which inclined the hearts of men to Antiochus Cyzicenus. But the Syrians were soon disillusioned. He had enough of the physical courage of his race, being a bold and splendid hunter, but as a ruler he was worthless; far more keenly interested in mimes, conjuring tricks, and ingenious mechanical toys than the affairs of state. He had also, without inheriting his father's greatness, inherited to the full his propensities to hard drinking.

A new dynastic war now blazed up over the Seleucid realm in Syria and Cilicia. It was again complicated with the feuds of the Ptolemaic house. Ptolemy Euergetes died in 117, and the power was seized by his widow, Cleopatra III. But like her sister, Cleopatra of Syria, she was obliged to associate her son, Ptolemy Soter II, in the throne. There were instantly two parties in Egypt, that which supported the Queen-mother, and that which was opposed to her, more or less openly. To the latter the King in his heart belonged, but he was outwardly subjected to his mother's will. His younger brother, on the other hand, Ptolemy Alexander, who governed Cyprus, was his mother's partizan. Ptolemy Euergetes had been allied, as we have seen, with Grypos against Zabinas, and these relations seem to have been maintained by Cleopatra. The opposite party in Egypt were therefore on the side of Cyzicenus.

These dispositions were expressed in act, when Cleopatra III, detecting antagonism to herself in her daughter Cleopatra, whom Soter had married, compelled him to divorce her and marry another of his sisters, Selene. The younger Cleopatra was at once bent on revenge, and acted in the spirit of her class. She would give her hand to

Cyzicenus, and procure his triumph over the ally of the Alexandrian court, Grypos. She did not come to him without a “dowry”; she came leading after her a royal army. They were troops which, by her own boldness and address, she had succeeded in bringing over from the service of Ptolemy Alexander in Cyprus and persuading to follow her.

Grypos, it will be remembered, had married Ptolemy’s daughter, Tryphaena. While, therefore, the two rival kings in Syria were half-brothers, their wives were now sisters. But this only increased the ferocity of the strife. Cyzicenus was master of Antioch, and when he went campaigning, Cleopatra was left in occupation of the palace there. After some defeat he was driven from the neighborhood, and Grypos, who had Tryphaena with him, proceeded to lay siege to Antioch. When the city fell, Tryphaena asked to have Cleopatra put into her hands; she wished to triumph over her sister in her captivity, and aggravate her humiliation. Grypos was shocked and demurred. Then Tryphaena suspected him of a guilty passion for Cleopatra, and her vindictiveness was whetted by a furious jealousy. Cleopatra had taken sanctuary at Daphne, but Tryphaena on her own authority sent soldiers to take her life. When they entered the temple to drag her outside the sacred precinct, Cleopatra grasped the image of Artemis with a determination over which the ruffians could not prevail. Then they struck through her wrists with their swords. The princess died, calling curses upon her murderers. Shortly after, by a turn of fortune, Tryphaena fell into the hands of Cyzicenus, and he did not spare to avenge.

In 113-112 the position of Grypos in Syria had become so weakened that he retired to Aspendus, in Pamphylia, to raise fresh bands. There were places in Syria where his cause was maintained during his absence, notably the loyal Seleucia. In about two years he came back (111-110) and recovered some part of the kingdom. It is curious that he made the year of his return a new era for the official dating. The war after this seems to have languished, either king acquiescing in his rival's occupation of a certain sphere, without formally making peace, “like athletes who give up a trial of strength, but being ashamed to retire, protract the contest by indolence and repose”. The power of Antiochus Grypos lay in the north of Syria, and he seems to have won the countenance of Rome; that of Cyzicenus in Palestine and Phoenicia.

Of course the feud of the two Seleucid brothers was taken advantage of by all within the realm who hankered after independence, and all outside of it who wished to cut off portions for themselves. Even the kings were obliged to further the work of disruption by conceding independence, where they thought that they could, by so doing, retain at any rate the good-will of a community. Tyre had been already given its freedom by Cleopatra in 126-125, perhaps as a reward for the part taken by the city in the killing of Demetrius II and Balanea in 124. Sidon, where Cyzicenus coined as late as 113-112, attained its freedom in 111, Tripolis in 110. In 109-108 Grypos conceded autonomy to Seleucia, as the reward of its steadfast loyalty to the legitimate king; his letter conveying notice of it to his ally Ptolemy Alexander is preserved in a Cyprian inscription. Ascalon, where coins of Cyzicenus were struck in 109-108, dates its freedom from 104.

The Jewish state advanced by great strides. Hyrcanus about 108 besieged the great Greek city of Samaria. This was in the region dominated by Cyzicenus. But his attempts to relieve Samaria were futile, although in Egypt the party friendly to his cause was now in the ascendant, and Ptolemy Soter, able at last to show his inclinations, sent him 6000 men. So strengthened Cyzicenus raided Judaea, but Samaria fell nevertheless after a year's siege. The Jews effaced all mark of it, and turned the water-courses over its site. Soon after, by the venality of Antiochus' general, they acquired Scythopolis. Antiochus on his side was for the moment strong enough to seize Joppa and put in a garrison, as well as to wrest some other important places, such as Gezer and Pegae from the Jews. But the Jews procured from Rome a decree of the Senate, bidding him restore them, and his occupation was transient.

John Hyrcanus died in 104, but the advance of the Jewish state in power and dignity did not cease. Aristobulus, his son (104-103), assumed the title of king — the Jewish monarchy restored! but not, to the vexation of the Pharisees, in the house of David. Under Aristobulus the Galilee which we know in the Gospels was created. Inhabited by the heathen Ituraeans—a people of (perhaps) Arab stock but Aramaic speech—it was now conquered by the Jews, and the population given the choice of expulsion or circumcision. The majority seem to have preferred the latter, and became merged in the community of Israel.

In 103, owing apparently to a recrudescence of hostilities between Grypos and Cyzicenus, the Seleucid authority had so far disappeared in Palestine that the Greek cities, when attacked by Alexander Jannaeus (Jonathan), the king of the Jews, who succeeded his brother Aristobulus in that year, turned for protection to Ptolemy Soter. Cleopatra had driven Soter out of Egypt and called Ptolemy Alexander home. Soter was therefore now in Cyprus, as his brother had been before. He was induced by the appeal of Ptolemais to intervene on behalf of the Greek cities, and Cleopatra promptly led an army to the support of the Jews. The ensuing war in Palestine only concerns the Seleucid house in that it brought home to Cleopatra how dangerous the alliance which still subsisted between Ptolemy Soter and Antiochus Cyzicenus might prove. She feared that they might make a combined attack on Egypt. Accordingly she helped Grypos in a substantial way, supplying him with the troops which his depleted treasury could no longer procure. She also sent him Selene, whom she had compelled Soter nearly twenty years before to marry, but whom he seems on withdrawing from Egypt to have left behind. These developments must have taken place before 102-101, the year in which Cleopatra falls from power.

It was not the Jews only who pressed in where the Seleucid power gave way. The Nabataeans became about this time a considerable power under Erotimus. He is the first ruler of the Nabataeans, so far as we know, who bore the name of king; and the rise of the Nabataeans, with whom we found the Jews associated in the days of Maccabaeus, runs thus closely parallel to that of the Jews. The expeditions conducted by Erotimus and the 700 (sic) sons, whom his extensive harem brought him, swept the lands which lay along the desert on the confines of Syria and Egypt.

In the North the province which adjoined Armenia, and which we already saw under a rebel dynast in the days of Antiochus IV, Commagene, now formally took rank as an independent kingdom. The dynasty which ruled it was of Iranian, and professedly of Persian origin, like the neighboring houses of Cappadocia and Pontus. But King Mithridates Kallinikos, who ruled Commagene in the earlier part of the last century *BC*, married Laodice the daughter of Antiochus Grypos, and in this way obtained an affiliation of the dynasty to the Seleucid house. Of their Macedonian parentage the kings of Commagene were still more proud than of their Persian; they regarded themselves as continuing the Seleucid line. Antiochus was adopted as the dynastic name, till the little kingdom was extinguished in 72 AD by the Romans.

While the peoples of the East were reasserting themselves in regions which had once obeyed the Macedonian kings, in the West the outposts of Roman rule already touched the realm of Antiochus Grypos. Rome had become one of the Asiatic powers in 133 by taking over, as the province of Asia, the kingdom bequeathed it by the last Attalus. In 102, some permanent military and naval stations were fixed in Cilicia, as bases for action against the pirates whose nests were in the mountains to the west. The command of these stations constituted the Cilician 'province. The Seleucid King did not lose his Cilician territory, with which the Roman stations on the coast probably interfered little, but their presence was a sign.

Antiochus Grypos married Selene about 102. But he was not destined to live with her long. Among those who stood highest at court was Heracleon of Beroea. From a fragment of Posidonius we may infer that he was at the head of the war department and a strict disciplinarian. He made the soldiers take their dinner in divisions of thousands, lying upon the ground in the open air. Each man's dinner was a large loaf and a piece of meat, and the drink, wine of the common sort mixed with cold water. The serving was done by men with knives, and strict silence was imposed. Heracleon's ambition urged him in these unsettled times to look higher than the office of King's minister. In 96 he murdered Grypos and seized the throne. Queen Selene fled, to give herself to Cyzicenus.

Heracleon cannot long have maintained himself in the place of the King, since Seleucus the son of Antiochus VIII is spoken of as succeeding, without any interval being mentioned. But we gather that Heracleon detached the north-eastern region of Syria, including his native Beroea, Bambyce-Hieropolis and Heraclea, as a separate principality.

Grypos left five sons, of whom the eldest succeeded him as Seleucus Epiphanes Nicator. He was a man of stormy vehemence. He infused a new spirit into the war against Cyzicenus, and took the field with a strong army. City after city was lost to Cyzicenus. In the year following Grypos' death (in 95) Seleucus defeated his uncle in a pitched battle, and Cyzicenus came to his end.

But Seleucus was not suffered to take possession undisturbed. Antiochus Cyzicenus had left a grown-up son, who almost immediately (still in 95) proclaimed himself king in Aradus, as Antiochus Eusebes Philopator (Antiochus X). He also took

over his father's recent wife, Selene, who, since she married her first husband, her brother Ptolemy Soter, in 116, must now have been of some years. According to one account, Seleucus would have succeeded in taking his life, as well as that of his father, had he not been saved by a courtesan who loved him for the beauty of his person. So the dreary circle came round again. Seleucus was beaten, and had to abandon Syria to Antiochus Eusebes, withdrawing to Cilicia. Here he fixed his temporary capital at Mopsuestia, but had soon fallen foul of the citizens, who found that unlimited demands were made upon their property by a king who had sunk to be a mere captain of bandits. Insurrection followed, and Seleucus VI perished in the flames of his residence (95).

Then the remaining sons of Grypos took up the quarrel. Antiochus XI Epiphanes Philadelphus and Philip, whose name shows that the Seleucid princes still cherished the memory of their Antigonid blood, were probably with their brother Seleucus in Cilicia. They made haste at any rate to avenge his death by letting their bands loose upon Mopsuestia and pulling down the houses. Perhaps they were twins, as they were called; Antiochus took precedence, but Philip also had the title of King, and his head appears behind that of Antiochus on some coins. Together they crossed the Amanus to attack Antiochus Eusebes in Antioch. But a battle near the city went against them, and in the flight Antiochus Philadelphus rode his horse into the Orontes and was drowned. Philip, however, as King Philip Epiphanes Philadelphus, continued the war. At the same time (in 95) another son of Grypos, Demetrius III, established himself as Demetrius Theos Philopator Soter in central Syria. He was living in Cnidus, when Ptolemy Soter, who was still excluded from Egypt and reigning in Cyprus, offered him troops to try his fortune in Syria. Demetrius made Damascus his capital. He is generally distinguished by his nickname Eukairos.

Within a few months, therefore, of the death of Antiochus Grypos there were three separate Seleucid kingdoms in Syria. Antiochus Eusebes was pressed both on the north and south by the two sons of Grypos, Philip and Demetrius, who seem at this time to have acted in concert. What happened to him in this chaos we cannot make out. Demetrius before 88-87 had possession of Antioch. But Antiochus Eusebes was still holding his bands together in some part of Syria or Cilicia and calling himself Seleucid King.

Demetrius III is the last Seleucid who interferes in the affairs of the Jews. His help was asked by the people themselves, who were disaffected to their king, Jannaeus Alexander. Jannaeus had surrounded himself, like the other princes of the time, with foreign mercenaries—wild men from the highlands of the Taurus; the Jews rose against him and sent to Damascus for help. Demetrius came himself with an army, and at Shechem joined the national army of the Jews. There seemed at that late date a prospect of the Jews by their own act restoring Seleucid supremacy to escape from the Hasmonaean king! But when Jannaeus had been driven to the hills, they thought better of it, and Demetrius was too insecure to entangle himself in a war with the Jews.

About 88 a war broke out between Philip and Demetrius. Philip was allied with Strato, who ruled the little principality which had recently been constituted with its centre at Beroea. Philip himself was in Beroea when Demetrius laid siege to the city.

Then Strato appealed to a neighboring Arab chief, called Aziz, and to Mithridates the Parthian governor (of Mesopotamia?). They answered to his call, and the besieger Demetrius was besieged in his turn. He was cut off from his water-supply and obliged to capitulate. The Antiochenes in his camp were sent home without a ransom, but Demetrius was taken a prisoner to the Parthian court. Mithridates the Great, who then held the Arsacid throne (he died about 86), treated his captive with the respect paid by the Parthians to the other members of the Seleucid house who had fallen into their hands. In such honourable captivity Demetrius III ended his days.

Yet a fifth son of Grypos now appears to wrangle over the fragments of the heritage, Antiochus XII Dionysus Epiphanes Philopator Kallinikos. Philip got possession of Antioch, and Antiochus established himself in Damascus. Philip watched his opportunity to strike him there, and when Antiochus was engaged in an expedition against the Nabataean Arabs, he suddenly appeared before the city. Milesius, who held the citadel for Antiochos, opened the gates. Philip, however, had soon given this man offence, and when he went to see some races in a hippodrome outside the city, Milesius shut the gates and returned to his old allegiance. Antiochus Dionysus hurried back on hearing what was on foot, and Philip had to retire. But almost immediately Antiochus started away again on a fresh expedition against the Nabataeans. This time he went by way of the Philistine coast, now dominated by the Jews. Jannaeus tried in vain to stop him by a great line of works from Chapharsaba (mod. Kafar-Saba) to Joppa. Antiochus broke through, and entered the country of the Arabs. Here he fell by a chance stroke in an affray when victory was already inclining to his side.

It was obvious that chaos could not go on for ever in Syria. The house of Seleucus was on the point of extinction, self-consumed by its own disordered energies. But what would take its place? Gradually, ever since the death of Seleucus Nicator, two hundred years ago, it had been relinquishing to the barbarian dynasties the territories it had inherited from Alexander the Great. Mesopotamia had been lost to the Parthian before 88; Commagene had a king Mithridates; southern Syria had fallen to the Arabs and the Jews. Only its territory beyond the Taurus the house of Seleucus had ceded a hundred years before, not to a barbarian power, but to the house of Attalus, from whom it had been inherited in 133 by Rome.

But between 90 and 80 *BC* it seemed questionable whether the whole of Asia was not about to revert to the rule of Orientals. Two of those dynasties, whose first beginnings we have watched in the days when the Seleucid house was great, were now risen to an imposing strength—the house of Mithridates in Pontus, and the house of Artaxias in Armenia. Mithridates Eupator now sat on the Pontic throne. In 88 he occupied nearly the whole of Asia Minor, and put the resident Romans to the sword, and in the following year flung his armies upon Greece. True, the campaigns of Sulla made Mithridates give back, but the peace signed in 84 was an uneasy one, and left Mithridates in a position to renew the fight. In Armenia the king of the house of Artaxias was Tigranes, who had first suppressed the rival dynasty in Sophene, and then extended his conquests outside Armenia at the expense of the Parthians. Before 83 he had conquered Mesopotamia, and was ready to cross the Euphrates into Syria.

In 83 the Armenian armies overflowed Syria. The men who called themselves kings—Philip the son of Grypos, and Antiochus Eusebes the son of Cyzicenus—are no more heard of. In utter weariness of the dynastic feuds, the Greek cities of Syria acquiesced with relief in the rule of the Armenian King of kings. His governor Magadates now sat in the palace of Antioch, and coins were struck there in his name. The Cilician plain, as part of the Seleucid realm, Tigranes also took in possession, and emptied its Greek cities to make the population of the huge Tigranocerta, which he began to create in Mesopotamia. Only here and there some stronghold maintained itself against the Armenian, notably Seleucia in Pieria, so long distinguished for its loyalty to the legitimate Seleucid King, and now defying all the efforts of Tigranes to enter its walls. About 75 BC the young sons of Antiochus Eusebes appeared in Rome, and were recognized as the “kings of Syria”. They stayed nearly two years in Rome, and showed no signs of impoverishment. They maintained a royal state, and were served with such gold and silver plate as beseemed a king’s table. It is also stated that they came from Syria, returned to Syria, and were in possession of the Syrian throne. We can hardly doubt that it was in Seleucia that they still had a court and treasury.

The object of the visit of King Antiochus and his brother to Rome was to ask to be installed as kings of Egypt. They claimed through their mother Selene, who was still living in Syria. The Ptolemaic kingdom was also suffering from a confused succession. They naturally got nothing from Rome, and one of them was robbed of some of his choice plate by Verres when he stopped in Sicily on his way home.

The arms of Tigranes did not reach the south of Syria. Queen Selene was still residing in 69 in Ptolemais; but in the land as a whole the Arabs, the Ituraeans of Chalcis, and the Jews had it all their own way, except in so far as they fought with each other. Damascus soon after the death of Antiochus Dionysus (about 85) put itself into the hands of the Nabataean king Haretas III, to escape the worse fate of falling into the hands of the Ituraean dynast. The Ituraeans overran the Phoenician coast between Sidon and Theuprosopon, wasting the fields of Byblos and Berytus. On the seaboard between Phoenicia and Egypt, the cities where Hellenic culture had lately flourished, Gaza, Strato’s Tower, Dora, were ruinous solitudes—monuments of the vengeance of the Jews. The peoples of the desert and its fringes, of regions like Idumaea, drifted into the country to efface the marks of the Greek, like the desert sand which submerges forsaken cities. The mixed population, Jewish for the most part in manners though not in origin, came to be classed indistinguishably under the name of Idumaeans. Government there was none. Ordered society gave place to bands of robbers and pirates. The homeless inhabitants of the towns which had been destroyed, the defeated factions of cities which still stood, took to brigandage as their living, or joined the great pirate confraternity.

Only a few cities like Ascalon, which had saved itself from the Jews by a timely subservience, still nursed in this region the seeds of Hellenic life.

Was the work of Alexander and the Greek kings undone? was all the land once more from Central Asia to the Mediterranean to go back to the Oriental? At that moment there wanted but little for the whole to be once more in the possession of native races and kings. Yes; but even the conquests of an Oriental house did not bring about

the state of things which had existed before the battle of Granicus. In the first place, these conquering dynasties had themselves, while retaining their native names and memories, assimilated to a greater or less degree the penetrating culture of the Greeks. Macedonian blood ran in the veins of princes who bore the names of Mithradata or Ariorath. Greek was spoken at their courts; they prided themselves on being the champions of Hellenism. Even the kings of the Jews and of the Arabs took the surname of Phil-Hellene.

This consideration would, no doubt, tend to make the Greeks look upon the return of Oriental rule more favourably. At Antioch there had existed a party before 83 who were for calling in Mithridates of Pontus: Tigranes actually came in response to an invitation. But, with all that, the prevailing feeling among the Greeks was one of antipathy to the Oriental dynasties. Do what they might to show their phil-Hellenism, they were in the eyes of the Greeks barbarians still. Tigranes had been welcomed in Syria, but before long “the rule of the Armenians was intolerable to the Greeks”. Perhaps the Greeks were right in their feeling that Hellenic culture and Oriental despotism could not in the long run subsist together.

In the second place, the existence of this great Greek population all over the Nearer East made the situation in 80 BC in reality utterly different from the situation in 333. The Romans found this people, their natural allies, waiting for them when they came to take possession. It was a true instinct which led Alexander and his successors to make the foundation of their work a system of Greek cities. Their dynasties perished, but their cities remained. The Romans had not to begin the work over again. They had but to carry on a work which the disruption of the Greek dynasties had brought to a standstill.

It was in 73 that the Romans put forth their strength a second time to roll back the power of Mithridates. *We may regard that year as the date when the tide of barbarian advance which since the death of Seleucus I had, with an occasional reflux, yet increasingly prevailed, turned before the advance of Rome.* The last great general who was a sincere servant of the oligarchy, Lucius Lucullus, drove back Mithridates from Cyzicus, marched victoriously through Pontus, and in 69 invaded Armenia, where Mithridates had sought refuge.

Tigranes was at the moment pushing his conquests further south. He was already master of the Phoenician coast, and had taken Ptolemais, where Queen Selene had held out against him, when the news reached him that Lucullus was in Armenia. He hastily retired north, taking Selene with him, who by the fall of Ptolemais had come into his hands. At Seleucia on the Euphrates opposite Samosata she was imprisoned, and after some time put to death. The successes of Lucullus in Armenia brought about that or the following year the complete evacuation of Syria by the Armenian armies.

Now the dethroned descendants of Seleucus saw their chance again. The son of Antiochus Eusebes, he probably whom we saw robbed by Verres some six years before, showed himself in Syria, and was hailed by Antioch as the lawful king. Lucullus gave his sanction. So once more a Seleucid king reigned in Antioch, Antiochus XIII,

nicknamed Asiaticus, from some temporary residence in Asia Minor. True to the character of his race, he was soon fighting, with whom we are not told, probably the neighboring Arabs. The Arabs had now pushed into the Orontes valley itself. Emisa (*mod.* Homs) was the seat of a chieftain called Shemash-geram (Sampsigeramus), who had also possession of Arethusa (*mod.* Arrastan). With him, however, Antiochus was friendly, and it was probably with the rival chief Aziz that Antiochus had come to blows. About 65 he suffered a defeat, which so damaged his credit at Antioch that there was a movement to drive him out again. Antiochus, however, was strong enough to quell it, and the ringleaders fled. A son of the late King Philip of the other Seleucid line was living in Cilicia, and the refugee Antiochenes persuaded him to try his chances in Syria. He made a compact with Aziz, and was set, as a dependant of the Arab chiefs, upon the Seleucid throne. Antiochus placed all his hopes on the support of Shemash-geram, and the ruler of Emisa moved in fact down the Orontes with his bands. He asked Antiochus to come and confer with him in his camp. Antiochus, of course, went and was instantly made a prisoner. Shemash-geram had secretly arranged with Aziz that they should each make away with his Seleucid ally and divide the inheritance between them. Before, however, Aziz had carried out his part of the undertaking, Philip got wind of it and escaped to Antioch.

When in 64 Pompey, having hunted Mithridates out of Asia, appeared as conqueror in Syria, to settle its affairs in the name of Rome, he received an application from Antiochus XIII, entreating to be restored to his throne. But Pompey had a consciousness of what Rome was come into Asia to do—to establish a strong government which would protect the centres of Hellenic life from barbarian dominion. It was that which the cities expected from Rome, and the restoration of such Seleucids as were now to be had was the last thing they wanted. According to one account, Antioch gave Pompey large sums to refuse the application of Antiochus. The account is probably untrue, but it truly represents the attitude of Antioch. Pompey gave Antiochus a scornful answer. The man who had lost Syria to Tigranes was not the man to save it from Arabs and Jews. Syria, except cities which were given their freedom or the districts left to native dynasts under Roman influence, was now made a Roman province and put under the direct rule of a Roman governor. The kingdom of the house of Seleucus was come to an utter end (64).

What became of the surviving members of the royal house is lost in darkness. Antiochus XIII was sooner or later killed by Shemash-geram. Another of them was invited by envoys from Alexandria in 58 to come to Egypt and marry Berenice, the daughter of Ptolemy Auletes, who reigned there during a temporary expulsion of her father. “He, however”, says the account, “fell sick and died”. If he is identical with the person nicknamed Kybiosaktes by the Alexandrians, what happened is that the unhappy man accepted the invitation and was incontinently strangled by Berenice. Philip II, the last Seleucid king, reappears for a moment in 56, when he also received an invitation from Alexandria to come and be king in Egypt, but was forbidden by Aulus Gabinius, the proconsul of Syria, to go. Then he, and with him the house of Seleucus, finally disappears.

There were still people for many generations who prided themselves on having in their veins the blood of the imperial house. A priestess of Artemis at Laodicea-on-the-sea, in the beginning of the second century after Christ, tells us in her funeral inscription that she is sprung “from King Seleucus Nicator”. The dynasty of Commagene vaunted it, and after the dynasty was brought down, the last members of the family. One of them, Gaius Julius Antiochus Philopappus, put up the well-known monument at Athens about 115 *AD* with a statue of Seleucus Nicator, his great ancestor. Another of them, a lady in the train of the Empress Sabina, the wife of Hadrian, visited the Egyptian Thebes in 130 *AD*, and left upon the colossal “Memnon”, the image of King Amenhotep III, some Greek verses, legible today, which record the praises of her mistress and her own royal descent. It is as if here, upon this monument of the dead empire of the Dawn, the powers of later fame would leave a register of their passage, a remembrance of names which in their hour were great, they also, in the earth.

CHAPTER XXXII

GOVERNMENT, COURT, AND ARMY

The kingdoms of Alexander and his successors show a mingling of several distinct traditions, which they did not succeed in altogether happily reconciling. We may distinguish three. (1) There was the Oriental tradition, the forms and conceptions which the new rulers of the East inherited from the “barbarian” Empires which went before them; (2) there was the Macedonian tradition; and (3) the Hellenic.

In the political constitution of the realm the Oriental tradition was predominant, for the kings were absolute despots. There was the same sort of government machine that there had always been since monarchy arose in the East, with the sovereign at the head of it and a hierarchy of officials who derived all their authority from him—satraps and district governors, secretaries, and overseers of taxes. Seleucus Nicator had publicly adopted the principle of despotism that the will of the King overrode every other sort of law. We have seen the Seleucid kings following in their practice the barbarian precedent—in the punishment of rebels (Molon and Achaeus).

But with all this, the successors of Alexander made a pride of distinguishing themselves from their barbarian predecessors—Pharaohs, Babylonians, and Persians. They would have the world remember that they were Macedonians. They avoided the use of titles which had an Oriental color. “King of kings”, for instance, no Seleucid is found to call himself. “Great King” was a title borne only when there was some special reason to emphasize the Oriental dominion, as in the case of Antiochus III and Antiochus Sidetes.

It is noteworthy that the inscription put up at Delos in honor of Antiochus III by the courtier Menippus, while giving him the title of Great King, qualifies it by describing him as “a Macedonian”.

Did anything of old Macedonian custom survive in the constitution of the Seleucid realm? In Macedonia, as we saw, before Alexander, while the King was supreme and apparently unfettered by any legal form, he was practically restrained both by the hereditary nobility and by the will of the people as expressed in the assemblies of the national army. The state of things was thus closely analogous to what we find among the Romans in the days of the kingdom. Do either of these forms of restraint appear in the Seleucid realm?

We certainly find a nobility, but it was not such a nobility as could restrict the King’s power. It was not a nobility of great families with a power resting on landed domains and local influence—such a nobility of barons as the old Macedonian kings, like the Persian kings and the kings of England, had to deal with : it was a nobility of

court creation, the standing of whose members consisted in a personal relation to the King. We shall look more closely at it when we come to consider the court. In the train of the chiefs who made themselves kings after Alexander's death there must have been many representatives of the old Macedonian aristocracy: they and their descendants after them may have been persons of influence at the new courts, but they had, of course, by being severed from their ancestral soil, lost any independent power as against the King, and must have soon been merged in the new nobility, consisting of those whom the King's favor elevated. Such a family, we may divine, was that of Achaeus, of whom came the mother of Attains I and the queen of Seleucus II.

As in old Rome, so in the Macedonian kingdom under Philip the father of Alexander, the idea of *people* and *army* had coincided. The army acted as the Macedonian people assembled under arms. And during the career of Alexander we find it by no means passive : it judges the Macedonians accused of treason : its will, even when informally expressed, is a factor with which Alexander has to reckon.

The Roman popular assembly came into action especially at a transference of the royal power, for the election of a new king. So at Alexander's death we find the Macedonian army electing Philip Arrhidaeus. In the first years of confused struggle we hear repeatedly of the army acting as a political body. The Regent Perdiccas brings a question before the "general assembly of the Macedonians". Ptolemy is accused by Perdiccas before the Assembly and acquitted. After the death of Perdiccas, it is the Macedonian army which, on the proposition of Ptolemy, elects Pithon and Arrhidaeus to take his place. Then it passes sentence of death upon Eumenes and others of the adherents of Perdiccas. When Pithon and Arrhidaeus lay aside their power at Triparadisus, they do so before an Assembly, and "the Macedonians" choose Antipater as Regent. In the days that followed, the Macedonian army ceased to be a unity. It was broken up among the different chiefs. But we still find Antigonus following the old practice in 315 and assembling his Macedonian troops before Tyre to hear his accusation of Cassander and Vote him a public enemy.

Does the Seleucid realm show any trace of a similar assembly? Even if we had no reference to such a thing, we could not use the argument from silence, where our sources are so imperfect. But as a matter of fact, we have several references which seem to point to a survival of the practice, and just on the occasions we should expect from what has gone before—where a transference or delegation of the royal authority is in question. Seleucus I, having resolved to make his son Antiochus king of the eastern provinces, calls together the "army", or, as Plutarch puts it, an "Assembly of all the people", to give its approval. It is the army which calls Antiochus from Babylon to ascend the throne, on the murder of Seleucus III. The guardians of the child Antiochus V are said to have been given him "by the people". Tryphon, when he would make himself king, to the exclusion of the Seleucid dynasty, solicits election at the hands of the "soldiery" or "the people".

We see from all this that at important conjunctures an assembly of "the army" or the "people" was still called into action. But it is less clear of whom precisely the army in question consisted. The place of assembly can hardly have been anywhere but

Antioch, the seat of government, but it is difficult to suppose that the Assembly which determined the government of the Empire was identical with the popular assembly, the *demos*, of the city Antioch. Although the military head-quarters were at Apamea, there must have been a camp near the King's person at Antioch. And the soldiers who formed it consisted no doubt mainly of "Macedonians" *i.e.* the descendants (real or professed) of the Macedonians settled by Alexander, Antigonus, and Seleucus I in the East. On them, we may believe, the old customary rights of the Macedonian army devolved. There was apparently a large proportion of Antiochenes in the home-born army, and to that extent the people who voted in the civic assembly of Antioch as members of a Hellenic *demos* would also, we must suppose, take part in the imperial assembly of the Macedonian army. *There was in this way a real popular element in the Seleucid realm.* The Roman Empire also was a military despotism, but there was this difference, that the Roman troops who disposed of the imperial throne were largely barbarians from the outlying provinces or beyond, whilst the Seleucid army was mainly home-born. The attempt of the Cretan mercenaries under Demetrius II to get rid of the home-born army provoked, as we have seen, a national rebellion.

In the political frame Oriental despotism and Macedonian popular kingship were thus combined; the Hellenic tradition was opposed in principle to monarchy, and could therefore hardly find a place in the constitution. But it was seen in the policy and spirit of the administration. It was as Hellenic rulers that the kings created city-states in every quarter, and dealt tenderly with the popular forms, the "ancestral constitution" in the older Greek cities. There was, as has been said, a fundamental incompatibility between the desire to rule over Greeks and the desire to be a patron of Hellenism. But how far a Seleucid king could go in the latter direction we see in the case of Antiochus Epiphanes. Again, the intelligence and progressiveness which belonged to the intellectual part of Greek culture showed itself in the scientific exploration of the realm, the attempt to open new ways, which marked Seleucid rule, when it got a little respite from the sequence of war on war. But being above all things fighters, the Seleucid kings had less scope to show their Hellenic quality than Ptolemies and Attalids. As benefactors of the states of Greece they had, before Antiochus Epiphanes, been behind their rivals. The Macedonian in them seems to the end to predominate over the Hellene.

The *régime* of the palace we should probably at first sight pronounce to be Oriental. There was the army of chamberlains and cooks and eunuchs. There was the display of crimson and gold, the soft raiment, the stringed instruments, the odours of myrrh, aloes, and cassia. But here again we shall see the Macedonian and the Hellenic tradition taking effect.

As we cast round our eyes, we should have observed that while material and colour were of an Oriental splendor, the form was Greek. By the fashion of column and doorway, the painted walls, the shape of candelabrum and cup, the dresses of men and women, we should have known ourselves in a Greek house. The King wore as the symbol of his royalty a band tied about his head. This use of the *diadem* was Oriental. But here again the form was Greek. The diadem of the Oriental kings was an elaborate head-dress; the diadem of the Greek kings was such as was common in Greece, as a sign, not of royalty, but of victory in the games—a narrow linen band. The royal dress

was the old national dress of the Macedonians glorified. That had not been like the garb worn by Greek citizens in the city, but such as was worn for hunting and riding, and was therefore characteristic of the Northern Greeks and Macedonians, who lived an open country life. It consisted of a broad-brimmed hat, a shawl or mantle brooched at the throat or shoulder and falling on either side to about the knees in "wings" (the *chlamys*), and high-laced boots with thick soles. Of these three parts — the hat, the *chlamys*, and the high boots—the royal dress of a Ptolemy or a Seleucid king was to the end composed. But it was gorgeously transfigured. The peculiar Macedonian hat, the *kausia*, had apparently no crown; it was a large felt disc attached to the head, and suggested a mushroom to the Athenian mocker. As worn by the kings, it was dyed crimson with the precious juice won by immense labor from the sea, and the diadem was in some way tied round it, or under it, its ends hanging loose about the neck. The diadem itself was inwrought with golden thread. The *chlamys* was no less splendid. That made for Demetrius Poliorcetes, when King in Macedonia, is described to us. It was of the darkness of the night-sky, covered with golden stars — all the constellations and signs of the Zodiac. The boots of the same king were of crimson felt, embroidered with gold.

We are told of Alexander that he wore on occasion the peculiar insignia of this or that deity, sometimes the horns and Egyptian shoes of Ammon, sometimes the bow and quiver of Artemis, or again the garb of Hermes, which, being that of a young man on travel, was not unlike the Macedonian dress—a crimson *chlamys*, an under robe striped with white such as, according to Persian custom, none but the King might wear, and a *kausia* with the diadem—only on giving audience in state the more distinctive emblems of Hermes, winged sandals and *caduceus*, were also assumed; or at other times Alexander appeared as Heracles, with the club and lion-skin. This statement is generally discredited as the gossip of a later generation, and unworthy of Alexander; but even if not true of Alexander, it points perhaps to a practice of impersonating deities at the courts of the successors. We hear of Themison, the favorite of Antiochus II, masquerading as Heracles, and the last Cleopatra of Egypt as Aphrodite or as Isis. In other cases, therefore, the royal dress was possibly modeled on the conventional garb of some god, and such emblems as horns and wings, which appear on the heads in coins, may have been actually worn. If so, the unfortunate suggestion of the theatre, which the Greeks found even in the gorgeous *chlamys* and high-boots of the kings, must have been doubly accentuated.

The special emblem of the Seleucid house was the anchor, which appears on many of their coins. Various stories were current in later times to explain it—that Laodicea, the mother of Seleucus, dreamed she had conceived of Apollo, and that the god had given her a signet with the device of an anchor, and just such a ring she actually found next day, which her son always wore; that his mother had given him the ring because she had been told in a dream that in whatever place it was lost, there he should be King; that when Seleucus was in Babylon he stumbled over a stone; the stone was raised and an anchor was found underneath, signifying that he was come to remain. As the anchor is already found on the coins which Seleucus strikes as satrap of Babylon (before 306), it was obviously a device belonging to his family before he had risen to

empire. In that case its origin goes back into obscurity, and while the later stories are rejected, we are not likely to gain any result by guessing in the dark. The belief is noteworthy that all the descendants of Seleucus were born with the anchor marked upon their thigh.

The language of the court and government was, of course, Greek. That a Seleucid king knew the language of any of his native subjects—Aramaic or Phoenician or Persian—is highly improbable; it was thought a wonder in the last Cleopatra that she could speak Egyptian. How far Macedonian survived we do not know; it seems to have been thought the proper thing for a Ptolemy or a Seleucid to keep up the speech of his fathers, but some of them, we are told, omitted to do so. The intellectual atmosphere of the court was Greek; its degree would depend upon the individual king. In literary brilliance the Seleucid court did not compete with the Ptolemaic or the Pergamene; but a goodly number of Greek men of letters, philosophers and artists must always have been found at the King's table. Aratus of Soli lived for a time at the court of Antiochus I and made an edition of the *Odyssey* on the King's order. The poet Euphorion was made by Antiochus III librarian of the public library in Antioch, and ended his days in Syria. Antiochus IV was, of course, exceptional in his Hellenic enthusiasm, and made Antioch for the moment the chief center of artistic activity in the Greek world. A recently deciphered papyrus from Herculaneum throws a curious light upon the relations of this King with philosophers. The papyrus is a life of the Epicurean philosopher Philonides. Antiochus Epiphanes did not regard that school with favor, and Philonides went to the Syrian court with a large body of literary men to convert him. After Antiochus had been plied with a battery of no less than *one hundred and twenty-five tracts* he succumbed. He embraced the Epicurean doctrine and made admirable progress as a disciple. Later on Demetrius Soter treated Philonides with great consideration; he insisted on having the philosopher continually with him, that they might discuss and read together. Hence Philonides acquired great influence, which he did not use, his biographer throws in, reflecting on what other philosophers did under such circumstances, to be given a voice in the Council or a place in embassies and such like, but for helping the necessities of Greek cities like Laodicea-on-the-sea. Even Alexander Balas dabbled in philosophy and professed himself a Stoic. That Seleucid kings retained contact with Hellenic culture almost to the end of the dynasty we may infer from the places where some of the later kings were brought up—Antiochus Grypos at Athens, Antiochus IX at Cyzicus. Antiochus Grypos was even, as we saw, himself an author.

The letter of a King Antiochus cited by Athenaeus shows a very different attitude to philosophers. The official to whom it is addressed, Phantias, is instructed to suffer no philosopher to be in "the city" or its territory, as they did the young men such harm. The philosophers are to be all banished, all young men caught dealing with them *to be hanged*, and their fathers subjected to strict inquisition. Radermacher, who has discussed this odd document, shows that its Greek is of a popular kind, and he suggests that it is a Jewish forgery intended to discredit the Seleucid kings. That any Seleucid king wished to drive all philosophers *out of the kingdom*, as Athenaeus understands the letter, is certainly incredible. But it does not seem to me impossible that they might have been banished from a particular city, even from Antioch, if they were supposed to be

instilling a dangerous republicanism. We must remind ourselves once more that there was a radical inconsistency in the position of a Seleucid king as a patron and defender of Hellenism and as a lord over Greek city-states. Which aspect was prominent depended on the circumstances of the moment, and during the last tumultuous years of the dynasty we see a strong movement towards independence in the Greek cities of Syria and Cilicia. And it was just these last kings, sunk to be almost captains of bandits, who might be expected to show as poor a Hellenism in their literary style as in their coins. The letter therefore seems to me a possibly one from an Antiochus of the generation of Philadelphus or Asiaticus. But that the hypothesis of Radermacher is equally possible I should not attempt to deny.

The ceremonial of the court I should judge to be much freer than in the Iranian kingdoms. There is, for instance, no record of any Seleucid attempting to introduce the Oriental practice of prostration, as Alexander had done. No doubt the main recreations were hunting and feasting, both of which had taken a large place in old Macedonian, as in old Persian, life. We have indications that the ancestral passion for hunting did not die out in the Seleucid and Ptolemaic houses. Demetrius I, we saw, Polybius knew as a keen sportsman, and even in the last degeneracy of the house Antiochus Oyzicenus was noted for his daring and skill in the field. The same thing is told us of Ptolemy V Epiphanes.

In the royal banquets the splendor and abundance of gold and silver plate, the profusion of choice wines, seemed to show Oriental luxury; but at no time more than in his convivial hours was the difference between the Macedonian King and the Oriental Great King thrown into prominence. The seclusion and unapproachableness of the Oriental monarch were among his essential characteristics. On the other hand, even Alexander, for all his assumption of the Great King, maintained to the end the old Macedonian way of good-fellowship and familiarity over the wine-cup. The abandonment of all dignity at such hours which the Macedonian King permitted himself was an offence even to the more correct Greeks, and the stories told us of Antiochus Epiphanes are to some extent explained by Macedonian manners. For we hear that at the court of his father, Antiochus the Great King, the armed dance was gone through at dinner not only by the King's Friends, but by the King himself. And it is noteworthy that for the chief to dance a war dance after a feast is a custom shown us by Xenophon among the neighbors of the Macedonians, the Thracians.

When we turn to the Seleucid queens we see a curious mingling of all three traditions. The Hellenic is traced in the fact that the Seleucids and Ptolemies were so far monogamous that they had at one time only one legitimate or official wife. For the old Macedonian kings, like the Oriental, were polygamous; and they were followed in this respect by Alexander, who was more inclined than his successors to preserve the fashion of Oriental courts. The monogamy was official only, for the kings kept mistresses at their pleasure, some of whom, like the mistress of Antiochus Epiphanes, might be openly invested with power. On the other hand, in the choice of their wives Ptolemies and perhaps Seleucids followed the Oriental practice in a way which outraged Greek morality by marrying their sisters. The practice had been allowable in Egypt, and among the ancient Persians was not only allowable, but especially pleasing to God. It

must be admitted that there is no certain instance of the marriage of full brother and sister among the Seleucids; that of Antiochus, the eldest son of Antiochus III and Laodicea, is probably such, but Laodicea may have been only his half-sister, as Laodicea, the mother of Seleucus II, was of Antiochus II.

It was in the character and action of the Seleucid and Ptolemaic queens that the Macedonian blood and tradition showed itself. Both dynasties exhibit a series of strong-willed, masculine, unscrupulous women of the same type as those who fought and intrigued for power in the old Macedonian kingdom. The last Cleopatra of Egypt is the best known to us, but she was only a type of her class. There was no relegation of queens and princesses to the obscurity of a harem. They mingled in the political game as openly as the men. It was in the political sphere, rather than in that of sensual indulgence, that their passions lay and their crimes found a motive. Sometimes they went at the head of armies. We have seen one of them drive, spear in hand, through the streets of Antioch to do vengeance on her enemies. It is only in the intensity and recklessness with which they pursue their ends that we see any trace of womanhood left in them.

The King was surrounded by the nobility of the court, who bore the title of Friends. To their body the great officials of the kingdom, the ministers of the different departments, the higher officers of the army belonged. They furnished a Council, which regularly assisted the King with its advice on matters of state. The Friends were distinguished by the wearing of crimson, just as the nobility of the Achaemenian kingdom had been, and similar names were current among the Greeks to describe them. This is explained by the custom, both among the Persians and among the Macedonians, for the kings to make presents of costly dresses to their friends; according to Xenophon, no one at the Persian court might wear such dresses and golden ornaments except those who had received them as a gift from the King. We have an indication that the same rule held good in the Seleucid kingdom. In modern Persia the giving of a rich dress is an ordinary mark of the Shah's favor.

Within the body of Friends we find a variety of grades. So far as the few notices relating to the Seleucid court take us, they show a close analogy to the system revealed by the papyri at the Ptolemaic court in the second century B.C., and Strack, in his article on the Ptolemaic titles, advances the theory that the system was borrowed under Ptolemy V Epiphanes from the court of his great father-in-law, Antiochus III. The order of these classes is not clearly fixed by existing data ; it is certain that the highest was that of the Kinsmen. In writing to a Kinsman the King addresses him as "brother" or "father". Next to the order of Kinsmen came, in Egypt, a set of people to which we cannot yet prove a parallel at the Seleucid court, nor have yet been discovered in a Seleucid document.

It is important to observe, as Strack points out, that these titles did not carry office with them, although they were, of course, regularly conferred upon those who held high positions in the government or army or court. Their nearest analogy in our world is the honorary orders of European courts.

Just as the Friends as a whole were distinguished by the crimson of their apparel, so it would seem that there was a graduated scale of splendor for the different grades. We hear of the golden brooch which it was customary to give to the King's Kinsmen—some badge which makes the analogy with our orders still closer.

Admission to the class of Friends depended entirely upon the King's will; the standing of the nobleman was not anything he possessed in himself or could transmit to his heirs; it consisted in a personal relation to the King. It ceased when the diadem passed to a stranger. No qualification, except to have pleased the King's fancy, was necessary in order to be classed with the Friends. Any one of the crowd of parasites whom the chances of lucre or honor drew to the royal courts might be invested with the rank, whether his native place was within the King's dominions or beyond, whether he was Greek or barbarian.

Of the great officers of state the highest is he who his position corresponds to that of a grand vizir in a Mohammedan kingdom. When the King is a minor, he is at the head of the administration, and combines with the office of prime minister that of regent or guardian. He probably in most cases, if not all, held the rank of Kinsman.

We hear also "Secretary of State". Dionysius, who holds the position under Antiochus IV, is able to put a thousand slaves into the procession at Daphne, each carrying a piece of silver plate of one thousand drachmae or over. Bithys, the Secretary of State of Antiochus Grypos, puts up a statue of that king at Delos, on the basis of which he gives his title of Kinsman.

Another of the principal offices was that of minister of finance, which Antiochus Epiphanes gave to his favourite Heraclides.

Of the functionaries of the court we get a notion from a Delian inscription in honor of Craterus the eunuch. He combines the offices of chief physician and "lord of the Queen's bedchamber"; his rank is that of the First Friends. Two of the men who were connected as court physicians with the house of Seleucus left their mark in the history of Greek medicine, Erasistratus, the physician of Seleucus I, and Apollophanes of Seleucia, whom we saw at the court of Antiochus III.

A custom found in Persia of bringing up children of nobles at the palace together with the children of the royal house seems to have been followed both in old Macedonia and in the courts of the Successors. One gathers this from the frequency with which persons of high station are described as "foster-brothers" of the King. Under the Seleucids we have Philip, the foster-brother of Antiochus III, Heliodorus of Seleucus IV, Philip of Antiochus IV, Apollonius of Demetrius I.

From the sons of nobles grown old enough to bear arms a corps of attendants on the King was formed with the name of "Children of the King". They figure more than once in the wars of Alexander, and we saw that Seleucus I was perhaps at one time their commander. The institution continued at the later Macedonian courts. And it still apparently served the purpose for which it was intended, that of a "seminarium ducum

praefectorumque". Myiscus, who commanded a division of the elephants at Raphia, is mentioned as having been promoted from the corps of *the Children*. They appear as a body, six hundred strong, in the pomp of Daphne.

We come now to consider the army of the Seleucid kingdom. As is implied in the nature of a military despotism, its part was a very important one. Its will might make and unmake kings. Its disposition is given a significant place in the factors which enable Antiochus I to surmount the difficulties which confront him on his father's murder. Military service was one of the chief ways by which men could rise to power and greatness.

The nucleus of the army was the phalanx, recruited from the "Macedonians" of Syria. It was a standing body. All the troops of this kind are spoken of together as "the phalanx". The name of "foot-companions", which had been in use in the army of Philip, the father of Alexander, was still current to describe the Syro-Macedonian pikemen.

The phalanx was armed with the huge pike or *sarissa*, twenty-one feet long, and the men of the phalanx were known indifferently as *phalangitai* or *sarissophoroi*. They also wore swords, and were protected by a helmet, greaves, and a shield. The last must have been held by an arm-ring, since both hands were required for grasping the *sarissa*. When drawn up for battle the phalanx stood in a solid mass of sixteen ranks. The first five ranks stood with their *sarissas* at "the charge", making the front a bristling hedge of steel.

At Raphia the numbers of the phalanx were 20,000; at Magnesia only 16,000. If this figure is right, the diminution may be accounted for partly by the enormous loss suffered the year before in Greece, partly by the heavier drain on the royal forces for garrison purposes since the extension of the Empire. In the pomp of Daphne the phalanx again reaches 20,000.

A lighter description of infantry than the phalanx were those who carried the round Macedonian shield, smaller than the old Greek shield, and decorated in a peculiar way with metal crescents. This light infantry, the *hypaspistai*, played a principal part in the campaigns of Alexander. Their *corps d'élite* was the celebrated Silver Shields, who ended by betraying Eumenes. The term *hypaspistai* is seldom found in our accounts of the Seleucid armies. But we hear of a corps which had shields covered with bronze or silver; and these, it may well be, are *hypaspistai* under another name.

They were the *Guards* of the Macedonian army, who specially attended upon the King's person and stood to the infantry as the Companions did to the cavalry the corps in which it was proudest to serve. At Raphia, although they were armed in the Macedonian manner, they were not apparently Macedonian in blood, but picked men drawn from all provinces of the Empire—an indication that here again the policy of Alexander to bring young Orientals under the Macedonian drill-sergeant and close to his own person was not abandoned.

A still lighter infantry were those who carried, not the Macedonian shield, but the unmetalled *pelte* (originally a Thracian weapon), which had come into common use in Greece in the fourth century. It was as *peltasts* that the Greek mercenaries in the armies of the Eastern kings served, and it was to supply this arm that the recruiting officers of Ptolemy and Seleucid were continually going up and down Greece. Aetolians, we gather, were the branch of the Greek race who figured most largely in this line, till by the Peace of Apamea Antiochus was cut off from his source of supply and forbidden to recruit any more in the Roman sphere. Certain of the races of Asia Minor also furnished peltasts — the semi-hellenized Lycians, the Pamphylians and Pisidians.

Next in order of lightness to the peltasts came the Cretans, who formed a very important element—especially for mountain warfare. Crete seethed in chronic broils of one little state against another; the Cretans were born to arms, to ambushes in steep places and stealthy clambering. When they were not fighting at home they went to fight abroad in the service of foreign kings. They were found in all the armies of the time, ranged indifferently on both sides in the great battles.

With the Cretans are classed at Magnesia the Carians and Cilicians. The Cilicians are described, both at Raphia and in the Daphne procession, as “armed in the manner of men girt for running”—that is, everything was sacrificed to rapidity of movement on broken ground. The condition of things in Cilicia was very much the same as in Crete; both peoples made the strength of the great pirate power in the last century before Christ.

Some of the tribes of the Balkan peninsula, Thracians and Illyrians, also took service in the same capacity as the Cretans. In the Daphne procession there are 3000 Thracians.

The missile-shooters, those whose weapons were of long range—archers, slingers, javelineers—here drawn from non-Hellenic races in various parts of the world. We hear of Thracian slingers (Agrianes), of Mysian bowmen, Lydian javelineers, Elymaean, Median and Persian bowmen, slingers from the hills of the Kurds (Kyrzioi, Kardakes).

But none of the peoples of Asia were more dreaded as enemies or valued as allies than the Gauls. Their large limbs, wild hair, enormous shields and swords, the chanting, howling, and dancing with which they moved to battle, the deafening rattle of their shields, all contributed to strike terror. Perhaps from the time when the house of Seleucus was excluded from Asia Minor it became harder and harder to get Gaulish mercenaries. We hear of none in the later wars whose theatre was Syria. But Antiochus IV was still able to show 5000 in the Daphne procession.

The cavalry, by the Macedonian tradition, took a higher rank than the infantry. The name of Companions, which belonged to the old Macedonian nobility who followed the King on horse, was still borne by part of the Seleucid cavalry, but the relation of the different bodies is hard to make out. The *étapi* and the Royal Squadron are expressly distinguished from the *agema*; and yet the same description is given of

both, that they were the *corps d'élite* of the cavalry. The Royal Squadron was the corps which surrounded the King in battle; it was probably the first squadron of the Companions. The *agema*, according to Livy, was composed of the chivalry of Iran. The Iranians were, no doubt, horsemen born; but still one suspects some confusion, as we are told that the Thessalians of Larissa in the Orontes valley served in the “first *agema*”.

®

Another division of the cavalry was, if not drawn from Iran, at any rate formed on an Iranian model— the “mailed horse”. Both horse and man were covered with armor. There were 3000 *kataphraktoi* at Magnesia, and 1500 appear in the Daphne procession. But this arm was not so important in the Seleucid armies as in the Parthian.

The cavalry hitherto mentioned were, no doubt, armed with lances. The cavalry lance called the *xystos* is spoken of, but whether it was a sort of lance peculiar to certain corps, or whether whenever a cavalryman had a lance it was a *xystos*, I do not know. But there were other mounted troops whose weapons were of a different sort. We hear of “Tarentines”—a kind of cavalry which had come into vogue since the Macedonian conquest; their peculiarity was that each man led a spare horse and was armed with javelins. There were also the Scythian horsemen from the steppes of the Caspian, the Daae, who fought with bows and arrows, like the cavalry employed by the Parthians which gave the Romans so much trouble, when —

quick they wheeled and, flying, behind them shot

Sharp sleet of arrowy showers against the face

Of their pursuers, and overcame by flight

We hear of them in the armies of Antiochus III, but after this time the Parthian power must have prevented more Central-Asian horsemen reaching the Seleucid King. From the South Antiochus drew Arabs, who formed a camel corps at Magnesia, and were armed with bows and immense swords, six feet long.

The elephants were a feature of the Seleucid armies, of which the kings made a great deal. For from the days of Seleucus Nicator they alone, of all the Western kings, could procure fresh supplies from India. The elephant became one of the Seleucid emblems upon the coins. To make up for their deficiency, the Ptolemies and Carthaginians caught and trained African elephants, but they were held inferior to the Indian ones. The elephant was tricked out for battle with frontlets and crests; beside the Indian *mahout* who bestrode his neck, he carried upon his back a wooden tower with four fighting men. It would seem that before a battle the elephants were shown an imitation of blood made from the red juice of fruit, either to excite them or prevent their being alarmed by the real bloodshed. All the Indian elephants of the Seleucid kingdom were destroyed by Octavius in 162, but Demetrius II got possession of the African elephants of Ptolemy Philometor. These, we saw, Tryphon captured, and that is the last we hear of the elephants of the Seleucid army.

Lastly, the Seleucids as late as Magnesia used the futile device of scythed chariots, in which the Persian kings had put faith. But it may be questioned whether after the experience of that day they were used again.

These statements as to the composition of the Seleucid army belong to the time of the dynasty's greatness. As its dominion contracted it could no longer draw on such distant fields. The army probably became more exclusively Syrian, although the Taurus still furnished wild fighting men; and we have seen the Cretan mercenaries of Demetrius II take possession of the kingdom. But that the mass of the army of Antiochus Sidetes was drawn from Syria we are distinctly told; there was hardly a household unaffected by its loss.

The armies of the Greek kings of the East were distinguished both from the older Greek armies and the Roman by their external magnificence. The commanders and the Macedonian cavalry wore, like the King, the national dress—*kausia*, *chlamys* and high-boots—which was, in fact, a sort of military uniform. “Nothing anywhere but high-boots, nothing but men with the *chlamys*!” exclaim the Syracusan ladies who go to see a procession of troops in Alexandria. The *kausia* of the officers was crimson. The cloaks were in many cases gorgeously embroidered.

We remember that the foot-guards had shields covered with silver or burnished bronze. Even their high-boots, we are assured—it is hardly credible—had nails of gold. The bits of the principal cavalry corps were of gold.

A Seleucid army set out with an immense following of non-combatants—cooks and merchants. They were nearly four times as many as the combatants in the expedition of Antiochus Sidetes to Iran. But though this seems to have provoked the censure of the Greek historian whom Justin echoes, the proportion is not really very extravagant for Oriental warfare. The English at one time followed the fashion in India.

In the order of battle certain stereotyped rules can be observed. The phalanx made the center; light infantry, especially those who fought with missiles, and cavalry composed the wings. The battles opened with skirmishes between the wings; these prepared the way for the decisive shock of the heavy-armed infantry.

We have many descriptions of the extraordinary effect of these royal armies as they stood or moved forward in line of battle. In external show the Roman armies made but a poor figure before them. They were a blaze of gorgeous uniforms, of silver and gold, and moved with the precision of men who had spent their lives on the parade ground. The phalanx looked like a solid wall; the elephants like the towers of it”. “When the sun shone upon the shields of gold and brass, the mountains glistened therewith and shined like lamps of fire. . . . They marched on safely and in order. Wherefore all that heard the noise of their multitude and the marching of the company, and the rattling of the harness were moved”. “They went a little forward, and suddenly, as they surmounted some height, they came in view of the enemy descending into the plain. The golden armor flashed in the sun from the extremities of the *agema*. They moved in perfect order. There were the towers of the elephants on high, and the crimson

housings with which they were dressed for battle. When the sight of it broke upon those who went in front, they stood still". A description of the army of Perseus would fit that of Antiochus. "First marched the Thracians, the sight of whom, Aemilius says, made him blench more than any other thing—men of great stature, armed with white-shining shields and greaves, black tunics underneath, javelins resting on the right shoulder, uplifted for the throw. Next the Thracians the Greek mercenaries were stationed, with all sorts of gear, and Paeonians mingled amongst them. Third after these came the *agema*, the flower of the army, the choice of the Macedonians themselves for valor and person, ablaze in gilt armor and new crimson cloaks. And as these took their post, the battalions with bronze shields emerged from the trench and filled the plain with the flashing of steel and the shining of bronze, and the hills round with a noise and the shouting of commands. So boldly and swiftly they came on, that those who first fell dead were only two stades from the Roman entrenchment". Or take the description of the Pontic army. "The other generals overbore Archelaus; they drew up the army in line and filled the plain with horses, chariots and shields, great and small. The cries and shouting were more than the air could contain when so many nations got into their ranks together. The bravery and splendor of their sumptuous equipment was not idle or without its moral effect; the flashing of armor brilliantly chased with silver and gold, the wonderful colors of Median and Scythian vesture, mingled with the gleam of bronze and steel—as it all shifted and moved hither and thither, the effect was really dazzling and overpowering. The Romans shrunk behind their palisade, and nothing that Sulla said could bring back their heart".

I do not propose to discuss the strategy or tactics of the Seleucid battles. That would belong more properly to a study of the warfare of that age, and it is hoped that we shall soon have from Professor Oman something to throw a new light upon this domain. I should merely like to point out the persistence with which the tradition was adhered to—the brave folly—that the Kings themselves should fight in the thick of the battle. It was, of course, fatal to any proper direction of the battle, for the King had no idea what was going on in the rest of the field. In both the Seleucid battles described to us with any detail this was the main cause of defeat Antiochus had ridden away in pursuit with the cavalry of the right wing when the critical moment came. And yet how characteristic it was of Seleucid rule as a whole!

We have tried to get some idea in outline of the constitution and fashion of the Seleucid realm. To do so is interesting, not so much as calling up the picture of things long passed away, but as studying a phase in the tradition which has come down even to us. For when Rome became an Empire with a monarchic court and system, it followed to a large extent, both in its inner principles and its external forms, the Greek kingdoms which it superseded. A real continuity of tradition bound the court and government of the Caesars to the court and government of Seleucid and Ptolemy, and the tradition sanctioned by the authority and majesty of the Roman name continued as a sort of ideal in the Middle Ages, shaping institutions which in their turn have gone to making the modern world. If by our custom classical literature is the main part of a liberal education, not so much for its inherent excellence as because it is the origin of our own culture, we may with equal reason trace the far-off ancestry of our systems of

government in those kingdoms where the Greek first took in hand to rule in the seats of ancient monarchy.

THE END

READING HALL "THIRD MILLENNIUM LIBRARY"

